

ADWAITA PHILOSOPHY

AN INTRODUCTION TO

ADWAITA PHILOSOPHY

[A Critical and Systematic Exposition of
Sankara School of Vedanta]

BY

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AND

Savā-Pandit of the 'Cooch-Behar Durbar'



(A Revised and Enlarged Second Edition)

PUBLISHED BY THE

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

1926

PRINTED BY BHUPENDRALAL BANERJEE
AT THE CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY PRESS, SENATE HOUSE, CALCUTTA

Reg. No. 138B, April, 1926—E.

अद्वैतवाद-मुकुरः किल शङ्करस्य
गाढ़ं कदर्थ-रजसा तमसानुलिप्तः ।
तस्यैव भाष्यमवलम्ब्य मया कृतोऽस्मिन्
कामं मलापनयनेऽस्य महान् प्रयत्नः ॥

परिचिन्तितमत्र 'तत् पदं'
ग्रथिता ब्रह्मकथा पुरातनी ।
इदमद्य करे समर्पितं
भवतां सादर मात्मतृप्तये ॥

PREFACE

The Adwaita philosophy of India was a most magnificent achievement of Indian thought and it towers like a pyramid above all other philosophical schools which pale almost into insignificance before the dazzling brilliancy it sheds both on the practical and the metaphysical needs of humanity. The leader of this school was the great Sankarâchâryya who accepted it as he found it floating among other schools of thought in the intellectual atmosphere of India. It was in no sense a school founded by him. His credit lies in his successful attempt at systematization, development, elaboration and methodically philosophical treatment under which the doctrine appeared in what may be characterised as an altogether new garb in which he clothed it with a master's hand. A large part of its principles existed embedded in the hymns of the Rig-veda * and in the elaborate exigetical rules and injunctions connected therewith. Later on, the diverse theories of Buddhistic philosophy so obscured its principles that its presence seemed at times hardly suspected, and its traces were almost lost sight of. It was mainly Sankarácháryya who first discovered and then brought it out from its unmerited obscurity into the clear light of day, adding to it the lustre which has since gathered round it.

Of late, many volumes have been written and the system criticised by a large number of brilliant scholars,

* We have shown this in our Third volume of the "Upanishader Upadesh."

nearly all of which have tended to fall into a groove—an undesirable state of things which cannot but demand serious and careful consideration on the part of those who are desirous of seeing the Adwaita philosophy preserve its original features untouched by such elements as are likely to prove inconsistent with its special lines of thought and reasoning. It is now clear to the scholars who take real interest in this system that the Adwaita philosophy has of late been presented before the learned world in forms which are different from the ideas of its original interpreters.

The main object of this book is to consider all the new forms in which this system has been sought to be presented and it has been the author's attempt to form an estimate of these with a view to finding out if they really come into a line with the original form in which Sankar-ácháryya himself presented it. The time seems almost ripe when a clear note of warning should be sounded for all those who wish really to study the Adwaita system. They will have to utterly forget all preconceptions and pre-imbibed ideas and to approach this system of philosophy with an open and unbiassed mind which enables them to make for themselves a correct estimate of the positions adopted therein.

The author further attempts to bring forward, in brief but clear outlines, all the main issues which are generally discussed in the Adwaita system, and which have been unfavourably criticised in other quarters. For the student of philosophy, all the points raised here are absolutely necessary for a clear grasp and right comprehension of the Adwaita doctrine in its principal aspects. Information requisite for a deeper study of the original works on the subject has been brought together in this book. In dealing with the different topics, an endeavour has been made to discover the real teaching of Sankara. The author has not been unmindful of the imperious necessity which every teacher feels to guide, with a due measure of caution, the foot of the beginner through the naturally difficult track,

rendered, in the case of this system, more intricate by the unfavourable criticisms directed against its main theories.

In this book an endeavour has been made at the very outset to furnish the student and the general reader with the right views about the teachings of Sankara on each of the topics treated herein, and to equip them with the help needed to reach a proper solution of the difficulties they are likely to experience when diving deeper into the subject. No pains have been spared to make the work a suitable introduction to the proper study of the originals, and the subject-matter has been arranged in such a way as to make the book an indispensable companion for any full understanding of Sankara's position. It presents also to beginners an opportunity of making themselves familiar with antagonistic views on various points, and supplies them with reasons to combat those views, from Sankara's works. The whole of the book is expository and contains the essentials of Sankara's teaching in as simple a form as the subject-matter allows, no principles being left out which a student ought to keep in view in the systematic study of Sankara's original works.

The author's experience as a lecturer in the Indian branch of philosophy has convinced him of the necessity of help in the shape of a book like this for the student who may have drifted from the old moorings. It has been his special study to present the expositions as faithfully as possible in the lines adopted and pursued by Sankara himself, and with a view to establishing the various positions, the author has quoted innumerable extracts in the footnotes from Sankara's writings, in support of those opinions. In this respect all the commentaries of Sankara have been treated as of equal importance. For this purpose, the ten *Upanishads* he has commented upon have been laid under contribution as also his commentaries on the *Brahma-Sutra* and the *Gita*.

Considering the intrinsic difficulty in getting at the right sense of Sankara's position from his voluminous

writings on the subject,—writings whose style, though admirably lucid and impressively attractive, is not always easy of comprehension on account of long polemics against his opponents, and considering also the difficulty in putting the most abstruse of the reasonings of Sankara in a foreign tongue, the readers, the author trusts, will look upon this work with a kind indulgence.

Suggestions for the improvement of the book from sympathetic critics and scholars will be most gratefully accepted.

Lastly, the author takes this opportunity to express a very deep debt of gratitude he owes to the Hon'ble Justice Sir Asutosh Mookerjee who almost from the beginning of the author's college career has always fostered his literary aspirations and has very liberally helped him. It is needless to say that but for such generous help from him, the desire that impelled the author to undertake this work would have been baffled.

May, 1924.
CALCUTTA } KOKILESWAR BHATTA'CHA'RYYA

PREFATORY NOTE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

In the preparation of the second edition which was called for within a few months of the appearance of the work last year, the book has been minutely and carefully revised. A few mistakes have been detected and corrected. An effort has been made to re-think the entire subject and to throw some more light upon it. Those texts which demanded a larger measure of attention and those also to which ample justice could not be done when the book first saw the light, have in this edition received more adequate treatment and for this purpose considerable new matter has been added to the first three chapters in appropriate places of discussions and the authorities more extensively quoted at the footnotes in support of each position. To make the citations of the authoritative passages as full as possible, all the commentaries of Sankara have been carefully read and re-read and the author hopes that his primary object to place in the hands of the philosophical student a complete and right exposition of the system of Sankara within the scope of a single volume has now been adequately realised. No pains have been spared to give a connected and complete view of the system of Sankara-Vedanta as that view appears from the writings of Sankara himself and to present his philosophy as he himself thought it. The material has been all drawn straight from the fountain-head, and the author ventures to hope that this fact has given to his work an abiding value and its usefulness has thus been greatly enhanced.

To get a fairly adequate and a correct idea of the essentials of the whole Vedanta doctrine which is admittedly a complicated one, it is necessary to master at least the ten

or twelve big commentaries of Sankara which cannot but prove a formidable task to a student. And even then, without such aid as this book is intended to supply, to connect together the widely scattered utterances of Sankara and to arrange them under different topics the student will find his task a very hard one, if not impossible. And even if he is prepared to labour at the actual texts of Sankara, he will find many of his difficulties cleared up and his path smoothed, *hitherto* considered thorny, if he reads this book side by side with Sankara's own deductions and conclusions. It has therefore been the special aim of the author to state Sankara's essential thoughts as easily and methodically as possible.

The author avails himself of this opportunity to acknowledge a deep debt of gratitude which he owes to those *savants* of the East and particularly of the West who have given a warm reception to the book and furnished him with their valuable appreciation. The author also desires to return a grateful acknowledgment to the Board of Higher Studies in Philosophy composed of a body of those veteran scholars of philosophy presided over by that reputed Professor of Philosophy—Prof. S. Radhakrishnan, for selecting this work as a text book in philosophy for the M.A. students of the Calcutta University. It is gratifying to note that this recognition from such quarters amply shows that the interpretations which the book contains, though they may appear new, have the approval of the learned world. The author fervently hopes that the reading public will accord to this edition the same measure of sympathy which its predecessor gained.

Any suggestions for the improvement of the book in making it a more efficient help to the study of this difficult subject will be gratefully accepted.

SENATE HOUSE,
Calcutta University
May, 1926.

KOKILESWAR BHATTA'CHA'RYYA.

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AUTHORITIES QUOTED :

ABBREVIATIONS

बृ० भा० — Brihadáranyaka-Bhásya
छा० भा०—Chándogya-Bhásya
वे० भा०—Vedánta-Bhásya or Brahma-Sutra-Bhásya
गी० भा०—Gitá-Bhásya
प्र० भा — Prasna-Bhásya
तै० भा०—Taittiriya-Bhásya
ऐ० आ० भा०—Aitareya-Araṇyaka-Bhásya
मा० भा०—Mandukya-Bhásya
मा० का० भा०—Mandukya-Karika-Bhásya
केन० भा०—Kena-Bhásya
के० भा०—Kena-Bhásya
क० भा०—Katha-Bhásya
बृ० — Brihadaraṇyaka-Bhásya
तैत्ति० भा०—Taittiriya-Bhásya
ऐ० भा०—Aitareya-Bhásya
ईश० भा०—Isa-Bhásya
मा० आ०—Mandukya-Bhásya (A'nandagiri)
वे०—Vedanta-Bhásya
मा० कारि०—Mandukya-Karika-Bhásya
मु० भा० —Mundaka-Bhásya
कठ० भा०—Katha-Bhásya
श्वे० भा०—Swetāswatara-Bhásya
उप० सा०—The Upadesa-Sahasri (Sankara's work)
शतश्लोकी—Sankara's work
वाक्यवृत्ति— „ „
स्वात्मनिरूपण— „ „
पञ्चदशी—Vidyáraṇya's work
अनुभूतिप्रकाश— „ „

AN INTRODUCTION TO
ADWAITA PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER I

On Brahman as Creator

Brahman reveals its nature to finite individual through his organism.

1. It is laid down in the Adwaita System of philosophy that the *Prána-spandana*—the universally diffused vibratory Prána is the revelation of Brahma's 'nature' which involved the creative activity of Brahman. From this Prána-Spandana or external nature (विषय), gradually, stages after stages, step by step, the human organisms with their external and internal elements (कार्य्य-करण-संघात) have been built up, as the last stage of the process of manifestation. Had there been no such revelation of the 'nature' of Brahman, we could not know its real nature, and it would remain for ever an abstract and remote being. That Brahman is a self-conscious power (प्रज्ञानघनाख्यं रूपं) would have remained shut up from our knowledge.[1] Elsewhere, we find this

[1] "स प्राणमसृजत। तत्र च आत्मचैतन्यज्योतिः सर्व्वदा अभिव्यक्ततरं" (बृ° भा°, 4.4.2)। "नामादिप्राणान्तानि उत्तरोत्तरविशिष्टानि तत्त्वानि, अतितराञ्च तेषामुत्कृष्टतमं भूमाख्यं तत्त्वं" (छा° भा°, 7.1.1) "यदि हि नाम-रूपे न व्याक्रियेते, तदा अस्यात्मनो निरुपाधिकं रूपं न प्रतिख्यायेत। यदा तु पुनः कार्य्य-करणात्मना

fact stated still more distinctly. It is stated that in order to reveal, by degrees, what she contains in herself, nature has gradually assumed the form of human organs—external and internal ;—so that she may, through these organs, reveal the infinite treasure she contains within her to the human selves.[1] The organs are merely the different phases of herself, which nature has assumed, and in which she is present herself. This description shows that the building up of the human organisms, or in other words, the evolution of the beings with their cognitive and active organs[2] through which the rational human beings become variously conscious of the external world and can act in diverse ways within it,—is the goal—is the final fulfilment, to reach which nature strives. Thus, Brahman has manifested itself as external nature, with a view to reveal to the human beings its own immense and infinite riches through her. The organisms of the different grades of beings[3] are but the differentiations—

नाम-रूपे व्याकृते भवतः, तदा अस्य रूपं प्रतिख्यायेत" (वृ° भा°, 2.5.19)। (कार्य्य = Physiological and करण = functional side of the organisms).

There was the revelation of Brahman as the rarefied, universally diffused *Prána-spandana* or *Sutra.* It gradually became more and more integrated, and it differentiated into five classes of elements (पञ्चतन्मात्र), which became, as the result of combination in different proportions, gross (स्थूलभूत) out of which the organisms were built up in accordance with the inner 'nature' or स्वरूप of the individuals "इन्द्रियादीनां यत् स्वरूपधारणं, तत्तु 'पारार्थ्येन' निमित्तभूतेन, चैतन्यात्मकृतमेव"—गी° भा°, 13. 22).

[1] "विषय-समान-जातीयं करणं मन्यते श्रुतिः। विषयस्यैव स्वात्मग्राहकत्वेन... स्वात्मविशेषप्रकाशकत्वेन संस्थानान्तराणि करणानि" (वृ° भा°, 2.4.11)।

[2] "विज्ञान-क्रियाशक्तिद्वयसंमूर्च्छितात्मा (जीवः)"—This is the Rational and moral self (छा° भा°, 8.12.3).

[3] The Individuals are classified under *four* typical divisions—स्वेदज, अण्डज, उद्भिज्ज and जरायुज।

not separation—from the common environment universally existent. There are thus action and reaction always going on between the organisms and the particular portion of the environment—within which they are placed. As there is always a feeling-element which accompanies these reactions, the organised beings—particularly the human beings whose organs have been more highly developed—come to enjoy what is श्रीमत् (beauty), विभूतिमत् (grandeur) and ऊर्ज्जितं (sublimity)[1] in the external world; and as the human being actively arranges these feelings and rationally acts for the realisation of his own end,—this contact with the world reveals to him the important truth that he is a *rationally active* being. Thus we find that to furnish the human selves with their *objects* of knowledge and action in the shape of cognitive and active organs, *manas*, etc.—appears to be the purpose for which nature perpetually works, and this she does, because an eternal, inexhaustible Power (Brahman) is present behind her, which is realising its own Swarupa (स्वरूप) gradually in higher and higher forms, through the successive stages of nature.[2] Such creation is perpetually going on and it

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[1] *Vide* Gita, 10.41. "यद्द यद्द विभूतिमत् सत्त्वं श्रीमदूर्ज्जितमेव वा। तत्तदेवावगच्छ त्वं मम तेजोऽंशसम्भवम्" इत्यादि।

[2] "स्थावरत्वादारभ्य उत्तरोत्तरमाविस्तरत्वमात्मनः" (ऐ° आ° शङ्कर-भाष्य, 2.3)। "एकस्यापि कूटस्थस्य चित्त-तारतम्यात् ज्ञानैश्वर्य्याणामभिव्यक्तिः परेण परेण भूयसी भवति" (वे° भा°, 1.3.30) "प्राणः सर्व्वप्राणभृत्-क्रियात्मक...सूत्रसंज्ञकं जगतो विधारयितृ—अस्यापि अन्तर्यामिणं, तस्यैव सूत्रस्य नियन्तारं विद्यात्" (बृ° भा°)। "स प्राणमसृजत। तत्र च आत्मचैतन्यज्योतिः सर्व्वदा अभिव्यक्ततरम्" बृ° भा°। "सत्त्वाधिक्यात् आविस्तरत्वोपपत्तिः।...यत्र च सत्त्वमत्यन्तप्रकाशं तत्र आविस्तरं ज्योतिः।...तुल्येऽपि मुखसंस्थाने...आदर्शादौ स्वच्छे स्वच्छतरे च 'तारतम्येन' आविर्भवति" (गी° भा°, 15.12)। "उत्तरोत्तरविशिष्टतरानेव लोकान् जयति।...परंपरं वरीयो विशिष्टतरमस्य जीवनं भवति" छा° भा°, 1.9.2।

still continues.[1] The creation is described in the Vedanta, for this reason, as not an event in time done once for all;[2] but as an eternal act and its purpose has not yet ceased or been finished.[3]

Two aspects of Brahman–Nirguna and Saguna—transcendental and immanent.

2. Thus, Brahman is represented in the Vedanta in its two inseparable aspects—its निर्गुण or Transcendental aspect and its सगुण or Immanental aspect. As Brahman is revealed partially in the activities of *Prána*, it is Saguna (सगुण); and as it is present behind its activities as the infinite and inexhaustible *source* of these activities, it is Nirguna (निर्गुण)। The same fact is stated in another form. Brahman is *both* the Efficient cause (निमित्त कारण) and Material cause (उपादान कारण) of the world.[4] If one of these aspects be ignored, a serious defect will at once vitiate the theory. If you represent Brahman in its *purely* immanent character, the world would be invested with a false independence, and everything of the world would have to be accepted as it is. The world, in this case, would be an exhaustive expression of Brahman, and a self-sufficient, an independent, completed whole—all its steps being predetermined by its antecedent steps in time. The individuals also, being mere parts of this whole, would be like automatic machines, acting their parts as they are made to act. If, on the other hand, Brahman is represented in its *purely* transcendental character, it is absolutely *separated* from

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[1] "यथा कार्य्यमपि जगत् त्रिषु कालेषु सत्त्वं न व्यभिचरति, तथा कारणमपि ब्रह्म त्रिष्वपि कालेषु सत्त्वं न व्यभिचरति" (वे° भा,° 2.11.6). "सर्गाणामादिरन्तः-मध्यञ्च—अहमेव" (गीता)।

[2] "अनादित्वात् संसारस्य—इत्यादि" (वे° भा°, 2.1.35)।

[3] "तदेव बहुभवनं प्रयोजनं नाद्यापि निवृत्तं" (छा° भा°, 6.3.2)।

[4] *Vide* वे° भा°, 1.4.23-27.

the world, and has no concern with any activities going on in the world. It would thus be a distant and remote being absolutely cut off from the changes,—an abstract, incomprehensible, extra-mundane being, exalted beyond all predicates (नेति, नेति).

Even among the friendly interpreters of *Vedanta* whose writings we have come across, there are many who have, unfortunately, thought of Nirguna (निर्गुण) Brahman in this light. They speak of Vedantic Nirguna Brahman as a "void—without consciousness, without activity,—a characterless nothing." It is something "abstract and remote and having no relation whatever with the world." "The Upanishads"—one of these writers declares—"reach their goal by the method of *excluding all difference*—the goal being *pure undifferenced being*; Sankara's doctrine is in this direction."

Brahman as Efficient and Material cause.

Everywhere Sankara has repeatedly declared Brahman to be—"अभिन्न-निमित्तोपादान-कारणम्";—that is to say, Brahman is to be regarded in *both* of its aspects; *i. e.*, Brahman's transcendency and immanence are *inseparable* (अभिन्न) aspects. Brahman is revealed in the world in the diversities of náma-rupa (नाम-रूप), but yet it is present behind its manifestations in its own inexhaustible (पूर्ण) nature. In the 1.4.25-27, (वे॰ भा॰), Brahman is described as evolving from its own nature the changes or the emergent effects, itself being their prior cause, present behind each change :—

"पूर्व्वसिद्धोऽपि हि सन् आत्मा, विशेषेण विकारात्मना
परिणमयामास आत्मानम्"।

It is its own Âtmá, its own 'nature' or स्वरूप, which differentiated itself into the multiplicity of changes, but

it retains, behind them, its own unity or identity which it does not lose in them.

In the Gitá-Bhásya, the world, *i. e.*, the active common medium (प्राण-स्पन्दन) and the finite individuals—these two are called as the two *Prakritis* of God, and they are held to be eternal (नित्य). Sankara here remarks that unless the elements to be controlled by God are eternal, God the controller of these two would himself turn out to be non-eternal (अनित्य), and thus his 'God-hood' (ईश्वरत्व) would fall to the ground.[1] In the Vedanta-Bhásya, he calls ईश्वर to be eternal (नित्यसिद्ध), in several places.[2] The creative act of Brahman has also been declared as eternal (नित्य)—

"तस्य नित्य-सिद्धस्य ईश्वरस्य सृष्टि-स्थिति-संहृति-विषयं नित्यज्ञानं भवतीति" (वे° भा°, 1.1.5)

That is to say, "the idea, of creation and maintenance of everything in existence, is eternal in Brahman." These gradually-revealed náma-rupas (नाम-रूपs) have also been declared to be the 'object' to which Brahman stands related as the 'subject.'—

"किं पुनस्तत् 'कर्म्म' यत् प्रागुत्पत्ते रीश्वरज्ञानस्य 'विषयो' भवतीति ? ...नामरूपे···व्याचिकीर्षिते इति ब्रूमः" (वे° भा°, 1.1.5).

And कर्त्ता pervades its कर्म्मs—the latter are taken up into the life of the former—not simply isolated. They are permeated by the action of कर्त्ता ।

In the face of such distinct and unmistakable expressions, how can the revealed differences (changes) be *severed*

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[1] "नित्येश्वरत्वात् ईश्वरस्य तत्-प्रकृत्योरपि युक्तं नित्यत्वेन भवितु" (गी° भा°, 13.19).

[2] *Vide* वे° भा°, 4.4.17, 18, 21, etc., etc.

altogether from the underlying Brahman, making it a "remote, difference-less being?"

3. In the commentaries of Sankara, the Náma-rupas (नाम-रूप)—the evolving and emerging changes—are always described as *accompanied* by the underlying causal Power, *i. e.*, Brahman.

Brahman—not a solitary and remote being; but ever present behind its manifestations.

"Whenever and wherever the changes emerge, they can never emerge *separated* or detached from their underlying Atmá or Brahman"—

"यदा नाम-रूपे व्याक्रियेते, तदा नाम-रूपे आत्मस्वरूपापरित्यागेनैव, ब्रह्मणाऽप्रविभक्त-देशकाले, सर्व्वास्ववस्थासु व्याक्रियेते"।
"न हि आत्मनोऽन्यत्...तत्-प्रविभक्तदेशकालं...भूतं भवत् भविष्यद्वा वस्तु विद्यते" (तै° भा°, 2.6. ।

i. e., "Nothing can be there, *separated* from the Brahman's 'nature'—either in time or in space."

"चैतन्याव्यतिरेकेणैव हि कलाः जायमानास्तिष्ठन्त्यः प्रलीयमानाश्च सर्व्वदा लक्ष्यन्ते" (प्र° भा°, 6.2)।

"When the कलाs, *i. e.*, the emerging differences or changes are created, are maintained in existence, and then will merge in their final end—they do so *not separated* from the underlying *chaitanya*, *i.e.*, the 'nature'—स्वरूप of the self"—

Again—

"All the emergent effects or changes are never *severed from* their underlying cause on which they stand. When they emerge and are sustained in existence after their emergence,—they are always grounded in the underlying *sat* (सत्) or the Causal Power'—

"प्रजाः न केवलं सन्मूलाः एव, इदानीमपि स्थितिकाले सदायतनाः सदाश्रया एव" (छा° भा°, 6.8.4)।

"Can घट, *viz.*, a transformed state of मृत्तिका stand even for a moment, if severed or disconnected from clay, from the underlying मृत्तिका?—

"यस्य च यस्मादात्मलाभो भवति, स तेन अप्रविभक्तो दृष्टः, यथा घटादीनां मृदा" (बृ° भा°, 1.6.1) "what is produced by something remains inseparably connected with it; it cannot be separated out of it."

If such be the case; if under all circumstances, the emergent changes, the náma-rupas, are found to be accompanied by their underlying causal reality, and if this causal reality maintains its unity in the successive changes,—it follows that the underlying Brahman, which is the source of all these varieties of the evolving changes, can neverbe looked upon as *purely* transcendent and as unrelated to, and cut off from, these changes.

In the Vedanta, Brahman, as well as the finite individuals are held to have a 'nature'—a स्वरूप, of their own. This 'nature' or स्वरूप of Brahman or of the individual beings, is never, in the Bhásyas, regarded as a *solitary* nature standing *alone* on its own account, remote from, and unrelated to, the emerging states and activities produced from that nature. It is always looked upon as *adhisthāna* (अधिष्ठान)[1] because it has a 'nature,' a 'character' of its own which *sustains* all.

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[1] "चैतन्यस्य एकत्वेन, नित्यत्वात् जगद्भिन्नत्वेन, तस्य 'अधिष्ठान'त्वोपपत्तेः" (आनन्दगिरि)। "न च असतोऽधिष्ठानत्वं आरोपितानुवेधाभावात्" (मा° भाष्ये, आ° गिरि, ३।३२)। "यस्य यत्-सम्बन्धितया वर्त्तमानं तत्—'सत्'—9.19 गी°" "सर्व्वानुस्यूतस्यापि असङ्गस्वभावतया निर्व्विशेषत्वं" (उप° सा°, 8.3)। "सद्बुद्ध्यनुवृत्तेः सतोऽनिवृत्तिरिति"—इत्यादि (छा° भा°, 6.2.1)। अधिष्ठान= sustaining ground.

4. It is indeed true that sometimes, the prior condition—प्रागवस्था—of the world, where there were supposed to be no changes as yet created or emerged, has been described; and Brahman has also been described as standing alone, without a second, during that condition. And this apparently solitary being, *viz.*, Brahman has sometimes been likened, in the Bhásyas, to the individual self during its dream-less sleep (सुषुप्तावस्था) when all its states and activities disappear in the self, and the self thus stands *alone*, as it were, at that time. Now, it may be asked, what explanation can be suggested to clear off this situation. Apparently this is a condition described in the Sankara-Bhásya, where the *pure* transcendence of the self or of Brahman—cut off from all relations with the world—seems to be made quite evident.

Apparent cases of solitary character of Brahman and finite self—explained.

OUR ANSWER TO THIS ENQUIRY IS TWO-FOLD:—

(*i*) Firstly: When the dream-less state of the finite self is described, it will be seen that the self is not actually *solitary* or *alone* even during this condition. Sankara tells us that the self is not an 'empty subject' even then. The subject has for its 'object,' during that condition, the presence and operation of the Pràna (प्राणशक्ति)। When the action of the external environment upon our sense-organs ceases to operate, during the time when we fall asleep, there are no functions of the organs excited. In the absence of these, our mind (*manas*) also ceases to act. Necessarily, all the external and internal functions, says Sankara, merge in the *Pràna*—the source of all kinds of activities of the human

Prána-sakti—never absent from the finite self and—

organism.[1] All activities lie latent in the Prána now. This latent प्राणशक्ति, though its functions as differentiated in time and space-orders have ceased, is actually present within the organism, as is evidenced by the heat of the body and the other actions during our dream-less sleep. The self is not solitary and alone even now. It controls the Prána-sakti ("प्राणाध्यक्ष"). When we again wake up, all the latent activities of this Prána will again go on, as before, as soon as they are elicited from the Prána by the actions of the external environment upon our sense-organs. This emergence again of these activities proves the presence of the Prána within our organism during our sleep.[2]

Similar is the condition of Brahman when the varieties of the changes of Náma-rupa (नाम-रूप) are merged in the universally existent *prána-spandana* or *sutra* (vibratory tremor of the diffuse Prána); and this Prána is the source of all subsequently developed activities emerging after the creation. It appears therefore that this Prána-sakti or the नाम-रूप-शक्ति was *existent in* Brahman during the प्रागवस्था, *i.e.*, at the time of first manifestation (after the last *pralaya*). Thus we find that Brahman was not *alone* or solitary even then. Sankara took sufficient care to observe—

never absent from Brahman also.

" आत्मस्थे अनभिव्यक्ते नाम-रूपे " ।—

i.e., the नाम-रूप—the root-cause of all differentiations *existed in* Brahman; and it was an 'object' in relation to

[1] " देहे चेष्टात्मक-जीवनहेतुत्वं प्राणस्येति 'आयुष्ट-निर्द्दिष्टः' " (वे° भा°, रत्नप्रभा)।

[2] " मनन-दर्शनात्मकानां चलनात्मकानाञ्च 'क्रियासामान्यमात्रे' प्राणेऽन्तर्भावः " (बृ° भा°)। "दर्शन-श्रवणे एव हि मनः-स्पन्दिते, तदभावे हृद्येव अविशेषेण प्राणात्मना अवस्थानं...वीजात्मकत्व मपरित्यज्यैव प्राणशब्दत्वं सतः" (मा°का°भाष्य १)।

which Brahman was described as its 'subject.' Brahman was, therefore, not *alone* and solitary and *object-less*, even then. To show the presence of this Práṇa-sakti in Brahman, the Katha-bhásya thus expresses the idea :—

> "As in an almost imperceptible tiny seed of a Fig-tree, its final end, *viz.*, the immense and gigantic tree itself is existent as a *future*-power (वीजशक्ति); so in the 'nature' of Brahman is interwoven the subsequently developed world with all its varieties, as a latent *future* power.[1] Otherwise, the changes or differences are to be imagined to have been produced out of nothing (असत्)."

"अव्यक्तं सर्व्वस्य जगतो वीजभूतं अव्याकृत-नाम-रूपसतत्त्वं सर्व्वकार्य्य-करण-शक्ति-समाहार-रूपं......परमात्मनि ओतप्रोत-भावेन समाश्रितं, वटकणिकायामिव वटवीज-शक्तिः" (कठ° भा°, 3. 11)।

In the Chándogya-Bhásya also, the presence of this náma-rupa (नाम-रूप) *in* Brahman and its control by Brahman are beautifully expressed thus—

> "Brahman is *distinguished* from the náma-rupa contained within it, and *untouched* by it, but yet it *controls* its activities"—

"ते नाम-रूपे...यस्य ब्रह्मणो मध्ये वर्त्तेते......यत्...नामरूपाभ्यामस्पृष्टं ...नाम-रूप-विलक्षणं...तथापि तयोर्निर्व्योढृ एवं लक्षणं ब्रह्म"

(छा° भा°, 8.14.1)।

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[1] "इदमेव जगत् प्रागवस्थायां...वीजशक्त्यवस्थं अव्यक्तशब्दयोग्यं" (वे° भा°, 1.4.2)। "प्रलये सर्व्वकार्य्यकरणशक्तीनां मवस्थानमभ्युपगन्तव्यं, शक्तिलक्षणस्य नित्यत्वनिर्व्वाहाय" (कठ° भा°, आ° गिरि)। 'प्राण-चेष्टा'—is a distinguishing property of a चेतन (वे० भा०, 3.3.53)।

Exactly similar observations occur in the Vedanta-Bhásya also.[1] We find then that Brahman has nowhere been really described as a *solitary* being without anything for it to control, *i.e.*, as 'object-less' or difference-less 'subject.'

(*ii*) We shall now come to our second answer—

The individual self, according to Sankara, has a distinct 'nature' or स्वरूप of its own, and this स्वरूप cannot be resolved into its states and activities evoked from it through its interaction with the external environment. This nature or स्वरूप maintains its unity or identity in all its evolved changes or states. Brahman too, in this system of philosophy, has a distinct 'nature' or स्वभाव of its own, and this स्वभाव maintains its unity, as distinguished from the infinite varieties of the changes of náma-rupa (नाम-रूप)—ever evolving from this स्वभाव.[2] The importance of this truth cannot be too highly emphasised. Most people are liable to resolve this unity into the visible multiplicity of the changing states, and to take the aggregate of the states to be the only self. It is therefore necessary to impress the mind of the seekers of truth with this great principle, so that the people may not forget this स्वरूप of their own, as well as of Brahman itself,—as underlying all the diversities of the changes.

During our dreaming and waking states, our real 'nature' or स्वरूप becomes utterly obscured by our

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[1] "ईश्वरस्य आत्मभूते इव…नामरूपे… मायाशक्तिः प्रकृतिरिति च अभिलप्येते। ताभ्या 'मन्यः' सर्व्वज्ञः ईश्वरः" (वे° भा°, 2.1.14).

[2] "नहि उपाधियोगादपि अन्यादृशस्य वस्तुनोऽन्यादृशः 'स्वभावः' सम्भवति" (वे° भा°, 3.2.11)। "तदव्यक्तमनिन्द्रियग्राह्यं—सर्व्वदृश्य-साक्षित्वात्" (3.2.23)। "उपाधिभूतेषु सविशेषा इव अवभासन्ते, न च 'स्वाभाविकीं' अविशेषात्मतां जहति (3.2.25)।

waking and dreaming *experiences*, as the case may be. The sum-total of these experiences appears to us to be the only self. It is most difficult to distinguish the presence and operation of our true self which underlies these experiences, unaffected by them.[1] It is needful therefore to choose a condition where, if possible, these varieties of experiences, do not appear to disturb the 'nature' of the self. Our dreamless sleep is the right condition, when all the outward and inward distractions seem to cease. There the true underlying self, unaffected by the experiences, comes distinctly into the view. For this very reason, the dream-less condition (सुषुप्तावस्था) has been taken to be the स्वरूपावस्था, *i.e.*, the true condition where the real 'nature' (स्वरूप) of the self is to be discovered. It is not really meant to show that the self is actually solitary or object-less.[2]

In a similar way, the pre-existing state—(प्रागवस्था)—of the world has been chosen to exhibit the true unaffected 'nature' or स्वरूप of Brahman which underlies the world, *i.e.*, its emerging changes or विकारs, and which is thus distinguished from them. The chance becomes infinitely harder

[1] "उपाधिकृतस्वरूपतिरोभावात्...स्वरूपस्य च अनपायित्वात्" (वे° भा°, 3.2.35)।

[2] "जाग्रद्विषये...बाह्याभ्यन्तरकार्य्य-करण-व्यवहार-सन्निपातव्याकुलत्वात्, न शक्यते तज्ज्योतिरात्माख्यं मुञ्जेषीकावत् निष्कृष्य दर्शयितुं" (बृ° भा°, 4.3.7)। "जाग्रत्-स्वप्नौ...तयोर्वीजं कारणं...सुषुप्तिरूपकं तमोवीजं" (उप° सा°)। "स्वप्न-जागरितयोस्तु उपाधिसम्पर्कवशात् पररूपापत्तिमिवापेक्ष्य...सुषुप्ते: 'स्वरूपा'पत्तिर्वक्ष्यते ...स्वरूपस्य अनपायित्वात्" (वे° भा°, 3.2.7)। "एकस्य अनेकस्वभावत्वानुपपत्तेः" (3.2.21)।

to detect the presence of this 'nature' unaffected by the changes, when the diversities of náma-rupa (नामरूप) perpetually work, as at present. The सुषुप्तावस्था of the individual self and the प्रागवस्था of the world both help us in easily detecting the presence of the 'nature' or स्वरूप of both the individual self and Brahman respectively, and in becoming convinced of a unity amidst diversity.

Prior state of world and *susupta* state of finite self—meant to show the 'nature' of Brahman and self respectively.

It has been thought advisable, on account of this very difficulty, to select or rather to imagine a condition of the world when the changes as yet did not appear to emerge, but just on the point of emerging into the view. This condition is named as Prâgabasthá (प्रागवस्था) of the world. It would be far easier to grasp the undisturbed true nature (स्वरूप) of Brahman in the absence of any emerging changes or विकारs. During the प्रागवस्था, there is no possibility to resolve the nature of Brahman into, and to identify it with, the empirical changes—taking the aggregate of these changes to be the only reality. It is for this that we find the प्रागवस्था (Prágabasthá) of the world described in the commentaries of Sankara. Its real purpose is not to show that there can ever be a state when Brahman can exist *without* any differences, as a *solitary* being self-sufficient without the created world—an object-less subject. *To imply this fact, the náma-rupa (नाम-रूप) has been expressly* stated, in the beginning of the Vedanta-bhásya, as the 'विषय' or the 'object' of Brahman—the 'subject.'[1] It

[1] "किं पुनस्तत्कर्म्म, यत्प्रागुत्पत्तेः ईश्वरज्ञानस्य 'विषयो' भवति ?...नामरूपे व्याचिकीर्षिते इति ब्रूमः" (वे° भा°, 1.1.5)। "तत् दर्शनस्य विषयो भवति—कर्म्मतामापद्यते इति। तत् कथं कर्म्मभूतं सत्, कर्त्तृ स्वरूपदृशिविशेषणं स्यात् ?... कर्म्म हि कर्त्तृक्रियया व्याप्यमानं भवति ; अन्यच्च व्याप्यं, अन्यत् व्यापकं ; न तेनैव तद्व्याप्यते" (बृ° भा°, 4.4.6)।

is therefore an erroneous attempt to interpret Brahman as 'object-less,' as Dr. Paul Deussen has done in his *Philosophy of the Upanishads.* This Prior state or प्रागवस्था has been chosen to show that Brahman has a 'nature' of its own and this nature must be existent *prior* to its manifestations and that Brahman is not an 'abstraction.'

Illustration of the above fact from Sankara-bhásya

That Brahman in its own character is invariably to be found *present* behind all the changes of the world and that the latter can never exist without the underlying Brahman—is everywhere repeatedly shown in the commentaries of Sankara. How carefully and beautifully the above fact is stated will appear from the following passages which we have selected with a view to support what has been stated in the preceding page.

In the Mándukya-bhásya, in describing the nature of the Transcendental (तुरीय) Brahman, Sankara states—

(*i*) If, it may be asked, Brahman is to be taken as something which lies *beyond* what has been manifested in the world; if it be *apart* from all changes, all states, all actions which are visible in the empirical world;—then it necessarily follows that no speech, no language, no word can describe its nature; in as much as the speech, the word and the language are included in the manifested things of the world. Then go a step further. That which cannot be expressed by a word; to which no thoughts—no words can be applied;—we may very well take that to be a non-entity, a mere void (शून्य). Raising this objection, Sankara thus meets it:—'No, Brahman is not a void, never a non-entity. Brahman always *underlies* the changes and sustains them. All manifestations come out from that underlying sustaining ground. The ground which gives support to these changes and constantly sustains them cannot prove to be a mere void or nonentity.

It must have a positive nature of its own. Even when a snake, a silver, a mirage appears to arise,—all these appearances are invariably found to be supported, in each case, by a sustaining ground upon which they appear, *viz.*, a rope, an oyster, and the surface of a desert; unsupported by which, these appearances cannot for a moment stand. Hence the Brahman's 'nature' is the sustaining ground of all changes, all manifestations,—in the absence of which the latter cannot stand, cannot live. If the sustaining ground is held to be a non-entity,—nothing; then, can mere 'nothing' give birth to the positive things of the world? [1]

(*ii*) Our life begins with our *experiences*. These experiences are of two kinds. Those which we experience in our waking state and those which are experienced in our dream. All our experiences are various, successive, and they change their aspects always. But underlying these changing experiences and unaffected by them, there is our true self which experiences them as they arise. This self is the sustaining ground of all our experiences, in the absence of which the latter cannot stand and operate. The experiences are, as noted above, successive, multiple in their nature and transitory. But the underlying self which lives in them and sustains them is a unity and it maintains its identity unaffected by these changing experiences. Our self is in touch with the transcendental (तुरीय) Brahman, which is our real self.

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[1] "सर्व्वशब्दप्रवृत्ति-निमित्तशून्यत्वात्, तस्य शब्दानभिधेयत्वमिति, विशेषप्रतिषेधेनैव 'तुरीयं' निर्दिदिक्षति।......शून्यमेव तर्हि? तन्न। मिथ्याविकल्पस्य निर्निमित्तानुपपत्तेः। न हि रजत-सर्प-पुरुष-मृगतृष्णिकादि विकल्पाः शुक्तिका-रज्जु-स्थाणूषरादि-व्यतिरेकेण अवस्त्वास्पदाः शक्याः कल्पयितुं। एवं तर्हि प्राणादिसर्व्वविकल्पास्पदत्वं तुरीयस्य" (मा° भा°, 1. 7).

There is no other way left to us to comprehend the nature of the self, except as the sustaining ground of our experiences, through which that nature realises or expresses itself. It cannot be a non-entity.[1]

No further quotation is necessary. These will suffice to prove the position of Sankara. From what has been stated above, it is evident that Brahman is regarded in the Vedanta, as perpetually present and operative, as an inexhaustible source, *behind* the changes or transformations evolving from it. It is thus intimately related to the nāma-rūpas, the विकारs or changes, as their ever-present ground and controller. It is therefore impossible to regard Brahman as *remote* and *solitary* and as an 'abstract void.' And as the creation is perpetually going on—

"नाद्यापि वहुभवनं प्रयोजनं निवृत्तम्" (का° भा°)—

and newer and newer differences are emerging continuously,

"उत्तरोत्तर-सर्व्वकार्य्येषु" (गी°)—

how can these be *separated* from Brahman, making Brahman a difference-less abstract?

5. The conclusions we have drawn above will appear more clearly if we show how in the Sankara-Vedanta the production of this world, of nāma-rūpas, from the Nirgun Brahman, and the relation subsisting between them have been described. The observations made by Sankara in this connection are of immense value for a clear

[1] "जाग्रदादिस्थानेषु एक एवायमात्मा इत्यव्यभिचारी यः प्रत्ययः, तेन अनुसरणीयं ...तुरीयं ब्रह्म।...निर्व्विशेषे एव आत्मनि सुखित्वादि-विशेषाः कल्पिताः। आत्मा एतेषु अनुगतः, सर्व्वत्र अव्यभिचारात्" (मा° भा°, 1. 7)। "वावस्थस्यैव आत्मनः तुरीयत्वेन प्रतिपिपादयिषितत्वात्"।

comprehension of the Máyá-theory of Sankara. We have therefore thought fit to elaborate the idea of Sankara in these respects here.

Being (सत्) and Non-being (असत्)

(1) In an important passage occurring in the Bhásya on the Taittiriya Upanishad, Brahman is defined as Sámánya (सामान्य)—*i.e.*, as the universal.

सामान्यं हि ब्रह्म ।

अपोढ़सर्व्वविशेषत्वात्...सर्व्वसामान्यत्वाच्च ब्रह्मणः (तै॰:भा॰, 2.6.)

This universal, this Sámánya is the idea of Being in general, pure being—सत्। It is obtained by abstracting from all specific determinations (विशेष) whatever. We are to think its Being which it has in common with every other object of the world (सर्व्वसामान्यत्वात्)। This being has no specific determinations, for we have abstracted from all determinations (अपोढ़सर्व्वविशेषत्वात्)। As it is the absence of everything of all determinations, it is undetermined. Apart from its Being, its "isness" (सत्ता), it has no character. It is pure "is," without any further determinations. This being, this "isness," cannot be removed; for in that case, Sankara points out, it would be pure nothing, it would lose its nature altogether. [1]

But a doubt may arise that what is devoid of all determinations is merely a non-existent thing—

तस्मात् विशेषतोऽग्रहणात् नास्तीति ?—(तै॰ भा॰, 2.6.)

Sankara resolves this doubt by remarking that as Brahman is the *Cause* (कारण), it cannot be said to be non-existent. In the 'Vedanta,' Brahman, the Universal, the

[1] सर्व्वविशेषरहितोऽपि जगतो मूलमस्त्येव, कार्य्यप्रविलापनस्य अस्तित्वनिष्ठत्वात्। (—कठ॰ भा॰)। परिशिष्यमाने कस्मिंश्चिद्भावे अवकल्पते, शून्यवादप्रसङ्गात्... अन्यथा निरास्पदत्वात् नोपलभ्यते—(वे॰ भा॰, 3.2.25.)

Being— is held to be the *Cause* of the world. It has no other cause beyond it, is its own cause.[1] And as a cause, it is not determined by something else (अन्य); but it determines itself; the whole of its determinations rises out of its own resources. Hence it is not undetermined, it is self-determined. All determinations can therefore be removed, excepting "isness"; for, Brahman being the Cause of the Universe, this cause underlies hidden behind this universe.[2]

Now, as Brahman is held to be the cause of the universe, the universe is produced out of it. It is a fixed tenet of the Vedanta that prior to their production, the effects (कार्य्यs), the náma-rūpas—existed in the cause. But in what form the effects, the differences of Náma-rūpa, existed in Brahman? Did the actual diversities of Nāma-rūpa, the actual determinations (विशेषs) exist in the cause? No; there was not yet any differentiation, there was as yet no separation of náma-rūpa into space and time.[3] Within the Being (सत्), no differences have yet disclosed themselves (अनभिव्यक्ते नामरूपे)। There was nothing to distinguish the जगत् from Brahman in that stage. Differentiations were all implicit, hidden

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1 यस्माच्च जायते, किञ्चित् तदस्तीति दृष्टं लोके। आकाशादिकारणत्वात् ब्रह्मणः, न नास्ति ब्रह्म—(तै° भा°, 2.6।) न च असतो जातं किञ्चित् गृह्यते लोके कार्य्यम्।

2 ब्रह्मणः 'सत्ता'-लक्षणः स्वभावः आकाशादिषु अनुवर्त्तमानो दृष्टः—वे° भा°, असतश्चेत् नामरूपादिकार्य्यं निरात्मकत्वान्नोपलभ्येत—तै° भा°, 2.6.

3 "आत्मस्थे अनभिव्यक्ते नामरूपे व्याक्रियेते।" "अव्याकृतनामरूपे आत्मस्थे अन्तर्गतेन आत्मना व्याक्रियेते"—तै° भा°, 2.6। "सर्व्वभावानाञ्च तेनाविभक्तदेशकालत्वात् कालाकाशादिकारणत्वाच्च" (2.1.)।

The जगत् existing in Brahman prior to its manifestation is called in मा° भा° as प्राणशक्ति or बीजशक्ति। Sankara here says that the *qualitative*

in सत्; differentiations were all inseparably, indistinguishably, blended in Brahman. Sankara has very beautifully described this condition by illustrations—

> मधुनि रसवत्, घृते माधुर्य्यवत्, स मुद्रप्रविष्टनद्यादिवञ्च
> मरुस्ति मरीचिवत्—एकीभवन्ति विवेकानर्हत्वमविशेषतां
> गच्छन्ति (सुषुप्त-प्रलययोः) [1]
>
> —प्रश्न° भा°, 4.1.

But, it may be asked, if there were, in that stage, no differentiations of Náma-rūpa, if there were no specific determinations yet appearing in the सत्, if जगत् could not be separated from Brahman, if there was nothing to distinguish náma-rūpas from Brahman,—may not the universe be called non-existent in that condition ? How do you know that náma-rūpa, जगत्—existed in Brahman ? In fact, there are passages in the श्रुति itself where the universe, prior to its production, is called as असत्—non-existent.—

> असदेवेदमग्र आसीत्।
>
> असदासीत् ततः सदजायत। (तै° उप°, 2.7.)

How do you know then that जगत् existed in the Being ?

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differences exist blended in Brahman ; otherwise the differences could not issue from it afterwards. आनन्दगिरि remarks here—"सर्व्वस्य कार्य्यप्रपञ्चस्य···एकमूर्त्तित्वं न वास्तवं, पुनर्यथापूर्व्वं विभागायोग्यत्वात" (मा° भा°, आग° प्र°, 5) In वेदा° भाष्य, 2.1.9, this वीजशक्ति is called अज्ञानप्रतिवद्धा विभागशक्ति (Power of potential distinction). This is माया, the potential वीज existing hidden in Brahman. It is objective, not merely subjective.

[1] As the sweetness existing in honey cannot be separated from it ; as the flavour exists indistinguishably blended in the clarified butter (घृत) ; as the different rivers flowing into the ocean exist there with their differences merged, etc , etc. So all differences exist in Brahman inseparably and indistinguishably merged in it. There is yet no *separation* of the नामरूप from ब्रह्म। Under no circumstances, नामरूप can remain separated—divided—from the underlying cause (Brahman).

Sankara furnishes us with the requisite reply to this question. First of all he points out that it is not in the sense of *absolute non-existence* of the जगत्, that the term असत् is used in the Sruti. The statement simply means that there were no differentiations developed as yet, no specific determinations, no actual manifestations. The term असत्, therefore, does not mean absolute non-being. Non-being here only means the absence of specific determinations. It only means that the determinations were implicit, hidden, not yet manifested or developed.[1] It follows therefore that the Being and non-being, सत् and असत्, ब्रह्म and जगत्—were *identical* in that condition,[2] and therefore indistinguishably blended. On account of the identity of the Being and non-being, Brahman is called in the Vedanta-bhāsya as—असदिव, and जगत् also is called in the Chāndogya-bhásya as सत् and in the Taittiriya-bhasya as आत्मा[3]—in that stage.

[1] असदिति व्याकृतनामरूपविशेष'विपरीत'मविकृतं ब्रह्म उच्यते ; न पुनरत्यन्तमेव असत्"—तै० भा०, 2.7, "न ह्ययमत्यन्तासत्त्वाभिप्रायेण प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्य्यस्य असद्व्यपदेशः। किं तर्हि ? व्याकृतनामरूपत्वाद्धर्म्मात् अव्याकृतनामरूपत्वं धर्म्मान्तरं। ...नामरूपव्याकृतं सच्छब्दार्हं लोके प्रसिद्धं। अतः प्राक्नामरूपव्याकरणात् 'असदिव'ासीत्" (वेदा० भा०, 2.1.17)।

[2] We have found before that the Being (सत्), *i.e.*, Brahman has been obtained by abstracting all specific determinations. The non-being (असत्) here mentioned is simply the absence of all specific determinations and differentiations. The Being and non-being are therefore *identical* (एकीभूतः, विवेकानर्हत्वं गतः). Being identical, they are indistinguishable. *Cf.* आ० गि०—"आत्मशक्तित्वेन...आत्मन्यन्तर्भावात् नाद्वैतश्रुतिविरोधः। *Cf.* also वटकणिकायामिव वटबीजशक्तिः...अव्यक्तं सर्व्वस्य जगतो बीजभूतं अव्याकृतनामरूपं...परमात्मनि ओतप्रोतभावेन समाश्रितं (कठ० 3.11)। *Cf.* 'अङ्कुरजननीशक्तिः सति खलु बीजे समीक्ष्यते सकलैः (Sankara's 'स्वात्मनिरूपणम्')।

[3] "ननु न श्रुतंत्वया 'सदेव' इत्यवधारणं इदं-शब्दवाच्यस्य कार्य्यस्य—प्रागुत्पत्तेः ? (छा॰ भा॰, 6.2.2) "व्याकृते च मूर्त्तामूर्त्तशब्दवाच्ये ते। आत्मना तु—अप्रविभक्त-

Having thus pointed out the fact that असत् in the Sruti does not mean absolute non-existence of náma-rūpa, Sankara goes on to show that जगत् could not be said to be non-existent in the सत् in that condition. For, if जगत् was absolutely non-existent, if जगत् did not exist in Brahman, it could not be produced from it. Why? Because, Sankara continues, you cannot get that from a thing which it does not *contain within* it. Brahman could not produce the universe from itself, unless the universe is contained in it—

यद्धि यच्च यदात्मना न वर्त्तते, न तत्तत उत्पद्यते ।[1]
(वे° भा°, 2.1.16)

It follows therefore that the being (सत्) *contained* non-being (असत्),[2] its own differentiations hidden away, merged, suppressed, within it. As Being gave birth to nothing,[3] nothing (असत्) was therefore within the Being. Brahman which is Sāmānya contained within it the differences (विशेषs). It is wrong therefore to suppose the

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देशकाले इति कृत्वा 'आत्मा' ते (नामरूप) अभवदित्युच्यते ।—नामरूपं आत्मस्वरूपापरित्यागेनैव ब्रह्मणा अप्रविभक्त देशकाले सर्व्वावस्थासु व्याक्रियेते" ।

"प्रागुत्पत्तेः अव्याकृतनामरूपभेदं—'आत्मैकशब्द'प्रत्ययगोचरं जगत्—ऐ° भा° 1.1 ।

[1] निर्विशेषस्य तु अभावस्य कारणत्वाभ्युपगमे शशविषाणादिभ्योऽपि अङ्कुरादयो जायेरन् —वे° भा° 2.2.26 । Also *cf.* कथं क्षीरादेव दधि उत्पद्यते, न मृत्तिकायाः? मृत्तिकाया एव च घट उत्पद्यते, न क्षीरात्?—वे° भा° 22.1.30.

[2] असत् does not mean अभाव or unreality. It is simply the *opposite* of सत्; *cf.*

"तदसच्छब्दवाच्यं स्वयमेवात्मानमेवाकुरुत कृतवत्" (तै° भा°)

[3] 'Nothing'—We shall see that all determinations are, according to Sankara, Negations. 'Nothing' here means therefore determinations or विशेषs.

universal, the being, the *sat*, as totally *excluding* all determinations; for it had its own differentiations implicitly present in it. Because it contained the जगत् in it, it has become possible for the जगत् to come out from it.

Now, we shall see how the जगत्, how the diversities of Nāma-rūpa came out—

"एकं बीजं बहुधा यः करोति" (श्वे° उ°)।

The Being distinguishes itself from itself and becomes its *other*. The unity suffers self-differentiation into diversity.

As the differentiations come out, there is some *distinction*, some वैलक्षण्य which now appears.[1] For Sankara remarks—

अत्यन्तसारूप्ये प्रकृतिविकारोच्छेदप्रसङ्गः।—नहि

असति अतिशये प्रकृतिविकारभाव इति भवति (वे° भा° 2.1 6 & 2 3.9).

"प्रकृति-विकारयो र्भेदेन व्यपदेशात्"—(वे° 2.1.27).

It was simply कारण before, now the कारण comes out in the form of कार्य्य.[2] And this कार्य्याकार is the *other* of the कारण।

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[1] *Vide* Vedanta Bhasya, 2.1.6 and also 2.2.11 where some वैलक्षण्य of this जगत् from its cause कारण(ब्रह्म) has been established. In another way this वैलक्षण्य has been shown by Sankara when he describes the relation between कार्य्य and कारण in वे° भा° 2.1, where कारण is described as अनन्य from the effect.

[2] 'कार्य्याकारेण कारणं व्यवस्थापयतः कारकव्यापारस्य अर्थवत्त्वमायाति (वेदा° भा° 2.1.18). But in the case of Brahman, कारकव्यापार is not necessary. *cf.* निमित्तान्तरानपेक्षात् अक्षरात् सम्भवति (मु॰ भा॰ 1.1.7। कारकभेदाभावेऽपि प्रवृत्तिं दर्शयतः ?—ब्र॰भा॰ 2.1.20। परिपूर्णशक्तिकन्तु ब्रह्म—अनपेक्ष्य बाह्यं साधनं स्वयमेव परिणमते—वे॰ भा॰ 2.1.24.

There was सामान्य (universal) before, now विशेषावस्था (particulars) comes out.[1] And this विशेषावस्था is the *opposite* of the सामान्य।[2]

It is well-known that all determinations are regarded by Sankara as negations.[3]

The कारण therefore produces its own *negations* from it which it contained within it.

We find therefore that the Being or Brahman produces its other, its opposite, its negation from it. In this way there is, according to Sankara, some distinction, some वैलक्षण्य, some भेद, between the cause and its effect.[4]

[1] सामान्याद्धि विशेषा उत्पद्यमाना दृश्यन्ते, मृदादेः घटादयः"—वे° भा° 2.3.9. "...अपास्तविशेषं सामान्यात्मकं कारणं विशेषवदवस्थान्तरमापद्यमानं 2.1.15, and also तदेव तु द्रव्यं विशेषवदवस्थान्तरमापद्यमानं कार्य्यं नाम अभ्युपगम्यते, 2.3.8।

[2] व्याकृतनामरूप-विशेष-विपरीतं opposite) अविकृतं ब्रह्म (वे° भा° 2.7।

[3] It is remarkable that here in this point there is complete agreement between Sankara and Hegel. Determinations are विशेषणs, and विशेषण operates by negation (निवर्त्तक, व्यावर्त्तक)। We quote the whole passage from Sankara-bhasya:

यदा हि अनेकानि द्रव्याणि एकजातीयानि अनेकविशेषणयोगीनि, तदा विशेषणस्य अर्थवत्त्वं। विशेष्यं विशेषणान्तरं व्यभिचरत् विशेष्यते, यथा नीलञ्च रक्तञ्च उत्पलम्। समानजातीयेभ्य एव निवर्त्तकानि (negations) विशेषणाणि (determination) विशेष्यस्य। तद्विपरीत-धर्म्मवत्त्वो विशेष्येभ्यः ब्रह्मणो विशेष्यस्य नियन्तृत्वम्—वे° भा° 2.1।

"To determine a thing is to limit it, to cut it off from some sphere of being. To say that a thing is green limits it by cutting it from the sphere of red, blue and other coloured things. The differentia (विशेषण) is that which carves out a particular class from the general class, by negating, excluding, the other species. Whatever is said of a thing *denies* something else of a thing. All determination is therefore negation." (W. T. Stace.)

[4] Sankara shows there is some अतिशय, some आधिक्य, some *new* element appearing in the effect (कार्य्य). *cf.* 'जीवनादधिकं' आकुञ्चन-प्रसारणादिकमपि कार्य्यान्तरं निवर्त्तते (वे॰ भा॰ 2.1.20). Also 'कारणावस्था'

As the Being (सत्) splits into particulars, as the Being, of its own accord (संकल्प), by its own act, has undergone self-differentiation into diversity in which it manifests itself, it is *now* सत् and something more ; it is now सत् and diversity of náma-rūpa.[1] The universal is therefore inflated[2] with a determination, a difference, a negative element—nothing. This is the particular (विशेष or विकार). The being, the universal, the सत्—as determined by particularity and difference appears as the universe. It is evident from these that Sankara did not altogether deny distinction or भेद between the cause and its effect.[3]

But is this distinction an *absolute* distinction?

The particulars and determinations which are produced are, in reality, not utterly and absolutely different,

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'अस्पष्टं' (undeveloped) सत्...व्यक्त' (Developed) 'स्पष्ट'' गृह्यते (वे० भा० 2.1.19). In explaining "बहु स्यां प्रजायेय," Vidyaranya, thus remarks—"प्रकर्षेण जनि: स्मृता। 'प्रकर्षो' नाम पूर्व्वस्मा 'दाधिक्यं'। अधिका तु या, सा माया" (अनुभूति प्रकाश)। There is thus some new element, some आधिक्य, some lift in the कार्य्य। Hence there is वैलक्षण्य ; *i.e.*, it is distinct from the cause. It appears therefore that शङ्कर has not altogether abolished the भेद। भेद is there, but it is not ultimate and absolute.

[1] कदा 'सदेवे'दमासीदिति उच्यते ? अग्रे, जगत: प्रागुत्पत्ते:। किं न इदानी-मपीदंसदेव ? ......, इदानीमपीदं सदेव, किन्तु नामरूप-विशेषणवदिदंशब्द-बुद्धि-विषयश्चेति इदं च भवतीति। प्रागुत्पत्तेस्तु—केवलसच्छब्द-बुद्धिगम्यमेवेति"—छा० भा०, 6.2.1.

Also 'प्रागुत्पत्ते:' अव्याकृतनामरूपभेदम्...आत्मैकशब्द-प्रत्यय-गोचरं जगत् ; इदानीं व्याकृत-नामरूप-भेदत्वात् अनेक-शब्द-प्रत्ययगोचरं आत्मैकशब्द प्रत्यय गोचरञ्च इति विशेष:" ऐ० भा०, 1. 1.

[2] *Cf.* ब्रह्म—उपचीयते, उत्पादयिषदिदं जगत्, अङ्कुरमिव'बीज'—'उच्छूनतां' गच्छति।—प्र० भा०

[3] The distinction is there, but it is not absolute and ultimate. See further on.

absolutely and utterly other (अन्य), from the Being (सत्)। Sankara observes that it is our Avidyá—अविद्या—which sees absolute distinction, absolute separation and opposition between the cause and the effect, between the विषयी and विषय। Avidyá looks upon the diversities of náma-rupa, the effects, the जगत्—as absolutely different, as absolutely separate (अन्य) from Brahman.[1] Sankara has thus characterised the अविद्या—

जागरिते स्वप्ने वा 'अन्यदिव' आत्मनो, 'वस्त्वन्तर'मिव
अविद्यया प्रत्युपस्थापितं भवति।......असति
आत्मन: 'प्रविभक्ते' वस्त्वन्तरे, असति च आत्मनि
तत: 'प्रविभक्ते' अन्य: अन्यत् पश्येत्—(बृ° भा° 4 3.3.)
न चास्य 'अन्य:' ब्रह्मविद आत्मकामस्य अस्ति। [2]

Sankara has repeatedly shown that it is not possible and proper at all to *separate* náma-rūpas, the particulars,

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[1] We regard the effects (कार्य्य) different—अन्य—स्वतन्त्र—from the cause which underlies hidden behind them, and treat them as separated from, outside of, the cause—as self-subsisting and independent. This is our व्यवहारिक view of the world. But the व्यवहारिक view is अविद्यात्मक। Sankara remarks in the Vedanta that "परमार्थाभिप्रायेण सूत्रकारोऽपि 'तदनन्यत्व' मित्याह"। From the पारमार्थिक view, the effects are really अनन्य—non-different from, identical with, the cause. This अनन्य relation between कार्य्य and कारण is to be found elaborated in the सूत्रs 14 to 20 in the Vedanta Philosophy, Chapter II. 1. पारमार्थिक view is the real view. Although कार्य्य is somewhat *distinct*—विलक्षण—(वे० सू० 2.1.6) from the कारण, yet in reality it must be regarded as अनन्य—not अन्य, not *other*. Hence भेद and अभेद are not of equal value. अभेद has been particularly emphasised by Sankara, but भेद has not been abolished.

[2] By अविद्या the particular is regarded as अन्य—different from the universal. 'विशेषसंज्ञा...... 'अन्यत्व'-दर्शनलक्षणा—अविद्यानिमित्ता'—बृ० भा०, 2.4.13. And also—

"आत्मनो 'ऽन्यत्' वस्त्वन्तरं प्रत्युपस्थापयति—अविद्या बृ० भा०, 4.2 20, इत्यादि।

from Brahman, and to regard them as अन्य, as so many self-sufficient independent entities. There is distinction, but also identity.[1]

Sankara thus brings out the identity, the non-separation (अनन्यत्व) between the universal and the particular:—

It is Brahman, the Universal, the Being, which evolves all its determinations and differences of náma-rūpa out of the depth of its own being; what it has put forth from itself is only itself. For, it is the Being which distinguishes itself from itself and appears as its other. In putting forth its own particulars, it has not lost itself, nor has it become something else (अन्य). For, its other, its opposite, is only itself, as Sankara declares—

'नहि विशेषदर्शनमात्रेण 'वस्त्वन्यत्वं' भवति
...'स एवेति' प्रत्यभिज्ञानात्' ।
कार्य्याकारेऽपि कारणस्य 'आत्मभूत' एव ।
(वे० भा० 2.1.18.)

It is the self-differentiation of the कारण itself[2] into its other, its opposite—

परमेश्वर एव तेन तेन आत्मना (*i.e.*, कार्य्याकारेण) अवतिष्ठमानः···
···सृजति ।—(वे० भा०, 2.3.13).[3]

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[1] But both are not of equal importance. We must cultivate the अभेददृष्टि even in our ordinary practical concerns of life (व्यवहारिकावस्था) ।

Cf. 'एष विशेषो विदुषां, पश्यन्तोऽपि प्रपञ्च संसारं, 'पृथगा'त्मनो न पश्येत्' —Sankara's 'आत्मनिरूपणम्' । *cf.* भेदज्ञानस्य सम्यग् ज्ञानेन बाधितत्वात् (वे० भा०, 2.1.22).

[2] "आत्मनोऽव्यतिरिक्ता एव प्रभवन्ति"—मु० भा०, 1.1.6.

[3] एक एव अवस्थानान्तरयोगात् अनेकशब्दप्रत्ययभाक् भवति । (2. 2. 17, वे० भा०) ।

Hence, in passing out into its opposite, it remains *identical with itself* (स एवेति प्रत्यभिज्ञानात्) । As it has put forth its opposite from itself, the Being (सत्) remains, even in its opposite, *identical* with itself. It is the कारण itself which embodies itself in particular shapes—

"अपास्तविशेषं 'कारणमेव' तत्तद्विशेषवदवस्थापन्नं
'कार्य्य' संज्ञां लभते" ।—वे० भा०, 2.3.7.

Hence the कारण finds in its own कार्य्य—not an *alien other*, but its own very being (कारणमेव) । For, the कार्य्य is, in reality, no other but the mere form, the guise, the shape, which the कारण *itself has assumed* for its own manifestation—

कारणस्य 'संस्थानमात्र' मिदं कार्य्य' (वे° भा°, 2.2.17.)

It follows therefore that the *other* is only itself; part of कारण; the manifestation of its nature [1]; it is, in reality, only *itself*—

न कार्य्यं नाम कारणा'द्व्यतिरिक्तं' मस्ति किञ्चित् ।
—वृ° भा°, 1.6.1.

It is the universal itself which has gone forth into its particular. In passing from one to the other, nothing has been added from outside; new material has been put forth from the womb of the being itself.

Hence, the universal sunders itself into its particularity, yet remains universal. Hence, the distinction which it gives rise to is no distinction. Therefore the world is at bottom no other than Brahman.[2] Therefore the universal,

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[1] *Cf.* 'आत्मस्वरूपावगमाय च आकाशादि अन्नमयान्तं कार्य्यं प्रदर्शितं (तै° 2.6) । "दर्शयति च सृष्ट्यादिप्रपञ्चस्य ब्रह्मप्रतिपत्त्यर्थतां, वे° भा°, (1.4.14) न चात्र 'अन्यः ब्रह्मविदः आत्मकामस्य अस्ति"—ऊ° भा° ।

[2] "आत्मानं 'आत्मान्तरत्वेन' जगद्रूपेण' परिणमयामास"—ऐ° भा° । The Universe is nothing but the आत्मा in reality. This is पारमार्थिक दृष्टि । *Cf* 'निर्विशेषं इत्यविशेषं, इय् पत्नेन पश्यतां विदुषां '—Sankara's ' स्वात्मनिरूपण '

while going forth out of itself, yet *all the while abides unchanged within itself.*

'"एकं"मेव द्रव्यं तेन तेन 'विशेषणेन' "अनेक" शब्द-
प्रत्ययभाक् भवति......द्रव्यात्मकता गुणस्य ।—वे°, 2.2.17.

The true कारण is therefore *identical* in all its diverse forms, which remains hidden behind (कार्य्याकारेण तिरोहितम्) ।

Under the influence of अविद्या, we absolutely separate and thus forget or ignore this underlying being and take the mere forms as so many independent objects—as मृत्पिण्ड, कपाल, घट, etc. But the one सत्ता (being) which is identical in all its diversity of forms, as सत्, is not itself any single individual thing or phenomenon. The 'multiplicity' is not therefore something different (अन्य) or separate altogether from the 'unity.'

We find from this discussion that there is distinction as well as identity or more properly, *identity in difference,* between the कार्य्य and the कारण ।

Sankara has therefore concluded thus—

"सलक्षणं विलक्षणञ्च[1]......अक्षरात् सम्भवति...समस्तं जगत्" (मु° 1.1.6.

Elsewhere we find him remarking that every finite individual object is a compound of *two factors*—सत् and असत्;

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[1] *Vide* also माण्डूक्यभाष्य, गौड़° कारिका, 6 Sloka.

In Vedanta Bhasya where Sankara shows the relation between कार्य्यं and कारण, he shows the *distinction* between them by holding कारण to be अन्य from the कार्य्य । He has shown the *identity* between them by holding कार्य्य to be अनन्य from the कारण । The reader should bear this in mind.

In वे° भा° 2.1.13, Sankara distinctly says that although the differences are non-different (अनन्य) from their cause, still they remain—they are not abolished. "न च समुद्रादनन्यत्वेपि...फेनतरङ्गादीनां इतरेतरभावापत्तिर्भवति ।...न च तेषां...अन्यत्वं भवति ।

of which सत् is abiding and constant, while असत् is ever-changing.[1] The readers will note that असत् does not mean here 'unreality.' What is variable;—the perpetually changing and succeeding forms—are called असत्. And what is constant amidst all these changing forms or appearances is called सत्.

These discussions unmistakably show that it is not at all possible for the जगत्, for the nāma-rupas to break loose from the कारण, *i.e.*, from Brahman—

न तत एव 'निर्भिद्य' यष्टीतुं शक्यते (बृ° भा°, 2.4.7)[2]

The distinction of náma-rupa is developed *within* the unity of the cause—

विशेषाः सामान्ये अन्तर्भवन्ति ।—छा° भा°, 7.4.1.

सामान्यं विशेषान् आत्मस्वरूपप्रदानेन बिभर्त्ति ।—बृ° भा°, 2.4.7.

Hence, under no circumstances, can the नामरूप be *separated* from Brahman and regarded as अन्य। As soon as they are *separated*, they become *unreal*, false—कदलीस्तम्भवदसारं। It is in this sense alone, Sankara has called जगत् to be unreal. सदात्मना विकाराणां सत्यत्वं, सतोऽन्यत्वेन अनृतत्वं (छा° 6.6.2).

By ignoring or forgetting the Reality of the ever-constant, underlying, hidden, Brahman of which the *process of the world* is a gradual manifestation or appearance and by

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[1] "सर्व्वत्र हे बुद्धी सर्व्वैरुपलभ्येते समानाधिकरणे...सन्घटः सन्पटः सन्हस्तीति। तयोर्घटादि बुद्धिर्व्यभिचरति, न तु सद्बुद्धिः" (गीता° भा° 2.16) असत् is what changes—'यद्विषया बुद्धिर्व्यभिचरति' तत् 'असत्'। This is also called 'अनृतं'। अनृतं means—'यद्रूपेण यन्निश्चितं तद्रूपं व्यभिचरत् 'अनृत' मित्युच्यते (तै° 2.1). It does not mean unreality.

[2] "यत्र यस्मिन् अन्तर्भवति, तत्तस्य व्यापकत्वात् ततो भूयो भवति" (छा° 7.3.1.) The effects are subsumed under their cause and are pervaded by it. It runs on into each of the effects.

severing the connection of जगत् with the underlying Brahman, if you occupy yourself with merely *this continuous process*, imagining a sort of causal relation among the changing antecedents and consequents [1] and a relation of means and end [2] among them, it would be a futile and useless occupation on your part. For, you would take that to be real which is unreal, in as much as, severed from their connection with Brahman, the nāma-rupas become at once कदलीस्तम्भवदसारः—unessential.[3] We cannot resist the temptation of quoting, with the permission of our readers, the beautiful lines in which Sankara has embodied this idea—

> " ...सर्व्वोलोकः साध्य-साधन-लक्षणः क्रिया-फलात्मकः संहतानेक--प्राणि--कर्म्मवासनावष्टम्भत्वात्—क्षणिकोऽसारोऽशुद्धो नदीस्रोतः-प्रदीपसन्तानकल्पः कदलीस्तम्भवदसारः फेनमाया-मरीच्यम्भःस्वप्नादिसमः तदात्मगत-दृष्टीनामविकीर्य्यमाणो—नित्यः सारवानिव लक्ष्यते "—बृ° भा°, 1.5.2.

(2) In this connection, we now desire to place before our readers some very weighty observations made by Sankara while explaining the term अनन्त—Infinite, and showing its relation with the finite things of the world. These observations, properly understood, will

Infinite and finite.

[1] क्रिया-फलात्मकः। Elsewhere it is called ' क्रिया-कारक-फल लक्षणः '।

[2] साध्य-साधन लक्षणः।

[3] *Cf.* also " आत्मस्वरूपात् ' अन्यत् '...' वस्त्वन्तरं '...स्वप्नमायामरीच्युदकसम-मसारम् "—बृ° भा°, 3.5. Also स्वप्नमरीच्युदकमायागन्धर्वनगरसमत्वात्, दृष्टनष्टस्वरूपः "—गी°, 15.3. Severed from Brahman, this world becomes unessential (असार), since—" नहि निरात्मकं किञ्चित् व्यवहाराय अवकल्पते. "

Cf. also योहि ब्रह्मक्षत्रादिकं जगत् आत्मनोऽन्यत्र, ' स्वातन्त्र्येण ' लब्धसत्ताकं पश्यति, तं मिथ्यादर्शिनं। (वे°, 4.19).

show that to separate the Vedantic Nirgun Brahman completely from the world and to treat it as vacuum and empty is to go directly against the views of the Bhāṣya-kāra.

All finite objects, Sankara observes, are limited. We can only know the limit of a thing by knowing what lies beyond the limit. We can only be aware of the *end* (अन्त) of a thing by being aware of something which stands beyond the thing. A finite is that which has a limit. If something is limited, it follows that beyond the limit, there is another something. Therefore to be finite means to be limited by something else. Sankara says :—

"अश्वत्वान्तं गोत्वमिति अन्तवदेव
भवति । स च अन्तो (limit)
भिन्नेषु वस्तुषु दृष्टः" (तै° भा° 2.1)

But limit always involves negation (निवर्त्तकत्व). A horse is a horse and not a cow, because it possesses the determinations or qualities of a horse and not those of a cow. Its being a horse is just what limits it, *prevents* it from being a cow. It is in its *negative* aspect that quality is limit. Sankara says—

यतो यस्य बुद्धिनिवृत्तिः (negation),
स तस्य अन्तो (limit) भवति ।
यथा गोत्वबुद्धिरश्वत्वात् 'विनिवर्त्तते' ।[1]—तै° भा°, 2.1.

In this way, one determinate thing *negates* its opposite, negates another determinate thing. This is what keeps one thing *separate* (भिन्नेषु वस्तुषु) from another thing. Each one *excludes* or *negates* the other ones from it. They are thus *different* from one another. चूर्णं is चूर्णं for it negates (निवर्त्तयति) its opposite पिण्ड; पिण्ड is पिण्ड for it negates its other घट. Thus one finite object negates

[1] "वस्त्वन्तरबुद्धिर्हि प्रसक्ताद्वस्त्वन्तरात् 'निवर्त्तयति' (negates)—तै° भा°, 2.1.

another finite object.[1] This is Sankara's description of the relation between finite objects.

Now can any of the finite objects exclude or negate the Infinite? No; it cannot. Why? Because, according to Vedanta, the Infinite is the *Cause* of all finite objects. Hence, none of the finite objects can *negate* their *cause*. Sankara has declared—

"नहि कार्य्यं नाम वस्तुतोऽस्ति,

यत: कारणबुद्धि 'विनिवर्त्तेत" ।—तै° भा°, 2.1.

For, कार्य्य (the effect) is not something really *different* from the कारण (the cause). Had it been different from the cause, the cause could not have produced it from itself. For, Sankara remarks—

यच्च यदात्मना यत्र न वर्त्तते, न ततत उत्पद्यते ।—वे° भा°.

What is not contained in a thing cannot be produced from it. The cause, the Infinite, contained its effect, the finite, *within* it which it has expelled from it. It is the Infinite, the cause, which has differentiated itself as the effect, the finite. For, what is an effect (कार्य्य) ? It is the cause (कारण) itself which has taken the shape of an effect—a कार्य्याकार ।—

कार्य्याकारोपि कारणस्य आत्मभूत एव ।—वे° भा°, 2.1.8.

Really, the effect, the finite, is no other than the cause, the infinite itself. For, the कारण in becoming its *other*, has not, in reality, become something different from it. For, Sankara says—

न विशेषदर्शनमात्रेण वस्त्वन्यत्वं भवति...

स एवेति प्रत्यभिज्ञानात् ।—वे° भा°, 2.1.18.

Hence, as the finite is not something different from, other than, the Infinite, how can it negate the idea of its

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[1] "वस्त्वन्तरबुद्धिर्हि प्रसक्तादवस्त्वन्तरात् 'निवर्त्तयति' (negates)—तै° भा° 2.1.

cause? Even when Infinite passes over to its opposite—finite, it still remains the *same*. The effect, the विशेष, the finite—has not broken loose from the cause, the सामान्य, the infinite;—but remains the product of it, so that in it the cause, the Infinite, is still present, though hidden.[1]

It is अविद्या which *separates* the two. अविद्या supposes finite is *not* infinite and infinite is *not* finite. They stand facing each other, totally opposed. But this view will make the infinite finite. Infinite, in this view, would be *limited* by the finite. Sankara Says—

"न ब्रह्मण: परं (outside) वस्त्वन्तरमस्ति।
ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तं वस्त्वन्तरं वारयन्ति।
अन्यप्रतिषेधेऽसति, वस्तु वस्त्वन्तरात्
'व्यावर्त्तते' इति परिच्छेद (limit) एव
आत्मन: प्रसज्येत"। (वे° भा°, 3.2.37.

Hence, infinite is not something *outside* the finite; it has the finite *within* the Infinite.

In another way, Sankara brings out the same thing—

We have seen above that मृच्चूर्ण negates or excludes पिण्ड; and पिण्ड excludes or negates (व्यभिचरति) its opposite घट. But do the मृच्चूर्ण, पिण्ड, घट—negate मृत्तिका, of which they are the products? He says—

पिण्ड: घटं व्यभिचरति, घटश्च पिण्डं,
किन्तु पिण्ड-घटौ मृत्त्वं न व्यभिचरत:। (छा° भा° 6.2.2.)

Neither पिण्ड, nor घट negates the underlying causal substance—मृत् which has taken these forms, which the मृत् has expelled from itself; for, these are merely मृद: संस्थान

[1] *Cf.* 'दुन्दुभिदृष्टान्त' and 'एकायन प्रक्रिया'—in the Brihadāranyaka. "बाद्याघातध्वनीनां न पृथगनुभव: किन्तु तत्साहचर्य्यात्' (Sankara's 'शतश्लोकी)।' 'तद्युक्तमखिलं वस्तु, व्यवहारश्चिदन्वित:' (Sankara's 'स्वात्मबोध)। 'कारणाव्ययि कार्य्यस्य अवस्थानानुपपत्ते:'—वे° भा°, 2.3.14.

मात्रम्[1] । It is the cause (सत्) which has distinguished itself from itself in the forms of पिण्ड, घट, etc. Hence we see the justification of Sankara's remark—

नहि कार्य्यं नाम वस्तुतोऽस्ति,
यतः कारणबुद्धिर्विनिवर्त्तेत ।—तै° भा°, 2.1.

The कार्य्य is not something *different* from the कारण; hence it cannot negate the idea of the cause. We have already seen that what stands at the *end* of a thing, what is *outside* of a thing, can negate it. But the Infinite being the cause runs through all the effects, underlies each of the finite effects, hence how can कार्य्य be treated as standing *outside* of, or at the end of, its कारण? It is therefore clear that no finite effect can negate or exclude the idea of its cause, the infinite. For, it is the cause itself which has issued from it as its effect, has differentiated as its effect, has manifested itself as its other—as particular effects. Hence the Infinite does not exclude but *include* its effects within it. For it has not become something else, in assuming a mere form.

The readers will remember that in the Vedanta Sutras (II.1.14-20) where the relation between the effect (कार्य्य) and the cause (कारण) finds an elaborate discussion, it has been shown that the effect cannot be *separated* from, and placed outside of, the cause and regarded as utterly other (अन्य) from the cause. It is really[2] अनन्य from the cause. For, there is *distinction* no doubt, but the distinction is not absolute, not ultimate[3]; for, the कारण itself appears as कार्य्य, as its other. It is therefore not really other, but कारण itself.

[1] *I.e.*, mere shapes, forms, means—for its manifestation.

[2] *I.e.*, From the पारमार्थिक stand-point.

[3] It is our अविद्या which makes it utterly distinct (स्वतन्त्र). It is our व्यवहारिक दृष्टि.

In this way, it is impossible to separate the effects from their cause, separate the नामरूप from their underlying Brahman. Yet, under the influence of Avidya, we separate the effects and treat them as outside of the cause, as something अन्य. This is a wrong view of the case.[1] It is done in either of two ways : by separating Brahman from the world altogether as an unknowable and unknown something, or by entirely reducing the nature of the cause (Brahman) to the Nāma-rūpas, taking nāma-rūpas as self-subsisting independent-things,[2] and ignoring the underlying hidden[3] Brahman altogether.

Iswara or creator is not a different being *other* (अन्य) *than* Brahman and consequently not *unreal.*

6. We now come to consider the important question of the alleged *unreality* of the Creator—the Vedantic Iswara (ईश्वर). Several writers on Vedanta maintain the view that "Sankara was unable to rise to a higher conception of Divine character and that ईश्वर as creator is recognised by the wise as *unreal.*" This is indeed a very serious allegation against Sankara and, we confess, there are passages in the Vedanta bhāṣya which are responsible for this hasty conclusion formed with regard to the unreality of the nature of *Iswara.* We shall consider these passages presently. But before we do so, a remark or two on the subject is necessary.

(*a*) Sankara has made no distinction between the two—Brahman and Iswara. The act of creation, he says, ought not to be regarded as a *separate* and distinct

[1] *Cf.* "एष विशेषोविदुषां, पश्यन्तोपि प्रपञ्चसंसारं। पृथगात्मनो न किञ्चित् पश्येयुः। Sankara's 'स्वात्मनिरूपणम्'.

[2] This is Sankara's अध्यास.

[3] कार्य्याकारे तिरोहितम्।

act, by which Brahman has become something *other than* its own self ;—as if it was Brahman *first*, and *then* became a creator. Such manner of thought would introduce a false difference in the 'nature' of Brahman which is always a real *unity*. The act of creation is but the *revelation* of its own nature. As the revelation cannot be exhaustive and must necessarily be partial, every fresh act of creation must be regarded as the revelation of its nature *so far forth*. The nature of Brahman being infinite (पूर्ण) and inexhaustible (अव्यय), no act of creation can be the exhaustive expression of its nature. Sankara observes—

"यद्यपि कार्य्यात्मना उद्रिच्यते, तथापि यत्स्वरूपं
पूर्णत्वं तन्न जहाति। पूर्णमेव उद्रिच्यते (वृ° भा°, 5. 1. 1)—

i.e., as Brahman is inexhaustible in its nature, it is eternally making (उद्रिच्यते) itself—creating itself—to realise its own nature. If Brahman, creating the world, were to exhaust its nature, the world, in that case, would have to be regarded as a complete and finished whole. But such cannot be the nature of Brahman which is inexhaustible and infinite. Sankara has told us that—

"ध्येय ब्रह्म, *i.e., Iswara* can never really be an aggregate of many parts—भेदसमाकुलं अनेकरसं" (वृ° भा°, 5.1.1.)[1]

In the Gītá-Bhásya he observes that—

"the being which has revealed itself as the world is *no other* than the 'nature' of Brahman itself."[2]

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[1] "नहि...शतसहस्रभेदसमाकुलं समुद्रवनादिवत् (*i.e.*, a *whole*—aggregate of parts: mere unity of collection) अनेकरसं ब्रह्म—ध्येयत्वेन विज्ञेयत्वेन वा—श्रुत्या उपदिश्यते" (वृ० भा०, 5.1.1.). "एकस्य अनेकस्वभाव-त्वानुपपत्तेः" (वृ० भा०). Otherwise a false difference would be introduced into the 'nature' (स्वभाव) of Brahman which is always a unity (एकः स्वभावः).

[2] "यत् 'पदं' सर्व्वस्य अवभासकमपि, अग्न्यादित्यादिकं ज्योतिर्नावभासयते··· यत्-प्राप्ता मुमुक्षवः न निवर्त्तन्ते···'तस्य पदस्य' 'सर्व्वव्यवहारास्पदत्वं' विवक्षुः... विभूतिसंक्षेपमाह" (गी०भा०, 15. 11.).

In the Kena-Bhásya, a similar remark is recorded—

"तस्यैव ब्रह्मणः···सगुणत्वेन उपासनम्। ब्रह्मेति परः, लिङ्गात्।
न हि अन्यत्र परादीश्वरात्...तथं वशीकर्तुं सामर्थ्यमस्ति" (3.1.).

That is to say—the immanent God is really the same as the transcendent Brahman. Sankara is still more explicit and expressive there in the sentence—

"ब्रह्मशब्दवाच्य ईश्वर इति अवसीयते" (के° भा°, 3.1.)

Elsewhere, the same fact is stated expressly thus—

"It is the same transcendental Paramátmá who sustains everything in the world by His Power."[1]

In the Mundaka-Bhāṣya, he observes that—

"the immanent God is in reality nothing but the transcendental Brahman"

"अक्षरं निर्विशेषं पुरुषं सत्यं······
मन्त्रेण उक्ता, पुनस्तदेव 'सविशेषं' वक्तव्य-
मिति प्रवर्त्तते"। (मु° भा°, 2.1.3.).

Sankara has definitely condemned those who would make the slightest distinction[2] between ब्रह्म and ईश्वर—

"भेददृष्ट मीश्वराख्यं, तदेव ब्रह्म,
अल्पमप्यन्तरं कुर्व्वतो भयं भवति" (तै° भा°, 2.7).

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[1] "क्षरेषु अक्षरेषु 'अस्यैव स्वरूपस्य' (निर्गुणस्य) या या अभिव्यक्तिः, सा सा अस्य 'विशिष्टरूपं'।...स्वरूपसद्भावमात्रेण सर्व्वं बिभर्त्ति" (गी०भा०, 15.19). ईश्वर is only the विशिष्टरूप of Brahman itself, not something separate or अन्य।

[2] Iswara is not to be really looked upon as *identified* with the world; for Brahman has not really and actually been *reduced* to the created elements and thereby has become something else. It is really the same Brahman still. Hence, Brahman and Iswara are not distinct, but the *same* being. This is the पारमार्थिकदृष्टि, *i.e.*, true view of the case.

"स्वरूपसद्भावमात्रेण सर्व्वं बिभर्त्ति—न तु 'व्यापृततया'"।

Thus, it is wrong to ascribe to Sankara the view that in his system, his *Iswara* is something *other than* (अन्य) and distinct from Brahman, that Iswara is a *lower* and empirical Brahman. It is the Sankara's established theory that, in revealing itself as the world, Brahman has not become something *other than* its own nature.

It is not possible to regard the निर्गुण and the सगुण as two *separate* entities. We have already seen that behind the multiplicity of Nāma-rūpa there is the underlying unity (ब्रह्म). With a view to show that this unity is not to be reduced to the multiplicity, the निर्गुण aspect has been emphasised, which shows that ब्रह्म is unaffected by the changing Nāma-rūpas. As this unity is the indwelling spirit working in the world, as it is the impelling force—energy which makes things move or change, its सगुण aspect has been mentioned, which shows that it controls and directs all movements—changes—in the world. To show this two-fold [1] relation of Brahman with the world, *viz.*, standing unaffected yet controlling

N. B.—Col. Jacob in his introduction to his edition of the *Vedānta-sāra* is wrong in pointing out 'inconsistencies' in the writings of Sankara. The reader will see that he has failed to grasp the true sense of the relation of ब्रह्म and ईश्वर ।

[1] (*a*) यस्य नेति नेतीति अन्य-प्रतिषेधद्वारेण (Negative) ब्रह्मणो निर्द्देशः कृतः, तस्य विधिमुखेन (Positive) कथं निर्द्देशः कर्त्तव्य इति मूलं च जगतो वक्तव्यं (बृ° भा°, 3.1.27)।

(*b*) सर्व्वमेतत् येन नियतं (*i.e.* regularly controlled) यस्मिन् प्रतिष्ठितं आकाशान्तं ओतं प्रोतञ्च—तस्य निरुपाधिकस्य 'नेति नेतीति' निर्द्देशः कर्त्तव्यः (3.9.26).

(*c*) कार्य्यं-करण व्यतिरिक्तं—कार्य्यकरण संघातानुग्राहकञ्च तज्ज्योतिः(4.3.6).

(*d*) स्वतः कार्य्यकरणादिसंसर्गरहितः विविक्तः स्वेन रूपेण—(किन्तु) कार्य्यकरणानि तदवभासितानि कर्म्मसु व्याप्रियन्ते (4.3.11.).

and acting—the निर्गुण and the सगुण aspects are given in the Vedanta.

(*b*) Without taking into consideration the foregoing passages of Sankara, much emphasis has been laid upon certain passages which occur in the Vedanta-bhâsya (II.1.14). One of such passages runs to this effect—

> "It is only in the practical concerns of life that there is Iswara and the idea of a Controller and the Controlled. But when the real knowledge will dawn, where is the creation and where is the creator ?"

> "परमार्थावस्थायां ईशेशितव्य-
> व्यवहाराभाव: प्रदर्श्यते ।
> व्यवहारावस्थायान्तु उक्त: श्रुतावपि
> ईश्वरादिव्यवहार: (वे° भा°, 2.1.14).

The true idea of the passage, as it appears to us, has not been correctly grasped and Sankara has been unjustly ridiculed as "recognising a pinchbeck deity" and his system has been thought "to have no place in it for theism."

We shall here try to arrive at the right view of Sankara's remarks from his own standpoint, and we crave our readers' particular attention to this important point.

The world is the manifested form of Brahman. We have already seen that Brahman, of its own motion, has manifested its 'nature' in the form of the universe. This is its *immanent* aspect. Ordinarily, people take this aspect of Brahman as *Iswara*. In our everyday व्यवहार, in our all practical concerns of life, we are quite satisfied with taking the world—the nâma-rūpas—as the manifested

form of God—ईश्वर[1] । As Iswara is the *cause* of the world, the world is regarded as His manifested form. We do not care to direct our thought to the deeper implications involved in this view of Iswara.

That this is the people's conception of Iswara was known to Sankara quite well. For, we find him remarking in his Vedanta-bhásya thus—

> "सर्व्वकारणात्तु विकारधर्म्मैरपि कैश्चि'द्विशिष्टः'
> परमेश्वरः उपास्यत्वेन निर्द्दिश्यते ।
> —सर्व्वकर्म्मा सर्व्वगन्धः सर्व्वरसः इत्यादिना"
>
> —वे° भा॰, 1.1.20.

Iswara, then, is ordinarily restricted to the विकारधर्म्मs, as He is the cause of the विकारs, the Nāma-rūpas, the world. This is the विशिष्ट-form, of Brahman.[2] Brahman, in this view, is taken to be *entirely* manifested in this world. That there is still a transcendental form is not at all thought of. It is assumed that because the world has been deduced from Him, He becomes the world, He *is* the world. That, in reality, He *is* indeed the world, but yet something *more* is quite forgotten.[3] People think that

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[1] *Cf.* 'एतावानेव आत्मा परमेश्वरो वा, नातः परमस्तीति—ईदृशं ज्ञानं तामसानामेव भवति'—गी° भा°, 18.22.

[2] It is the notion of the Divine immanence. It is the pantheistic idea of "All is one". "सर्व्वकारणत्वात् सर्व्वात्मकत्वोपपत्तेः" (वे° 1.1.20) पादोऽस्य सर्व्वाभूतानि'—इति 'सर्व्वात्मोपपत्तेः"—वे° भा°, 1.1.26. As it is the cause itself which transforms itself into various forms of effects, so God is taken to be an all-inclusive whole. "चरेषु अचरेषु या या अभिव्यक्तिः, सा सा अस्य (निर्गुणस्य) 'विशिष्टरूपम्'—मधुसूदन in गी° भाष्य ।

[3] Compare—"सर्व्वात्मत्वात् सर्व्वप्राणिकारणैः 'महान्' भवति। किञ्च ततोऽपि 'अधिकतर' मेतत् भवति"—तैत्तिं भाष्य, 1.6.। "सर्व्वगतस्य तु सर्व्वदेशेषु विद्यमानत्वात् परिच्छिन्नदेशव्यपदेशोऽपि कयाचिदपेक्षया सम्भवति"

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ईश्वर is the only Reality existing on his own account, and that there is no other Reality (ब्रह्म) beyond God (ईश्वर) ।

We have already seen that under the influence of Avidya (अविद्या), people quite ignore the *separate* being of the cause and regard the effects as something quite distinct (अन्य), as self-subsisting objects. This is called by Sankara as व्यवहारिक-stand-point. Thus, we quite forget the *transcendental* aspect of Brahman and *restrict* it to its immanent aspect alone. In this way, the विशिष्ट-रूप of Brahman, *i.e.*, Iswara is looked upon as quite sufficient for the purpose of worship. This is our ordinary view of Iswara.[1] This view has been emphasised by Sankara when he declares Iswara to be—"सर्व्वगन्धः सर्व्वरसः," etc., quoted above.

But, although, we admit, this view of Iswara is sufficient for the ordinary purposes of life, still there is the other side which, philosophy demands, can never be lost sight of. As Brahman is perfect and transcendental, as it is inexhaustive and inexhaustible (अव्यय and पूर्ण), no one of its determinations, no one of its definitions can exhaust its potentiality, no one of its actualisation can fix it in a rigid form and be regarded as final.[2]

(वे° भा°, 1.2.7.) । "उपाधिषु 'सविशेषा' इव अवभासन्ते, न च स्वाभाविकीं 'अविशेषात्मतां' जहति, तद्वत्" (वे°, 3.2.25) । "'सर्व्वगतः' परमेश्वरः, एकः 'स्वतन्त्र' श्च" and "रूपं रूपं 'प्रतिरूपो', 'वहिश्च' " (कठ भाष्य) । In Vedanta, परमेश्वर *is* everything, yet he is *more*. This is the true view.

[1] "एतावानेव आत्मा, परमेश्वरो वा, नातः परमस्तीति—ईदृशं ज्ञानं (तामसानामेव भवति)—गी° भा°, 18.22.

[2] To restrict the cause to its particular manifested effects and to regard these as its complete and final expressions is wrong. गीता has denounced this view as तामसिक ।—

"यत्तु कृत्स्नवदेकस्मिन् कार्य्ये सक्तमहैतुकं......तत्तामसमुदाहृतं" (18.22.) ।

But, we have seen, it is our Avidya (अविद्या) which makes us forget this transcendental aspect of Brahman and to reduce or restrict it to a particular manifestation. For this reason Sankara has described Iswara—God—as—व्यवहारिक and also as अविद्यात्मक.[1] The readers will see that by this, Iswara does not become an unreality. Śankara remarks—

मायामात्रमेतत् यत् परमात्मनोऽवस्थात्रयात्मनावभासनम्—(वे° 2.1.1), *i.e.*, It is माया which conceals[2] the transcendental and inexhaustible nature of Brahman and entirely reduces it to, or identifies it with, the three manifested states of activities (*viz.*, सृष्टि, स्थिति and प्रलय)। But the *true* view of the case is that Iswara (God) though the creator or the cause of the world, has not and does *not* necessarily become *restricted* or entirely reduced to the effects (कार्य्यs or विकारs) created ; but He has also a *transcendental* nature which remains unaffected by these.[3] This is the true view of God. Sankara has declared for this reason that—

'निष्प्रदेशस्यापि' ब्रह्मणः उपाधिविशेषसम्बन्धात्...प्रदेश-
विशेषपरिग्रहो न विरुध्यते।—(वे° 1.1.24)

[1] "व्यवहारावस्थायान्तु उक्तः श्रुतावपि ईश्वरत्वादिव्यवहारः" (वे° 2.1.14).
and अविद्यात्मक-नामरूपोपाध्यनुरोधी ईश्वरो भवति"।—इत्यादि।

"*Cf.* उपाधि सम्बन्धात् तदाकारतामिव प्रतिपद्यते, तदालम्बनो ब्रह्मण आकार-विशेषोपदेशः उपासनार्थो न विरुध्यते"—वे° 3.2.15

'ब्रह्मणो अनेकरसत्वं अनेकधात्वं......न द्रष्टव्यं। यत्तु एकरसत्वं तद्द्रष्टव्यं प्रशस्तत्वात्"—वृ°, 5.1.1.

[2] "उपाधिकृतस्वरूपतिरोभावात्" (वे°.3.2.35)। Also 'कार्य्यगतेन विविधेन भासा तस्य 'भा'-रूपत्वं स्वतोऽवगम्यते" (कठ° 5.15)। "उपाधिद्वारेणैव विज्ञानादिशब्दैःनिर्द्दिश्यते" (केन, 2.1)।—इत्यादि। 'मनसः संकल्पस्मृत्यादि प्रत्यये 'रभिव्यज्यते' ब्रह्म (केन, 4.5)।

[3] पर्य्यायेण त्रिस्थानत्वात्, सोऽहमिति स्मृत्या प्रतिसन्धानाश्च स्थानत्रयव्यतिरिक्तत्व मेकत्वञ्च सिद्धं" (मा° का° भा°)। "आकारब्रह्मविषयाणि वाक्यानि न

For, although Brahman assumes particular forms or aspects, it remains all along *identical with* itself, For—

"न विशेष-दर्शनमात्रेण वस्त्वन्यत्वं भवति
......स एवेति प्रत्यभिज्ञानात्"—वे° 2.1.18

and also

"न हि उपाधियोगादपि अन्यादृशस्य वस्तुनः
अन्यादृशः स्वभावः सम्भवति।"—वे° 3.2.11.

It is clear therefore that although Iswara has assumed the manifested forms—although He is विकारधर्मैः विशिष्टः, still it is *in reality* nothing but Brahman; that is to say, although Brahman appears acting in the world in its immanent aspect, yet it remains unaffected in its transcendental nature. It is wrong to take the immanent aspect *alone* as an independent reality and to *ignore* the transcendental aspect which is the real aspect[1].

For, the fact is that—

यद्यपि कार्यात्मना उद्रिच्यते,
तथापि यत् पूर्णस्वरूपं तन्न जहाति,
पूर्णमेव उद्रिच्यते"—वृ° भा°

प्रधानानि, आकाररहितमेव ब्रह्म अवधारयितव्यं"—वे° भा°, 3.2.14. दर्शनश्रवण विज्ञानाद्युपाधिधर्मैः 'राविर्भूतं' सत् लक्ष्यते'—मु. 2.2.1.

[1] "प्रत्युपाधिभेदं अभेदमेव ब्रह्मणः श्रावयति शास्त्रं।" "भेदस्य उपासनार्थत्वात् अभेदे तात्पर्यात्"—वे° भा°, 3.2.11 Also 'उपाधिनिमित्तस्य वस्तुधर्मत्वानुपपत्तेः"—वे°, 3.2.15.

Cf. 'अव्यक्तं व्यक्तिमापन्नं मन्यन्ते मामबुद्धयः।
परं भावमजानन्तो ममाव्ययमनुत्तमं। गी°......)

It is the ignorant (अबुद्धयः) who regard the inexhaustible Brahman as entirely reduced to its manifestations (व्यक्ति)।

From these discussions, the readers will find now that —the immanence of God must not be taken in the sense of Divine *identification* with the process of the finite world, and the transcendency also ought not to be taken in the sense of *absolutely separating* God from the world as an unknowable something, without recognising His activity as indwelling spirit. It is the immanence of *transcendence*, in reality.

(*c*) Now, we shall come to explain some other passages in the Sankara-bhásya which have produced the erroneous opinion about the unreality of the Vedantic Iswara. It will be seen that Sankara begins his discussion about Iswara in this part of his commentary with the sentence—

"अविद्यात्मक-नामरूपोपाध्यनुरोधी ईश्वरो भवति" (वे° भा°, 2.1.14)

"अविद्यात्मक-नामरूपबीजव्याकरणापेक्षत्वात् ईश्वरस्य"—(*Ibid*).

Finding that the word अविद्यात्मक has been used in connection with ईश्वर, the conclusion has been hastily formed that ईश्वर must be unreal, false.

• Now, what does the word अविद्यात्मक really mean? We have carefully examined the various commentaries of Sankara and have found that in connection with नाम-रूप, he has used these words—अविद्याकल्पित, अविद्याप्रत्युपस्थापित, अविद्याध्यारोपित and अविद्यात्मक। In a passage in the Taittiríya-bhásya, Sankara has concluded that the Náma-rupas cannot be regarded as the essential property (धर्म) of the self; that they are the property of our *intellect*. Our intellect (understanding) falsely ascribes Náma-rūpa to the self as its essential property[1]. If we follow this explanation,

[1] "विद्याऽविद्ययोस्तद्धर्मत्वमिति चेत्? न। विवेकाविवेकौ रूपादिवत् प्रत्यक्षा-वुपलभ्येते अन्तःकरणस्थौ......तस्मान्नामरूपपक्षस्यैव विद्याविद्ये, नामरूपे च नात्मधर्मौ" —इत्यादि (तै° भा°, 2.8)। It is also found in गी° भा°।

we come to see that wheresoever he uses the epithet अविद्याकल्पित in connection with नामरूप, the enquiry would naturally arise to the effect—अविद्याकल्पित *on what?* and अविद्याकल्पित *how?* That is to say, are the नामरूपs imagined by अविद्या *on the self?*;—and are the नामरूपs imagined by अविद्या on the self *as its essential property?* This disposes of the enquiry about the 'on what' and 'how'? The two phrases अविद्या-प्रत्युपस्थापित and अविद्या-ध्यारोपित convey the same sense with अविद्याकल्पित[1] । Only one phrase, namely,—अविद्यात्मक now remains to be explained. The readers will see that when this phrase invariably occurs in connection with the term नाम-रूप, as in the case of the three other phrases, it must also convey the same sense and significance which those other phrases convey. We therefore would not be wrong, if we say that the नामरूपs are 'अविद्यात्मक', because they are imagined to be the essential property of the self. This is the sense of 'अविद्यात्मक' here.

In the famous Introduction to the Vedanta-bhásya, Sankara has taken care to explain the sense of the term अविद्या which it would convey in his commentaries. From the explanation given here, it will appear that under the influence of अविद्या, men ignore the distinct presence of the underlying unity and *identify* it with the changing states and activities evolved from it. Men, under the power of Avidya, *identify* the underlying ब्रह्म with the manifested world. In this way, the manifested Nāmarūpas, *i.e.*, the world becomes the only Reality standing

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[1] The readers will see therefore that wherever Śankara would employ such phrase as अविद्याकल्पिते नामरूपे, it would mean that नामरूप is always erroneously imagined by अविद्या as the धर्म or the essential property of the self; (whereas it is really the property of the intellect itself).

on its own account, and beyond this reality there is no other Reality (ब्रह्म) at all. In this way, ईश्वर is regarded quite an independent reality, absolutely *separate* and *different* (अन्य) from ब्रह्म. Now, Sankara has declared such view of ईश्वर as unreal, false and अविद्यात्मक। For, Brahman in appearing as creator—as ईश्वर—has not in reality lost its own nature, neither has it passed out of itself into something else—

नहि विशेषदर्शनमात्रेण, वस्त्वन्यत्वं भवति,
......स एवेति प्रत्यभिज्ञानात् ।—(वे° भा° 2.1.18)

The fact is that if you look upon ईश्वर as a *different* being, as *other than* (अन्य) Brahman, you are wrong. But if you regard Him as an aspect of Brahman and therefore nothing but Brahman itself—this is the correct view.

Thus the readers will find now that Sankara has not denied ईश्वर ।

(*d*) The created elements have been evolved from the 'nature' of Brahman for its own realisation. Brahman has not sundered itself into these elements; it has not actually passed into, or been converted into, these elements and thereby has become something *other than* its own nature. It expresses itself through these. We have therefore no right to *separate* these from it and take them as 'something' distinct and complete in themselves. Hence is Sankara's remark—

" परमार्थावस्थायां कुत एव वा सृष्टिः ? "
(वे° भा°, 2.1.22)

The evolving changes—the diversities of emerging Náma-rūpa—are not something other than (अन्य) Brahman's nature. We can not sever their connection with the

underlying Brahman, but they must be looked upon as really the further and further *revelations* of this nature [1].

When we come to truly realise the unity of Brahman as untouched and unaffected by the evolving changes, we will then look upon the world and all the changes evolving therein as mere *means, medium, symbols,* [2] through which Brahman is realising its own nature—is expressing itself. Everything will appear as incorporated [3] in Brahman as its necessary *expressions.* This is the correct interpretation of the passage under notice, in the light of the Sankara's entire theory. No other view is possible. One who has declared Iswara to be eternally existent (नित्यसिद्ध) cannot declare him to be *unreal.*

Illustration in proof of the above position.

That this is the case will appear also from the illustration [4] recorded by Śankara which we now desire to explain. To express the idea of the letters, we employ certain points, lines, strokes, etc. The letters do not themselves pass into or become actually

[1] *Vide* दुन्दुभिदृष्टान्त in बृ° भा°, 2.4.7. "सामान्यस्य ग्रहणेनैव तद्गताविशेषा, गृहीता भवन्ति। न तु त एव निर्भिद्य ग्रहीतुं शक्यन्ते"। *Cf.* 'न पृथगनुभवः किन्तु तत्-साहचर्य्यात्'—शतश्लोकी, 63.। "तद्दुक्तमखिलं वस्तु, व्यवहारस्विदन्वितः। तस्मात् सर्व्वगतं ब्रह्म, क्षीरे सर्पिरिवाखिले"— । "उपर्य्युपरि आविस्तरत्व-मात्मनः आत्मप्रकाशनाय"—ऐ° भा°, 2.1.3.

[2] "दर्शयति सृष्टिप्रपञ्चस्य ब्रह्मप्रतिपत्त्यर्थतां।···उपायः सोऽवताराय" (वे° भा°, 1.4.14). 'जगदाकारपरिणामित्वादि ब्रह्मदर्शनोपायत्वेन विनियुज्यते (वे° भा°, 2.1.14). 'नामरूपादि...उपलब्धिद्वारं भवति (छा° भा° 7.17.1.)। सत्संस्थान-मात्रमिदं सर्व्वं' (6.2.2.) &c.

[3] "सामान्यस्य ग्रहणेनैव 'तद्गता विशेषाः' गृहीता भवन्ति...तत्रैवान्तर्भावात्" (बृ° भा°)। 'सामान्ये तद्विशेषाः प्रोताः।

[4] "यथा एकप्रभृत्यापरार्द्ध-संख्यास्वरूप-परिज्ञानाय, रेखाध्यारोपणं कृत्वा··· एकेयं रेखा, दशेयं शतेयं इति ग्राहयति, अवगमयति संख्यास्वरूपं केवलं; न तु

converted into these points, lines, strokes. These merely express the nature of the letters. These are merely symbols standing for the letters which find their expression in them. Such is the case also with the numbers. The numbers—one, two, three, etc.—are expressed through certain lines and points. They do not actually pass into, or are converted into, these lines and points. These are merely symbols which are employed to express the nature of the numbers. *Separated* from the numbers which find expression in them, and taken as independent things,—the lines, points, etc., lose their value and become unreal.[1] So long as they are taken *in connection with* the numbers which they express, they have their value. But sever them off from the numbers, they at once become useless. Such is the case with the created elements, and Brahman. As soon as they are *separated* from the underlying Brahman which expresses itself through them, they lose their value and are quite useless. Hence these cannot be regarded as something independent—अन्य—self-sufficient and complete in themselves; but they are अनन्य from (*i.e.*, not really *other than*) Brahman underlying them. In the third chapter of this book we have tried to explain the relation of the cause and the effect elaborately. We need not repeat here the arguments used there. It will suffice to say that "The first part of Sankara's causal theory implies that the causal reality is *distinct* from its effects or its successive manifestations, because it has a 'nature,' a स्वरूप, a स्वभाव (swarūpa or swavāba) of its own, and it cannot therefore

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संख्याया रेखात्वमिव । यथा च अकारादीनि अक्षराणि विजिग्राहयिषुः, पत्रमसी-रेखादिसंयोगोपायमास्थाय, वर्णानां सतत्त्वं आवेदयति ; न पत्र-मस्याद्यात्मकताम-क्षराणां ग्राहयति । तथा चेह उत्पत्ति-स्थिति-लयाद्यनेकोपायमास्थाय, एकं ब्रह्मतत्त्वमावेदयति " इत्यादि (बृ° भा°, 4.4.25).

[1] "तथा अकारादिसत्याक्षरप्रतिपत्ति दृष्टा, रेखानृताक्षरप्रतिपत्तेः" (वे° भा°, 2.1.14).

be resolved into, or identified with, the effects or the changes emerging from it. Sankara expresses this idea in—

"न तु कारणस्य कार्य्यात्मत्वं" (वे° भा°, 2.1.9)।"

"The second part of the theory implies that the cause is no doubt distinct from, and independent of, its effects or the emergent changes; but the effects cannot be *separated* from their underlying cause and regarded as independent and self-sufficient 'things' (वस्तुs), each complete in itself. The effects must therefore be regarded as *ananya* (अनन्य) from their cause; *i.e.*, the real 'nature' of the cause expresses itself gradually, or becomes realised in, these successive effects.[1] The latter are therefore mere forms, means, instruments for the realisation of the nature of the cause which underlies them. It is not therefore possible to *separate* any of the effects from the underlying cause which expresses itself in them. Separated from it, they would lose their value and become useless."

We find therefore from the illustrations quoted above that the successive changes are *inseparable* from their underlying cause which gradually realises or expresses its own nature in and through them. The underlying causal reality has not actually passed into, or been converted into, these evolving changes,—thereby becoming something else *other than* its own nature (अन्य).[2]

Finite individuals and their responsibility for their works.

7. It follows from this exposition that what gradually expresses its inexhaustible nature in its changes, cannot exhaust itself in them and so become *identical* with them. Yet translating the word *ananya* (अनन्य) as absolutely "identical," Sankara's theory

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[1] "तारतम्येन आविर्भाव:" (वे° भा°, 1.1.11). Also 1.3.30.

[2] *Cf.* "भूतमात्रासंसर्गजं 'अन्यत्वा'वभासं तिरस्कृत्य"—बृ° भा°, 5.1.1.

has been reduced to a kind of 'Pantheism' which he took so much pains to refute in various parts of his commentaries.

Taking Sankara to be a Pantheist, it has also been supposed that he has, in his theory, not only abolished Iswara but also abolished or negated the 'Individuality' or the 'personality' of the finite individuals, making them merely *parts* of an all-inclusive abstract whole, *viz.*, Brahman:—"ascribing to this Brahman alone the agency of all works." Many critics of Sankara's theory believe that in the Adwaita philosophy as expounded by Sankara, the finite individuals are *not responsible* for their works, that all activities proceed from the agency of Brahman alone.

There are valuable arguments by which Sankara has established the 'individuality' of the selves which we have discussed elsewhere. Here in this chapter, we shall content ourselves only examining the position whether the individual beings are not responsible for their works in this system of philosophy, so far as the 'theory of creation' is concerned.

Differences in experiences prove differences in individual 'natures.'

We find in our daily observation that the *experiences* of one individual man differ in their character from the experiences of another individual. Your experience and mine are not of the same character. Even the individuals born and brought up under similar circumstances develop different experiences, exclusively belonging to each. If Brahman—the only Individual—be reduced to the relations of the world, he alone can be held responsible for this unequal distribution of the experiences or fortunes of different individuals, and the finite individuals would thereby be absolved from their share in the responsibility for their experiences. Sankara appears to remark in the Vedanta-

bhāsya (II. 1. 34) that for the inequalities of the experiences, the *works* of the individuals are to be held responsible. A hasty idea has been formed from this remark that as in this system there are no real individuals at all, these *actions alone* constitute the so-called individuality of men. A western writer has thus written about Sankara's theory—

> "Its *resolution* of human life into *a series of acts mechanically related* keeps it at what we must describe at a low level."

That in the Sankara-system, the actions are but the responses made by the individual to the external environment with which there is an interaction, and that the source of this response is the 'nature' of the individual which underlies these actions, and that this nature cannot be resolved into these activities—all these points can be proved without much ado from the pages of Sankara's commentaries. We shall record in this place only one argument employed in the Vedanta-bhásya to expose the absurdity of the position held by the critic above referred to, which will suffice for our present purpose.

Individuals—their substantive and adjectival modes of existence.

8. Every individual self, Sankara remarks, has a two-fold mode of existence—substantive (स्वरूप or विशेष्य) and adjectival (सम्बन्धि-रूप or विशेषण).[1] In his substantive mode, he exists *for himself*, he belongs to himself. In his adjectival mode, he is related to others,

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[1] "एकत्वेऽपि स्वरूप-बाह्यरूपापेक्षया, अनेकशब्दप्रत्ययदर्शनात्। यथा एकोऽपि सन् देवदत्तः, स्वरूपं सम्बन्धि-रूपञ्च अपेक्ष्य, अनेकशब्दप्रत्ययभाक् भवति......मनुष्यः ब्राह्मणः......युवा स्थविरः......पिता माता जामाता इति"।

"यथा एकापि सती रेखा, स्थानान्यत्वेन निविशमाना, एक-दश-शत-सहस्रादि-शब्दप्रत्ययभेद-मनुभवति"।

"द्रव्यस्यैव तेन तेन विशेषणेन प्रतीयमानत्वात्, न द्रव्य-गुणयोर्भेदप्रतीतिरस्ति" (वे॰ भा॰ 2.2.17).

he exists *for others*. His substantive existence or स्वरूप cannot be resolved into the adjectival existence; for, the individual is always *more* than his mere relations. His स्वरूप (Swarupa) is permanent and transcendent (कूटस्थ); but his सम्बन्धि-रूप, *i.e.*, his relations with others depend on the things with which he comes into interaction, and these relations therefore are always liable to changes. Thus, there is a Swarup (स्वरूप) belonging to each individual being which underlies the relations or the activities elicited from this स्वरूप (Swarupa) through its relation with other objects.

'Nature' of individual selves cannot be resolved into mere relations or works.

How is it possible, in the face of such clear arguments, to come to the conclusion that the system of Sankara has left no place for the 'individuality,' and that the individuals are mere aggregate of their actions or relations? It follows irresistibly from this discussion on the subject in question that when Sankara apparently makes the *works* of the individuals responsible for their inequalities, he really makes the underlying 'natures' or स्वरूप (swarupas) of each individual responsible for the special character of the works issuing out from him. This will be evident, if we consider the character of the collateral arguments used by Sankara in this very place (वे° भा°, II. I. 34). He illustrates his position here by showers of rain and the germination of distinct kinds of crops from their respective seeds. The peculiar and the distinct nature inherent in each class of *seeds* is the true cause, says he, for the visible inequalities in the development of different plants, each distinguished from each class;—though the general and common cause for the growth and germination of crops must be held to be the showers acting upon the

seeds.[1] It is well-known that Sankara has used the term 'seed,' *i.e.*, बीज with reference to the four different types of individuals distinguished from one another in their nature and character. We would refer our readers to a passage in the Bhásya on the Chandogya Upanishad where this line is to be found—

"तेषां खल्वेषां भूतानां त्रीण्येव 'बीजानि' भवन्ति,
——अण्डजं, जीवजमुद्भिज्जमिति । (जीवजं
——includes स्वेदजं and जरायुजं) ।" (छा० भा०, 6.3.1.)

The seed (बीज) therefore includes in it the living 'natures' of the individual selves, each distinguished from the other class.[2] The difference in experience therefore is to be accounted for by the difference in the respective 'natures' or स्वरूप of the individuals. The result reached here will be far more evident if another passage is considered in this connection. In the Vedanta-bhásya (III. 2. 9), a discussion runs to the effect whether, when a man wakes up after a deep sleep, it is the

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[1] "यथा हि पर्जन्यो व्रीहियवादिसृष्टौ साधारणं कारणं भवति। व्रीहियवादि-वैषम्ये तु तत्तद्बीजगतान्येव असाधारणानि सामर्थ्यानि कारणानि भवन्ति। एवमीश्वरो देवमनुष्यादिसृष्टौ साधारणं कारणं भवति। देवमनुष्यादिवैषम्ये तु तत्तज्जीवगतान्येव असाधारणानि कर्माणि कारणानि भवन्ति" (वे० भा०, 2.1.34). *Cf.* परायत्तेऽपि हि कर्तृत्वे, करोत्येव जीवः।......ईश्वरस्य च अत्यन्तानपेक्षत्वे...पुरुषकारस्य वैयर्थ्यं") वे० भा०, 2.3.42).

[2] "बीज is what *grows* and hence continuously *permanent*. "बीजं प्ररोहकारणं...न हि अबीजं किञ्चित् प्ररोहति। नित्यञ्च प्ररोहदर्शनात् बीज-सन्ततिर्न व्येति इति गम्यते" (गी० भा०, 9.18). 'Seeds' (बीज) in the Sankara system means those which have living individual *selves behind* them, and hence they grow. *Cf.* बीजं मां सर्व्वभूतानां"—(7.10) गी० and "भूतानां जीवाधिष्ठितानां" गी० (10.32).

same identical individual who had slept has now waken up or it is a different individual. It is shown here that it is the same identical individual to whom both the *past* and the *present* belong. Among other arguments used to prove this fact, we should like to refer to only two arguments given there. The first is about the works done by the individual and the second is the fact of recollection. To prove the identity of the same individual both before and after his sleep, Sankara argues that otherwise the man waking up could not have begun again the same works which he had left unfinished before he went to sleep. Here we would request our readers to carefully examine the nature of this argument employed by Sankara to establish the identity of the individual. If the idea of Sankara were, as our opponents hold, really to resolve the individual self into his actions or works, how, we ask, could he employ this argument; and how could the argument establish the identity of the Soul? The works the man had left off when he fell asleep, are a thing of the past. Those works have vanished already because they belonged to a *past time*. How can the man who now wakes up begin again the works which are *now* non-existent? What is the link here to connect the past work with the present? It must be, therefore, Sankara's inner purpose to show that it is the identical inner 'nature' of the man to which both his past and present works must belong, which 'nature' must be the underlying link here, connecting the works. This line also brings to light what was really working in the mind of Sankara when he wrote this commentary—

"न च अन्येन सामिकृतस्य कर्मणो, अन्यःशेषक्रियायां प्रवर्त्तितुमर्हति"—
i.e., A piece of work half done by one man, cannot be brought into completion by a different man.

Again, Sankara speaks of 'memory' (स्मृति) here. The man exercising his memory, recollects where he left off his past work and where he is to begin now. The works themselves cannot exercise the memory.[1] It must be the underlying self which does it and recollects his past work and connects it with the present. It is therefore to this self that both the works must belong, and it is not the *works* themselves, which can recollect *themselves*. Here again, by the phrase—

" अकृताभ्यागम and कृतप्रणाश "—

Sankara makes the underlying self *responsible* for his works. By holding the individual man responsible for his works done by him (or left undone by him), Sankara clearly establishes the fact that behind the works done, there is the underlying 'nature' or स्वरूप (Swarupa) of the man which is really accountable for its works. Otherwise, if the man be simply an aggregate of his works, then his present work being the necessary outcome of his antecedent work in time and predetermined by it,— you cannot make *the man* responsible for his present works.

Human responsibility for works.

9. It may not be out of place here to refer, in this connection, to the arguments used by Sankara in the Vedanta-bhásya, which will also show that difference in the works or activities really implies difference in the deeper 'natures' which underlie the works or activities. The argument is originally used

Every individual has a distinct 'nature' of its own.

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[1] स्मृति (memory) is the distinguishing characteristic attribute (धर्म्म or स्वरूप) of the self. " प्राणचेष्टाचैतन्यस्मृत्यादयश्च आत्मधर्म्मत्वेन अभिमताः आत्मवादिनां " (वे॰ भा॰, 3.3.53).

to expose the absurdity of the theory of *Asad-káryya-váda.* It is everywhere observed that certain *definite* changes or activities are invariably accompanied by a *definite* 'nature' behind them. Certain *other* definite changes or actions are invariably accompanied by *another* definite 'nature' which is utterly distinct and different from the 'nature' mentioned above. In all the successive transformations or changes of मृत्तिका (say, a lump of earth), the 'nature' of मृत्तिका is seen behind them (but not the nature of a *tree*). Again, in all the successive transformations or changes of a tree, the nature of the tree—but not the nature of the *earth*—is seen behind them. Why, it may be asked, is such the case everywhere in connection with all kinds of definite changes or activities ? [1]—Simply because, these definite changes or transformations are determinations of the *nature of the earth*, and not of *any other nature*. This proves the fact that definite changes or actions belong to definite 'natures,' and these natures are distinguished, one from the other.[2] A similar argument, slightly changed, is given elsewhere. If a man wants to produce an earthen vessel, he must collect some *earth* for the purpose. But *milk* must be collected, if he wants to produce curd. The collection of earth will not serve his purpose in the latter case. Thus, definite 'natures' only, can produce definite works or changes. If there are not definite natures

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[1] "न च मृदन्विताः शरावादयोभावाः, तन्त्वादिविकाराः केनचिदभ्युपगम्यते। मृद्विकारानेव तु मृदन्वितान् भावान् लोकः प्रत्येति।...बीजादेव अङ्कुरो जायते, क्षीरादेव दधि=इत्येवंजातीयकः 'कारणविशेषाभ्युपगमः' अर्थवान् स्यात्···सर्व्वस्य च वस्तुनः 'स्वेन स्वेन रूपेण' (*i.e.*, स्वरूपेण=Their own natures) भावात्मनैव उपलभ्यमानत्वात्" (वे° भा°, 2.2.26).

[2] *Cf.* "गवादिभ्यश्चान्योऽहं, मत्तश्चान्ये गवादयः" इत्यादि (गी° भा°, 18.66).

actually present in the world, anything could be made to produce any work indiscriminately. There would have been no *difference* in the works at all. For, there would be nothing to distinguish one kind of work from another.[1] These arguments very clearly prove that every finite individual possesses a definite *nature* of its own which cannot be resolved into the works or activities produced from it. We fail to understand how Sankara's system can be held to negate the individualities.[2]

The Universal (सामान्य) and the Particular (विशेष).

10. "The creation," according to Sankara, "is but the gradual manifestation of diverse Universals (सामान्य) in the form of individual objects (विशेष) produced from them."[3] All finite individual objects are a compound of two factors—the universal and the particular. The universal or सामान्य stands to the individual objects (विशेषs) as unity to multiplicity. There is but one universal cow, while there are many individual cows. There is the clay, while there are its many particular differentiations—मृचूर्ण, पिण्ड, घट. Thus the world of the Universals (सामान्य) manifests itself in

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[1] "दधिघटरुचकाद्यर्थिभिः प्रतिनियतानि कारणानि क्षीर-मृत्तिका-सुवर्णादीनि उपादीयमानानि दृश्यन्ते। न च दध्यर्थिभिः मृत्तिका उपादीयते, न घटार्थिभिः क्षीरं। अविशिष्टे हि प्रागुत्पत्तेः, सर्व्वस्य सर्व्वत्र असत्त्वे, कस्मात् क्षीरादेव दधि उत्पद्यते, न मृत्तिकायाः?" (वे° भा°, 2.1.18.) [Does not the expression—'प्रतिनियतानि कारणानि' imply the different *grades* of Individuals?]

[2] Besides the arguments given in this chapter, there are other valuable arguments used by Sankara to prove the existence of the 'nature' of different individuals.

[3] "सामान्य-विशेषवानर्थोनामव्याकरणवाक्ये विवक्षितः" (बृ° भा°, आन°, 2.4.9).
"सामान्यम् आत्मस्वरूप प्रदानेन विशेषान् बिभर्त्ति" (बृ° भा°, 1.6.1).

the multiplicities (विशेष) of the sense-world. Thus, the truth of all particular things we find in the Universals.

Each individual is a compound of सामान्य and विशेष.

The true सामान्य is thus used in the Vedanta-bhāṣya to denote the Universals or the deeper 'natures' of the single individuals, and the term विशेष to denote the states and activities (which constitute the finite individual beings) produced from these 'natures' through interaction with the environment[1] (कारकव्यापार). The readers should remember that in his theory of causality as explained by Sankara (वे° भा°, 2.1.14—20) the term Sāmānya stands for the causal reality; and the term Viśeṣas stands for its effects which are but its appearances or forms or shapes or its modes of acting in which the causal reality reveals its nature.[2] The same reality appears in many different forms. The true causal

[1] "अपास्तविशेषं सामान्यात्मकं कारणं विशेषवदवस्थान्तरमापद्यमानं कार्यसंज्ञां लभते" (वे° भा°, 2.1.15 and 2.3 7).

"कार्य्याकारेण कारणं व्यवस्थापयतः 'कारकव्यापारस्य' अर्थवत्त्वमुपपद्यते" (वे° भा°, 2.1.18)।

[2] Vijnāna-bhikshu very clearly explains these terms and agrees with Sankara entirely in this respect. He explains—

"सामान्य' 'स्वरूप'-शब्देन परिभाषितं। स्वरूपपरिभाषा च स्थिरतामात्रेण।"

Sankara also says—

"स्थिरस्वभावानां···कारणभावदर्शनात्" (वे° भा°, 2.2.6).

Vijnāna also explains—

"विशेषा हि आगमापायितया न द्रव्यस्य स्वरूपाणि"।

Sankara also says—

"विशेषस्तु विक्रिया" (तै° भा°, 2.8)।

reality is therefore identical in all its diverse effects or forms, but is not itself any single individual thing.[1]—

"सामान्याद्धि विशेषा उत्पद्यमानाः
दृश्यन्ते, मृदादेर्घटादयः" (वे° भा°, 2.3.9).

"नामसामान्यात्…विशेषनामानि
यज्ञदत्तदेवदत्त इत्येवमादि-
प्रविभागानि…विभज्यन्ते उत्पद्यन्ते"
—बृ° भा°, 1.6.1.

That the causal reality (सामान्य) is *active* points to something beyond it with which it interacts. The term कारक-व्यापार stands for stimulating conditions which make possible its interaction, evoking its responses and activities (*i.e.* विशेषs).

"न हि कारकमन्तरेण क्रिया सम्भवति" (बृ°, 2.4.14).

Elsewhere in this connection Sankara has written—

"There are in the world diverse universals (सामान्यs) involving their particulars (विशेषs) which they produce—both sentient and insentient. All these Universals form a hierarchy and in their graduated series (पारम्पर्यगत्या) are included and comprehended in the one highest universal, *i.e.*, in Brahman. It is Brahman which contains and connects with it all these universals." Brahman is the central controlling unity of all

[1] *Cf.* "यः कश्चन शब्दो वागेव सा…शब्दसामान्यमात्रम्; एतद्धेतेषां नामविशेषाणां …कारणम्।…विशेषाणाञ्च सामान्ये अन्तर्भावात्"—बृ° भा°, 1.6.1.

universals, so that the whole form an organic unity in which all सामान्यs are fused.[1]

Now, it is clear that in the Sankara-system, the deeper 'natures' or स्वरूपs of the finite individuals are not denied. It is in this way then that the difference of experiences or works implies difference in the deeper 'individual natures' which underlie them. Brahman is thus absolved from any share in the inequalities or differences of the works for which the inner 'natures' (स्वरूपs) of the individuals are solely responsible,—Brahman being looked upon as a general controller or director of all the activities set a-going in the world. It proves also that Brahman has a distinct 'nature' (स्वरूप) of its own which cannot be resolved [2] into the evolving changes, and neither can

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[1] अनेके हि विलक्षणाश्चेतनाचेतनरूपा: सामान्य-विशेषा:। तेषां पारम्पर्य्य-गत्या एकस्मिन् महासामान्ये अन्तर्भाव: प्रज्ञानघने" (बृ° भा°, 2.4.9).

"मयि सर्व्वमिदं—भूतानि मयि ईश्वरे अनुस्यूतानि (गी° भा°, 7.7)।" अनुस्यूत —*i.e.* Each universal runs on continuously into every other; not a mere aggregate. We have seen before that भूतानि = वीजानि = living individuals (जीवा:). 'भूतानि = जीवाधिष्ठित वीजानि (10.32 and 7.10).'

N. B.—These सामान्यs are elsewhere (तै° भा°, 2.6) called as Divine Ideas—सत्या: कामा:—(संकल्प) and these are not different from (अनन्या:) the nature of Brahman. There is, the छान्दोग्य says, a causal relation between these Divine Ideas and the manifested individual things in the world (छा° भा°, 8.5.4).

Also *cf.* "वस्तुमात्ररूपेण हि...विशेषणानि व्याप्नोति—तस्मिन्...एते अभिन्नतां प्रतिपद्यन्ते"—(बृ° भा°, 1.4.7).

N. B.—The 'Universals' may be called as the *Ends*. Brahman is the absolute End to which all beings strive. Each being has its own end in itself. But Brahman—as absolute End—*includes* all lower ends (अन्तर्भाव:).

[*Vide* the terms स्वार्थ and परार्थ explained in Chapter II of this book.]

[2] एकस्य अनेकात्मकत्वानुपपत्ते:, यथा समुद्रात्मना एकत्वं, फेन-तरङ्गाद्यात्मना अनेकत्वम्"—बृ° भा°, 2.1.14. Also *vide* बृ° भा°, 5.1.1.

the individuals be treated, in this system, as mere *parts* of an all-inclusive abstract whole. We have found that Brahman is a Reality which maintains its unity and identity *in* the multiplicity of the ever-changing, but inseparable, elements of the universe—which cannot therefore be taken as a "difference-less, empty, pantheistic void."

Brahma's 'nature'—It is (*a*) self-conscious and (*b*) self-determining power, and (*c*) is the supreme good.

11. We shall now proceed to show how Sankara has characterised the 'nature' of Brahman. In many parts of his commentaries, Sankara has made a very valuable observation which, we regret to note, seems to have escaped the attention of many critics of his Adwaita theory.

He has repeatedly stated, and drawn our special attention to, the important truth that 'unity' and 'multiplicity' cannot *both* be held to be equally true in respect of the same thing. If a particular object be 'one,' it cannot also be held to be its opposite, *i.e.* 'many.' Because, 'one,' and 'many' are of opposing characters and contradict one another. One cannot be put as a rival to the other; for, the claims of both cannot be adjusted. If a thing be possessed of several qualities or states, it cannot also be devoid of all qualities.[1] Brahman is a 'unity' and,

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[1] "न हि एकस्य ब्रह्मणः परिणामधर्म्मवत्त्वं, तद्रहितत्वञ्च शक्यं प्रतिपत्तुं" (वे° भा° 2.1.14).

"विशिष्टशक्तिमत्त्व-प्रदर्शनं, विशेष-प्रतिषेधश्च—इति विप्रतिषिद्धं" (गी°भा°, 12.1).

"न हि एकं वस्तु परमार्थतः कर्त्रादिविशेषवत्, तच्छून्यञ्च—उभयथा द्रष्टुं शक्यते" (तै°भा°, 1.11).

"न निरवयवेषु अनेकात्मकता शक्यते कल्पयितुं एकस्य" (वृ°भा°, 4.3.30).

"ननु एकत्वं नानात्वञ्च—उभयमपि सत्यमेव ? नैवंस्यात्" (वे°भा°, 2.1.14).

as such, it retains that character, throughout, under all circumstances.[1] It cannot be reduced to the multiplicity of the transformations which are produced out of it. Such being the case, the multiplicity which is working in the world indicates the *presence* of a unity behind it and this unity cannot be phenomenalised. For, it is the presupposition of the 'many,' and its presence and operation are necessary to connect the 'many' to it.[2] The multiplicity of transformations issuing out of the 'unity' is not, therefore, of *equal* value,[3] though inseparable [4] from it. The 'many' are the expressions or manifestations of the 'one,' without which the real nature of 'unity' could not have been comprehended.[5]

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[1] "यद्धर्मको यः पदार्थः प्रमाणेन अवगतो भवति, स देशकालावस्थान्तरेष्वपि, तद्धर्मक एव भवति"—(बृ°भा°, 2.1.20).

[2] "सामान्यं हि विशेषान् आत्मस्वरूपप्रदानेन बिभर्त्ति।" (बृ°भा°, 1.6.1). अन्वयिद्रव्यमेव सर्व्वत्र कारणं भवति—सर्व्वेषु विकारेषु अन्वयविच्छेददर्शनात्।" "न हि कारणोपष्टम्भमन्तरेण अविभ्रंश्यमानं कार्य्यस्यात्मनमुत्सहते"। (छा°भा°, 6.7.1, and (वे° 2,3.14),

[3] "न चात्र उभावपि भेदाभेदौ श्रुतिस्तुल्यवत् व्यपदिशति"—(वे°भा°, 3.2.29). Sankara elsewhere observes that there can be no co-ordination (सामानाधिकरण्य) between the one and the many. 'सर्व्वं ब्रह्मेति च सामानाधिकरण्यात्···नानारसः विचित्र आत्मेति आशङ्का भवति, तां निवर्त्तयितुमाह" (वे°, 1.3.1).

[4] सामान्ये हि तद्विशेषाः प्रोताः (गौ°भा°, 7.7, and बृ° भा°)। "यस्य च यस्मादात्मलाभोभवति, स तेन अप्रविभक्तो दृष्टः, यथा घटादीनां मृदा" (बृ° भा°, 1.6.1).

[5] *Cf.* "स प्राणमसृजत इति। तत्र हि आत्मचैतन्यज्योति रभिव्यक्ततरम्"—इत्यादि (बृ°भा°, 4.4.2). Also *vide* बृ° 2.5.19. "यथा···संख्यास्वरूप-परिज्ञानाय रेखाध्यारोपणं कृत्वा···अवगमयति संख्यास्वरूपमेव केवलं; न तु संख्यायारेखात्मत्वमेव" (बृ°भा°, 4.4.25).

Nature of Brahman.

With these general observations, we come now to consider how Sankara has characterised the nature (स्वरूप) of Brahman.

1. Brahman—is a self-conscious subject (ज्ञाता)—

(*a*) We can, to a certain extent, learn the nature of Brahman by discovering the nature of ourselves—our own self. The self of man is in essence one, but yet this unity is manifested in several cognitive states and functions. Consciousness is our essence, and it is really the consciousness of Brahman, and it is this consciousness within whose embrace we live.[1] Whenever an object is presented to our senses, we immediately come to be conscious of it. That an object of consciousness is there, and yet we are not conscious of it—is a contradiction.[2] But the objects of consciousness may change, one object may succeed another, but the subject (ज्ञाता) which is conscious of these changing objects does not change. It underlies, unaffected, all its conscious states, hidden behind them.[3]

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[1] "चैतन्यञ्च अविशिष्टं जीवेश्वरयोः, यथा अग्नि-स्फुलिङ्गयो रैक्यम्" (वे° भा°, 2.3.43). "चैतन्यमेव हि अस्य (जीवस्य) स्वरूपं, अग्नेरिव औष्ण्य-प्रकाशौ (2.3.29).

"सुषुप्तौ—प्राज्ञेन आत्मना सम्परिष्वक्तस्य" (2.3.40). "ब्रह्मैव तु एकमनपायि सुषुप्ति-स्थानं (3.2.7).

[2] वेदितुरात्मा ब्रह्मैव इति वेदान्तानां निर्द्धारितोऽर्थः।"—(केन° वा° भा°, 2.1).

"सर्व्ववस्तूनां अज्ञातसत्ताऽभावात्"। "स्वरूपव्यभिचारिषु पदार्थेषु चैतन्यान्व्यभिचारात्, यथा यथा यो यो पदार्थः विज्ञायते, तथा तथा ज्ञायमानत्वादेव तस्य तस्य चैतन्यस्य अव्यभिचारित्वं। व्यभिचरति तु ज्ञानं ज्ञेयं न व्यभिचरति कदाचिदपि"—प्र°भा°।

"यो यस्य विषयः, न तेन हीयते वर्द्धते वा" (मा°भा°)।

[3] "स्वरूपव्यभिचारिषु पदार्थेषु चैतन्यस्य अव्यभिचारात्"—मा° भा°। "न अभिव्यक्ति-साधनापेक्षता, नित्याभिव्यक्तत्वात्"—वृ° भा°, 4.4.6. "देहेन्द्रियाद्युपाधिभिः स्वरूपतिरोभावः।"

(*b*) Consciousness which is our essence is constant. It retains its own character always. The particular states of consciousness (विशेषविज्ञान) are the modes which are evoked from it by its connection with the external objects.[1] And whenever these are produced, they appear permeated by, and embraced within, the Consciousness,[2] and what is pervaded must lie *within* the pervader.[3] These particular modes or the cognitive states are included within the consciousness itself. They are felt as its *objects* (विषयभूता उत्पद्यमाना:), and the conscious subject (ज्ञाता) remains unaffected by them (यो यस्य विषय:, न तेन क्षीयते वर्द्धते...वा).

(*c*) The presence of a conscious subject, the "I," thus accompanies each of our particular states whenever they are produced.[4] This "I" is present in all our acts

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[1] सर्व्वा भूतभौतिकमात्रा अस्य 'संसर्ग'-कारणभूता विद्यन्ते"—वृ° भा°, 4.3.9. बुद्ध्याद्युपाधियोगात् 'उद्भूतस्य' विशेषविज्ञानस्य"—वे° भा°, 3.2.34. "उपाधि-'सम्बन्धजातं' विशेषात्मस्वरूपं···अन्त:करणगता'भिव्यक्ति-विशेषविज्ञानं' उत्सृज्य, स्वाभाविके अविशेषे आत्मनि वर्त्तते—वृ° भा°, 2.1.18. "चैतन्यरूपतया अविशिष्टेन, भूतमात्रा-'संसर्गेण' लब्धविशेषविज्ञाना सती"—छा° भा°, 6.3.2. "अविज्ञात्मनि हि निरुपाधिके प्राणाद्युपाधि-'कृता' विशेषा: वस्तुमात्ररूपेण हि...उपाधिविशेष-'जनितानि विशेषणानि व्याप्नोति"—वृ°,1.4.7. "अन्यसंयोगनिमित्तं कालुष्यं हित्वा" (वृ°,4.3.6).

[2] "आत्मन: स्वरूपं ज्ञप्ति:। तथापि बुद्धे:···चक्षुरादिद्वारै:...ये शब्दाद्याकाराव-भासा: ते आत्मविज्ञानस्य 'विषयभूता' उत्पद्यमाना एव आत्मविज्ञानेन 'व्याप्ता' उत्पद्यन्ते"—तै° भा°, 2.1.

[3] 'अन्यत् व्याप्यं, अन्यच्च व्यापकं। न हि तेनैव तत् व्याप्यते—वृ° भा°, 4.4.6.

[4] "तस्मादशेषसाक्षी, परमात्मै'वाहमर्थ' इत्युचितम्।"..."तस्मात् सर्व्वशरीरे-'ष्वहमह' मित्येव भासते स्पष्ट:। य: प्रत्ययो विशुद्ध:, तस्य ब्रह्मैव भवति मुख्योऽर्थ:" —'स्वात्मनिरूपणम्' 87 and 88. "सर्व्वदु:खविनिर्म्मुक्त-चैतन्यात्मक: 'अह' मित्येष आत्मानुभव: (वे° भा°, 4.1.2).

"सर्व्वत्र अव्यभिचारात् 'ब्रह्मस्वरूपस्य' सत्यत्वं...जाग्रदादिस्थानेषु एक एवात्मा अव्यभिचारी य: प्रत्ययस्तेन अनुसरणीयम्" (मा° का° भा°, 1.7). "कथ'मह'

of consciousness, without being itself an *object* of consciousness.[1] It manifests itself as knower, at the time it manifests its states or its objects.[2] The cognitive states are variable, being determined by stimulating objects[3] ; but the underlying conscious subject does not change. For, if it were to change itself, who is to know these changing states ? [4] It is the constant factor in us,

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मदोऽद्राच्च 'मह' मिदं स्पृशामीति...एकस्मिन्नसति प्रत्यभिज्ञाप्रत्ययः स्यात्"—इत्यादि (वे° भा°, 2.2.25).

[1] "चक्षुरादिव्यापारानुमितास्तित्वं प्रत्यगात्मानं, न 'विषयभूतं' ये विदुः" (बृ°, 4.4.18).

"'विषयीक्रियन्ते' तु वाह्याध्यात्मिकानि भूतभौतिकानि चैतन्येन" (वे° भा°, 3.3.54).

"सर्व्वबोधान् प्रति बुध्यते 'सर्व्वप्रत्ययदर्शी' चिच्छक्तिस्वरूपमात्रः, प्रत्ययैरेव प्रत्ययेषु अविशिष्टतया लक्ष्यते, नान्यद्द्वारमात्मनो विज्ञानाय" (के° भा°, 2.4).

[2] "अस्ति अनेकार्थदर्शी विज्ञानव्यतिरिक्त आत्मा (बृ°, 4.3.7)."

"सर्व्वे प्रत्यया विषयीभवन्ति यस्य स आत्मा।...सर्व्वप्रत्ययदर्शित्वे च उपजनापाय-वर्ज्जितदृक्स्वरूपतानित्यत्वं निर्विशेषैकत्वञ्च—के° भा°, 2.4)."

"देहादिलक्षणान् रूपादींश्च...देहादिव्यतिरिक्तेनैव विज्ञानस्वभावेन आत्मानं विजानाति (कठ° भा°, 4.3)." "येषां निराकारं ज्ञानं तेषामपि ज्ञानवशेव (*i.e.* ज्ञातृवशेव) ज्ञेयावगति रिति ज्ञानमत्यन्त प्रसिद्धं—गी° भा°, 18-50)."

"विज्ञानस्वरूपस्यैव अविक्रियस्य 'विज्ञातृत्वोपचारात्" (गी° भा°, 13.2).

'न हि प्रदीपः स्वरूपाभिव्यक्तौ प्रकाशान्तरमन्यतोऽपेक्षते स्वतो वा' (के° वा° भा°, 1.4).

[3] कारकव्यापार (*vide* वे° भा°, 2.1.18).

[4] चैतन्याव्यतिरेकेणैव हि कलाः जायमानास्तिष्ठन्त्यः (प्रलीयमानाश्च) सर्व्वदा लक्ष्यन्ते। अतएव भ्रान्ताः...चैतन्यमेव प्रतिक्षणं जायते नश्यतीति—इत्यादि प्र° भा°, 6.2).

"अन्यथा द्रष्टृ-दृश्ययोरसजातीयत्वाङ्गीकारे, द्रष्टुः परिणामित्वात् धीवत्, साक्षिता न स्यात्। यस्मात् साक्षी एवात्मा...न परिणामी" (उप° साह°, रामतीर्थटीका, 1514).

"अवस्थात्रयसाक्षी एक अव्यभिचारी, अवस्थात्रयेण व्यभिचारिणा न संस्पृश्यते (वे° भा°, 2.1.9).

not determined by anything else (निमित्तान्तर निरपेक्ष). It is our *true* self, and the particular states constitute our ordinary empirical-self. The latter is really the 'object' of the former.[1] We are thus finite and infinite in our nature,—a combination of subject and object.[2] It is the infinite lying hidden in us which, as an End, moves us towards its fulfilment or realisation.

From these considerations, we come to the following conclusions:—

(*i*) As Brahman has no *other* cause of itself and is thus self-caused; so it has no *other knower* of itself: It is self-knower. As it is the knower of all, its knowability is not dependent on anything else. It knows itself: It is thus the absolute knower.[3] If it be an *object* of a conscious subject *other* than itself, it would he dependent upon that. Its self-subsisting independence would vanish: it would not be a self-explanatory principle. That which is determined by something other than itself cannot be regarded as the first knower. But Sankara has defined Brahman as 'that

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[1] 'सर्व्वोजन्तुः 'अहं परमात्मेति' न गृह्णाति।—अनात्मानं देहेन्द्रियादिसंघातं आत्मनो 'दृश्यमान' मपि (*i.e.* its object) घटादिवत्, आत्मत्वेन...दर्शनश्रवणादिकर्म्मा इति गृह्णाति' (कठ° भा°, 3.12).

[2] (*a*) "एवं मनोमयादिभिः पूर्व्वपूर्व्वव्यापिभिः उत्तरोत्तरैः सूक्ष्मैः आनन्दमयान्तैः ...आत्मवन्तः सर्व्वे प्राणिनः: (*b*) तथा स्वाभाविकेनापि...अविकृतेन...पञ्चकोषातिगेन...आत्मवन्तः (तै°, 2.3). Again—(*a*) स पुरुषः क्षेत्रज्ञः भूतमात्रा-संसर्गवशात्...प्रविभक्तः (*i.e.* अन्यत्व). (*b*) स पुरुषः स्वेन स्वाभाविकेन आत्मना सम्परिष्वक्तः एकीभूतः सर्व्वात्मा...न बाह्यं किञ्चन सुखीत्यादि वेद (वृ°, 4.3.21). Again—(*a*) द्रष्टुरनन्यत्वदर्शनार्थं भूमैव निर्दिश्यते अहङ्कारेण. (*b*) अहङ्कारेण देहादिसंघातोपि आदिश्यते अविवेकिभिः (छा° भा°, 7.25 and 26).

[3] Otherwise अनवस्था (regressus ad infinitum) would arise. "सर्व्वात्मनो ज्ञातुः ज्ञात्रन्तराभावः" (के° वा° भा°, 1.4).

which is in itself and is conceived through itself.' If it has another knower, it must fail to be a self-determined and self-conscious principle.[1] Sruti has declared therefore—

विज्ञातारं मरे केन विजानीयात् ?

(*ii*) *Our* knowledge, as we have already seen, is dependent on, and determined by, the object[2] which is 'other' than us, which is outside [3] us. Our ज्ञातृत्व is thus variable and dependent. But the consciousness of Brahman is self-determined and self-sufficient (स्वयंसिद्ध, अत्यन्तप्रसिद्ध)[4]; it is not produced or determined by something *other than itself*. In the earlier part of this chapter it has been pointed out that it produces its object from out of itself, and therefore its object, the world,—is not something *other* (अन्य), but only itself.[5] It is thus a

[1] (*a*) यथा ज्ञेयं घटादिलक्षणं ज्ञाता ज्ञानेन व्याप्तुमिच्छति, तथा ज्ञानमपि (*i.e.* ज्ञातारमपि) ज्ञानान्तरेण (*i.e.* अन्येन ज्ञात्रा) ज्ञातव्यमाप्तुमिच्छेत् ? न चैतदस्ति। अतः अत्यन्तप्रसिद्धं ज्ञानं, ज्ञातापि अतएव प्रसिद्धएव (अत्यन्त-प्रसिद्ध—Self-sufficient, independent, self-determined and self-conscious)—गी° भा°, 18. 50. "यदा हि सर्व्वं ज्ञेयं......तद्व्यतिरिक्तं ज्ञानं ज्ञातमेव (*i.e.* ज्ञातैव)—प्र° भा°, 6.2." "विज्ञानस्वरूपस्यैव 'विज्ञातृ'त्वोपचारात्—नैषदोषः—गी° 13.2.

(*b*) तद्ब्रह्म आत्मानमेव नित्यदृग्रूपं...अवेत् विदितवत्। ननु विप्रतिषिद्धं... विज्ञातु र्विज्ञानं ? न; एवं विज्ञानान्न विप्रतिषेधः। अन्यज्ञानानपेक्षत्वाच्च। न च द्रष्टुर्नित्यैव दृष्टि रित्येवं विज्ञाते, द्रष्टृविषयां दृष्टि मन्यां आकाङ्क्षते (बृ°, 1.4.10).

(*c*) विज्ञानग्रहणमात्र एव विज्ञानसाक्षिणो ग्रहणकाङ्क्षानुदयात् अनवस्था-प्रसङ्गानुपपत्तेः। स्वयं सिद्धस्य च साक्षिणो अप्रत्याख्येयत्वात्—वे° भा°, 2.2.28.

[2] "विषय-विषयि-सम्बन्धजनितः" (तै० भा०, 2.8).

[3] "देहादिवदेव चैतन्याद्व बहिरुपलभ्यमानत्वात्" (वे० भा०, 4.1.2).

[4] What is determined by something else can not be a self-determined and self-sufficient thing.

[5] "न नित्यस्य अमूर्त्तस्य...'संयोगज'-दृष्टाद्यनित्यधर्म्मवत्त्वं सम्भवति"

self-determined principle. In manifesting its object, it manifests itself ; in thinking of the world, it only thinks itself.[1] It is thus at once the subject and object of its thought.[2] We find therefore that Brahman is a self-conscious subject—the first knower.

We thus find that in Vedanta, Brahman is a self-conscious, self-determined subject.[3] It is not, as many hold, a "homogeneous impersonal intelligence."

II. Brahman—is Directive Power (प्रेरयिता)—

All the activities manifested in the world have behind them a unity which must be the *source*, of which they are the visible products ; and this source or power is realising itself *in* these activities. Sankara's arguments in proof of Brahman as the seat of power are well-known. They are :—

(*i*) Where regularity (नियमेन प्रवर्त्तनम्) and adaptability (रचना)[4]—are visible in any action, these marks indicate the presence and operation of a Director (अन्तर्यामी).[5]

(ऐ० भा० 4). "बोधश्च जायते विनश्यति च...तत्र एवं सति विक्रियात्मकः सावयवः अनित्य इत्यादयो दोषा न परिहर्त्तुं शक्यन्ते" (के० भा०, 2.4).

[1] *Cf.* "आत्मान मात्मना वेत्थ, सृजस्यात्मानमात्मना". Also *vide* ऐ°भा°,1.2.

[2] "अभिन्नः स्वाभाविकः, न विषय-विषयिसम्बन्धजनितः" (तै०, 2.8).

[3] In Sankara-bhásya, the terms अत्यन्तप्रसिद्ध, स्वसंसिद्ध—occur frequently. These term's, as we have already explained, mean—Not dependent on, not determined by, something *other* than itself. It is self-determined and hence self-conscious. For, the world is in reality not *other*, but itself. In knowing the world, it knows itself. Hence it is not determined by anything *other*, but itself.

N. B.—It is to be noted that this does not mean that Sankara has abolished the world. He simply holds it to be अनन्य from Brahman, from the पारमार्थिक standpoint.

[4] *i.e.* Adaptation of means towards an end—*i.e.* arrangement in a purposive way (विशिष्टकार्य्याभिमुखप्रवृत्ति—वे° भा°, 2.2.1).

[5] "अग्निवायुसूर्य्यादिकं जगत् अस्मादेव ब्रह्मणो बिभ्यत्, नियमेन स्वव्यापारे प्रवर्त्तते इति...ब्रह्म। एजयितृत्व मपीदं परमात्मन उपपद्यते, न वायुमात्रस्य" (वे° भा°, 1.3.39).

(*ii*) Where a combined activity (संहननम्) for a common purpose (एकार्थवृत्तित्वेन) is visible—where parts are mutually related and act in subordination of the whole—it is to be inferred that a purposive power is present and operative behind such activity—which (power—सामर्थ्य) has combined the elements and directs them for its own purpose.[1]

(*iii*) All material object *in activity* proves the presence of an intelligent principle as the source of these activities.[2]

(*iv*) In the Kena-bhāṣya, the true self is proved to be a Prayoktā (प्रयोक्ता) or Prerayitā (प्रेरयिता), and throughout this Upanishad, the real underlying self is regarded as a purpose—a will-power—the supreme End.[3]

[1] "नहि एषां 'परार्थानां' संहत्यकारित्वात् जीवनहेतुत्व मुपपद्यते। 'स्वार्थेन' असंहतेन केनचिदप्रयुक्तं संहताना मवस्थानं न दृष्टम्।...संहतविलक्षणेन तु सर्व्वे संहताः सन्तः प्राणादयः जीवन्ति। यस्य असंहतस्य अर्थे ..सर्व्वं व्यापारं कुर्व्वन् वर्त्तते संहतः सन्, स ततोऽन्यः" (कठ°, 5.5).

Also "ऐन्द्रियिकाश्चेष्टाः संहतैः कार्य्य-करणैर्निर्व्वर्त्त्यमाना दृश्यन्ते।—तच्च 'एकार्थ-वृत्तित्वेन' संहननं नान्तरेण चेतनमसंहतं सम्भवति" (तै° भा°, 2.7). "नहि मृदादयः···अचेतनाः...चेतनैरनधिष्ठिताः 'विशिष्टकार्य्याभिमुखप्रवृत्तयो' दृश्यन्ते" (वे° भा°, 2.2.2). 'संहतत्वाच्च पारार्थ्योपपत्तिः प्राणस्य"—वृ° भा°, 2.1.15. [This is the relation of 'End' and 'means.' As End, it is the organising principle, a Unity. As means, it is the factor of plurality (संहतानामनेकत्वोपपत्तिः)—which are moulded into this End.]

[2] "अचेतनप्रवृत्तिश्चेतनाधिष्ठाननिबन्धना अचेतनप्रवृत्तित्वात् रथादिवत्" (रत्नप्रभा).

"अचेतनस्य काष्ठलोष्ट्रसमस्य चेतनेनाप्रवर्त्तितस्य प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः" (वे° भा°, 3.2.38). *Vide* also वृ° भा°, 3.8.9, "तस्मात् (प्रशासनात्) सिद्धमस्य (अक्षरस्य) अस्तित्वम्"—इत्यादि.

[3] "संघातव्यतिरिक्तस्य स्वतन्त्रस्य 'इच्छामात्रेणैव' मन-आदि-प्रेषयितृत्वम्—इत्यस्य प्रदर्शनाय केनेषितमित्यादि विशेषणद्वयमुपपद्यते." And this purpose cannot

III. Brahman is the supreme End or the supreme Good (आनन्दस्वरूप)—

The varieties of pleasure, pain, etc., Sankara declares, which we find manifested in the world and which the जीवs enjoy show the constant presence of a perfect good which finds higher and higher realisation in them.[1]

Now, the readers will find from these discussions that all the phenomenal cognitions elicited from the self are premeated and pervaded by the eternal consciousness underlying them[2]; and the self is the *source* of all its visible activities in which the underlying power is manifesting itself partially. The self is, for this reason,

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be *resolved into* the activities of the organs, manas, body, etc. 'किं यथाप्रसिद्धमेव कार्य्य-करण-संघातस्य प्रेषयितृत्वम् ? '—इत्यादि. Prāṇa is the root-cause of all kinds of activities and the soul is the power *behind* this Prāṇa in activity. The source of all activities must itself be a Power. This Upanishad is invaluable, for it holds the soul to be will-power.

[1] 'परमानन्दस्यैव विषय-विषय्याकारेण मात्रा प्रसृता...परमानन्दस्य मात्रा अवयुत्वा ब्रह्मादिमनुष्यपर्य्यन्तेषु भूतेरूपजीव्यन्ते......आनन्दमात्राहारेण मानिवणमधिजिगमिषति" (बृ° भा°, 4.3.33). In छा° भाष्य, this good is called साधु. "साध्वर्थस्य लोकादिकार्य्येषु कारणस्य अनुगतत्वात् साधुशब्दवाच्यं...ब्रह्म वा लोकादिकार्य्येषु अनुगतम्"—2.2.1. Also *cf.* "सुखस्वरूपमात्मा प्रियादीनां सुखावयवानां तेषु अनुस्यूतत्वात्...कर्म्मणोऽनवस्थितत्वात् सुखस्य चणिकत्वं"—तै° भा°, 2.5. Here *cf.* "ईश्वरस्य कारणीभूते आनन्दाख्ये ब्रह्मणि...मुख्यं प्रवर्त्तकत्वं दर्शयति" (महाभारते नीलकण्ठ, वनपर्व्व, Chap. 213).

[2] "आत्मन: 'स्वरूपं'—ज्ञप्ति: । तथापि बुद्धे रूपाधिलच्चणाया: चक्षुरादिद्वारैर्विषयाकारेण परिणामिण्या: ये शब्दाद्याकारावभासा: (*i.e.*, cognitions or states of consciousness), ते...आत्मविज्ञानेन व्याप्ता एव उत्पद्यन्ते ।...तस्मात् विज्ञानशब्दवाच्या:, विज्ञानावभासाश्च ते" (तै॰ भा॰, 2.2). *Cf.* also "अन्यच्च व्याप्यं, अन्यत्-व्यापकं ; न तेनैव तत् व्याप्यते । कर्म्म हि कर्त्तु:क्रियया व्याप्यमानं भवति (बृ॰ भा॰, 4.4.6). "सर्व्वे प्रत्यया विषयीभवन्ति यस्य, स आत्मा सर्व्वप्रत्ययदर्शी" (कै॰ भा॰, 2.4).

characterised as *Sattā-sphurti-rūpah* (सत्ता-स्फूर्त्ति-रूप:).[1] It is partially manifest *in* its cognitions and in its activities, and in varieties of pleasure, pain, etc., and they are therefore regarded as a *means*—द्वारभूतानि—indicative marks—for the presence and operation of the underlying Rational power.[2]

It is very hard to believe how such broad and clear facts have escaped several writers who have, unjustly, exhibited Sankara's Brahman or the self as a mere "abstract intelligence" to the learned world.

The purpose or end of the creation.

12. We cannot conclude this chapter without recording Sankara's view on the purpose of the creation of the universe as stated by him in his commentaries. It has been shown above that in the System of Vedanta, it is held that Brahman has a 'nature,' a स्वभाव, a स्वरूप, of its own; and this nature cannot be resolved into anything else. *This nature (स्वभाव) is constant and does not vary*

[1] "सकलविकारानुस्यूत—सत्तास्फूर्त्तिरूप:—विकारोपमर्द्देन अनुमन्वेय:" (उप० सा०) (सत्ता=Being; स्फुर्त्ति=Active Power).

"निष्कलं निष्क्रियं...जगद्वीजप्रवर्त्तकं नियन्तृत्वात् अन्तर्यामिसंज्ञं भवति"—(ऐ० भा०)। "चेतनेनाप्रवर्त्तितस्य प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्ते:" (वे० भा०, 3.2.38.).

[2] So it is likened sometimes to the reflected image of the sun upon a surface of a lake. As the reflected image is an imperfect and partial expression of the sun which underlies the image; so the nature of the self is imperfectly and partially reflected or manifested in our cognitive states and activities, etc.—

अयं पुरुष: भूतमात्रासंसर्गत: प्रविभक्त: (अन्य इव separate) जलादौ चन्द्रादिप्रतिबिम्बवत्, कार्य्यकरणे इह प्रविष्ट:" (वृ० भा०, 4.2.21).

"तदन्त:करण-देहेन्द्रियोपाधिद्वारेणैव निर्द्दिश्यते 'विज्ञानादि'-शब्दै:।"

"अस्ति...सर्व्वान्तरतमं कूटस्थं...श्रोत्रादेरपि तत्-सामर्थ्यनिमित्तं। श्रोत्रादे:, स्वविषयव्यञ्जनसामर्थ्यं...चैतन्येऽसंहते सर्व्वान्तरे सति भवति, नासतीति" (केन० भा०, 1.2). *Cf.* "सोऽस्ति कार्य्यकरण संघातविलक्षण:, यश्चेष्टयति (वृ°, 3.8.8-9)."

under any circumstances. This nature remains identical, even in its relation with the things of the manifested world (उपाधियोगादपि). An object, Sankara remarks,[1] must have always *one* nature and one nature alone; it cannot have more than one nature. Otherwise, it would be impossible to recognise the object. Brahman is always a unity and it does not vary in its relation to any place, time, object or circumstances.

The diversities of the changing nāma-rūpas (नाम-रूपs) which have evolved and are still continuously evolving point, Sankara observes, to something beyond, as their *cause*; they cannot but indicate the presence of some conditioning activity which must have produced them—

"शुङ्गमुत्पतितं नेदममूलं भविष्यतीति" (छा० भा० quoted in वे० भा०, 4.3.14).

Again, these emerging changes point to some *final End* (उदर्क), towards which they are moving; they indicate the final stage, the complete realisation, of the purpose which has created them—

"उदर्कं तस्यैव जगन्मूलस्य 'विज्ञेयत्वं' [2]-दर्शयति"।

It is thus that Sankara states here the fact that the created world—the emerging changes—always carry with them the idea of a purpose *as yet unrealised*.[3] The

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[1] "एकस्य अनेक-स्वभावत्वानुपपत्तेः" (वे० भा०, 3.2.21).

"न तावत् स्वतएव परस्य ब्रह्मणः उभयलिङ्गत्व मुपपद्यते।...नहि उपाधियोगादपि अन्यादृशस्य वस्तुनः अन्यादृशः 'स्वभावः' सम्भवति" (वे० भा० 3.2.11).

"उपाधिनिमित्तस्य च 'वस्तुधर्म्मत्वा'नुपपत्तेः" (वे० भा०, 3.2.15).

[2] The term विज्ञेय used here and elsewhere means the End (as contrasted with the *means*). It is explained in the Gita-bhasya thus—

"ज्ञेयमेव ज्ञातं सत् ज्ञानफलं (End) भवति" (गी० भा०, 13. 17).

[3] "अेवमुत्पत्त्यादिश्रुतीनां निराकाङ्क्षार्थत्व-प्रतिपादनसामर्थ्यमस्ति" (वे० भा०, 4.3.14).

readers are requested to carefully mark the arguments employed by Sankara to establish this important position. He speaks of 'ज्ञेय' *i.e.*, Brahman (to be realised), as the *final end* of realisation--

"ज्ञानफलं भवति" ।—

that is to say, Brahman is *completely* realised in the *final* stage, and that is the final purpose or end of the created world.[1]

This truth is very distinctly explained in the Gita-bhasya—

"मया अध्यक्षत्वेन हेतुना चराचरं जगत्
विपरिवर्त्तते सर्व्वासु अवस्थासु" । (9.10.)

What do these emerging changes—परिवर्त्तनs—परिणामs of the world imply ? Whatever has been manifested in the world—all its व्यवहारs, *i. e.*, all its states, activities, the objects, in fact, everything of the world—all these are for—

"आत्मावगत्यवसानार्थत्वात् सर्व्वव्यवहारस्य"...,

i. e., "all these move towards the *final* realisation of the Atma. Brahman is the final End (अवसान), for the realisation of which, these changing manifestations are perpetually moving on.[2]

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[1] *Vide* Gita-bhasya, 13.17—"ज्ञेयमेव ज्ञातं सत् ज्ञानफलमिति 'ज्ञान-गम्य'मुच्यते." Brahman is the फल, *i.e.*, the final End. Hence it is that in Vedanta, it is called as पर्य्यन्त', *i. e.*, the last or final End. "अवगति-पर्य्यन्तं ज्ञानं, नातःपरं किञ्चित् ज्ञातव्यमस्ति." When this End is realised, there remains no further end for realisation, and our desires and aspirations get their fulfilment (वे° भा°, 1.1.1). "नातःपरं किञ्चित् आकाङ्क्ष्यमस्ति" (2.1.14). *It is the goal* where our *higher* and higher aspirations are finally fulfilled.

[2] The same idea is expressed in "आत्मावगत्यवसानार्थत्वात् सर्व्वव्यवहारः" (गीता भा°, 18.50). All our actions (प्रवृत्तयः) being परार्थ, they are for the realisation of the Power behind them—which is their अवसान, final End.

This is the purport, Sankara goes on to point out, of the creation mentioned in the Sruti-texts. When the *final stage* is reached, then and then alone the changing nāma-rūpas (नाम-रूपs) will reach the complete realisation of the purpose working behind them. Hence this आकाङ्क्षा *viz.,* this realisation of the final end or purpose is inherent —interwoven—into the structure of the created elements of the world. The creation is meant to show this important truth in the Sruti. It is *not* meant to show that the underlying Brahman is *identical* with the world, as if Brahman has no 'nature' of its own to realise.

We had occasion to point out above that in the Vedanta-System, we find mention of the four *typical* classes of Bijas (वीजs); and that these are characterised by growth and development, and this characteristic feature marks them out to be living individuals (जीवs).[1] In the Gita-bhāṣya, it is stated that they are continuous. This description of the Bijas (वीजs) clearly indicates that by them the different *grades* of finite individuals from the lowest to the highest are meant. Now, these continuously evolving higher and higher grades of the individuals are all interwoven in the Infinite Self (Brahman) which is always present behind them.[2] In the lower finite individuals, the Infinite is realised unconsciously.

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[1] "वीजं प्ररोहकारणं प्ररोहधर्म्मिणां।···न हि अवीजं किञ्चित् प्ररोहति। नित्यञ्च प्ररोहदर्शनात्, वीज-सन्तति न व्येति इति गम्यते" (गी°भा°, 9.18).

This term वीज is synonymous with the term भूत in the Gita; and the भूतs are described as जीवाधिष्ठितानां in 10.32. *Cf.* "वीजं मां सर्व्वभूतानां" (7.10). It is clear therefore that वीजs = भूतs = जीवs.

[2] "सर्व्वमिदं····· सर्व्वाणि भूतानि·····प्रोतमनुविद्ध मनुस्यूतं मयि परमेश्वरे" (गी०भा०, 7.7)। *Cf.* also: "सर्व्वे प्राणाः·····सर्व्व एते आत्मानः····· यस्मात् व्युच्चरन्ति···यदात्मकाश्च वर्त्तन्ते" (बृ० भा०, 2.1.20). Also बृ० भा०, 2.5.15. "तेषां पारम्पर्य्येण गत्या एकस्मिन् महासामान्ये अन्तर्भावः" (बृ°, 2.4.9).

It is only in man that the Infinite is present and is being realised consciously.

According to Sankara, then, this realisation of the Infinite in the world and in the finite human beings in higher and higher forms until the final stage is reached—is the purpose of the creation.[1]

[1] Such is the 'nature' or स्वभाव—of Brahman—"स्वभावादेव सम्भवति" (वे॰ भा॰, 2.1.33-34). "परिपूर्णशक्तिकन्तु ब्रह्म—अनपेक्ष्य वाह्यं साधनं—स्वयमेव परिणमते" (वे॰ भा॰, 2.1.24);

CHAPTER II

THE PURE EGO AS ACTIVE POWER.

The view that the Ego is not active,—how arose?

1. The individual ego, as depicted in the Adwaita philosophy, has given rise to several controversial points, as regards its nature and character, in certain quarters. Among other points, the most important controversy has gathered round the question of the 'activity' of the pure Ego. An idea prevails that in the Sankara system the Individual Ego, like Brahman, is merely an "abstract intelligence destitute of activity." How the idea arose we shall try to set forth. It was found out from the Bhásya that Sankara raised a clear voice of warning against ascribing the objective qualities to the subject; that as soon as it acquires an objective content, the "I" passes over into the *Me*. The Ego or subject is that through which we know all; it follows from this that it cannot itself become an object of knowledge. And because the self cannot be known, Sankara treated it as an "abstract concept, as pure knowledge or intelligence." This idea was strengthened and received an additional force when it was discovered that there were sentences in the Sankara-bhásya itself which unmistakably refuse to allow 'agency' to the Pure Ego. Take for instance such sentences as the following :—

> " न स्वाभाविकं कर्त्तृत्वं आत्मनः सम्भवति, अनिर्मोक्ष-
> प्रसङ्गात्। कर्त्तृत्वस्वभावत्वे हि आत्मनो, न कर्त्तृत्वा-
> न्निर्मोक्षः सम्भवति ; अग्नेरिव औष्ण्यात् "—
>
> वेदा० भाष्य, 2.3.40.

i.e., The self cannot be an agent; it is not active. If there be agency in the nature of the self, it can never free itself from it—no more than the fire can free itself from its heat. The activity does not really belong to the self, and if we could only realise this, we gain a true conception of the individual self.

Now, the natural consequence of these discoveries in the Sankara-bhásyas was not slow to make its appearance. The conclusion which the critics of the Sankara system drew from these, resolves itself into such a train of thoughts as this :—

"The idea of intelligence dissociated from the idea of activity is an idea which passes from the subjective order to the objective order. The self thus conceived merges necessarily in the univ ersal and it disappears into a pantheistic void.......We can only be sure of this pure Ego, not as an object, but as a subject *persistently active* so long as we have experience. But this activity Sankara denies to the self."

But the self which the critics of the Sankara-system have found out is not the true self at all according to Sankara as we shall presently see. Sankara is reluctant to call t'ais a self at all; he rather wants to call it a non-ego—अनात्मा.[1]

Sankara not only refuses to allow *agency* to *this* self, but he has refused to allow it *knowledge* also. For, all the elements which constitute this self are not *free* in their activities; the next term being given by the preceding

[1] "चलनात्मकस्य कर्म्मणः—अनात्मकर्तृकस्य—'अहं करोमी'ति प्रवृत्ति-दर्शनात्" (गी० भा०, 18.66). "देहादिसंघाते 'अहं' प्रत्ययो मिथ्या"—*Ibid.* It is called अनात्मा because it is the product of interaction with the Non-Ego "चलिक्रिया तु प्राणस्यैव मन-आदिषु" (कै० बा० भा, 1.1).

which determines its action.[1] And the states constituting this self have borrowed their consciousness from the *true conscious self* which is present *behind* them.[2]

The empirical, actual self and the transcendental, true self: The transcendental self is the true 'agent.'

2. We propose in this chapter to consider carefully the view if in Sankara's system, he regards the Pure Ego merely as an "abstract intelligence," and whether it is active or not. It is needless to say that there is hardly any justification for this belief in the writings of Sankara himself. Let us now proceed to consider what evidence the Bhāṣyas themselves offer which show that the individual Ego has ever been regarded by Sankara as "dissociated from activities."

The finite self is *ordinarily* regarded as a self-contained entity existing on its own account. It is merely a bundle of passive feelings and states, and possesses a fund of impulses and passions which constitute the source of its physical and mental movements or activities. It is continuous with, and a part of, the external nature which has equipped it with its organs of sense and the nervous system. When the organs of sense come in contact with the external environment (विषयेन्द्रिय-सम्पर्क), the latter evokes certain states and activities in the former, and these actions

[1] "विक्रियावतो हि अन्यैः संहननं सम्भवति ; संहत्य वा 'कर्त्तृत्व" स्यात् । न तु अविक्रियस्य आत्मनः केनचित् संहननमस्तीति, न सम्भूय 'कर्त्तृत्व'मुपपद्यते" (गी० भा०, 18.17).

[2] "अन्तर्गतेन नित्यविज्ञानस्वरूपेण—स वाह्यो बुद्ध्यात्मा अनित्यविज्ञान आत्मा अभ्युपगतः" (केन-वा° भा०, 1. 4). "देहादिसंघातस्य शब्दादिस्वरूपत्वाविशेषात् विज्ञेयत्वाविशेषाच्च, न युक्तं 'विज्ञातृत्वं'। तस्मात् देहादिलक्षणान् विज्ञानस्वभावेन आत्मना विजानाति' (काठ० भा०, 4.3)."

and reactions constitute the self.[1] This is the actual empirical self. According to Sankara, it is not the real self ; and he calls it—

" कर्त्तृत्व-भोक्तृत्व-विशिष्ट जीवः "

and

" आत्मा अपरमार्थः " ।[2]

The *agency* disclosed in its activities is not the true agency at all ; for, all the elements constituting this agency (कर्त्तृत्व) determine, and are determined by, one another in an unbroken series of mechanical causality.[3] What this self does at the present moment is but the necessary outcome of his motive and character (प्रकृति) and habit formed in the past—

" एषणा...कामः, येन प्रयुक्तः अवश इव...बहिर्मुखः,
न स्वं लोकं प्रतिजानाति "

(वृह° भाष्य, 1.4.17).

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[1] " श्रोत्रादीनि इन्द्रियाणि...मात्राः। मात्राणां स्पर्शाः—शब्दादिभिः संयोगः।" (गी० भा०)। "विषयेन्द्रियोपाधि-सम्बन्ध-जनितेन अन्तःकरणगताभिव्यक्त-विशेष-विज्ञानेन विज्ञानमयस्तां बुद्धिं व्याप्नोति" (वृ० भा०, 2.1.17). शब्देन विषयेण श्रोत्रमिन्द्रियं दीप्यते...गन्धादिभिरपि घ्राणादिषु अनुग्रहीतेषु...मनसि...प्रवृत्ति-निवृत्त्यादयो भवन्ति " (वृ०, 4.3.6).

[2] Sankara calls this self as "भूतमात्रासंसर्गजनितः " and "मनोमयादि-पञ्चकोषविशिष्टः." This is regarded by him as *passive* self, and the real self is what underlies it. " करणानि हि मन-आदीनि नियमेन प्रवर्त्तन्ते ; तत्, न असति चेतनावति अधिष्ठातरि उपपद्यते " (कैन० वा० भा०, 1.1).

[3] "चक्षुरादीनि एव दर्शनादिक्रियाकर्त्तृणीति चेत् ? न। भिन्नकर्त्तृत्वे प्रतिसन्धानानुपपत्तिः। मनसोऽपि विषयत्वात् (ज्ञेयत्वात्), द्रष्टृत्वाद्यनुपपत्तिः।... तस्मात् अन्तःस्थं 'व्यतिरिक्तं' ज्योतिः (*i.e.*, true Atma)" (वृ० भा०, 4.3.6).

i.e., he is a slave of impulses and instincts which move in him and sway him hither and thither ; these impulses move him to act in the direction of their guidance. He has no eye to look to the *other path*.

This self is not free to choose the *end* of his life—

"पुरुषार्थसाधनप्रतिपत्तौ असामर्थ्यं परवशीकृतचित्तस्य"।

(बृ० भा०, 4.3.35)

Brahman is revealed in man as infinite ideal—infinite ज्ञानैश्वर्य—and it is the moving power.

But, Brahman indwells and is revealed in man in the form of infinite "ज्ञानैश्वर्य" hidden in him—in the form of infinite ideal of truth, beauty and goodness.[1] These indwelling ज्ञानैश्वर्यs—these Ideals—are gradually being revealed in man in higher and higher form and they are carrying the man to infinite possibilities in future. The infinite Brahman is thus immanent in man and it is for this presence that we do not feel content with our actual situation (विषय-विरक्ति) and seek higher and higher ends.

The ज्ञान-शक्ति-सौन्दर्य, etc., as we *actually* find them manifested in human nature are all imperfect, broken and fragmentary. But the ज्ञानैश्वर्य—which lies hidden deep behind in man is infinite and inexhaustible, and hence the two cannot be identified. Yet we identify the two, and the indwelling infinite ज्ञानैश्वर्य which constitutes the *real self* and which is the moving force within us becomes concealed, and the actual human nature as expressed in

[1] "जीवस्य ज्ञानैश्वर्य्य-तिरोभाव:, देहेन्द्रिय-मनोबुद्धिविषयवेदनायोगात्"

(वे० भा०, 3.2.6).

"स्वरूपस्य अनपायित्वात्,...उपाधिकृतस्वरूप-तिरोभावात्" (वे० भा०, 3.2.35)

"प्राकृतविषयविकारविज्ञानैः प्रच्छन्नम्" (काठ० भा० 2.12).

deeds and words is all-in-all to us, and future possibilities are shut out.[1]

But the pursuit of knowledge more and more, the quest of beauty in higher and higher forms which no finite objects of the world can perfectly satisfy, our infinite capacity and work for higher and higher ends, our dissatisfaction with mundane goods—all these prove the presence of Brahman in us in a newer way, such that it was never present in the lower animals in the same manner. Sankara points out—

> " The supreme self is *revealed* in the spirit of man in a higher and superior form. It is for this presence that man ever wants to *know* more and more, and by mundane means ever to reach what is supra-mundane."
>
> "प्राधान्यात्। किं पुनः प्राधान्यं पुरुषे ?—कर्मज्ञानाधिकारः। पुरुष एव हि शक्तत्वात्, अर्थित्वात्, अपर्युदस्तत्वाच्च—अर्थी, विद्वान्, समर्थः...पुरुषे त्वेव आविस्तरामात्मा। स हि प्रज्ञानेन सम्पन्नतमः विज्ञातं पश्यति श्वस्तनं...मर्त्येन अमृतमीप्सति[2]। अथ इतरेषां पशूनां अशना-पिपासे एव अभिविज्ञानं"।—
>
> (तैत्ति° भाष्य, 2.1.)

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[1] No one of its *actual* expressions can fix the infinite *possibilities* of the self in a rigid and *final* form. The Gita has condemned the idea of fixing or identifying the infinite possibility with its actual expressions—as—तामसिक। "यत्तु ज्ञानं कृत्स्नवत्,...'एतावानेव आत्मा ईश्वरो वा नातः परमस्तीति'...तामसानामेव ईदृशं ज्ञानं दृश्यते" (गी°, 18.22). *Vide* also वे° सूत्र, 3,2,22 "प्रकृतैतावत्त्वं प्रतिषेधति"।

[2] The implication of the term श्वस्तनं is that you cannot keep a man satisfied with the knowledge of *to-day*, he will seek for the knowledge of *to-morrow* and so on. मर्त्येन अमृतं—implies, he will seek the supra-mundane End, through the mundane means;—you cannot keep him content with what is mundane only. We have translated the passage accordingly.

Then again—

" पूर्व्व-पूर्व्व-प्रवृत्तिनिरोधेन, उत्तरोत्तरापूर्व्व-
प्रवृत्तिजननस्य प्रत्यगात्माभिमुख्येन प्रवृत्त्यादनार्थत्वात् " ।—
(गी° भाष्य, 18.66).

i.e., " By higher and higher *works* and *pursuits*, man desires to realise higher and higher *ends*, until all his pursuits are directed to the realisation of the supreme End."

And he further adds that—

" to other animals, their knowledge and action are limited to present eating and enjoyment."

Brahman thus indwells in us as an Ideal or End and this End is the 'higher self'—the real 'nature' of man. This 'nature' underlies all his manifested states and activities. This End or Purpose lying hidden in man carries the man to infinite possibilities in future. To quote a typical illustration [1] from the Vedānta—

As मृत्तिका (a lump of earth) moves to realise its future ideal घट (the earthen jar), which lies hidden in its nature; so the ideal which is inherent in man's nature gradually works out its end.

this end is thus the moving force or the *real agent* in man—

" सर्व्वप्रवृत्तीनामात्मावगत्यवसानार्थत्वात् " [2]

i.e., the realisation of Brahman in our self—the ब्रह्मात्मैकत्व—is the पुरुषार्थ or the final end of our life.

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[1] *Vide* Chap. III of this book for an elaboration of this.

[2] *Cf.* also—" अन्त्यमिदं प्रमाणं...नातः परं किञ्चित् 'आकाङ्क्ष्य' मस्ति " (वे° भा°, 2.1.14).

" ब्रह्मावगतिर्हि पुरुषार्थः, 'अवगतिपर्य्यन्तं' ज्ञानं " (1.1.1).

" नहि एकत्वाद्यवगतौ सत्यां...पुरुषार्थसमाप्तिबुद्ध्युत्पत्तेः " (4.3.14).

This is called 'पर्य्यन्त,' *i.e.*, the final End. " ज्ञेयमेव ज्ञातं सत् " 'ज्ञानफलं' भवति " (गी° भा°, 13.17) ।

Now, this 'higher self' or the End is our real self lying behind our states and activities. It is present as Purposive Power or End of our life.[1] It is not a slave like the empirical self, but is the true determining agent. It is not in time-series, but above it. It can introduce a new element or a difference in the time-series. Its actions are not determined by antecedents in time. It can direct the natural courses of the functions of its organs and lead them to the realisation of its own 'purpose'—

"स्वाभाविकात् कार्य्यकरणप्रवृत्तिनिरोधात्
विमुखीकृत्य, प्रत्यगात्मस्रोततया प्रवर्त्तयति"।
(वेदा° भाष्य, 1.1.4).

"कार्य्य-करण-संघातस्य स्वभावेन सर्व्वतः
प्रवृत्तस्य—सन्मार्गे एव निरोधः"।
(गी° भा°, 13.7).

Distinction between स्वार्थ (Purpose or End) and परार्थ (Means) between self and not-self.

3. Here in this connection, we should like to invite our readers' attention to an invaluable opinion of Sankara which occurs frequently in his Bhāṣyas. We mean how Sankara has drawn out a distinction between the respective characteristics of the Intelligent self (चेतन) and the non-intelligent elements of nature (अचेतन). The readers would do well to bear these characteristic features carefully in their minds. Sankara has characterised the चेतन or the Intelligent Self as स्वार्थ (*swārtha*), that is to say—it exists *for itself* and it has the *purpose* or the reason of its existence in itself. The चेतन is always described as स्वतः सिद्ध or नित्यसिद्ध,—*i.e.*, it is self-existent and self-sufficient and

[1] These states and activities cannot *really conceal* it.

"संघातव्यतिरिक्तस्य स्वतन्त्रस्य इच्छामात्रेणैव मन-आदिप्रेषयितृत्वं...संहतानां परार्थत्वात्" (केन भाष्य, 1.1).

does not depend for its existence on any other thing. In contrast with this characteristic mark of the चेतन, he has called the अचेतन or the material elements as परार्थ (*Parārtha*),—*i.e.*, existing and working *for something else* which is distinct from them in its nature; or in other words, which work and exist for the 'purpose' of something *other than* these elements. Sankara has pointed out the fact that the अचेतन has no purpose *of its own*—

"अचेतने स्वार्थानुपपत्तेः।" (ब्र° भा° 4.3.7).

He has thus described the nature of 'purpose' inherent in Brahman—

"स्वात्मनोऽनन्या: कामा:"। [1]

"न हि कामयितृ अचेतनमस्ति"।

As *our* uncontrolled human desires and purposes are dependent on, and determined by, their *extraneous* stimulating causes; as these, when produced, master us;—such are not the *purposes* of Brahman, which are अनन्य (*ananya*) from its nature, *i.e.*, not distinct or separable from the nature of Brahman.

The desires of living beings do not appertain to self, and require motives like virtue, etc., in the accomplishment of objects *distinct* from the self. But Brahman's wishes or purposes are prompted by no such motives, nor is Brahman influenced by them; because its purposes are *not distinguishable* from it.[2]

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[1] "यथा अन्यान् परवशीकृत्य कामादय: प्रवर्त्तयन्ति, न तथा ब्रह्मण: प्रवर्त्तका: कामा:। कथं तर्हि? स्वात्मभूतत्वाद्विशुद्धा:।...यथा अन्येषामनात्मभूता: निमित्तापेक्षा:...स्वात्मव्यतिरिक्ता:···साधनान्तरापेक्षाश्च, न तथा ब्रह्मण:। कथं तर्हि? स्वात्मनोऽनन्या:" (तै° भाष्य, 2.6).

[2] These purposes are Divine Ideas which are elsewhere called as सामान्यs subsumed under and organised by the highest सामान्य।—*Vide* Chap. 1, pp. 60-61, of this book.

To recognise the character of a man—his will—we must find the expression of his will in *action.* Brahman is best apprehended by our mind through its self-manifestation,—through the manifestation and expression of its purposes in the created world. Apart from its self-manifestation, Brahman for human thought tends to become a metaphysical abstraction. A Divine purpose is constantly working out and gradually developing from within and the world is progressively working out a purpose—a plan which is fulfilling itself in and through the order of nature.

Now, manifested nature and its elements, being परार्थ, are not self-sufficient and independent at all, but are constantly dependent on the self whose purpose they fulfil. They have only an instrumental value;—they are mere *means* through which the purpose of the self is constantly realised. If you deny this, " what are really परार्थ in their nature would themselves become स्वार्थ and would therefore be meaningless "—

" स्वार्थाः सर्व्वाः प्रवृत्तयः व्यर्थाः प्रसज्येरन् "

(गी° भा°, 18.50).

" Pleasure and pain and the like would, in that case, work and exist for the sake of pleasure and pain and the like "—

" न च देहाद्यचेतनार्थत्वं शक्यं कल्पयितुं ।

न च सुखार्थं सुखं, दुःखार्थं वा दुःखं " ।

From these observations of Sankara, it irresistibly follows that the world and the differentiations visible in the world are to be regarded as a means or instruments for the realisation of the Divine purpose; that a Divine purpose is realising itself gradually through the differences or stages of nature.

The important truth just noted can also be gathered from Sankara's comment on the Vedānta-sutra (4.3.14). In this commentary, Sankara shows Brahman to be the supreme goal or end. When this goal is reached, all our desires are satisfied and no *further* desire arises beyond this—

"न भूयः काचित् आकाङ्क्षा उपजायते,
पुरुषार्थसमाप्ति-श्रुतेः" ।

Here, in Brahman,—the *end* of human aspirations finds its *final* satisfaction. Thus the Vedāntic चेतन ब्रह्म, is to be always thought of as a Purpose or End.[1]

But Sankara observes in the same commentary that it is otherwise with the created elements of the world—

"नैवमुत्पत्त्यादिश्रुतीनां निराकाङ्क्षत्व—
प्रतिपादनसामर्थ्यमस्ति" ;—

that is to say, the idea of the *final* End, the idea of the final realisation—is not to be expected *within* the sphere of created nature and in its elements. For, this idea lies *beyond* them. As the process of the world is progressively moving [2] to the final goal which lies *beyond* it, no one of its elements can give us the *final* satisfaction. This remark implies that nature is परार्थ (*parārtha*)—a *means*—for the realisation of the final goal or end ; for, it gives rise to the idea of something which lies as its *source* and which also lies as its final *goal* towards which it is moving.[3]

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[1] Which is being gradually realised in the changing elements of the world and which is constantly directing them to their *final* goal.

[2] "चित्तोपाधिविशेषतारतम्यात्......आत्मनः......एकरूपस्यापि.....उत्तरोत्तर-माविष्कृतस्य तारतम्य मैश्वर्यशक्तिविशेषैः (वे° भा°, 1.1.11).

[3] "नैवमुत्पत्त्यादिश्रुतीनां नैराकाङ्क्ष्य-प्रतिपादनसामर्थ्यमस्ति । तथाहि··· नेदममूलं भविष्यति इति उपन्यस्य, उद्र्के सतएव एकस्य जगन्मूलस्य 'विज्ञेयत्वं'

The finite self is स्वार्थ (End or purpose) and its organism is परार्थ (A means).

4. The readers perhaps remember that in Chap. I, we have found that our idea of the *conditioned* is composed of (1) some kinds of being (सामान्य) and (2) the conditions or limits (विशेष—विकार) under which they are known. All these definite individual beings are *qualitatively* distinct in our consciousness and are all relative realities. These relative realities can be conceived only in connection with an absolute Reality. Sankara has shown that 'those who wish to produce certain effects, such as curds, jars, etc., employ for their purpose certain *determined causal substances*, such as milk, clay, etc. Each causal substance has a certain *capacity* for some particular effects only and not for other effects;—this capacity is the certain *Power* of the cause.'[1] We have seen that the *effects* are the means for the realisation of the *End* or the purpose working within, and each of the *definite causes* are but the *proximate ends* and these are all subservient to a *single ultimate end*.[2] It shows an *immanent* unifying power realising purpose;—it is a power *differentiating* its parts

दर्शयति" (वे° भा°, 4.3.14) । *i.e.*, The manifested or created elements invariably involve the idea of a Purpose or End (विनियत्व) *beyond* them, which has not been realised *as yet*.

[1] "दधिघटरुचकाद्यर्थिभिः प्रतिनियतानि कारणानि क्षीरमृत्तिकासुवर्णादीनि उपादीयमानानि लोके दृश्यन्ते । न हि दध्यर्थिभिः मृत्तिका उपादीयते, न घटार्थिभिः क्षीरं...कस्मात् क्षीरादेव दधि उत्पद्यते न मृत्तिकायाः?...क्षीरे एव दध्नः कश्चिदतिशयः, न मृत्तिकायां"—इत्यादि (वे॰ भा॰ 2.1.18) ।

[2] "सामान्य-विशेषवानर्थो नामव्याकरण-वाक्ये विवक्षितः...अनेके हि विलक्षणाः सामान्य-विशेषाः—तेषां पारम्पर्यगत्या एकस्मिन् महासामान्ये अन्तर्भावः" (बृ॰ भा॰) । "सामान्ये लब्धसत्ताकानामेव विशेषाणां कर्मणा स्पष्टीकरणम्" (छा॰ भा॰, 7.4.1).

from within and making the parts to serve as *means* for the realisation of a purpose.[1]

We find therefore, that all the elements of *human organism* also exist and work together for the realisation of the purpose of the self which controls and directs them.[2] Sankara has observed—

" The director is inferred by a logical necessity from the *activity* manifested by the ear and others combined, such as deliberation, volition, etc., inured *for the benefit* of something *distinct* from them all (ear, etc.). As things combined and organised for a common purpose or end exists *for the use* of other thing not so combined, we argue there is a *director* of the ear, etc., and *for whose use* the whole lot exists and has been combined." [3] Each of these fulfils

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[1] "सर्व्वा हि कार्य्य-करण-विक्रिया नित्यचैतन्यात्मस्वरूपे...सत्येव भवति" ।

"तत्र एकार्थवृत्तित्वेन संहननं

त्वन्तरेण चेतनमसंहतं न भवति" (तै० भा, 2.7) ।

[एकार्थवृत्तित्वेन संहननं = A central power makes the plurality of parts *co-operate* as factors of a higher unity.]

[2] " संघातव्यतिरिक्तस्य स्वतन्त्रस्य इच्छामात्रेणैव मन-आदि-प्रेषयितृत्वं...संहतानां परार्थत्वात्" (कै० भा०, 1.1) ।

"सर्व्वं हि कार्य्यकरणजातं 'पारार्थ्येन' संहतं नामरूपात्मक-मेतदेव" (प्र० भा०, 4.8).

We invite our reader's attention to the Bhásya on the Kena-Upanishad, 1. Here Sankara calls the true self as the Purpose or End which *directs* our impulses, organs, manas, etc., for the realisation of itself 'स्वतन्त्रस्य इच्छामात्रेणैव मन-आदि-प्रेषयितृत्वं—इत्यादि' । In the भाष्य of this Upanishad this self is described and proved as प्रेरयिता, *i.e.*, a directive or purposive Power.

[3] न हि एषां 'परार्थानां' संहत्यकारित्वात् जीवनहेतुत्वमुपपद्यते । 'स्वार्थेन' असंहतेन परेण केनचित् अप्रयुक्तं संहतानामवस्थानं न दृष्टं...तथा प्राणादीनामपि संहत्यकारित्वात् भवितुमर्हति । अतः...संहतप्राणादिविलक्षणेन तु सर्व्वे संहताः

a function and in fulfilling it, each contributes to the realisation of the purpose—अर्थ—of the cause within. Sankara says—

"एकार्थवृत्तित्वेन संहननं अन्तरेण चेतनं न भवति"

—(तै° भा°, 2.7).

i.e., Mutually dependent activities *for the purpose of a common object* are not possible without an independent *intelligent* power.

The following observations of Sankara will help us in arriving at the same conclusion :—

> "We are not told by scripture that the final welfare of man (पुरुषार्थ) depends on the scriptural passages about the *creation* and the like. All the passages setting forth *creation and so on* only subserve the purpose of the realisation of Brahman. The passages about Brahman *modifying itself into the form of this world* is merely to be applied *as a means* for the realisation of the absolute Brahman, but *does not bring about an independent result*." [1]

These remarks tell us that we are never to understand the universe of *nāma-rūpa* as mere self-existing (स्वतन्त्र)

सन्तो जीवन्ति ।...यस्य असंहतस्य 'अर्थे' प्राणापानादिः सर्व्वं व्यापारं कुर्व्वन् वर्त्तते संहतः सन्, स ततोऽन्यः सिद्धः" (कठ° भा°, 55).

N.B.—This shows that the Vedantic Brahman and the individual self as well are not abstract intelligences, as many seem to hold, but they are *conscious organising unities or powers.*

[1] "न ह्ययं सृष्ट्यादि-प्रपञ्चः प्रतिपादयिषितः ; न हि तत्प्रतिबद्धः कश्चित् पुरुषार्थः दृश्यते...दर्शयति च सृष्ट्यादिप्रपञ्चस्य ब्रह्मप्रतिपत्त्यर्थताम्" (वे०, 1.4.14).

Cf. "यत्तत्र अफलं श्रूयते जगदाकार परिणामित्वादि...तत् ब्रह्मदर्शनोपायत्वेन विनियुज्यते, न तु स्वतन्त्रं फलाय कल्प्यते" (2.1.14).

changes, but as *movement* to a definite goal—a progress; not as *becoming* merely, but as *being* that is becoming. The changing elements (विकारs) are the *means* serving the purpose of the being of the cause—the Power—working from within. They are sustained by the cause, so that in their evolution and interaction they conspire to realise the Divine Purpose.

The above discussion clearly brings home to our mind the fact that in as much as the self is held by Sankara to be a purposive Power (स्वार्थ), and all other objects and elements besides the self are regarded as a means (परार्थ) for the realisation of the purpose of the self, it follows that we must *use* the actions of our organs, passions, impulses in a way that our highest purpose may be realised through them.[1] The self is therefore the *true agent*.

Every individual possesses a 'nature' (स्वरूप) of its own. Contrast between this nature and its states and activities.

(*a*) We have already come to learn [2] that in the Commentaries of Sankara one fact cannot fail to stand out prominently. We mean the fact that a finite individual, be it a thing or a self, possesses a distinct 'nature' of its own. It is impossible for an attentive reader to escape this fact. This *nature* Sankara holds to be permanent or नित्य in the sense that it maintains its unity and preserves its identity in the successive changes of its manifested states and activities which it underlies. This nature, Sankara is

[1] "आत्मनोऽपकारकस्य कार्य्य-करण-संघातस्य, स्वभावेन सर्व्वतः प्रवृत्तस्य—सन्मार्गे एव नियोगः" (गी°भा°, 13.7).

[This idea has been further elaborated in Chap. IV of this book.]

[2] *Vide* p. 57 of this book.

careful to point out, is not at all dependent on anything beyond, or external to it; neither is it produced, like its states or activities, by an external stimulus or the environment with which it is put into relation.[1] *It not only* retains its unity in its changing states, it continues to live in each of its successive states evoked from it. But such is not the case with its states and activities. These are transient and impermanent; these are produced on the occasion of the action of the environment.[2] But they are not produced out of nothing (असत्); there must be something underlying them, out of which they are produced or manifested.[3] This underlying *nature* is called by Sankara स्वरूप (swarūpa) or धर्म (Dharma) or स्वभाव (Swabhâva). Sometimes the word सामान्य (Sámánya) is used to denote this nature. Throughout his system, the term कारण or cause invariably refers to this nature. As it transcends its states, it is sometimes called कूटस्थ (Kūtastha).

Here is how he describes this nature, and contrasts it with its states :—

> "The Real in a thing is that which
> does not depend on any other thing and

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[1] "नहि सोऽस्ति लोके परमार्थतः, योनिमित्तवशात् भावान्तरमापद्यते, निवर्त्तते। न च पारमार्थिकं वस्तु कर्त्तुं निवर्त्तयितुं वा शक्यते" (ब्र°भा°, 1.4.10)। "न हि अग्नेः उष्णस्वाभाव्यं अन्यनिमित्तं, उदकस्य वा शैत्यं"। "अविक्रियत्वात् नित्यः...अकर्मसम्बन्धी" (4.4.22)—इत्यादि।

[2] "यत् कदाचित् अभिव्यज्यते...अनात्मभूतं तदिति, अन्यतोऽभिव्यक्ति-प्रसङ्गः; तथा च अभिव्यक्ति-साधनापेक्षता।...इदं तु आत्मभूतमेव...नित्याभिव्यक्तत्वात्" (ब्र° भा°, 4.4.6)। "नहि यस्य यः 'स्वभावो' निश्चितः, स तं व्यभिचरति कदाचिदपि" (2.1.15)।

[3] "उत्पत्तिश्च नाम क्रिया, सा सकर्तृकैव भवितुमर्हति, गत्यादिवत्। क्रिया च नाम स्यात्, अकर्तृका चेति विप्रतिषिध्येत" (वे° भा°, 2.1.18)।

which is permanent. It does not change its character under any circumstances but maintains it. What appears or is produced by an external operative cause and is thus dependent on it is not the *nature* of the thing"—

"द्रव्यस्य हि तत्त्वमविक्रिया—परानपेक्षत्वात्। विक्रिया न तत्त्वं—परापेक्षत्वात्। न हि कारकापेक्षं वस्तुनस्तत्त्वं। सतो विशेषः—कारकापेक्षः; विशेषश्च—विक्रिया। यद्धि यस्य नान्यापेक्षं स्वरूपं, तत् तस्य तत्त्वं। यदन्यापेक्षं, न तत्तत्त्वं, अन्याभावे अभावात्।[1] तस्मात् 'स्वाभाविकत्वात्' ......सुष्ठु न विशेषः"—

(तैत्ति° भाष्य, 2.8).

Sankara's elaborate discussions in his Vedanta-bhásya (2.1) on the relation between the cause and its effects bring into prominence these important truths. The कारण or the *nature* of the individual things or beings maintains its identity and continues to live in their successive effects brought about by the action of the external stimulus (कारक-व्यापार). These effects or states or activities do not touch or affect the nature of the cause—

"अवस्थात्रय-साक्षी एकः अव्यभिचारी,
अवस्थात्रयेण व्यभिचारिणा न संस्पृश्यते"।

(वेदा॰भाष्य, 2.1.9)।

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[1] In the Gita-bhasya, Sankara employs similar arguments, and uses the term सत् (sat) for the "nature" or स्वरूप, and असत् (asat) for the changing states. "यद्विषया बुद्धि र्न व्यभिचरति, तत्—'सत्'। यद्विषया व्यभिचरति, तत्—'असत्'—इत्यादि (गी° भा°, 2. 16)।

"न तु पुनः पदार्थो···देशान्तरे कालान्तरे वा स्वं स्वं स्वभावं जहाति" (केन° वा° भा°, 3.12)। "स्वाभाविकी द्रव्यस्वभावत एव सिद्धा...सापि न कालान्तरे व्यभिचरति देशान्तरे वा।" (मा° का° भा°, 4.9)।

The underlying 'nature' cannot be resolved into its activities or states. This nature is the true agent.

(*b*) The changing states or activities cannot, Sankara takes particular care to observe, constitute the 'nature' of things. For, these are always changing and transient, but the underlying nature is not liable to change.[1] Among other arguments used by Sankara to prove this nature, the following may be specially noted here. Sankara points out—

> Every individual object, every individual self, exists *for itself*, as well as *for others* (स्वरूप and सम्बन्धि-रूप). In other words, each individual has a substantive and adjectival existence. The one, Sankara observes, cannot be reduced into the other. But an individual, in order to exist for others, must first of all exist for itself. If an individual does not exist for itself—has no *nature* of its own—how can it come into relation with others and how can others evoke from it its states and activities? You cannot say that finite individuals exist only by reference to something beyond them. Things cannot

[1] "स्वभावश्चेत् क्रिया स्यात्; अनिर्मोक्षतैव स्यात्; न तु स्वभावः; अतो विमोक्ष उपपद्यते" (बृ° भा°, 4.3.15)।

"न च स्वाभाविको धर्मो एव नास्ति पदार्थानां इति शक्यं वक्तुं... न च स्वभावात् अन्यत् नित्यं कल्पयितुं शक्यं"। "न हि क्रियानिर्वृत्तः अर्थः नित्यो दृष्टः" (बृ°भा°, 4.4.6).

"या प्रकृतिः—स्वभावः—तस्या अन्यथाभावो नास्ति। सांख्यादिभि बौद्धिभिः तस्या अन्यथाभावः कल्प्यते—कारणमेव कार्य्याकारेण परिणमते इति" (मा° का° भा°, 4. 10-11).

be merely adjectival to one another. The same identical *Devadatta* (देवदत्त) comes to be designated differently in relation to different objects with which he comes into connection, but Devadatta does not, says Sankara, lose his own nature, does not abandon his identity, when he is thus designated differently.—

> "एकस्यापि स्वरूप-बाह्यरूपापेक्षया अनेक-
> शब्दप्रत्ययदर्शनात्। एकोऽपि सन् देवदत्तः,
> स्वरूपं सम्बन्धि-रूपञ्च अपेक्ष्य, अनेक-
> शब्दप्रत्ययभाक् भवति"———etc. etc.
>
> (वेदा° भाष्य, 2.2.17).

Making his position thus secure, Sankara now goes on to argue that the *nature* of the individual cannot be resolved into its states and activities, in as much as the nature maintains its identity and continuity in its changing and successive states and activities. He observes that—

> "न हि विशेषदर्शनमात्रेण वस्त्वन्यत्वं
> भवति···स एवेति प्रत्यभिज्ञानात्"
>
> (वेदा° भाष्य, 2. 1. 18).

"An individual, simply because a new difference has emerged—certain particular states and activities have been produced in it,—does not lose its own character and becomes something else."—

Elsewhere, he teaches that—

"You will never meet with any particular successive states which are not interwoven in and

sustained by, the underlying continuity of their real '*nature*'—

"सामान्यानतुविङ्गानां विशेषाणामद्दर्शनात्"

(बृ० भा०, 1.6.1 and 2.4.7).

Yet, such is the perversity of the ordinary human mind that it forgets or ignores the presence and operation of the true self which underlies its successive states, and takes the self to consist entirely in its mutually exclusive states and activities connected by a mechanical causal law. Sankara says that this is done by the influence of *avidya* or our natural ignorance. The aggregate of these states and activities is the empirical self of the ordinary ignorant people and this is the *only* self to them. This self is stated by Sankara as the—

"कर्तृत्व-भोक्तृत्व-विशिष्ट जीव"।

The *nature* or the underlying स्वरूप of the individuals, as we have shown above, is the *real* self and it is transcendental or कूटस्थ, to which its states and activities belong as to a centre. It is *free* in its activities, because it is *above* time and it has no antecedent in time to determine its actions. This *agency* is the true agency in the system of Sankara. Out of its own resources which are inexhaustible, this real self can introduce an entirely new element in time, and it can chalk out a new path for itself, and initiate a new movement. Its vision is kept confined to its future infinite possibilities, and it is moving on and on in the direction of its Divine goal, for which reason it is called by Sankara as ब्रह्मात्मक (*i.e.*, it is *essentially* Brahman in its nature).

Wherever Sankara denies agency to the self, it is always the *passive* agency (if such term can be used) of the empirical self, because all its manifested activities are, as

shown above, mechanically determined in an unbroken series in time. Sankara never denies anywhere the free active agency of the underlying real self.[1]

The Self is a Real Agent.

The underlying 'nature' is a seat of power.
(a) *It is revealed in sensitive and intellectual activities.*

5. We shall now proceed more particularly to show that Sankara regarded the real self as an *active power*, and its activity is "reflected in all our sensitive, ideational and in other aspects of our experience." The following discussion will bring out the two-fold sense, in Sankar's system, in which the term 'agency' has been used, and will, we also hope, bring into prominence the fact that the Pure Ego is an active power, when it gains the perception of the external world. Sankara thus describes—

> " Whenever *any* of our organs functions, there are always two kinds of *activities* simultaneously present there. Of these, the one is visible and the other invisible ; one is transitory and dependent, and the other is permanent and independent ; the one works in time, the other is beyond time. There are *two visions*—
>
> "द्वे दृष्टी—दृष्टिरिति द्विविधा भवति,
> लौकिकी, पारमार्थिकी च"—

[1] Sankara denies movement or change to the real self. He calls such activity as चलनात्मक, *i.e.*, in which the sense-organs, body, *manas*, *buddhi*, etc., etc., actually *move*. Such activity he keeps confined to the empirical self. "चलनात्मकस्य कर्म्मणः अनात्मकर्तृकस्य 'अहं' करोमीति प्रवृत्तिदर्शनात्" (गी° भा:, 18, 66). These movements he calls अनात्म—Non-Ego, object. For, these are really *objects* to the true self which underlies these and connects these to itself as their 'subject,'

the first kind is an action evoked in the mind through the affection of the organ of eye. This activity is transitory in its character ; it appears, it disappears. It is a change produced, when the eye is stimulated into activity by an external object with which it has come into contact; and it vanishes when the contact ceases to operate. But underlying this activity here, there is an eternal and permanent vision of the self, and this vision or activity constitutes its real nature,—as heat and light constitute the nature of the fire. This vision of the self cannot be said to be produced, neither can it be said to be liable to disappear. The former vision of the eye, as soon as it is produced, is found to be invariably *permeated or pervaded* by the latter vision or the permanent activity of the self which is constantly present and operative behind it.[1] Thus the two kinds of vision or activity appear *blended* together, and the ignorant unable to discriminate the one from the other, are liable to misrepresent the activity of the self as actually produced and as actually disappearing, with the appearance and disappearance of the changing activity of the eye. Hence, although the activity of the self is eternal and unchanging, it is held to be seeing

[1] *Cf.* also : "लौकिक्या दृष्टेः कर्मभूतायाः द्रष्टारं स्वकीयया नित्यया दृष्ट्या व्याप्तारं न पश्येः ?"—वृ° भा°, 3.4.2.

"अयमपि आत्मा अविपरिलुप्तस्वभावया दृष्ट्या नित्यया द्रष्टेति उच्यते " न तु आत्मनोऽन्यःदर्शन प्रकारोऽस्ति"—वृ° भा°, 4.3,23.

> when the vision of the eye is excited, and to be not seeing when the vision vanishes. This is also the case with the functions of the other organs of sense."

(*Brih. Bhāsya, 3.4.2 and Ait. Bhāsya, 4.1.*)

Now, what do these remarks show? They unmistakably bring to light the important fact that in the perception of the external objects what really perceives is the true self and that it is this self which exhibits its real *agentship* (कर्त्तृत्व) in its activities of comparison, discrimination and assimilation. Sankara holds that there can be no perception of a definite object unless there is an active comparison of similars and dissimilars—

"निष्कृष्य समानासमानजातीयेभ्यो…'इदं तत्' इति निर्दिश्यते"—

(तैत्ति° भाष्य, 2.6.)

In the Brihadāraṇyaka and in the Vedānta Bhāsyas also, Sankara thus briefly describes the activity of the underlying self in the act of perception :—

> " I happen to receive two distinct kinds of sense-impressions when somebody touches me by his leg and next by his hand. There is as yet no discrimination, until the self energetically sets to work to compare one kind of sensation with the other, and differentiate one from dissimilar other sensations. These activities of comparison, reflection, discrimination and assimilation are all operations of our intellect (बुद्धि) which is a mere *instrument* in the hands of the self; for all these activities are indeed my present changes; but these activities *discover* or *reveal* the *active* self as the subject from whom they issue. An

activity which distinguishes, an activity which carries the work of comparison and raises the sense-presentations to the level of *discriminative* consciousness cannot be a mere item of passive feelings. By these activities the Ego is *discovered* as the energetic *source* from which the actions issue—

"त्वङ्मात्रेण कुतो विवेक-प्रतिपत्तिः ?" 1.5.3. (बृ° भा°)

Then again, so long as the self does not direct its *attention* to the changes received, they can never become the *objects* of our knowledge. It is for this that Sankara remarks—

"अन्यत्रमना अभूवं, नापश्यम्, etc. etc.," (वे° भा°, 2,3.32.)

All these *reveal* the presence and operation of an *active* self underlying these feelings and activities, which maintains its identity in its constant movement [1] among similar and dissimilar elements, and to which both the past and the present belong. We find Sankara remarking—

"न हि अन्यदृष्टं अन्यः स्मरति, प्रतिसन्धाति
वा" । "तेनेदं सदृशं—तेनेति दृष्ट-स्मरणं
——इति द्वयायत्तत्वात् सादृश्यस्य...
सदृशयो र्द्वयो र्वस्तुनोः ग्रहीतु रेकस्य
अभावात्, सादृश्यनिमित्तंप्रतिसन्धान मिति
मिथ्याप्रलाप एव स्यात्" (वेदा° भाष्य, 2.2.25).

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[1] *Cf.* also: "चक्षुरादीनि एव दर्शनादिक्रिया'कर्तॄ'णी'ति चेत् ? न, भिन्नकर्तृकत्वे प्रतिसन्धानानुपपत्तेः । मनसोऽपि विषयत्वात् (ज्ञेयत्वात्) द्रष्टृत्वाद्यनुपपत्तिः । तस्मात् अन्तःस्थं व्यतिरिक्तं ज्योतिः'" (बृ° भा°, 4.3.6, etc.)

Cf. "अगमत् मे मनोऽन्यत्र, साम्प्रतञ्च स्थिरीकृतं ।
एवं यो वेत्ति धीवृत्तिं सोऽहमित्यवधारय (वाक्यवृत्ति, 21)"

The *identity* of the self which persists through its changing states is implied in any exercise of memory. "To know a flower by scent, we must remember a prior experience of it and discriminate it from other appeals to the same sense."

"अहमदोऽद्राक्षं इदंपश्यामीति च,—
पूर्व्वोत्तरदर्शिनि एकस्मिन्नसति कथं
प्रत्यभिज्ञा-प्रत्ययःस्यात् ?"

These observations of Sankara prove that to him, the real character of the Pure Ego is not merely "a being," or "a knowledge"—but an "active power" and a *source* of activities. And this source cannot be pheuomenalised ; for, in its absence there would be no perception at all.

In connection with this subject, we crave our reader's indulgence for the liberty of quoting a few other passages bearing on this important point.

(b) It is revealed in ideational activities.

6. In the Gita (Chap. XIII, 12-13), Brahman's nature is described as neither *sat*, nor *asat*—apparently possessing no definite characteristics. Now, the question arises—Is *átmá* to be regarded, then, as a mere non-entity, a non-existent something? For, if there is no positive mark to characterise its nature, it is as good as non-existent—*asat*. Now, we invite our reader's attention to the reply which Sankara suggests to this very pertinent question.—

"No, you cannot say that Átmá is non-existent or *asat* (असत्). For, there are *indicative marks* by the help of which we are enabled to infer—we are assured of—its nature. What are

these indications? To prevent the supposition that the Ātmá (आत्मा) must be a mere void or non-entity (शून्य) the Gita proceeds to teach that the Ātmá exists as—(1) the inner self (प्रत्यगात्मा) and as—(2) the *source* of *all activities* of the senses and the like."

Sankara points out—

"Krisṇa proves, by way of inference, the existence of Ātmá as the inner self thus:—There must be self-conscious principle (power) behind the insentient elements *in activity*, such as the physical body and the senses; for, we invariably find self-conscious principle underlying all insentient objects *in activity*, such as carriage in motion. Hands, feet and the like constituting the limbs of all bodies in all places, *derive their activity* from the *energy inherent* in the knowable (आत्मा) and, as such, they are the marks of its existence and operation."[1]

Sankara also says—that "Ātmá (आत्मा) reveals its nature through the *upādhis* (उपाधि) of external and internal senses, through the *functions* of all the senses, *viz.*, determination, thoughts, desires, hearing, speech, etc., etc., *i.e.*, the knowable (आत्मा) *functions as it were* through the functions of the senses. But does it *actually* function? The *Sruti* implies the knowable has the power to accommodate itself to the varying functions of all the senses......not that it *actually possesses* swift motion and

[1] That which is the *source* of these activities must—itself be an *active power*. Sankara calls it प्रयोक्ता। "संहतानां श्रोत्रादीनां परार्थत्वादवगम्यते श्रोत्रादीनां प्रयोक्ता। "मनआदीनां च अचेतनानां प्रवृत्तिर्दृश्यते। तद्धि लिङ्गं चेतनावतोऽधिष्ठातुरस्तित्वे" (के० वा० भा०)।

such other activities." This is shown also by **Sankara** elsewhere by his remarks—

"सत्तामात्र एव कर्तृत्वं, न तु व्यापृततया" ।

It does not imply that the self is to be regarded as merely '*a being*.' It does not mean that the self is not a power. It simply implies that this power cannot be phenomenalised or reduced to its manifested activities. This expression has been chosen to guard against the supposition that the self is subject or liable to transient changes or विकारs, and to show that it is a निर्व्विकार power.[1] This power is constantly *present* and *operative* behind the activities, as their free active *source* or *seat*—of which these are but partial manifestations, and these manifestations can never exhaust this inexhaustible source. These manifested activities are the indicative marks of their underlying power. In the Chāndogya-bhāsya, the nature of the self is actually called "सामर्थ्य" or the source of power (8.12.4). And it is characterised as—

"करणव्यापारेषु अव्यापृतः, तद्विलक्षणः"
(गी° भा°, 13.22)

i.e., the source cannot be resolved into the activities of the senses and the like, but is present and operative in and through them, and is above them. This important truth is expressed in the Vedanta-bhásya by the expression—

"न कारणस्य कार्य्यात्मत्वं" (वे° 2.1.9).

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[1] "विक्रियादिविशेषरहितस्य आत्मनो मन-आदि-प्रवृत्तौ निमित्तत्वं"
(केन° वा° भा°, 1.2).

Cf. "अनापन्नविकारः सन् अयस्कान्तवदेव यः। बुद्ध्यादीन् चालयेत्, प्रत्यक् सोऽहमित्यवधारय" (वाक्यवृत्ति, १९)। *Vide* वे° भा°, 2.2.2.

that is to say, the underlying power (cause) cannot be reduced to, and identified with, its manifested, actual activities (effects), because this *source* is inexhaustible and, as such, no one of its manifestations can fix it in a rigid form and be regarded as final.

It is the influence of *Avidyā* alone which, as Sankara tells us, is responsible for this erroneous identification. If the cause cannot be resolved into, or identified with, its effects; if the true *nature* of the individual self maintains its identity through its successive changes; if it is by *avidyā* that we confound the underlying unity with its multiple states and activities;—it follows, as the night follows the day, that all activities which we find in the phenomena must be traced to their underlying self or the unity—as their *source.* Had Saṅkara reduced, like the Pantheists, the Causal Reality into its successive activities and states, then of course for the source of these activities we must seek the phenomena alone. But Sankara has repeatedly remarked that when an individual being or thing assumes different forms or phases in consequence of its connection with the things outside it, it does not lose its identity—it does not become something else entirely different from its own nature—

"न हि विशेषदर्शनमात्रेण वस्त्वन्यत्वं भवति

...........स एवेति प्रत्यभिज्ञानात् ;

(वेदा° भाष्य) ।—2.1.18.

It still maintains its unity, preserves its identical nature in and through these successively changing phases or differences. We must therefore look for the *source* of all phenomenal activities, according to Sankara, to the *nature* of the individual thing or the self which underlies these activities, and continues to operate through them unaffected by them.

(c) It is revealed in ethical and religious activities.

7. As in the intellectual, so also in our *moral* experience, the operations of an active underlying self cannot be abolished or negated. We, here, briefly describe Sankara's method in the selection of the ends in our moral sphere.

In the Katha-bhāsya, Sankara explains this method thus:—

> In his system, Brahman is both transcendent and immanent. If it be of purely transcendental nature, all possibility of comprehending Him would be shut out for man. He would be a remote and abstract being. But, fortunately, He is also immanent in nature and in man, and through this revelation, man can comprehend His 'nature' to a certain extent. Man seeks the realisation of the End inherent in his own nature. But if he seeks this end merely in the external mundane order, he will not find it there—
>
> "यो हि बहिर्मुखः प्रवर्त्तते पुरुषः, इष्टं मे
> भूयादनिष्टं मे माभूदिति ; न च तत्र आत्यन्तिकं
> पुरुषार्थं लभते" ।
>
> (वेदा° भा°, 1.1.4) ।

For, outward nature, as it is, cannot be regarded as complete and self-sufficient. The rational and ethical human being seems to be the goal of outward nature.

Sankara teaches—

"विषयस्यैव......स्वात्मग्राहकत्वेन
संस्थानान्तरं करणं नाम"— (बृह° भा°, 2.4.11).

Nature has supplied man with his senses and the nervous system, by which he is put into relation with

the world.[1] The more his organs and his mind are developed, he is able more and more to realise the grandeur of the universe. He must therefore seek his end within his own nature. The infinite Divine ज्ञानैश्वर्य—the Ideal of truth and beauty, etc., is revealed in man, and man is endowed with the capacity to realise it. But if man seeks the ज्ञानैश्वर्य as it is found *actually* present in the human beings, and regards this as the final end, he will be disappointed. For, the in-dwelling ज्ञानैश्वर्य शक्ति-सौन्दर्य is transcendental and it cannot be identified with the *actual* ज्ञानैश्वर्य as is working in the human beings. He must therefore seek the अनन्त-शक्तिसौन्दर्य in the future possibilities of man. It is progressively revealing in man and will reach perfection in future.

> "Two Ends," Sankara writes—" one mundane and the other transcendental—come to man indiscriminately for his choice. All men are propelled by these two goods according as one wishes for mundane prosperity, or the supreme happiness. These two are opposed and conflicting in their nature to each other. They are therefore not possible to be pursued by the same individual at the same moment. One who pursues the mundane good and regards this as the true end of his life, misses the true end of man. These two are not easily distinguishable by persons of poor intelligence

[1] "भूतानां शरीरारम्भकत्वेन उपकारात्...तदन्तर्गतानां तेजोमयादीनां करणत्वेन उपकारात्" (बृ° भा°, 2.5.4). "कार्य्यकरणै: मूर्त्तै: संश्लेष: मूर्त्तस्य ; स तु क्रियाहेतुर्दृष्ट:" (४।३, etc.) "संसर्गाभावे विशेषविज्ञानस्य अभाव:" (वे°, 1.4.22), *i.e.* The *individuals* have their *determinate* character and *meaning* elicited through this interaction within a common connecting ground (प्राण).

and of irresolute mind. The truly wise man examines both the pleasant and the good—the mundane and the supra-mundane ends—as a flamingo separates milk and water; and having considered in his mind the relative weight of the two courses, divides them both and selects only the supreme end as preferable to the mundane ends. But the man of poor intelligence incapable of such discrimination, pursues the lower good, such as—cattle, sons, position, wealth, etc., for the purpose of gratifying his pleasures of sense."

(Katha. bhās. 2.2.)

Here again, the discrimination between the higher and the lower good, the comparison of the relative worth of the two courses, the rejection of the one and the selection of the other and the pursuing of the same until the supreme end is perfectly realised—all these activities distinctly *reveal* the presence and operation of an energetic self, not as a "mere being," or a "mere knowledge"—but as an active power.

In spite of such clear expression of his views, is it not doing a great injustice to Sankara's system to hold that Sankara's pure Ego is not a persistent activity? We shall further speak on this supreme end later on.

(d) It is revealed in the construction of plant organism and animal organism.

8. Plants and trees are looked upon in the school of Sankara as a kind of lower *organism.* This school admits the existence and evolution of four kinds of organism, *viz.*—" स्वेदज, अण्डज, उद्भिज्ज and जरायुज,"[1] Now, within even the organism of the plants, says

[1] *i. e.* Those born in perspiration, etc., that which is born from the egg, that which is born from seed or which shoots out; and that which is born from the womb.

Sankara, is the constant operation of an *active* self जीव and its *Power is to be inferred* from the incessant movement of the sap (रस) within the body (*i.e.*, its plasticity) of the plants and from the gradual growth and development of the plant through its successive stages, till the full development of the tree is reached.[1]

Sankara in his commentary on the Chāndogya Upaniṣad and in other places has distinctly expressed his views as to the impossibility of regarding any of the stages of the plant development as *separate* and self-sufficient (अन्य) from the process of development of the plant as a whole. The stage of sprout (अङ्कुरावस्था) is seen to arise after the destruction or disappearance of its antecedent stage, *viz.*, the stage of seed (बीजावस्था); but that does not, Sankara tells us, prove that non-existence or असत् is the cause of the sprout (अङ्कुर). The future possibility of the tree which is the *final end* [2] is present in its seed-stage and other subsequent stages and this it is which is the *real cause* which has successively operated in bringing the plant to its final stage or full development. In the Brihadāraṇyaka bhāsya (1. 2. 1), he explains his theory of causality with the help of the illustration of मृत्तिका (a lump of earth) and its successive development into

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[1] "जीवेन च प्राणसंयुक्तेन अशितं पीतञ्च रसतां गतं जीवच्छरीरं वृक्षंच वर्द्धयत् रसरूपेण—जीवस्य सद्भावे लिङ्गं भवति।......वृक्षस्य रसस्रवण-पोषणादिलिङ्गात् जीवत्वं......चेतनावन्तः स्थावराः" (छा° भा°, 6.10.2). "यत्र रसस्तत्र चित्तमनुमीयते"—ऐत° आर°, शङ्करभाष्य।

[2] That it is present as a *future end* has been expressed by Sankara in the phrase—अनागतार्थे प्रवृत्तस्य (बृ,° 1.2.1). अर्थ is the end, towards which the अर्थी (*i.e.*, the causal substance, मृत्तिका, in the present illustration) strives. For, the potter for the purpose of constructing घट, gave the मृत्तिका its successive shapes. [We shall further elaborate the idea in the next chapter.]

घट (Jar). This is to be regarded as a typical illustration which holds good in all cases of causal development, in the light of the rules given in the Brahma-Sūtras, II. 1.14-20.

"स्वेन भविष्यद्रूपेण घटो विद्यते" ।...

"घटस्य प्रागभाव इति, न घटस्वरूपमेव प्रागुत्पत्तेर्नास्तीति" ।——

(बृह° भा°, 1.2.1.)

In this way, the *end* is present in the cause from the very beginning and it is this end which gradually carries the real *nature* of the cause through its successive stages, until it is fully realised in the last stage. He says—

"असति अर्थितया प्रवृत्तिर्न दृष्टा" ।—

(*Ibid.*)

To realise this end or *purpose*, the movement of the causal substance had begun in the past and this continues in the present, until it reaches its final realisation in future.

If we keep this teaching before our view, we shall be able to comprehend the real significance of the fact as to why in Sankara's system, the effect or the end is stated to be अनन्य (*i.e.*, no other than) from its cause. To understand the true nature of the cause, we must see it realised successively through all its stages of manifestation up till the final stage, and no one of its stages can, therefore, be *separated* from it and regarded as something अन्य (*other than* that '*nature*').

9. In the human organism also, in the similar manner, it is the self as an active power which, for the realisation of its *purpose* inherent in it (पारार्थ्येन निमित्तभूतेन), has built up the body. It has brought into being certain elements within it and combined and organised them in

(*e*) *It is revealed in the construction of human organism.*

such a way that one and all co-operate to realise a common purpose—

> "ऐन्द्रियिकास्चेष्टाः संहतैः कार्य्य-करणैः
> निर्वर्त्यमानाः दृश्यन्ते। तच्च एकार्थवृत्तित्वेन
> संहननं, नान्तरेण चेतनमसंहतं सम्भवति।"
>
> (तैत्ति° भाष्य, 2.7.)

In the Katha-bhāsya, similar observations are found—

> "'स्वार्थेन' असंहतेन परेण केनचित्
> अप्रयुक्तं संहतानां (*i.e.*, परार्थानां)
> अवस्थानं न दृष्टं।
> यस्य असंहतस्य 'अर्थे' प्राणापानादिः
> सर्व्वं व्यापारं कुर्व्वन् वर्त्तते,
> संहतः सन्, स ततोऽन्यः।" [1]
>
> (कठ°, 5. 5).——

that is to say,—the self which is स्वार्थ (self-existing and self-working and having the 'reason' or 'purpose' of its being in itself) and which is अन्य (*i.e.*, which transcends) from these elements,—has combined them with a view to realise its own purpose through them, and thus the organism has been built up.[1]

The elements and the senses (and their activities) are called परार्थ, because these are the means or mere

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[1] The terms स्वार्थ (Swārtha) and परार्थ (Parārtha) have been explained before, in the beginning of this chapter. Sankara has laid down this as a general rule that wherever there is a combination and combined activity, there must be an underlying power which has combined the elements for the realisation of its purpose. "स्वार्थेन असंहतेन परेण केनचित् अप्रयुक्तं संहतानामवस्थानं न दृष्टं" (कठ° भाष्य)।

instruments through which the purpose of the self is realised.—

> "देहेन्द्रियादीनां यत् स्वरूपधारणं……
> पारार्थ्येन निमित्तभूतेन…तत् चैतन्यात्मकृतमेव।"
> (गी° भा°, 13.22.)

पारार्थ्य is the निमित्त here; that is to say, the realisation of its final end is the निमित्त or the impelling *occasion*, and the building up of the body and its successive developments are चैतन्यात्मकृतमेव, *i.e.*, are brought about by the *agentship* of the self.

Can a clearer exposition of the theory go further? That the self is an active power is thus everywhere shown by Sankara.

Brahman—a seat of power revealed as prime-mover of Prāṇa in which it is realised to be.

10. In the Vedānta-Sutra and in the Upanishads, Brahman is described as प्राणस्य प्राणः (*i.e.*, it is the Prāṇa of the prāṇa). That is to say,—Brahman is the underlying power of Práṇa (प्राण), it is the controlling and directing power which underlies the Prāṇa-Śakti (प्राणशक्ति). This Prāṇa-Śakti (प्राणशक्ति), in Sankara's system, has been held to be the first manifestation of Brahman's nature. Held by the underlying power and sustained by it, this Prāṇa has differentiated [1] itself into the form of the objects of the world and this differentiation is always going on. Brahman, in Sankara's system, is not a characterless being; it has a distinct *nature*, a character, a स्वरूप (swarūpa), स्वभाव (swabhāva) of its own, and this nature underlies the differentiations of

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[1] This differentiation is in *three* forms of activities—आधिदैविक, आधिभौतिक and आध्यात्मिक। All these are the interacted relations and are grounded in the various activities of definite individuals which have been brought into closest interaction by the everpresent Prāna.

the Prān-Sakti (प्राणशक्ति), untouched and *unaffected* by them—

"नामरूपाभ्यामसंस्पृष्ट'," "नामरूपाभ्यामन्यः,"

"नामरूपाभ्यांविलक्षणं ··· तथापि तयोर्निर्व्वोढृ"—

all these refer to the same truth.

As Brahman is both a transcendental and immanent principle, it is revealed in the world as the differentiations of Prāṇa, but still it is not resolved into or *identified* with them, but maintains its own unity or its own nature in them. This has been beautifully expressed in a passage in the Ishā-bhāsya.

> 'Held and sustained by the underlying Brahman—a चेतन power—the *Prāna* has differentiated itself—externally as the activities of heat, light as exhibited by the objects—the sun, the fire, etc., and internally as the physical and mental activities of the sentient beings.'[1]

Elsewhere, the underlying principle of *Prāna* is called Antaryāmī (अन्तर्यामी), *i.e.*, the sustaining power which controls and directs the Prāṇa-Sakti and its differentiation.

In the Vedanta bhāsya, one of the distinguishing characteristics of the Ātmā is stated as प्राणचेष्टा, *i. e.*, the control and direction of the Prāṇa, or which sets Prāṇa to work.[2]

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1 "तस्मिन्नात्मतत्त्वे नित्यचैतन्यस्वभावे (स्वयमविक्रियमेव यत्), मातरिश्वा... यदाश्रयाणि कार्य्य-कारण-जातानि·· यत् सूत्रसंज्ञकं...प्राणिनां चेष्टालक्षणानि, अग्न्यादि-पर्जन्यादीनां ज्वलनदहनाभिवर्षणादि-लक्षणानि विभजति। सर्व्वा हि कार्य्य-करणविक्रिया, नित्यचैतन्यात्मस्वरूपे सर्व्वास्पदभूते सत्येव भवन्ति।—" 4. "अतएव विक्रियारूपं सर्व्वंजगत् प्रवर्त्तते" (गी° भा°, 10,8)।

2 "निष्कलं निष्क्रियं शान्तं एकमद्वय···सर्व्वसाधारणाव्याकृत-जगद्बीज-'प्रवर्त्तक" नियन्तृत्वात् अन्तर्यामि-संज्ञं भवति" (ऐ°भा°, 5.3.)। "द्यावापृथिव्यौ

Pantheism refuted.· Finite self is not a mere phase of Pantheistic whole.

11. One Vrittikāra reduced Brahman or the unity into the differentiations of nāma-rūpa (नामरूप). In this view, Brahman was the whole and the differentiations of the nāma-rūpa including the finite individual selves were looked upon as parts of that whole—as modes of its self-expression—as mere reproductions of the whole. Reducing the unity into the plurality, the Vrittikāra yet held, quite inconsistently no doubt, *both* of them to be real.[1] This was a kind of pantheism current in the time of Sankara.

Sankara has, in several parts of his commentaries, taken particular care to refute this opinion of the Vrittikāra. He argues that when the differences emerge, the underlying unity does not and cannot become reduced into them. The unity does not, as the plurality arises—as the differentiations of nāma-rūpa arise,—become something else, losing its own nature in them—

"न हि विशेषदर्शनमात्रेण
वस्त्वन्यत्वं भवति.........
स एवेति प्रत्यभिज्ञानात्"।

.... एतस्य अक्षरस्य प्रशासने ... विधृते तिष्ठतः ... तस्मात् सिद्धमस्य अस्तित्वमक्षरस्य। अव्यभिचारि हि तल्लिङ्गं, यद्द्यावापृथिव्यौ नियते वर्त्तेते; चेतनावन्तं प्रशासितारमन्तरेण नैतद्युक्तं" (बृ°भा°. 3.8.9.)। "तत्कृतं हि प्राणस्य प्राणनसामर्थ्यम्" (के° भा°, 9.1.2).

[1] "ननु अनेकात्मकं ब्रह्म...यथा समुद्रात्मना एकत्वं, फेन-तरङ्गाद्यात्मना नानात्वं; अतः एकत्वं नानात्वञ्च—उभयमपि सत्यमेव?" (वे° भा°, 2.1.14).

"अत्र केचित् व्याचक्षते—आत्मवस्तुनः स्वत एव एकत्वं नानात्वञ्च; यथा गौः गोद्रव्यतया एकत्वं, सास्नादीनां धर्म्माणां परस्परतो भेदः (*i.e.* नानात्वं)"—बृ° भा°, 4.3.30.

Also *Vide* बृ° भा°, 5.1.1., and वे° भा°, 1.1.3.

It retains its unity, its own character, its separate substantial life, behind these differences. In criticising Vrittikāra's opinion, Sankara shows that when the unity is thought to be entirely reduced to multiplicity, the former cannot retain its distinct character—the separate life of its own. For, it is now to be found present in the form of many; it has now become composed of parts—अनेकात्मक.[1] The unity, of which the Vrittikāra still speaks, is an abstract nothing—a mere empty logical abstraction. For, it has no existence except in the multiplicity, because it has no nature by which it is recognisable apart from the many. It is a contentless abstract idea in general. Hence, argues Sankara, it cannot be held to be real. It is a mere unity of collection, an aggregate of parts. And the parts—the differences—of which the whole is a mechanical aggregate are disconnected parts with no organising principle to connect them. The parts—the differences—the multiplicity cannot also, in this view, be held to be real. For, mere differences with no real organising unity behind them would be an unreality. There are mere differences, haphazard changes—with no purpose, no plan, no end to govern them. And Sankara asks—how can such parts—differences—stand with nothing to connect them ?—

"न हि 'निरात्मकं' किञ्चित्
व्यवहाराय अवकल्पते ;
न हि रज्जुसर्पादयोऽपि
'निरास्पदा' भवन्ति"।
"आत्मना 'विनिर्मुक्तं' नामरूपादि
असत् भवति"।

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[1] 'यथा अनेकात्मको वृक्षः—शाखास्कन्धोमूलञ्च, इत्येवं नानारसः विचित्र आत्मा इत्यायत्ता भवति।......कार्य्यप्रपञ्च-विशिष्टः आत्मा...(वे° भा°, 1.3.1).

The finite selves, too, being mere phases of an indeterminate whole would have no character, no real life, of their own. They would be liable to be driven, like a ship without a rudder on the bosom of a stormy sea, by the gust of each impulse and passion which find them. Mere parts, mere differences, unrelated to, and separated from, any organising unity behind them are, in the opinion of Sankara, unreal.—

"सदात्मना सत्यत्वं, सतोऽन्यत्वे
अनृतत्वं"।
"न कारणोपष्टम्भमन्तरेण
अविभ्रंसमानं कार्य्यं स्यातु-
मुत्सहते"।

In this way Sankara, in his criticism of Vrittikāra's theory, has shown that neither unity nor multiplicity can be held to be real. Both of them must be declared false (असत्य).

Sankara again asks, if one is reduced to many, how can *both* be held to be real? One and the same self cannot, he says, be regarded as—possessed of qualities (many) and also devoid of all qualities (one). There would thus arise mutual contradiction (विरुद्धधर्म्मसमवायित्व).[1] Yet such absurd supposition would be the irresistible consequence of the theory of Vrittikāra who regarded *both* to the real. But this absurdity does not at all touch the position of Sankara. In the earlier part of this Chapter we have shown that the Infinite is present *in* the finite individual and that is the true self. It is present as an end—a possibility—which is the guiding energy of his life. It is this

[1] "विशिष्टशक्तिमत्त्वप्रदर्शनं, विशेषप्रतिषेधश्च—इति विप्रतिषिद्धं" (गी°भा°, 13.12).
"विरुद्धधर्म्मसमवायित्वं—एकस्यैवात्मनः अशनायाद्यतीतत्वं तद्वत्त्वञ्च" (बृ°भा°, 3.5.1).

self which in relation with other individuals and the environment[1] becomes manifested as the qualities and states of the finite self. When these states and qualities are erroneously *separated* from the underlying self and treated as a self-existing and independent reality, these become *unreal.* But under no circumstances can these differences (many) or changes remain *separated* from the self, because they are to be taken as *manifestations* of the self through which it is gradually realising itself.[2]

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[1] Environment—*i.e.*, the differentiations of Prāṇa in the form of Nāma-rūpas of the world under the control of Brahman behind it (see section 10, pp. 111-112).

[2] This is the celebrated 'Sat-kāryya-vāda' (सत्कार्य्यवाद) of the Vedanta Philosophy. The effects or changes produced reveal the nature of the cause. In the Māndukya-Bhāsya Sankara has told us that it is the manifestations which throw light on that which is manifested. The nature of the underlying reality is to be read in the manifestations. If, therefore, what is revealed is taken to be *unreal* —non-existent—then it can come into no *relation* with the underlying Reality. For, to be related there must be two terms of relation (द्वयायत्तत्वात् सम्बन्धस्य) which must be *both real* (न सदसतो रसतोर्वा). Otherwise, the causal Reality would, as आनन्दगिरि explains the idea, itself prove to be unreal, and thus Brahman would be an unreality. "कार्य्येन हि लिङ्गेन कारणब्रह्म-ज्ञानार्थत्वं सृष्टिश्रुतीनां। तच्चेदसद्भवेत् न तेन कारणस्य सम्बन्धधीरिति—असदेव कारणमपि स्यात्।"

For this Sankara has said—"सतोर्हि द्वयोः सम्बन्धः, न सदसतो रसतोर्वा" (वे° भा°, 2.1.18). Hence the future effect (end) *exists* in the nature of the cause

N. B.—The changes cannot be *separated* from the cause and treated as something self-existing. For this important fact, compare—

"यदा आत्मस्थे नामरूपे व्याक्रियेते, तदा नामरूपे आत्मस्वरूपापरित्यागेनैव सर्व्वास्ववस्थासु व्याक्रियेते" (तै° भा°, 2.6).

"चैतन्याव्यतिरेकेनैव कला: जायमानास्तिष्ठन्त्यः प्रलीयमानाश्च सर्व्वदा लक्ष्यन्ते" (प्र° भा°, 2.6).

"यस्य च यस्मादात्मलाभः भवति, स तेन अप्रविभक्तो दृष्टः, यथा घटादीनां मृदा" (छ° भा°, 1.6.1).

The connection of the finite individuals with one another shows that they all depend on a common ground —an ever-present connecting principle (प्राणशक्ति) bringing all into closest interaction.[1] Relations imply the interaction of the individuals and, we have seen,[2] these individuals are something *for themselves* (स्वरूप), ere they can be something *to one another* (सम्बन्धि-रूप). The individuals have their *determinate character* [3] elicited through interaction with other individuals and the whole within which they exist. Brahman is immanent in all individual centres, yet does not reduce these centres to mere phases of its own, as it is Transcendental also and therefore distinguished from the elements it connects.

In the theory of Sankara, therefore, unity is not to be reduced to multiplicity, but unity *contains* multiplicity which cannot be *separated* from it. Multiplicity is not self-existing and independent (अन्य), but is its revelations and hence multiplicity is incorporated (अनुविद्ध or प्रोत) as its *expressions* in the unity.

There are other arguments advanced by Sankara against Vrittikāra's theory of pantheism, but we have held them in reserve for future treatment. Here, we would place before our readers only one or two other arguments which have a direct bearing on the finite individuals. Sankara has clearly shown that the individual selves cannot be mere parts (अवयव) of an all-inclusive

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1 "यच्च लोके परस्परोपकार्य्योपकारकभूतं तत् एककारणपूर्व्वकं, 'एकसामान्यात्मकं'...दृष्टं। परस्परोपकार्य्योपकारकभूतं जगत् सर्व्वं पृथिव्यादि" (बृ°, 2.5.2)। "भूतानां शरीरारम्भकत्वेन उपकारात् मधुत्वं, तदन्तर्गतानां कारणत्वेन उपकारात् मधुत्वं" (2.5.4). *Vide* p. 111 for प्राणशक्ति।

2 *Vide* p. 84, sec. 3, of this book.

3 *Vide* p. 91, sec. 5, of this book.

whole; for, in that case, the whole, *i.e.*, Brahman would lose its own 'nature' or स्वरूप and will have to come down here to become a mundane jiva (जीव); and Brahman would be affected by the pleasure, pain and other experiences of the *parts*. The finite individuals also will have to lose their own 'nature' or स्वरूप and disappear in the pantheistic whole.[1]

12. Before we conclude this part of the subject, we should like to place on record here in this connection two other arguments found in the Vedanta-bhasya from which it would appear that the idea of absorption of the individuals (जीवs) in the Infinite whole and treating them as mere phases of that whole—was far from the mind of Sankara.

Relation of जीव to ब्रह्म.

We shall *first* invite our reader's attention to the passage where Sankara is considering the relation between the Infinite (ब्रह्म) and the finite individuals (जीवs). The relation is thus expressed—

"प्रतिषिध्यते एव तु परमार्थत: सर्व्वज्ञात् परमेश्वरात्
'अन्यो' द्रष्टा श्रोता वा।— परमेश्वरस्तु—
विज्ञानात्मारूयात् 'अन्य:'।" (वेदा° भाष्य°, 1.1.17).

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[1] "अथ अनेकद्रव्यसमाहारस्य सावयवस्य, परमात्मन: एकदेशविपरिणामी विज्ञानात्मा,......अथ नित्यायुतसिद्धावयवानुगतोऽवयवी परमात्मा, तस्यैव एकदेशो विज्ञानात्मा संसारी ?...तथापि सर्व्वावयवानुगतत्वात् अवयविन एव अवयवगतौ दोष: गुणौ वा इति...विज्ञानात्मन: दोषेण परमात्मा संबध्यते—इयमपि अनिष्टा कल्पना" (ब्र° भा°, 2.1.20).

"सर्व्वेषु एतेषु पक्षेषु (जीवस्य) 'स्वरूप'-नाशप्रसङ्ग:" (वे° भा°, 4.3.14).

Also *cf.* "यस्मात् परमार्थाकाशस्य घटाकाशो न विकार:, नापि अवयव:... तथा नैव आत्मन: परस्य महाकाशस्थानीयस्य घटाकाशस्थानीयो जीव:, यथोक्त-दृष्टान्तवत् न विकार: नापि अवयव:" (मा°, का° भा° 3.7).

Sankara argues that the individual self (जीव) cannot be *separated* from the Infinite which is present in him, and treated as a self-contained, independent entity (अन्य). The individual *Jivas* are always to be regarded as अनन्य (really *not other than*) from the Infinite from which they have derived their knowledge, action, everything. Neither can they be taken as *mere phases* of the Infinite, because the Infinite is अन्य from them; *i. e.*, because the Infinite has a being of its own and is thus *distinguished* (अन्य) from the individuals. As Brahman is transcendent, there is no necessity for suppressing the individualities of any one of these.

Prativimba theory.

(*a*) We shall now come to another passage where the individual Jivas are described as the "reflections" (आभास) of the true self behind them.—

"आभास एव चैष जीव: परस्यात्मन:, जलसूर्य्यकादिवत् ।
न स एव साक्षात्, नापि वस्त्वन्तरम्" (वेदा°, भा°, 2.3.50).

We all know that the reflected image of the sun is but an imperfect and partial manifestation of the sun in the sky, of which—

> "it is a reflection. And the image shows that there is something behind it—the original sun in the sky—whose reflection it is. In this way, the actual individual *Jiva* is but a partial and imperfect [1] revelation of the Infinite true self

[1] *Cf.* "न केवलं अध्यात्मोपाधिपरिच्छिन्नस्य ब्रह्मणोरूपं त्व 'मल्प'मेत्थ; यदपि—अधिदैवतोपाधिपरिच्छिन्नस्य अस्य ब्रह्मणोरूपं वेत्थ त्वं, तदपि नूनं 'दभ्र'मेव वेत्थ"।—केन° पद-भाष्य, 2.1. *Cf.* also—"मन-उपाधिकत्वाद्धि मनस: संकल्पस्मृत्यादि-प्रत्ययै"रभिव्यज्यते ब्रह्म" (4.5),

which is behind him. This Infinite cannot be reduced to the individual self, as the sun in the sky cannot be reduced to the reflected image. For this reason, Sankara says—

"न स एव साक्षात्, नापि वस्त्वन्तरं" वे०, 2.3.50.

i.e., neither can the individual Jīvas be *identified* with Brahman, nor can they be regarded as something *other than* Brahman.

Illustration of a juggler (मायावी) and his tricks.

(*b*) In another passage in the Vedânta-bhāsya, Sankara has explained this relation with the help of an illustration of a Juggler and the tricks exhibited by him. Sankara writes—

"A Juggler was exhibiting his tricks before a number of spectators. People saw that a man holding in his hand a shield and sword climbed up to the sky and they all took this man to be the real Juggler. But the fact was that the man whom the people saw playing in the sky was the production of the माया brought into being by the real Juggler who stood on the ground invisible to the spectators. In the same way, the true self of the finite individual is Brahman which underlies hidden behind the *actual* Jīva.[1]

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[1] "प्रतिषिध्यते एव तु परमार्थतः···परमेश्वरात् 'अन्यो' द्रष्टा श्रोता वा। परमेश्वरस्तु···शारीरात् विज्ञानात्मनाख्यात् 'अन्यः'। यथा मायाविनः चर्म्म-खड्गधरात् सूत्रेण आकाशमधिरोहतः, स एव मायावी परमार्थरूपी भूमिष्ठः अन्यः।" (वे० भा०, 1.1.17).

This also occurs in माण्डूक्य-भाष्य।—"तथैवायं मायाविनः सूत्रमाश्रित्य खसमः सुषुप्तस्वप्नादिविकासः... सूत्रतदारूढाभ्यामन्यः परमार्थमायावी, स एव भूमिष्ठः मायाच्छन्न एव स्थितः।" (1.6).

Now, the sum total of the states, actions, passions, impulses, etc., constitute to us the actual finite individual—the "Me" (कर्त्तृत्व-भोक्तृत्वविशिष्ट: विज्ञानात्मा). We take this self to be a separate (अन्य) and self-sufficient reality existing on its own account, utterly ignoring the real self which is present be hind[1] it unaffected by these states, etc., and distinguished from them. But the states, etc., cannot be *separated* from the real self behind and treated as an independent reality; they must be viewed *in connection with*[2] the true self as *its revelation,* through which it is expressing its nature and realising itself. Separated[3] from the underlying self, the states, etc., become unreal.[4] The readers will note that it is in this sense alone that the finite self has been declared to be unreal in the Sankara-vedānta.[5]

We must change our outlook and think of Brahman or the absolute Reality alone which is revealing in

[1] "प्राकृतविषय-विकारै: प्रच्छन्नम्" (कठ० भा०, 2.12).

[2] *Cf.* "न पृथगनुभव: किन्तु तत्-साहचर्य्यात्" (शतश्लोकी)।

[3] "नातीत्य तदात्मकतां, 'तदन्यत्व' गच्छति कश्चन"—कठ० भा० 4.9.

[4] "अणु महद्वा यदस्ति, तदात्मना 'विनिर्मुक्तं' मसत् भवति"—कठ० 2.20.

[For, they would be mere crass plurality, there would be no purpose, no end in them.]

[5] The illustration of Juggler appears to us to be more appropriate than even the illustration of रज्जु-सर्प. The illusion of a second man (whom the spectators saw) was produced by the *power* of the Juggler who stood—invisible all along unaffected by this illusion. In the case of रज्जु-सर्प, the illusion of Snake is not produced by any action of the rope, it is simply a *subjective* idea of the people who sees it. [The 'man' ought not to be thought of as an independent reality, but only as a *production* of the Juggler and this would be the real view there.]

ourselves, and of our states, etc., as its mere expressions. This is the true पारमार्थिक view. We find thus that the Infinite true self cannot be *reduced* to, and identified with, the actual individual self. Such self is unreal, Sankara would say.

· CHAPTER III.

On the Falsity of the World.



Contributory causes of the widely current opinion about the falsity of the world.

1. A charge has often been brought against the Adwaita system of philosophy to the effect that in this school the world has been treated merely as an appearance and as an illusion; that the object world, in this system, is an "unsubstantial pageant" having no "stuff of reality" in it. And this they say, finds an appropriate and admirable support in the short but significant line of the old Vedantic Professor Goudapâda—

"ब्रह्म सत्यं जगन्मिथ्या, जगद्‌ब्रह्मैव केवलम् ।"

The current belief in this respect is that Sankara's theory of Adwaitavāda unmistakably teaches us the falsity of the world,—that Brahman being considered to be the only Reality, everything else we find in the world must needs be unreal and false. From a frequent use in the commentaries of Sankara, of the terms 'Mâyâ' and 'Avidyâ'—it has been hastily concluded that everything of the universe must be Mâyâ-maya—illusory. The employment of some similes, in the works of Sankara, such as the similes of the Juggler and his Jugglery, of the celestial city in the sky conjured up by a magician, of the desert and the mirage, and the like has lent no inconsiderable help in corroborating the idea thus formed of the multiplicity (नानात्व) in the world as unreal and a mere appearance. It has not been felt advisable to

carefully examine the terms and the contexts in connection with which they occur. No need has also been felt to scrutinise how Sankara himself has explained these terms and similes. Now, we feel it incumbent upon us to test the ground with caution, upon which such dogmatic assertion about the falsity of the world and its diversities of nâma-rupas (नाम-रूप) has been founded and to see also if the alleged unreality finds any real support from the writings of Sankara himself.

Three classes of objects. Analysis of their fundamental and distinctive features does not favour the idea of falsity.

2. Those who care to go through the commentaries of Sankara will find out that he has mentioned three distinct classes of objects, each possessing characteristic features which distinguish each class of objects from the other class. This important classification can be very easily gathered from various portions of his Bhâsyas and it has a most valuable bearing upon the question of the falsity of the world which has gained such a notorious currency in his name.

(*i*) The first class includes in it such objects as are generally known as—rabbit-horn (शश-विषाण); barren-woman's son (वन्ध्या-पुत्र); and sky-flower (आकाश-कुसुम)[1]—and the like.

We find Sankara employing the term *alīka* (अलीक), *i.e.*, 'false,' 'non-existing,' and the general term *asat* (असत्), *i.e.*, 'unreal' in connection with these objects.

(*ii*) The objects falling under the second class are generally known as things like रज्जु-सर्प

[1] These are all imaginary objects conjured up by diseased fancy.

(a rope appearing as a snake); शुक्ति-रजत (an oyster appearing as silver; मरु-मरीचिका (desert-mirage); and गगन-मालिन्य (the sky appearing as blue) and the like.

The term (*asat*) असत्, *i.e.*, 'unreal' is sometimes applied to such class of objects.

(*iii*) Then comes the last class which comprises the created phenomenal objects of the world, *i.e.*, the *nāma-rūpas* (नाम-रूपs), *i.e.*, the changes (विकारs) in all their diversities which we find in the world.

After enumerating these three classes of objects,[1] Sankara tells us that the objects designated under the first class, *viz.* the शश-विषाण, etc., etc., have a peculiar nature of their own. They form a separate class distinguished from the two other classes of objects. For, these objects are of such a character that they do not *work* at all in the world, that do not serve any practical purpose of men. We cannot put these objects to any practical use at all. Why? Because, Sankara observes, the things which have nothing to take their stand upon, which have no permanent ground to sustain them and which are not supported by any underlying substratum—must be *false*; since such things can *do* us no practical good; they would break down, they would not work—in our varied experiences of the world—

"न हि 'निरात्मकं' किञ्चिद् व्यवहाराय अवकल्पते" गौ° 9.4.

"न हि मृग-तृष्णिकादयोऽपि 'निरास्पदा' भवन्ति"—मा° का° 6, गौ° 13.14.

"अणु महद्वा यदस्ति लोके वस्तु,
'तदात्मना विनिर्मुक्त' 'असत्' सम्पद्यते"—कठ° 2.20.

[1] *Whatever is presented to the consciousness may be called an—'object.'*

In respect of these objects, Sankara's remarks run to this effect :—

> The objects like शश-विषाण, etc., etc., have no *prior* cause from which they are produced; neither these objects are sustained or supported at the *present* moment by any underlying cause or 'being'—these have no underlying ground upon which they stand at present. Again, when these objects disappear (in future), they will have nothing—no sustaining ground—in which they will merge. For these reasons, such objects must be pronounced as really false or अलीक. As there is no underlying 'being' (सत् or आस्पद) to support them, they must be 'non-existent' things. Hence they are not true; they are false.[1]

But such is not the case with the objects which are subsumed under the second class; *viz*, the objects शुक्ति-रजत, रज्जु-सर्प, etc. We cannot, Sankara remarks, call these things false or अलीक in the same manner as we call the objects शश-विषाण, etc., etc., as false. Why? Because, Sankara argues—

> Such things as रज्जु-सर्प, शुक्ति-रजत, etc., cannot be said to have no permanent

[1] "असतः शश-विषाणादेः 'समुत्पत्त्यदर्शनात्'—तै-भाष्य 2·6। Again—
" वन्ध्या-पुत्रो न तत्त्वेन, मायया वापि 'जायते'—मा॰ का॰ भाष्य 1.6.
" न हि वन्ध्या-पुत्रो राजा बभूव, 'प्राक्' पूर्णवर्म्मणोऽभिषेकात्...इति मर्य्यादा-करणेन, वन्ध्या-पुत्रो राजा 'बभूव,' 'भविष्यतीति' वा"—वेदा॰ भाष्य, 2.1.18.

ground to sustain them as long as they appear,—

"न हि मृगतृष्णिकादयोऽपि 'निरास्पदाः' भवन्ति" ।—
i.e., none of these is निरास्पद; that is to say, the *prior* condition of the snake was the rope, *i.e.*, as the rope appears as a snake, the *prior* underlying ground which gave rise to the form or appearance of the 'snake' must have been the 'rope.' At the *present* moment too, the ground which sustains the appearance 'snake' is the 'rope.' Again when in *future* the notion of snake, on the dawning of the correct notion, will disappear, it will merge in its underlying ground, *i.e.*, the 'rope.'[1] It is evident, therefore, that these objects do not resemble the objects described above, *viz.*, शश-विषाण, etc., in respect of their 'unreality' or 'falsity.'

These objects, *viz.*, रज्जु-सर्प, etc., cannot, therefore, be declared to be 'false' in the sense in which the objects शश-विषाण, etc., can be so declared.

Now, let us consider the character of the third class of objects enumerated above, *viz.*,—the empirical objects

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[1] "रज्ज्वात्मना अवबोधात् 'प्राक्' सर्पः 'सन्नेव' भवति" 1-6 ; "सतोविद्यमानस्य वस्तुनो रज्ज्वादेः-सर्पादिवत् जन्म युज्यते"—मा० का० भा०, 3.27. ।

न हि सर्प-रजत-पुरुष-मृगतृष्णिकादिविकल्पाः रज्जु-शुक्ति-स्थाणूषरादि-व्यतिरेकेण अवस्त्वास्पदाः (स्थितिकाले) शक्याः कल्पयितुम्" (मा० आगम प्रकरण 1.7.) ।

"रज्जुरेवेति निश्चये सर्पविकल्पनिवृत्तौ (भविष्यति काले) रज्जुरेवेति" (मा० वैतथ्य प्रकरण 2-18) ।

(*i.e*, the evolving changes (विकारs) or the nāma-rūpas (नामरूपs). Sankara points out—

> these objects agree in an important respect with the objects described above as शुक्ति-रजत, रज्जु-सर्प, etc., etc. These changes (विकारs),—these empirical objects have a *prior* cause from which they are produced; during their sustenance at the *present* moment, the same identical causal reality underlies and sustains them; and in *future* also, they will merge in the same underlying ground which sustains them now.[1]

Thus, it will appear from a comparison of these three classes of objects with one another that, as regards the underlying sustaining ground, both the last-mentioned classes of objects agree with one another; but both of these differ from the first class of objects in this respect. It necessarily follows, therefore, that if you call the first class unreal or false (as Sankara has justly called them), the other two classes must, by implication, be *real*

Now, what is the net result of this discussion? The objects known as शश-विषाण, आकाश-कुसुम, etc., are the only objects which may, as the above discussion shows, be designated, in the system of Sankara, as actually false or unreal. Why? Because, these objects are the only objects which, as has been proved by the above-mentioned arguments, do not even serve the practical concerns of

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[1] "प्रत्यभिज्ञाबलेन सर्व्वेषु विकारेषु 'अन्वय्य' विच्छेद-दर्शनात्, अन्वयिद्रव्यमेव सर्व्वत्र कारणं भवति, न पिण्डादिविशेषः अनन्वयात् अव्यवस्थानाच्च" (छा० भाष्ये 6.2.2. आन°)।

"कारणं ब्रह्म त्रिष्वपि कालेषु 'सत्त्व'' न व्यभिचरति, तथा कार्य्यमपि जगत्"—इत्यादि (वेदा० भा० 2.1.16.)

"सत्त्वोक्तैव सत्यत्वमुच्यते। यस्माच्च जायते किञ्चित् तदस्तीति दृष्टं लोके".
(तै० भा०) 2.6.।

our life, because they have no prior or present sustaining-ground upon which they stand.

Tested by this line of argument, even such objects as are known to us as शुक्ति-रजत, रज्जु-सर्प, मरु-मरीचिका, etc., cannot be regarded unreal or false, in the Sankara system. For, can the snake, as has been seen in the above illustration, remain *separated* from its underlying substratum, *viz.*, the rope? Can the mirage stand, even for a moment, *separated* from the surface of the desert? [1]

It follows therefore that the man who has, thus, taken pains to prove the *reality* of such things as रज्जु-सर्प, मरु-मरीचिका, etc., will never feel inclined to regard the actual changes in the world—the empirical objects—the nâma-rūpas (नाम-रूप)—as unreal or false. But Sankara is not yet satisfied by mere comparison, by mere exhibition of the points of agreement and disagreement among the three classes of objects. He has gone further. He actually teaches in *express terms* the fact that the reality of the empirical objects is even more pronounced than the reality of such objects as the mirage, the *Sukti-rajata* and the like—

"मृगतृष्णिकाद्यपेक्षया, परमार्थोदकादि सत्यं"।[2] (तै० भाष्य, 2.6.)।

Elsewhere too, while describing the created subtle and gross elements (मूर्त्तामूर्त्त पञ्चभूत) of the world, Sankara calls them—"सत्य" or 'reals,' and the underlying Brahman as—"सत्यस्य सत्यं" or 'the Reality of the reals.' [3]

[1] "न हि सर्प-रजत-पुरुष मृगतृष्णिकादि विकल्पाः, रज्जु-शुक्ति-स्थाणूषरादि-'व्यतिरेकेण' अवस्तुास्पदाः शक्याः कल्पयितुं" (मा० भा०—आग० प्रक०) 1.7.।

[2] *Cf.* also "सत्य—परमार्थोदकादि। असत्य—मरीच्युदकादि" (प्रश्न० भा०, ४।५)।

[3] "पञ्च भूतानां सत्यानां स्वरूपावधारणार्थमिदमारभ्यते" (बृ० भा०, 2.3.1.)। "नेति नेति शब्दाभ्यां—सत्यस्य सत्यं निर्दिदिक्षितं" (बृ० भा०, 2.3.6)।

How can Sankara call the created empirical objects unreal or false? How can their existence be denied? Because, he has laid down the principle that "what is produced from something, from a prior 'being' —cannot itself be a 'non-existent' thing. For, a 'non-being' cannot be produced from a real 'being.'"[1] As we can know nothing of the Causal Reality (*i.e.*, Brahman) *apart* from its effects upon us, the effects or the products must be 'real.'

In this way, the empirical objects or the emergent changes have been regarded as *real* objects, in the system of Sankara's philosophy. Yet, most people have hastily concluded that the world is regarded false in this system.

It will be seen that it is only in comparison with the Absolute Reality (परमार्थ सत्य) which is none else but Brahman, that the phenomenal things may be designated *asat* (असत्) or 'unreal,' which therefore means—'relatively real.'[2]

It is to be regretted that the critics of the Sankara system have not cared to consider properly these weighty arguments to be found dispersed in the Vedanta-works; but they have, from the mere mention of the terms in the Bháṣyas, like शश-विषाण, मरीचिका, etc., etc., jumped at once at the conclusion that the world is false in the Vedānta.

[1] "असत: शश-विषाणादे: समुत्पत्त्यदर्शनात्, अस्ति जगतोमूलं।...... यस्माच्च जायते किञ्चित् तदस्तीति दृष्टं लोके, सत्त्वोक्तैव सत्यत्वमुच्यते" (तै० भाष्य 2.6। "कार्य्येण हि लिङ्गेन कारण-ब्रह्मज्ञानार्थत्वं सृष्टिश्रुतीनां" (मा० आ० 1.6)। "अग्राह्यमेव तत्, असदेव आत्मतत्त्वं? तन्न; कार्य्यग्रहणात्" (मा० का० भा०, 3.27)।

[2] "सत्यमुक्तं सत्यत्त्वं विकाराणां—तत्तु न परमार्थापेक्षया। किं तर्हि? इन्द्रियविषयापेक्षया उक्तं।...सत्यस्य परमार्थस्य उपलब्धिद्वारं भवति" (छा० भा०, 7.17.). "सत्यञ्च व्यवहारविषयं......न परमार्थसत्यं। एकमेव हि परमार्थसत्यं ब्रह्म" (तै० भा०, 2.6)।

Our waking and dreaming-experiences compared: comparison does not suggest the falsity.

3. To another reason, the current belief in the falsity of the world may be traced. Sankara has, in more than one place in his commentaries, compared the experiences of our waking life with our dream-experiences. Finding this comparison, most people, without feeling any necessity to pause to weigh carefully the observations of Sankara recorded in these places, have run away with the idea that as the dream-experiences are known to everybody to be unreal—to have no objective reality—the waking experiences which have been likened to these, must be equally unreal. But we beg to invite our reader's attention to the two most important passages wherein this comparison occurs and to request the readers to follow us, with a view to find out how Sankara has expressed his own views on the subject.

(*a*) First, we should like to refer our readers to the famous passage in the Brihadáranyaka—in the story of *Ajáta-satru and Báláki* where an elaborate description of the dream-state and its experiences occurs. And here also is recorded Sankara's view of the sense in which he regards the waking and the dreaming experiences as 'unreal.'

If our readers follow us patiently, it will be as clear as daylight that Sankara never regarded the objects experienced by us to be unreal. What he looked upon as unreal is an altogether different thing.

Sankara thus observes—

When a man falls asleep and happens to dream, he finds himself, say, to be a king

actually sitting upon a royal throne—surrounded by his people, ministers and servants;—with the maids fanning him and himself enjoying various pleasurable and painful experiences. Now, the cognitions he receives, the activities he performs, the states and feelings he enjoys—these are all his dream-experiences. Are these experiences to be taken as constituting the actual 'nature' or स्वरूप (swarūpa) of the self? or, is the real nature of the self to be regarded as something which is *distinct* from these, and which maintains its *distinct* identity and unity in and through dreaming experiences? Is this स्वरूप (nature) to be regarded as the aggregate—the mere sum-total—of these experiences, or does it possess a nature—a 'Self-hood'—distinguished from these?

Sankara declares that these experiences cannot constitute the self; the self cannot be resolved into and identified with them. What the real self is cannot be reduced into its states and activities; for, these are not its स्वरूप or आत्मभूत। The real self is that which experiences these things, unaffected by them; and hence it is the *subject* to which these stand as its *object*, and these are erroneously attributed to the subject as its 'nature' or स्वरूप. Such is also the case with the soul's *waking* experiences.

Here towards the close of this discussion, Sankara has employed the term—"अविद्यमाना": *i.e.*, 'non-existent.'

and the term—"मृषाध्यारोपिता": *i.e.*, 'falsely ascribed to the self'; and these two terms have been used in connection with the dream-experiences. These two terms are, we are afraid, the source of immense mischief created in respect of the idea of the falsity of our world-experiences.

But the readers will see that Sankara never says here that what a man experiences in his dream is false. He

"आत्मभूतत्वेन अविद्यमाना एव सन्तः"——

> That is to say, these experiences do not exist as his आत्मभूत, *i.e.*, as his स्वरूप or as the 'nature' of the self. These are falsely regarded as the nature or the *swarupa* (स्वरूप or आत्मभूत) of the self. The *experiences* of both the waking and the dreaming states of the man cannot be his आत्मभूत,, *i.e.*, cannot constitute his swarupa. The 'nature' (स्वरूप) of the self is what is *distinct* from these experiences; and this nature underlies these experiences, without losing its own identity in them.[1]

Here with a view to preclude any possibility of a mistake, Sankara records three reasons showing that

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[1] In his commentary on माण्डुक्यकारिका, वैतथ्य प्रकरण (2.8), Sankara has shown both the waking and dreaming experiences as असत्—unreal. But the reason given for it is the same as here. They are unreal because they are regarded as धर्म्मी, *i.e.*, *essential* property of the self. In reality, these experiences are not so. The self seems to be *affected* (*i.e.*, become सविकल्प) by these, but really it stands *apart* from these. "न स्वतःसिद्धं, किन्तु स्वप्रस्थानवतो धर्म्माः।...स्थानिधर्म्मेवत्वमेवेति असत्वम्।"

the real nature of the self is *distinct* from its experiences and the latter cannot therefore be regarded as आत्मभूत of the self. The experiences are *his*; they are not *he*. Why?—

(I) दृश्यत्वात्—These experiences are the *objects* of the self. They are what the subject experiences, to which the self directs its attention. The knower must be distinct from the objects known. Hence these known objects cannot constitute the *nature* of the knower.

(II) व्यभिचार-दर्शनात्—These experiences are by their nature transient and changing. They appear, they vanish and they are succeeded by other experiences. Such being their character, how can they constitute the nature of the self which is permanent?

(III) वस्त्वन्तर-सम्बन्ध-जनितत्वाच्च—These experiences are elicited from the nature of the self by the external or internal stimulating environment upon which they depend. But the underlying self is not dependent on anything and not produced by any stimulating object like "शब्दादि," *i.e.*, the sounds, touch, etc., etc.[1]

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[1] "हित्वा स्वप्नं, यदा सुषुप्तः तदा 'स्वाभाव्यं' गतो भवति,... 'अन्य-सम्बन्ध-कालुष्य'-हित्वा।...तदा शब्दादेः 'सम्बन्धि वस्त्वन्तरं' किञ्चन न वेद" (बृ० 2.1-18–19).

Here *cf.* "न हि यस्य यत् स्वरूपं, तत्तेन अन्यतोऽपेक्ष्यते। अनपेक्ष मेव सिद्धत्वात्। यद्धि अनपेक्ष्यं, तत् स्वत एव सिद्धं" (केन भाष्य, 1-4). Also—"द्रव्यस्य हि तत्त्वमविक्रिया, परानपेक्षत्वात्। विक्रिया न तत्त्वं, परापेक्षत्वात्। न हि कारकापेक्षं वस्तुनस्तत्त्वं। सतो विशेषः कारकापेक्षः; विशेषश्च विक्रिय। यद्धि यस्य नान्यापेक्षं स्वरूपं, तत् तस्य स्वरूपं। यदन्यापेक्षं, तत् न तत्त्वं-अन्याभावेऽभावात्"—तै० भा० 2.8।

The self is therefore distinct from its experiences. We see, now, that the experiences of the world, as such, are never regarded by Sankara as unreal or false. The unreality only comes, when the self is entirely resolved into these experiences, and when these are taken to be the nature (आत्मभूत) of the self.

(*b*) In a similar passage in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, where a similar comparison between the waking and the dreaming experiences occurs, Sankara very forcibly expresses his view saying that their apparent unreality lies in their *relativity*, *i.e.*, in relation to the dreaming experiences, the waking experiences may be called unreal and in relation to the latter, the former may be regarded unreal.[1]

" जाग्रद्विषयापेक्षं तदनृतत्वं, न स्वतः । "—8.5.4.

But both kinds of experiences must be regarded *real* respectively *in their own spheres* (स्वविषये,स्वतः)।—

" स्वविषयेऽपि सर्व्वं सत्यमेव,

स्वप्नदृश्याइव······इति न कश्चिद्विरोधः । "—छा० भाष्य 8.5.4.

The world is neither absolutely सत nor absolutely असत(अनिर्व्वचनीय).

4. The world of नामरूपs has frequently been described as *inexplicable*—अनिर्व्वचनीय—in the Saṅkara bhāṣya. We find such sentences as these—नामरूपलक्षणेन··· व्याकृताव्याकृतात्मकेन ' तत्त्वान्यत्वाभ्यामनिर्व्वचनीयेन ' ब्रह्म परिणामादिसर्व्वव्यवहारास्पदत्वं प्रतिपद्यते " (वे° 2.1.27)[2]

[1] Here compare वे° भा° 2.2.29, where similar conclusion has been drawn.

[2] *Vide* also वे° भा° 2.1.14.

The reason given for characterising the world as "inexplicable" is to be found in the expression—

तत्त्वान्यत्वाभ्यामनिर्वचनीयेन ।

This expression means that the world is neither absolutely सत् (*i.e.* ब्रह्म), nor it is not-सत् (*i.e.*, something absolutely different from Brahman), and it is therefore inexplicable.

If the readers will call to mind what has been said about Sat (सत्) and Asat (असत्) in Chap. I, the real significance of the expression (अनिर्वचनीय) will come out. From one point of view the world will appear as real or सत्, and from another point of view it will appear as unreal or असत्. We have seen there that prior to actual manifestation, the world of नामरूपs—existed in Brahman in undifferentiated condition and so indistinguishable from Brahman. But as the differentiations began to arise, some वैलक्षण्य—something new—some difference—began to appear. But the difference which arose was in reality not something altogether different (अन्य) from Brahman, but is Brahman itself. For, it was nothing but the *manifestation* of Brahman's nature.

So long as the world is regarded as existing *in* Brahman in undifferentiated condition, it is identical—अभिन्न—with Brahman—not विभक्त or अन्य from it, and so long it is real or सत्. But as soon as the world is differentiated, there is some difference—वैलक्षण्य or भेद also. In the Chāndogya, Sankara remarks that prior to its production, previous to its manifestation, the world was real—सत्.[1] But when it was differentiated or came out of Brahman—when नामरूप actually appeared—we began to look upon it as something absolutely different from

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[1] "......ननु न श्रुतं त्वया 'सदेवे'त्यवधारणम्" (छा॰ 6.2.2).

Brahman—as विभक्त or अन्य—as something self-existing and independent. Taken in this way, the नामरूप is unreal—असत्. But from a higher view, from the पारमार्थिक standpoint—नामरूप is not really different or अन्य from Brahman,[1] but inseparably connected with Brahman. Thus from two different views, the नामरूप or the world is both real and unreal. Hence it cannot be said to be *absolutely* real or unreal. We in our अविद्यावस्था, always *separate* the effects (विकारs) from their underlying causal reality (कारण). This is our व्यवहारिक-state. But even in our व्यवहारिक state, we must try to change our outlook and look upon the world from the पारमार्थिक point of view, and *then* the विकारs will appear standing inseparably connected with their cause (ब्रह्म)—the underlying Reality, and not something separate. For, the underlying Reality is being expressed or realised through them.

The readers will find that Sankara does not deny the existence of the world as such, he only wants us to treat it not as अन्य from Brahman[2] or something self-existent and independent. This is Sankara's view of unreality.

Doctrine of causality elaborated. Relation between unity and multiplicity does not imply falsity.

5. The theory of causality as elaborated in the Vedanta Philosophy by Sankara which is known as the Sat-kāryya-vāda (सत्कार्य्यवाद) has not, it appears to us, received the attention which it deserves, and such scanty and superficial treatment of this celebrated Principle of

[1] "न हि स्थितावपि हि कार्य्यं कारणात्मानमन्तरेण 'स्वतन्त्रं' मस्ति" (वे°, 2.1.9)।

[2] For this, the world—the नामरूप—has been stated as आत्मभूत in several places. It means—'not स्वतन्त्र from Brahman.' *cf.* "आत्मभूतामस्वतन्त्रां, न सांख्यपरिकल्पित-प्रधानादिवत् पृथग्भूतां स्वतन्त्रां शक्तिं······ईश्वर-रूपेणावस्थितामित्यर्थः" (श्वे° भा°, 1.3).

Causality is, we fear, responsible, to not an inconsiderable extent, for the current views about the falsity of the world.

In a previous chapter we have given brief indication of this theory, and here we desire to elaborate the idea of causality further in the light in which it has been elucidated by Sankara himself.

Sankara, it will be seen, has, at the very commencement of his discussion, splitted up the theory into two distinct parts and laid it down as a general rule that—

> " अनन्यत्वेऽपि कार्य-कारणयोः,—
> कार्यस्य कारणात्मत्वं, न तु कारणस्य कार्यात्मत्वं । "
>
> —वेदा° भा° 2.1.9.

(1) The first part, *viz.*,—न तु कारणस्य कार्यात्मत्वं implies that the cause or the causal Reality is *distinct* from its effects or its successive changes or manifestations, because it has a 'nature,' a स्वरूप, 'selfdom' of its own; and it cannot therefore be *resolved* into, or identified with, the effects or successive changes emerging from it;—it cannot therefore be regarded, to use Sankara's own mode of expression, as becoming something other than its own nature (स्वरूप) when the effects emerge from it in succession—

> " न हि विशेषदर्शनमात्रेण वस्त्वन्यत्वं भवति
> ......स एवेति प्रत्यभिज्ञानात् "—
>
> वेदा° भा° 2.1.18.

If you violate this part of the teaching, a great fault will vitiate your theory,

viz., the causal reality would consist merely in its effects, *i.e.*, the sum-total of the effects (parts) would constitute the cause (the whole). In this case—Brahman would be all, and all would be Brahman.

(II) The second part of the theory, *viz.*— "कार्य्यस्य कारणात्मत्वं"—implies that the cause is no doubt distinct from, and independent of, its effects or the emergent changes; but the effects (कार्य्य) or the successive changes cannot be absolutely *separated* from their cause and regarded as independent and self-sufficient 'things' (वस्तु), each complete in itself—

" यस्य च यस्मादात्मलाभो भवति, स तेन 'अप्रविभक्तो' दृष्टः, यथा घटादीनां मृदा 1.6.1. (वृ०)।" And—" नहि 'वस्तुवृत्तेन' विकारो नाम कश्चिदस्ति। कारणात् 'व्यतिरेकेण' अभावः कार्य्यस्य "।[1]

The effects are called अनन्य from their cause. That is to say,—as the real 'nature' of the cause becomes gradually manifested or realised in these successive effects, the latter are mere *means*, instruments, for the realisation of the 'nature' of the cause.[2] It is not therefore possible to *separate* any of the effects from the underlying cause. For, these are merely the phases, or stages (संस्थानभेद मात्रं)

[1] *Vide* 2.1.14. वे॰ भा॰, and also वृ॰ भा॰, 1.6.1.

[2] Our readers will remember that in the Vedanta the self is known as स्वार्थ, *i.e.* purpose, and everything else besides the self is known as — परार्थ for the realisation of that purpose. This point the reader will find discussed in Chapter II.

assumed by the cause for its own manifestation. We cannot, therefore, regard any of the stages as something अन्य or independent and separate, as if existing on their own account.—

"सांमान्यस्य (The cause) ग्रहणेनैव तद्गता: विशेषा: (the effects) गृहीता: स्यु:......न तत एव 'निर्भिद्य' ग्रहीतुं शक्यन्ते"[1]

In this way, the effects are called in the Vedanta as अनन्य (*ananya*) from their cause.

One of the Tiká-Káras amplified the sense of the term अनन्य (Ananya) by stating—

"कारणात् पृथक्-सत्ताशून्यत्वं साध्यते, न तु ऐक्याभिप्रायेण[2]"।

The created world is not absolutely *identical* with Brahman—its underlying cause; but the world has no *separate being* apart from, or independent of, its underlying cause. That is to say, the world is entirely *dependent on* Brahman and inseparable from it. No one of the successive changes can be separated from the underlying Causal Reality (*i.e.*, Brahman) which is constantly present behind each change, unaffected by it; and no one of its changes can be regarded as so many independent 'things'—

"न हि 'वस्तुवृत्तेन' विकारो नाम कश्चिदस्ति।"
"परमार्थत: कारणात् 'व्यतिरेकेण' अभाव: कार्य्यस्य"
—(वेदा० भाष्य 2.1.14)।

Sankara has, in this way, explained and elaborated his celebrated Causal Theory in his Vedántabhásya and other places.

Refutation of Pantheism does not favour unreality.

6. The readers must remember that we have already referred to the theory of Pantheism which was associated with the name of one Vrittikāra and which Sankara took particular care to refute. Some

[1] *Vide* बृ० भा०, 2.4.11, etc, etc., etc., and वे० भा०, 2.1.14.

[2] The Bhāmati remarks—'अभेद: न साध्यते, किन्तु भेदो व्यासिध्यते—वेदान्ते'।

of the arguments employed for its refutation has been considered in the earlier Chapter of this book (p. 63 and pp. 113-118). Some other arguments are given here.

While treating of Sankara's own view, we have found that Brahman has a 'nature'— स्वरूप — of its own and it is not liable to change (स्वरूपस्य अनपायित्वात्). And from this 'nature,' the world—the differences of nāma-rūpa—are produced. In the finite self also, its states or qualities are elicited from its 'nature' by its interaction with the environment.[1] When these differences emerge, the underlying nature or स्वरूप does not lose its identity, nor does it become entirely *reduced* to these.[2] It continues to maintain its unity—its identical nature—in these successively emergent changes or states.[3]

The Vrittikāra entirely *reduced* unity to multiplicity—Brahman or the self to the changing nāma-rūpas or states. Thus he made Brahman or the Self as—अनेकात्मक, *i.e.*, composed of parts. But yet, most inconsistently, he looked upon *both* the unity and the multiplicity to be equally real.[4]

But Sankara, in his criticism of this theory, very

[1] "संसर्गाभावे 'विशेष—विज्ञानस्य' अभाव: (वे° भा°)। Also "उपाधि-योगादुपजातविशेषस्य" (3.2.34).

[2] "न हि उपाधि-योगादपि अन्यादृशस्य वस्तुन: अन्यादृश: स्वभाव: सम्भवति। ...प्रत्युपाधिभेदं हि अभेदमेव ब्रह्मण: श्रावयति" (वे° भा° 3.2.11-12)।

[3] "आत्मा एतेषु 'अनुगत:,' सर्व्वत्र अव्यभिचारात्; यथा सर्प-धारादिभेदेषु रज्जु:।...अव्यभिचारात् कल्पनावस्थायामपि अद्वयता शिवा" (मा° का° भा°, 2.32-33). "एकमेवाद्वितीयं परमार्थत: 'इदं-बुद्धि-कालेऽपि' (छा° भा° 6.2.2)।

[4] ननु अनेकात्मकं ब्रह्म......यथा समुद्रात्मना एकत्वं,—फेन—तरङ्गाद्यात्मना नानात्वं; अत: एकत्वं नानात्वं उभयमपि सत्यमेव?—नैवं स्यात्—इत्यादि (वे° भा° 2.1.14).

pertinently asks—when you reduce the one to the many, or when you reduce the many to the one, how can *both* be declared to be equally real? [1] One of them must be an unreality. For—

(*a*) If the unity is entirely reduced to the many, the many would be the only reality and the unity has no *separate* existence apart from the many. The unity would be merely a unity of collection—a mere aggregate of disconnected parts. The aggregate alone stands here, with no *separate* unity behind to connect it. There would be no real unity, no plan, no purpose, no regularity (नियमेन प्रवर्त्तनम्) in the world. As the flowers of a garland fall when the connecting string is removed, so the successive differences of nāma-rūpa without any connecting identity passing through them would fall to the grund,[2] as आनन्दगिरि has so beautifully stated. Then again, as the unity is a mere logical *abstraction*, the nāma-rūpas—the many—would stand *unrelated*, as an independent whole. But how can there be nāma-rūpas at all, without Brahman on their background? For, it is Brahman as the cause of which the world of nāma-rūpa is the production. And without the subject, how there can be an object? Who

[1] *Cf.* " न मयेदमेकस्मिन् धर्म्मिणि अभिहितं । त्वयैव इदं विरुद्धधर्म्मत्वेन एकंवस्तु परिगृह्णीतं भ्रान्त्या " (बृ° 2.4.13).

" न हि एकंवस्तु स्वतएव रूपादिविशेषोपेतं, तद्विपरीतञ्च—इत्यवधारयितुं शक्यं विरोधात् (वे° 3.2.11).

Sankara elsewhere shows there can be no *co-ordination* between Brahman and the world. " सर्व्वं ब्रह्मेति सामानाधिकरण्यात् आशङ्का सम्भवति, तां निवर्त्तयितुमाह—इत्यादि " (वे° 1.3.1). *Cf.* also वे°, 3.2.29.

[2] कारणान्वयहीनं कार्य्यं न स्थातुमुत्सहते......अन्यथा सक्तुमुष्टिवत् व्यशीर्य्यत । " *Cf.* छा°भा°, 6.7.1. also.

would *combine* the series of his states and call them to be *his own* ?

(*b*) If the many is reduced to the one, if the nāma-rūpas are changed or sacrificed to Brahman, the one or the all-inclusive whole would be the only reality. Everything of the world, all differences of nāma-rūpa, the many—would be equally divine, all would be Brahman; there would then be no differences between a saint and a sinner. All distinctions, all भेदs, will, as Sankara justly remarks, disappear.[1] There would be no higher and lower, no तारतम्य in the objects of the world.[2] The finite selves would be mere phases of that whole and therefore would have no freedom and responsibility.

In this way, Sankara has shown that *both* the unity and the multiplicity cannot be held to be equally real in Vrittikāra's theory. In Sankara's own theory where there is no question of reduction, no such absurdity as noticed above can arise. In his own theory, the one is the reality which has a 'nature' of its own and which cannot be

[1] "एकं हि परं ब्रह्म द्वैताद्वैतात्मकं···न च उपदेष्टा अन्यो ब्रह्मण:...... ब्रह्मणोऽन्यत्र उपदेशग्रहणादिकल्पना न सम्भवति। नहि हस्तादिद्वैताद्वैतात्मके देवदत्ते, वाक्कर्णयो: देवदत्तैकदेशभूतयो: वाक् उपदेष्ट्री, कर्ण: केवल उपदेशस्य ग्रहीता, देवदत्तस्तु नोपदेष्टा नाप्युपदेशस्य ग्रहीता इति कल्पयितुं शक्यते" (बृ° 5.1.1).

"यदि हि अद्वैतार्थत्वमेवासां, ग्राम-पशु-स्वर्गाद्यर्थत्वं नास्तीति ग्रामपशुस्वर्गादयो न गृह्येरन्; गृह्यन्ते तु कर्म्मफलवैचित्र्यविशेषा:" (बृ° 3.2.1.)

Cf. क्रिया-कारक-फलभेदस्य लोकप्रसिद्धस्य सत्यतामसत्यताञ्च न च वारयति (2.1.20).

[2] "सत्वाधिक्यात् आविस्तरत्वोपपत्ते:। आदित्यादिषु हि सत्त्वमत्यन्तप्रकाशं... अतस्तत्रैव आविस्तरं ज्योति:···न तु तत्रैव तदधिकं...तारतम्येन आविर्भवति इत्यादि (गी° १५।१२)।

reduced to the many. And there arises no need also to declare the unreality of the existence of the many, as in the Vrittikara's view. The many is the factor which is inseparable from the one, in and through which the nature of the unity is realising or manifesting itself, and the many—the world of nāma-rūpas—is to be always taken in *inseparable connection with* the underlying unity of Brahman as its stages or means of manifestation,—and not as a separate and an independent whole. Taken as a *separate* whole, the world would be an unreality.[1]

Now, we find, as the result of this exposition of the Vedantic theory of causality that we are not to resolve the prior causal reality into its effects, *i.e.*, the created nāma-rūpas with their infinite diversities. If we do so, the causal Reality would lose its own unity or its *Swabhāva* (स्वभाव), and with the successive emergence of the differences or changes, it would itself become something absolutely *other than* its own nature (*i e.* अन्य). *Brahman would become the world*, and both would be entirely *identical*. Sankara calls such world *unreal, false*, असत्य. For, in that case the world would be the only reality. *Everywhere he has held the world and the changes* (विकारs) *to be unreal and false in this sense only.* He has not negated or abolished or denied anywhere the existence of the world and its changing विकारs, as they are, as they stand. In the case of the finite self and its states and activities, the theory holds good equally. If the finite self is resolved into its successively emergent states and activities;—the self will become absolutly *identical* with these and will thus become

[1] "सतोऽन्यत्वे अनृतत्वं, सदात्मना तु सत्यत्वमेव"। "न हि मृदमनाश्रित्य घटादिः सत्त्वं स्थितिर्वा सम्भवति" (छा° भा° 6.3.2 and 6.8.4.)

"आत्मस्वरूपात्—'अन्यत्' वस्त्वन्तरं—स्वप्नमायामरीच्युदकसममसारं" (बृ° भा°, 3.5.1).

something *other than* itself; such a self is unreal and false.[1]

The fact is that Brahman as well as the *Jivas* maintain their own nature or स्वरूप and preserve its unity and identity in and through its successive states or changes; and these emergent changes are always to be considered as self-evident *stages* (संस्थानभेद) for the manifestation or realisation of their underlying स्वरूप; for, we have seen that it is Brahman which has manifested itself as its *other* and therefore the other is not absolute, but only itself, and consequently they cannot be separated and treated as something absolulety distinct (अन्य)[2] from Brahman. When they are so treated, Sankara would at once call them unreal, false. In no other way, he is prepared to *label* the world and its experiences as false.

Certain terms, phrases and expressions examined. Examination does not favour falsity.

7. There is quite a large number of terms, phrases, and expressions, very widely made use of by Sankara which frequently occur in diverse places of the commentaries. These terms, phrases and expressions have, we are sure, contributed much to give currency to the idea of the falsity of the world. For, these phrases and expressions, when detached from the context in which they occur, convey the meanings which apparently may be taken to favour the idea of falsity. But fortunately, Sankara has, in every case, taken good care to give a clear exposition of these phrases and expressions, from which we can, if we feel so inclined, gather

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[1] " अविद्याध्यारोपितसुखित्वादिविशेषप्रतिबन्धादेव आत्मन: स्वरूपेण अनवस्थानं, स्वरूपावस्थानञ्च श्रेय: " (मा० का-भा०, 2.32).

[2] This idea of अनन्य, when perfected, has also been called by the phrase 'सर्व्वात्मभाव' in the commentaries. " सतएव द्वैतभेदेन अन्यथागृह्यमाणत्वात् नासत्वं कस्यचिद् वस्तुन: ब्रूमोवयं " (छा० भा० 6.2.3).

their right import. We now propose to present them to our readers with a view to show that a great injustice has been done to the writer of these phrases, terms and expressions in understanding them in a sense which was far from the mind of the author.

(*a*) Let us take the celebrated expression—

" वाचारम्भणं विकारो, नामधेयं,
——मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम् । "

We come across this sentence for the first time in the Chāndogya-Upanisad where Āruni Uddālaka, that vedic teacher of high renown who founded the celebrated Mortar-Doctrine—explained, to his son Sweta-ketu, with the help of certain familiar objects of every-day-use in the household, the relation existing between a causal substance and its effects which are successively produced from it. This sentence attained so much importance in the subsequent vedantic literature that one of its phrases formed an integral part of an Aphorism in the Brahma-sutra,[1] and Sankara himself made use of this sentence in several parts of his commentaries while engaged in giving an exposition of the vedantic causal theory. In view of the eminent place which this sentence holds, we shall here try to arrive at the true significance of this expression.

Uddālaka was telling his son that the causal substance—the clay—produces from it several transformations in succession to which specific names are applied—say, the plate, the pot, the cup and so on. A lump of gold produces several forms out of it to which we apply specific names, *viz.*, a bracelet, a crown, a necklace. Now, all these so-called objects, the transformations, the changes, (विकार) are, declares Sruti, absolutely dependent on the

[1] *Vide* the Aphorism—2.1.14.

specific words people choose to apply to them. But these are in reality nothing other than—नामधेयम्—the class-name, *i.e.*, नाम-सामान्य to which they belong as inseparably connected. This is the relation between a genus (सामान्य) and the several species (विशेषs) subsumed under it.

Sankara, in his commentary on the Brihadaranyaka, records his opinion on the relation which exists between a *genus* and its species. Sankara remarks there (1-6.1) that all the (शब्दविशेषाः) *specific* words are but the differentiations of one नाम-सामान्य—

" यः कश्चन शब्दो वागेव सा......

शब्द-सामान्यमात्रम्। एतद्धेतेषां—

नाम-विशेषाणां कारणम्। (बृ°, 1.6.1).

The class-name or the नाम-सामान्य is the cause of the specific words or the नाम-विशेषs (individual words). It is the नाम-सामान्य which divides itself into, differentiates into, the specific words and binds them to itself.[1] And these विशेषs cannot, therefore, be taken out of, separated from, the नाम-सामान्य and treated as self-sufficient entities (अन्य).[2] Why? Because these are all *included within*[3] the सामान्य and these are mere phases, shapes, forms, of that सामान्य in which it manifests itself—

" सामान्ये तद्विशेषाः उक्ताः। "

" विशेषाणाञ्च सामान्ये अन्तर्भावात् "—

Sankara concludes that when the सामान्य is taken, all

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[1] " नाम-सामान्यात् सर्व्वाणि नामानि यज्ञदत्तो देवदत्त इत्येवमादिप्रविभागानि ...उत्तिष्ठन्ति प्रविभज्यन्ते। न तत एव निर्भिद्य ग्रहीतुं शक्यन्ते। "

[2] " न पृथगनुभवः किन्तु तत्-साहचर्य्यात् " (स्वात्मनिरूपणम्).

[3] " कारणं हि लोके कार्य्यात् भूयो दृष्टं।...यच्च यस्य अन्तर्व्वर्त्ति, तदल्पं, भूय इतरत् (छा॰ 7.12.1)."

" सामान्ये हि विशेषः अन्तर्भवति " (छा॰ 7.4.1).

the विशेषs are taken along with it; for, it included them within it[1] as its inseparable parts. It is the सामान्य which sustains[2] all its विशेषs and it is, therefore, not at all possible or reasonable to *separate* the latter from the former, looking upon the latter as so many independent and separated objects existing on their own account, which all of us most unreasonably do under the influence of our अविद्या. Regarded in such a way, the so-called objects would be unreal, false.

Now, in the light of these suggestions made by Sankara, the sentence—"वाचारम्भणं विकारो, नामधेयं ; मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यं"—means that all विकारs, such as the earthen cup, the plate, the pot, etc., which are all dependent on वाक् (वाचालम्बनम्),—to which specific names or words (वाक्, *i.e.*, शब्दविशेषाः) are applied—are, properly speaking, only नामधेय, *i.e.*, नाम-सामान्य[3]. And this सामान्य is real—सत्य—in them, as the clay, *i.e.*, मृत्-सामान्य is real in the specific differences, *viz.*, the cup, the plate and the pot. Hence the विकारs, *i.e.*, these specific objects cannot be *taken out* of their सामान्य, cannot be separated from it and regarded as so many self-sufficient entities. In that case, if separated, they would be unreal—असत्य Yet in our practical life (व्यवहारिक-state), we always regard them so.[4] But in reality—from the पारमार्थिक-stand-point, they are not such independent (अन्य, विभक्त) things, but they are only सामान्य; for it is the सामान्य which sustains them, सामान्य which includes them in itself and which expresses its nature through them.

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[1] सामान्यस्य ग्रहणेनैव तद्गताविशेषाः गृहीताभवन्ति (बृ० 2.4.7).

[2] 'सामान्यं' आत्मस्वरूपप्रदानेन हि विशेषान् बिभर्त्ति धारयति' (बृ० 1.6.1.).

[3] The affix धेय is in स्वार्थे ; नामधेय must therefore mean नाममात्रम् *i.e.*, नामसामान्यम् ।

[4] 'अविद्यया 'अन्यत्' वस्त्वन्तरमिव पश्यति' (प्र° भा° 4.5).

The readers will see that this is the real explanation of the celebrated sentence according to the light thrown by Sankara himself, and this explanation does not at all make the विकारs non-existent or unreal or असत्य. Sankara wants us to regard विकारs to be taken always *in connection with* their सामान्य which finds its expression in them—and not *separated* from it, as so many different objects. We have no right, says he, to sever their connection or relation with their underlying सामान्य—which is their causal substance. Thus the world ought not to be taken as *separated* from the underlying Brahman and regarded as a self-sufficient whole existing on its own account. The world would be unreal in this sense alone, according to Sankara.

(*b*) Let us now take the expressions—

सर्व्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म—All this is Brahman;
आत्मैवेदं सर्व्वं—All this is Åtmā;
इदं सर्व्वं यदयमात्मा—All this is what is Åtmá;

A superficial reading of such expressions as these cannot but leave in the mind of a reader an impression of the absolute *identity* of Brahman with the world. But we would request our readers to turn their eyes to the three main places in the Vedanta-bhāsyá where Sankara himself explains these expressions; *viz.*,—the sutra 1.1.25, Sutra 1. 3. 1, and Sutra 2. 1. 14.[1]

[1] In fact, in the first section (commencing from aphorism 20), second section and the third section—in all these sections (पाद) of the first chapter of the Vedanta sutras, the readers will find that the real sense of such terms as प्राण, आकाश, ज्योति, गायत्री, वायु, etc., has been discussed. It has been concluded that these terms are not to be mistaken for the mere phenomenal objects of nature. They are all

Sankara's idea about these expressions may be summarised in his following observation :—

" विकारेऽनुगतं जगत्कारणं ब्रह्म निर्द्दिष्टं—'तदिदं सर्व्वमित्युच्यते,' यथा 'सर्व्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्मेति।' कार्य्यञ्च कारणात् अव्यतिरिक्तमिति वक्ष्यामः।"[1]

Sankara in these places, does not at all absolutely *identify* Brahmau—the causal Reality—with its effects (विकार). The effects he takes in the relation of अनन्य (*ananya*) from the cause. We have already explained the sense of अनन्य from the standpoint of Sankara which we need not repeat here. It does not mean pure *identity*. Such being his explanation of the phrase—'सर्व्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म,' we have no warrant to regard the world with all its changes (विकारs), as absolutely identical with Brahman

derived objects; have derived their existence and activity from Brahman --the causal Energy which lives in them and sustains them,—whose purpose they serve (संहतानांपरार्थत्वं दृष्टं). Sankara has shown that these are all *effects*, and can have no self-sufficient *being* of their own, *apart* from the *being* of the causal Brahman which reveals in them.

[1] In Sutra 1. 3. 1. also, it has been shown that Brahman cannot be resolved into the changes of the world. Hence Brahman is to be regarded as a unity unaffected by its evolving changes.

"न कार्य्यप्रपञ्च-विशिष्टः विचित्र आत्मा···यथा अनेकात्मको वृक्ष...एवं नानारसो विचित्र आत्मा इति। 'सर्व्वं ब्रह्मेति'च सामानाधिकरण्यात् आशङ्का सम्भवति ; तां निवर्त्तयितु माह।"

In Sutra 2 1.14 also, the effects are shown to be अनन्य from their cause. 'ब्रह्मैवेदं सर्व्वं', आत्मैवेदं सर्व्वं,' 'नेह नानाऽस्ति किञ्चन'—all these are cited as examples of that theory. *The nature of the cause gradually finds its expression in the effects. Hence the effects cannot be separated from it and regarded as something* अन्य *or independent.*

Such is the sense, everywhere, of these phrases.

regarding the world as the only reality. The real nature of the cause is transcendental (कूटस्थ)[1] in the system of Sankara, which underlies all its products. And it cannot, as we have already seen, be resolved into its products.

It is Brahman which realises itself in the form of the world. Hence the world cannot be absolutely *identical* with Brahman in Sankara's philosophy.[2] The world is simply to be taken as the means through which the underlying nature or स्वरूप of Brahman is being realised or expressed in higher and higher forms.[3]

(*c*) It is not infrequently that the differentiations or the created *náma-rūpas* (नाम-रूप), —the changes or differences that are

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[1] "कूटस्थात्...कारणात् कार्य्यमुत्पद्यते" [वे° भा°, 2.2.26].
"कूटस्थस्येति विशेषणात्" 2.1.14 इत्यादि।

Sankara has nowhere applied the term 'cause' to the mere *antecedent in time.* "नासावुपमृद्यमाना पूर्वावस्था उत्तरावस्थायाः कारणमभ्युपगम्यते" (वे° भा° 2.2.26).

[2] Compare the famous phrase "तत्त्वान्यत्वाभ्यामनिर्व्वचनीये"—*i.e.*, neither तत्त्व—absolutely *identical*, nor अन्यत्व absolutely *other*. (*Vide* p. 136)

Cf. Bhāmati—'न तु यत् ब्रह्म, तत् सर्व्वं' (वे°, 1.3.1).

[3] "कूटस्थनित्यस्य एकरूपस्यापि उत्तरोत्तरमाविष्कृतस्य तारतम्य मैश्वर्य्यशक्ति-विशेषैः श्रूयते" [वे° भा°, 1.1.11]. Continuously higher and higher differences emerge in Nature, as an Inexhaustible (अव्यय) and perfect principle stands behind nature and is revealing itself through her. "आदित्यादिषु हि सत्त्वमत्यन्तप्रकाशं अतस्तत्र आविस्तरं ज्योतिः [चैतन्य], न तु तत्रैव तत् अधिकं।... यथा तुल्येऽपि मुखसंस्थाने...आदर्शादौ स्वच्छे स्वच्छतरे च तारतम्येन आविर्भवति तद्वत्।...सत्त्वाधिक्यादाविस्तरत्वोपपत्तेः" [गी° भा°, 15.12].

"यद्यपि कार्य्यात्मना उद्रिच्यते—उद्गच्छति, तथापि यत्पूर्णत्वं तन्न जहाति,—पूर्णमेव उद्रिच्यते" [बृ°, भा°, 5.1.1].

emerging in the world have been called in the Bhāsyas as—

अविद्या-प्रत्युपस्थापित—brought about or presented by Avidyâ;

अविद्या-कल्पित—fancied or imagined by Avidyâ;

अविद्यात्मक—consisting of Avidyâ;

अविद्याध्यारोपिते नामरूपे—(nama-rupas) ascribed or imposed by Avidyâ;—and so on.

Now, these phrases, to all outward appearances, imply the illusory character or unreality or falsity of these changes—these emerging náma-rūpas. But such meaning, if adopted, would militate against the entire theory of Sankara, as we shall presently see.

For the true meaning of these phrases we would refer our readers to Chap. I of this book (p. 45) where we have shown that Sankara in commenting on the Taittiriya Upanishad observed that as Avidyā belongs to nāma-rūpa[1] and exists as a property of our intellect,[2] it is under its influence that our intellect (अन्तःकरण) always takes nāma-rūpa as an essential property of the self (आत्मधर्म्मौ).[3] In

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[1] "नामरूप-पक्षस्यैव विद्याविद्ये। नामरूपे च नात्मधर्म्मौ"।

[2] "विवेकाविवेकौ (*i.e.* विद्याविद्ये) रूपादिवत्...अन्तःकरणस्थौ"।

[3] "नामरूपे च न आत्मधर्म्मौ...ते च पुनर्नामरूपे सवितरि अहोरात्रे इव—आत्मनि कल्पिते, न परमार्थतो विद्यमाने"।—तै° भा°, 2.8. (कल्पिते=अध्यारोपिते। *Cf.* "'संसृष्ट'-रूपेण कल्पितत्वमिष्टं"—मा° का° भा°, आग,°3.32).

another passage, we find Sankara making a similar observation, where he says that as the self has a 'nature' (स्वरूप) of its own, it is always *distinguished* from the nāma-rūpa, and to look upon the nāma-rūpa as an essential property or धर्म्म of the self, which people erroneously do, must therefore be wrong.[1] Brahman always remains unaffected (निर्विकल्प) by the world of nāma-rūpa which has emerged from it; it is our Avidyā which makes it appear as affected (सविकल्प) by and thus identified with the changing nāma-rūpa of the world.[2]

The celebrated Introduction appended to the "Brahma-sūtra" also points out that it is our Avidyā[3] which produces false

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[1] "यत् यत् परः आत्मधर्मत्वेन अभ्युपगच्छति, तस्य तस्य नामरूपात्मकत्वाभ्युपगमात्। नामरूपाभ्यां च आत्मनोऽन्यत्वाभ्युपगमात्।...उत्पत्तिप्रलयात्मके हि नामरूपे तद्विलक्षणश्च ब्रह्म"।—बृ भा°, 2.1.20.

[2] "न हि परमार्थतो 'निर्विकल्पे' ब्रह्मणि कश्चिदपि 'विकल्प' उपपद्यते।... आत्मप्रतिपत्त्यर्थमेव बहुभवन-सर्गादि 'परिकल्प्यते' ब्रह्मणि" (तै° भा° 2.8).

Compare—स्वरूपेण अकल्पितस्य 'संसृष्ट'—रूपेण कल्पितत्वमिष्ट' " (मा° भा° आग° 3.32).

[3] Dr. Harmann Jacobi of the University of Bonn, Germany, in a letter addressed to the author, expresses his reluctance to take अविद्या in the sense of 'Individual Avidyā' alone, and he makes a distinction between 'Cosmic Avidya' and 'Individual Avidyā.' This individual Avidya he calls as "fundamental Adhyāsa" under whose influence the world and ourselves appear to us to be *real*, but when it is sublated, they *vanish* as far as concern the individual soul who has got rid of his fundamental Adhyāsa. It is the 'Cosmical Avidyā, he says, which as a cosmical principle is the cause of the material world, and as the world is the product of this Avidyā it must be *false*. He also observes

identification (अध्यास), and the changing states of the self are looked upon by its influence as the 'nature' or स्वरूप of the

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that when Vidyā arises it annihilates the Avidyā of an individual and thereby sublates for him the अविद्याध्यस्तः ब्रह्मणि प्रपञ्चः. But this विद्या is inefficacious with regard to the cosmic अविद्या which is the cause of नामरूप, which latter *continues to subsist* after the *mukti* of a jiva.

The arguments used by the learned professor do not, hewever, seem, to us, convincing. By making a distinction between the individual and the cosmic Avidyā, he simply shows that the world born of the latter is not a *mere subjective appearance.* It does not vanish into nothingness, the moment the individual attains Mukti. All that is involved in the attainment of Mukti is displacement of the false outlook (अविद्या) by the true one and not the annihilation of the world. If the world is *false*, even on attaining release not only the false vision of the world but the world itself should disappear. Since Dr. Jacobi concedes that the latter does not happen, he admits that the world is not false. Again, since the world is not due to our individual Avidyā but is born of the cosmic Avidyā, in Dr. Jacobi's term, its only locus is Brahman. Māyā, in Sankara-Vedanta, is looked upon as both Āvaraṇa (आवरण) and vikshepa (विक्षेप). In Mukti, the former only disappears while the latter remains, and it may not be regarded as more real than the false error of the *independent esse* of the world what the professor calls fundamental अध्यास (i.e., *false identification*). This alone disappears in Mukti, and not the world itself. Moreover, to regard the world as false world would be to identify Sankara's view with the vijnana-vāda which would be to violate all canons of sound interpretation. Sankara criticises Vijnana-vāda and it means that he is against all theses which reduce the world to mental states. In fact, the world, according to Sankara's view, is an expression of God's sakti and it is relatively real, not false. While it is necessary to distinguish the world from God, it is equally necessary to distinguish it from an illusion or subjective phantasm.

N. B. माया or प्रकृति in the Sankara-Vedanta is not merely a *subjective idea* but it is an *objective principle* from which the world of nāma-rūpa comes out. Many people labours under an erroneous idea that Sankara's माया is nothing more than a *subjective idea* of the mind by which we perceive the appearance of the world. But this is

self, though in reality the self is always distinguished from its states.

Now, from the above discussion, we may draw the following conclusions—

(*i*) The finite self is not a characterless being, but it has a distinct nature of its own and cannot therefore be reduced into its states and activities. The self has been described by Sankara as transcending the external and internal elements of the body, but yet controlling and illumining them—

"कार्यकरणातीतं ; तथापि कार्य्य-करणावभासकं—आत्मज्योतिः"। [बृ°, 4.3.10].

(*ii*) Similarly he has described Brahman's nature as transcending the náma-rūpas (changes) and untouched by them, but yet controlling and directing

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not true. In Ved-Bhâsya, II. 1. 9, a suspicion may indeed arise to the effect that Sankara makes मिथ्याज्ञान as the root-cause of all differentiations (विभाग व्यवहार). That it is not a mere subjective idea, but an objective principle or power (of Brahman) becomes clear if we consult a similar passage in Mândukya Bhâsya (कारिका, आगमप्र° 1-6) where this मिथ्याज्ञान has been identified with प्राणशक्ति which is the cause of all differentiations.

He says there—"निर्वीजतयैव चेत् सति प्रलीनानां सुषुप्ति-प्रलययोः पुनरुत्थानानुपपत्तिः स्यात् ; मुक्तानाञ्च पुनरुत्थानप्रसङ्गः। तस्मात् 'सवीजत्वा'-भ्युपगमेनैव सतः प्राणत्वव्यपदेशः सर्व्वश्रुतिषु च कारणत्वव्यपदेशः।" Here, प्राण is the cosmic seed (वीज) of the world present in Brahman. The term मिथ्याज्ञान of the Ved-Bhâsya referred to above is nothing but this प्राणवीज। Thus the world can not be false or subjective phantasm. It is called मिथ्याज्ञान or अज्ञान, because it is the *other* *i.e.* opposite of ज्ञान or ब्रह्म ; but it is not absolutely other, it is also identical. (*Vide* Chap. I, pp. 25-31.) Also *cf.* अनिर्व्वचनीयवाद, pp. 135-137.

the activities of these changing náma-rupas—

"नाम-रूपाभ्यामस्पृष्टं यद्दिवितत् तत्ब्रह्म, नामरूप-विलक्षणं नामरूपाभ्यामस्पृष्टं तथापि तयोः निर्व्योढ़ृ। एवं लक्षणं ब्रह्म"। [छा° भा°, 8.14.1.]

Hence we find that neither Brahman, nor the individual selves can be resolved into its manifested changes. The changes stand to the underlying reality in the relation of *ananya* (अनन्य),—*i.e.*, they cannot be separated from it and regarded as something *independent*; but they are to be taken merely as a *means* for the gradual manifestations of the nature of the underlying cause—

"उपर्युपरि आविस्तरत्वमात्मनः...'आत्मप्रकाशनाय'" (ऐ° आ° भा°, 2.1.3).

"ज्ञानशक्त्याद्यभिव्यक्तिः परेण परेण भूयसी भवति" (वेदा° भाष्य, 1.3.30).

"आत्मप्रतिपत्त्यर्थमेव...बहुभवनादि परिकल्प्यते" (तै° भा°, 2.8).

How can the changes, then, be regarded as false or unreal, in the view of Sankara? It is only when under the influence of *Avidyá*, we forget the separate reality of the underlying cause and *identify* it with its evolving changes (विकारs), as if the causal reality has become something *other than* its own nature,—that the changes become false, unreal.[1] This is done under

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[1] *Cf.* "अन्यदिव आत्मनो वस्त्वन्तरमिव अविद्यया प्रत्युपस्थापितं भवति···अन्यत्वेन ब्रह्मणः परिकल्प्यमानानि अन्यानि" [बृ° भा° 4.3.21-23].

"अविद्याकृतं भूतमात्रोपाधि-संसर्गजं 'अन्यत्वावभासं' तिरस्कृत्य—इत्यादि" (5.1.1).

The changing states and activities are all elicited from our underlying 'nature,' through interaction with the external environment भूतमात्रासंसर्गजं; सर्व्वाभूतभौतिकमात्राः अस्य संसर्गकारणभूता विद्यन्त (4.3-9).

the influence of Avidya. It is in this sense alone that the diversities of the changing náma-rupas in the world are regarded as false or unreal, in Sankara's system.

(*d*) Now, let us consider such expressions as—

नेह नानाऽस्ति किञ्चन—The diversities or the differences exist not in the world;—यस्य सर्व्वमात्मैवाभूत्......तत् केन कं पश्येत् ?—*i.e.*, the man who sees the Atmá everywhere, cannot see other things in the world.

These phrases seem to imply, apparently, that there are really no diversities,—no náma-rupas—no changes—nothing—in the world;—that these are all mere appearances and unreal.

But let us see how Sankara himself has explained these expressions. We invite our reader's attention in this connection to Sutras 2, 1, 14 and 3, 2, 22, where Sankara himself has quoted these phrases and explained them.

He first raises the question—If the 'unity' is reduced to 'multiplicity,' can

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When these are produced, we erroneously *identify* ourselves with these; and these become the only self to us. But this Self is *false.* The real self is what underlies these states and activities and to which these are referred as to a centre. Such is the case with Brahman also. This identification is due to the fault of our *intellect*. But how can there be *identification?* Sankara says—"अविद्याकल्पितेन दोषेण पारमार्थिकं वस्तु न दूष्यति।—न च मिथ्याज्ञानं परमार्थवस्तु दूषयितुं समर्थं" [गी° भा°, 13-2]. Sankara does not call the *objects false*; he calls *identification* false. स्वरूपेन अकल्पितस्य 'संसृष्ट'रूपेण कल्पितत्वमिदं" [मा° का° भाष्य, आग° १।२२]।

it retain its unity—and decides in the negative. He points out—as 'one' and 'many' oppose each other, *both* cannot be true in respect of the one and the same thing. The pantheists of his time looked upon 'unity' and 'multiplicity' *both* as true. The pantheistic unity is merely अनेकात्मक, *i.e.*, it is the unity of mere collection. It is an abstract whole—a mere aggregate of parts, having no substantial being or life of its own outside of and *apart* from its parts which constitute it.

But Sankara shows here that Brahman cannot be both एक and अनेकात्मक Brahman is a true unity; it has a 'being,' *outside* the world—

"उभयसत्यतायांहि कथं एकत्वज्ञानेन
नानात्वज्ञानमपनुद्यते इत्युच्येत ?"— वे° 2.1.14.

As Brahman has a 'nature' of its own, how can it be *resolved* into many and become अनेकात्मक ?[1] Hence his conclusion is that the 'unity' retains its unity in all circumstances and it is the only

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[1] न हि अद्वये परमार्थसत्यात्मनि प्राणादि-संसारजातमिदं जगत् 'नाना'—वस्त्वन्तरभूतं भवति। "न हि प्राणाद्यात्मना इदं विद्यते कदाचिदपि"। यथा रज्जुस्वरूपेण निरूप्यमाणो न 'नाना'भूत: कल्पित: सर्पोऽस्ति, तद्वत्" (मा° का-मा°, 2.34)।

Cf. 'मायामात्रं हि एतत्, यत् परमात्मनोऽवस्थात्रयात्मना अवभासनं' (वे° भा°, 2.1.9). (*i.e.*, as if Brahman has become अवस्थात्रयात्मक—*i.e.*, entirely reduced to अवस्थात्रय).

"मायया भिद्यते...न परमार्थत: निरवयवत्वादात्मन:। सावयवं हि अवयवान्यत्वेन भिद्यते"—मा° का° भा°, अद्वै° प्र, 19).

Reality. The diverse changes—नामरूपस —the differences which emerge from it—are not absolutely distinct from Brahman, as so many independent things true and real with the unity; but they are *means*, *stages* (द्वारभूतानि)—for the gradual manifestation of the 'nature' of Brahman which is present behind them and is realising itself through them.

Now then, the line—

"यस्य सर्व्वमात्मैवाभूत्.........तत्केन कं पश्येत्?"—

—and the line—

"नेह नानाऽस्ति किञ्चन"—

Such lines, such expressions—do not mean that there are *not* things in the world, that all are non-entities. They mean that the things in the world will no longer appear to us in the same light in which they appear to the ordinary *ignorant* people. They would not appear as so many absolutely—*independent* things—a crass plurality—a tree there, a cow here; a river there, a man here. They would appear only as higher and higher *stages* through which the underlying unity of Brahman is progressively revealing its own 'nature,' is realising itself—[1]

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[1] "स्थावरत्वादारभ्य उपर्य्युपरि आविस्तरत्वमात्मन:......आत्मप्रकाशनाय" [ऐ° आ° भा°, 2.1-3]।

"यथा मनुष्यादिस्तम्बपर्य्यन्तेष ज्ञानैश्वर्य्यादिप्रतिबन्ध: परेण परेण भूयान् भवन्

"'तत्स्वरूप-'व्यतिरिक्त 'मन्यवस्तु' किमिच्छन्
......आत्मनो 'व्यतिरिक्तस्य' कस्य कामाय" ?
(बृह° भा°, 4.4.12).

The emerging *nāma-rupas* would, now, be looked upon as only further and further revelations or realisations of Brahman; they would not, now, be looked upon as 'व्यतिरिक्त' or 'अन्य' or absolutely distinct from the underlying Brahman [1] but as अनन्य from it.

This is the conclusion which we have gained from a discussion of Sankara's celebrated Doctrine of Causality. Now it stands clear that there arises no question for the *abolition* of the diverse objects in the world—in the system of Adwaita Philosophy.

(*e*) There is still another phrase used in the Vedanta which demands our consideration and attention. We mean the phrase known as—विशेष-निराकरण or विशेष-प्रतिषेध।—*i.e.*, the repudiation or rejection of the

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दृश्यते, तथा मनुष्यादिष्वेव हिरण्यगर्भपर्य्यन्तेषु ज्ञानैश्वर्य्याद्यभिव्यक्तिरपि परेण परेण भूयसी भवति" [वे° भा°, 1.3.30]।

" एवं पूर्व्वस्याः पूर्व्वस्या भूमेः उत्तरस्यामुत्तरस्यां भूमौ......शतगुणेनानन्दोत्कर्षः उपपद्यते।—मनुष्यगन्धर्व्वाद्युत्तरोत्तरभूमिषु शतगुणोत्तरोत्तरोत्कर्षेण यावद्धिरण्यगर्भस्य ब्रह्मणः आनन्दः—इत्यादि" [तै° भाष्य, 2.8 also बृ° भाष्य 4.3.33].

"सत्त्वाधिक्यादाविस्तरत्वोपपत्तेः। आदित्यादिषु सत्त्वमत्यन्तप्रकाशं...अतस्तत्रैव आविस्तरं......नतु तत्रैव तत् अधिकं।...यथा आदर्शादौ स्वच्छे स्वच्छतरे च तारतम्येनाविर्भवति—तुल्येऽपि मुखसंस्थाने—तद्वत्" [गौ° भा°, 15. 12].

[1] "न हि कारणव्यतिरेकेण कार्य्यं नाम वस्तुतोऽस्ति यतःकारणबुद्धिर्विनिवर्त्तेत" [तै° भा°, 2.1].

particular determinant *qualities* we find in the world. The qualities are universally existent; and although they belong, in a sense, to one Reality—ब्रह्म—as a whole, still they belong definitely to a particular reality as its determinations and not of others. The qualities are but the activities of the individual things or individual beings. The phrase विशेष-निराकरण may appear at first sight to mean that Sankara has denied the existence of the qualities—that these are mere appearances;—that they do not really exist. But let us assure our readers this was far from the mind of Sankara. The explanation of this विशेष-निराकरण which he himself gives in the Vedanta-Sutras—4-3-14 and 3-2-22 conclusively shows that he has denied nothing, repudiated nothing, rejected nothing.

The purport of his explanation is briefly this:—Suppose a quality emerges; if you identify the underlying Brahman (Causal Reality) with this quality, Brahman becomes entirely reduced to this quality and hence it becomes something *other than* its own 'being'; whereas all the time Brahman maintains its unity in and through this quality;—and so on with other successively emergent qualities in the world. Sankara's idea is that Brahman is to be regarded always as a unity, unchanging in its own nature and unaffected by the

qualities; and it cannot therefore be regarded as—गुणविशिष्ट or धर्मविशिष्ट, *i.e.*, *identical* with the qualities—as if its nature is not one but composed of the qualities (अनेकात्मक)[1]—

"अनेकशक्तित्वं ब्रह्मण इति चेत् ? न।
विशेष-निराकरणश्रुतीना मनन्यार्थत्वात्।"

Sankara next concludes—

"प्रपञ्चमेव 'ब्रह्मणि कल्पितं' प्रतिषेधति,
परिशिनष्टि ब्रह्म"[2]—— (वे° भा°, 3.2.22).

i.e., By विशेष-निराकरण, the *qualities*, as such, are not repudiated or negated; but Brahman if regarded as *composed* of the qualities is repudiated or negated.

The 'nature' (स्वरूप) of Brahman is *present* behind the qualities evolved in the world and this nature cannot be resolved into or identified with them. It is present *unaffected* by these changing qualities. Sankara has elsewhere pointed out that all the changing and emergent qualities

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[1] *Cf.* "न कार्य्यप्रपञ्चविशिष्टः विचित्र आत्मा विज्ञेयः...यथा अनेकात्मको द्रव्यः" (वे°, 1.3.1).

[2] "कल्पित-रूपप्रत्याख्यानेन—'स्वरूपा'वेदनं" (कल्पितं=अविद्यया आरोपितं)। *Cf.* "स्वात्मयाथात्म्यज्ञानेन मरीच्युदक-रज्जुसर्प-गगनमलानीव, मरीचि-रज्जु-गगन-स्वरूपदर्शनेनैव ज्ञतज्ञत्योभवति" (कठ भा°, 3.14.)। "रज्जुद्रव्येन सता, 'अयं सर्प इति, धारेयं, दण्डोयमिति वा'—रज्जुद्रव्यमेव कल्पते, एवं प्राणादिभिरनन्तैः।...सर्व्व-एते आत्मनि अध्यारोप्यन्ते...आत्मा एतेषु अनुगतः, सर्पधारादिभेदेषु यथा रज्जुः" (मा° का°, 2.32-33).

> are interwoven into the underlying Reality which reveals its nature through them—.
>
> "सामान्यानानुविद्धानां विशेषाणामदर्शनात्" (ब्र° भा° 1.6.1).
>
> It is wrong therefore to identify the under-lying reality with these qualities. This *identification* is repudiated, as it is due to our intellectual error (बुद्धिदोष or अविद्या); and therefore such identification must be *false, unreal.*

This is the purport or sense of the विशेषनिराकरण or of the repudiation or rejection of the qualities. Sankara has established this position in another way thus—

> These qualities are definite relations into which one individual is brought with other individuals or things. But these relations cannot exhaust the individuals. I am brought into a particular relation with you, but yet I am something *more* than this relation. In this way, every individual self is a part of another individual self, yet he belongs to himself. Sankara points out that an individual has a substantive (स्वरूप or विशेष्य) and an adjectival (सम्बन्धिरूप or विशेषण) mode of existence. He exists by himself and this is his substantive mode; yet he is related to something beyond him and this is his adjectival mode of existence. A man, say Deva Datta, may come into different relations with different people and he is designated differently. But yet the same Deva Datta does not lose his own स्वरूप in

these relations.[1] Every individual therefore maintains his own identity in the various relations into which he is brought with others. Brahman, in the same way, maintains its own identity in those variously interconnected relations or qualities.[2]
If you identify the underlying Brahman with these relations, Brahman would become 'many'—अनेकात्मक, नानागुणविशिष्ट *i. e.* composed of parts. Sankara has not denied the relations or qualities as such. He only denies Brahman or the individual self being regarded as अनेकात्मक. Such self or Brahman must be unreal, false, in Sankara system.[3] The relations are but a means, or medium (उपाय, द्वार) for the expression

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[1] "एकत्वेऽपि स्वरूप-बाह्यरूपापेक्षया अनेकशब्दप्रत्ययदर्शनात्। यथा एकोऽपि सन् देवदत्तः, स्वरूपं सम्बन्धिरूपञ्च अपेक्ष्य अनेक शब्द प्रत्यय भाक् भवति—मनुष्यः बालः युवा...पिता भ्राता जामाता इति" (वे°भा°, 2-2-17)।
"शुक्लः कम्बलः, रोहिणी धेनुः, नीलमुत्पलं—इति द्रव्यस्यैव तेन तेन विशेषणेन प्रतीयमानत्वात्, द्रव्यात्मकता गुणस्य"
(वे°भा°, 2-2-17.)

[2] "सर्व्वगतः (*i.e.*, immanental) परमेश्वरः—एकः स्वतन्त्रश्च (*i.e.*, transcendental)"—कठ-भाष्य 5.12.। The qualities are but the responses made by the individuals to the *Pran-spandan* which is the active common medium or environment which elicits the responses. The qualities are thus 'inter-connected relations.'

[3] "न हि उषरदेशः तृड्वत्-प्राण्यध्यारोपितोदकफेनतरङ्गादिमान्, तथा नात्मा अबुधारोपितक्लेशादिमलैर्मलिनो भवति" (मा°का°भा°, 3.8)।

Cf. "अनेकात्मकः...कार्य्यधर्म्मविशिष्टः विचित्र आत्मा इति आशङ्का भवति, *etc.*" (वे°,1. 3.1). To imagine parts of the underlying ground is due to our intellectual error. In गौड़पादभाष्य, Sankara calls it चित्तकल्पना.

of the *swarupa* of the underlying unity
and hence they are अनन्य from the *swarupa*.

(*f*) There is another expression, *viz*, प्रपञ्च-विलय—Dissolution of the world—which deserves consideration.

The question of प्रपञ्च-विलय arose in connection with a doubt which existed in the mind of many people. So long as the world exists to occupy our mind, to distract our attention, how is it possible to realise the knowledge of Brahman? For, the world stands there as a rival to Brahman and it will act as an obstruction in the way of the knowledge of Brahman. It is therefore necessary to dissolve the world—to abolish it altogether so that nothing stands in the way of the realisation of Brahman.[1]

In order to remove this doubt, Sankara has given us the true sense of the idea of प्रपञ्च-विलय from which his views about the existence of this world very prominently stand in clear light. He has recorded his views thus:—

"What," Sankara enquires of the doubter, "is your idea about the Dissolution of the world—प्रपञ्च-विलय, pray? Do you mean by it that as heat disintegrates the solid particles of the clarified butter and ultimately dissolves them, we are to dissolve the world in the like manner? But this is, we say, simply an impossibility.

The world—both in its subjective and objective condition—actually exists (विद्यमानः), nobody is therefore capable of dissolving the *existence* of such a world. Hence such actual dissolution of the world is out of the question. You cannot really mean this by your term प्रपञ्च-विलय. If, however, your idea about dissolution be that we are to remove —dissolve—the false *identification*—the identification

[1] "......एवं ब्रह्मतत्त्वमवबुभुत्समानेन तत्प्रत्यनीकभूतः प्रपञ्चः प्रविलापयितव्यः।......तेन नामरूपप्रविलापनेन ब्रह्मतत्त्वावबोधो भवतीति" (वे° भा°, 3.2.21).

of the world with Brahman in consequence of an erroneous imposition of the former upon the latter (by ignoring the *distinct* being of Brahman which underlies the world unaffected by its changes), you are welcome to do this. Such dissolution by true knowledge is indeed possible. We agree with you in this view of *dissolution*."[1]

Do these remarks show in any way that in Sankara-Vedanta the actual existence of the world has ever been denied?

A typical illustration analysed. Cause strives towards future *end* which is real power present and realised in the changes which are inseparable. Inseparability proves their reality

8. We should like to conclude this discussion by calling the attention of our readers to an important typical illustration given by Sankara with a view to clearly illustrate the steps of his own doctrine of causality as expounded by him in his Vedanta-bhasya. We find this typical illustration admirably explained in the Brihadāranyaka-bhāsya. This powerful exposition of the theory makes it impossible, once for all, for us to look upon the world and its evolving changes (विकारs) as unreal or false. We have therefore to recognise this illustration as a fact of capital interest

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[1] "अत्र वयं पृच्छामः—कोऽयं प्रपञ्चविलयो नाम? किमग्निप्रतापसम्पर्कात् घृतकाठिन्य-प्रविलय इव प्रपञ्चप्रविलयः कर्त्तव्यः, आहोस्वित्......अविद्याकृतो ब्रह्मणि अध्यस्तः नामरूपप्रपञ्चः विद्यया प्रविलापयितव्य इति? अत्र, यदि तावत् 'विद्यमानोऽयं' प्रपञ्चः—देहादिलक्षण आध्यात्मिकः, बाह्यश्च पृथिव्यादिलक्षणः—प्रविलापयितव्य इत्युच्येत, स पुरुषमात्रेण अशक्यः प्रविलापयितु मित्यादि" (वे° भा°, 3.2.21).

N.B.—In Brihadaranyakabhasya, there is a reference to प्रपञ्चविलय. प्रपञ्च is ordinarily regarded as something independent—as अन्य—different from Brahman The idea of this अन्यत्व ought to be killed. This is प्रपञ्चविलय. "अन्यत्वदर्शनलक्षणा विशेषसंज्ञा—इत्यादि (बृ° भा°, 2.4.13)" ......In this way प्रपञ्चविलय is explained here. (This अन्यत्वदर्शन is the result of *identification*.)

and importance to the student of the Adwaita Philosophy which will make clear in a different way the problem, the solution of which we are seeking in this chapter; and will prove helpful in coming to a decision about it. We have therefore thought it fit to re-emphasise this illustration to which reference was made in a previous chapter.

Sankara explains here the idea of the cause and the effects which emerge in succession from it by an illustration of a lump of earth (मृत्तिका) and its successive transformations until the *last* transformation—the jar (घट)—is reached. The ultimate future end is present, he says, in the real nature or स्वरूप of the causal substance. It is impossible to hold *it* to be non-existent in the cause. To deny this presence is to make the passage clearer for the easy entrance of that undesirable guest—*Asat-kāryya-vāda* (असत् कार्य्यवाद). Until it is completely realised, the End—though future—must be held to be present in the nature of the cause.[1]

The potter, Sankara observes, with a view to produce this end, *viz.*, घट (jar) collects the मृत्तिका (lump of earth) and continues giving it its successive shapes (in the form of चूर्ण, पिण्ड, कपाल, etc.). You cannot, Sankara goes on, deny this striving on the part of the potter towards this future end.[2] Sankara says that, it is necessary, for an end to realise itself completely, to pass through certain

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[1] "प्रागुत्पत्तेरपि सदेव कार्य्यं। तस्मात् घटाद्यभिव्यक्तार्थिनो नियत एव कारकव्यापारोऽर्थवान् ।...एवञ्च सति, घटस्य प्रागभाव इति—न घटस्वरूप मेव प्रागुत्पत्तेर्नास्तीति ।...स्वेन हि भविष्यद्रूपेण घटो वर्त्तते" ।

[2] "अनागतार्थि-प्रवृत्तेश्च। न हि असति अर्थितया प्रवृत्तिर्लोके दृष्टा... असंश्चेत् भविष्यद्घटः, ऐश्वरं भविष्यद्घटविषयं प्रत्यक्षज्ञानं मिथ्या स्यात् । 1.2.1.— (Hence घट or the end is the real cause of the प्रवृत्ति or movement on the part of मृत्तिका.)

antecedent transformations or stages.[1] It follows therefore that the future end is present throughout the successive stages of the मृत्तिका—though not in actual form ("वर्त्तमानतारूपेण"), but still it is present throughout in the form of future possibility [2] in the nature of मृत्तिका.

The change is a *relation* between two terms. In order to be related, the two terms of the relation must be *real.* The change is therefore a relation between something present and something future, *i.e.*, which is going *to be.* If you say the *future* is unreal, is nothing—then the *cause* or Brahman would itself become unreal.[3] The future (घट) therefore operates in the present (*i.e.*, in the मृत्तिका);[4] and the present becomes thus connected with the future.

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[1] "कारणे वर्त्तमानं कार्य्यं कार्य्यान्तराणामावरणमित्यवोचाम।...पिण्ड-कपालाद्यवस्थयो विद्यमानमेव घटादिकार्य्यं ...... घटादिकार्य्यार्थिना ...... घटाद्युत्पत्तौ···यत्न: कर्त्तव्य:"। 1.2.1.

[2] "स्वेन हि भविष्यद्रूपेण घटो विद्यते। न हि पिण्डस्य वर्त्तमानता, कपालस्य वा घटस्य वा भवति।...तस्मात्कुलालादिव्यापार—वर्त्तमानतायां, प्रागुत्पत्तेर्घटोऽस्तीति न विरुध्यते (*i.e*, घट is not present *actually*, but as a *future* possibility.)"......... "किञ्च, प्रागुत्पत्ते: अभावभूतस्य घटस्य स्वकारणसत्ता-सम्बन्धानुपपत्ति:, द्वयायत्तत्वात् सम्बन्धस्य" (*i.e.*, the change being a *relation,* must have two terms of relation—the present and the future. The future cannot therefore be non-existent or असत्.)

[3] In the Mandukya, 6, Sankara says—

"यदि हि असतामेव जन्म स्यात्, ब्रह्मणो ग्रहणद्वाराभावात् असत्त्व-प्रसङ्ग:।"
..nanda-giri elaborates the passage thus—"द्वयायत्तत्वात् सम्बन्धस्य। कार्येण हि लिङ्गेन कारणब्रह्म ज्ञानार्थत्वं सृष्टिश्रुतीनां। तच्चेदसद् भवेत्, न तेन तस्य कारण-सम्बन्धधीरिति असदेव कारणमपि स्यात्।"

[4] For, घट is an end and it is the real cause of the striving or movement of मृत्तिका towards the end, which striving exists for its sake. The end is therefore present in the beginning and operates as a real cause.

Hence, the cause is really the future End or Power which is realising itself in all the changes. It is therefore this power which underlies, and works in, all changes. It gives continuity to them and is above them all. It is realising itself through all successive changes which cannot, therefore, be separated from it.[1] Sankara illustrates this idea thus—

> "As a player, taking on successive
> characters upon himself, enacts
> on the stage the parts of each of these
> characters in suceession, but yet
> retains his *own distinct* character ;
> so the underlying causal unity,
> retaining its own distinct identity,
> realises itself successively in each
> of the changes produced." [2]

Now, we must apply this typical case of मृत्तिका and its final realisation in the form of घट, to all the individual changes in the world. We come then to learn from Sankara's exposition just stated that—

> in the real nature or स्वरूप of an individual
> being, the future *end* is present, and this
> end works in it.

[1] Sankara has noted that the changes cannot be *separated* from the underlying cause, nor can they be separated from one another as independent 'things,' because the cause itself holds them all by its own power (स्वरूप) and realises itself in each of them successively.—

"आत्मस्वरूपप्रदानेन सामान्यं विशेषान् धारयति" and "सामान्ये लब्धसत्ताकानामेव कर्म्मणा स्फुटीकरणं" (बृ° and छा°)।

[2] "मूलकारणमेव आ—अन्त्यात्कार्य्यात्, तेन तेन कार्य्याकारेण, नटवत् सर्व्वव्यवहारास्पदत्वं प्रतिपद्यते" (वे° भा°, 2.1.18). Also *Vide* वे°, 1.3.19.

> And in order to have its final realisation, this end will necessarily have to pass through its preceding successive transformations or stages, until at last it becomes finally realised in its last stage.[1] This last stage is therefore the *end* of the individual being and this end is therefore a future possible power, present in the individual; and it works in all the changes as its *purpose*. This end (or purpose) is the *real cause*; for it reveals itself more and more through the successive transformations or stages and completes itself in the last stage.

Is it possible, then, to *separate* any of these *changes* or stages from the underlying स्वरूप (swarupa) of the individual and to treat them as independent things (अन्यवस्तु)? For, how is it possible to know the real nature of the cause until it reaches, and fully reveals itself in, its last change or stage?

For this reason, Sankara has repeatedly remarked that no effects can be treated as something *distinct* and *separate* from their underlying cause. For, it is the cause which is revealing or realising[2] itself *in* these changes. The

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[1] It has been noted that the underlying cause must be present up to the time the *last* effect is produced "हेतुस्वभावस्य फलकालावस्थायित्वं" and "हेतुस्वभावानुपरक्तस्य फलस्य अदर्शनात्" (वे° भा°, 2.2.20). For, it is seen everywhere that the *last* effect (फल) is always accompanied and coloured by the underlying cause. "तद्भावानुरक्तां बुद्धिं कार्यकारणयोः" (वे°, 2.1.15).

Cf. the expression—"एकविज्ञानेन सर्व्वविज्ञानं भवति."

[2] "आत्मप्रतिपत्त्यर्थमेव" (तै°, 2.8).

effects are therefore nothing but the necessary *expressions* [1] of the cause which is present and operative behind them.

Is it then possible for Sankara, who gives such a description, to deny the effects or changes and to declare them to be false or unreal? The falsity only comes in, if you regard the nature (स्वरूप) of the underlying cause actually *lost* in these effects emerging from it;—if the स्वरूप is resolved into and thus absolutely *identified with* these changes—as if it has become something *other than* itself (*i.e.*, अन्य),—as if the underlying Brahman is actually converted into the aggregate of the empirical changes,[2] and thus become अनेकात्मक: ।

Sankara has, everywhere in his Bhasya, called the world unreal or false *in this sense alone*.

There is no conflict between परिणामवाद and विवर्त्तवाद। Multiplicity does not oppose unity—but is incorporated in it.

9. We have tried, in the preceding pages, to find out the real intention of the Leader of the Adwaita school of thought in the Indian Philosophy, and examined carefully all possible cases which may produce in the mind some confusion about the unreality of the diversities of náma-rupa emergent in the world. It is, however, not necessary to push our examination any further, and the considerations we have so far made will, we hope, clear away all

[1] "आत्मप्रकाशनाय...आविस्तरत्वमात्मन:" (ऐ° आ° भा°) ।

[2] "न कारणात् 'अन्यत्' कार्य्य" वर्षशतेनापि शक्यं निश्चेतुं—एवं श्रुते: कार्य्यस्य प्रागुत्पत्ते: सत्त्वं अनन्यत्वञ्च कारणात्—अवगम्यते" (वे°भा°, 2.1.18).
"न च विशेषदर्शनमात्रेण 'वस्त्वन्यत्वं' भवति···स एवेति प्रत्यभिज्ञानात्"—2.1.18.
"अनात्मदर्शिनस्तु तद्व्यतिरिक्तवस्त्वन्तरेप्सो:—'ममेदं स्यात्' 'पुत्रस्य इदं' 'भार्य्याया इदं'—इत्येवमीहमान: पुन: पुन: जनन-मरण-प्रबन्धारूढ़......। सर्व्वात्मदर्शिनस्तु (*i.e.*, अनन्यत्वदर्शिन:) तदसम्भव एव" (बृ°भा°, 4.4.2).
"न कार्य्ये: तद्धर्म्मेण कारणं 'संसृज्यते'—वे° भा°, 2.1.9."

misapprehensions which certainly exist about the problem of the unreality of the objective world of facts and we may fairly conclude that we are not committed to the universal nihilism in Sankara's school of Philosophy. A few words must, however, be added in regard to one point of primary importance, before we conclude this line of our enquiry.

We have said that Brahman (as well as the individual-selves) possesses a स्वरूप, a nature, of it own. In order to realise this स्वरूप, Brahman has created and evolved the world,[1] and the world is moving from the lowest to the highest stages.[2] This movement has become possible for the world, because behind each stage, that eternal principle (पूर्व्वसिद्ध: आत्मा) is present, which is gradually expressing itself in and through these stages or changes.

The reader who has followed us thus far will now find that such is the position which Sankara has taken up in the Vedanta philosophy. Against this position, however, an objection may be urged to the effect that if the multiplicity of the changes is held to be *not false* or *unreal*, what would be the fate of the *Sruti* which insistently declares that—

> "there is only *one* principle—Brahman
> which is *without a second*—secondless "—

"ब्रह्म एकं अद्वितीयम्" ।

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[1] "पूर्व्वसिद्धोऽपि हि सन् आत्मा विशेषेण विकारात्मना परिणमयामास आत्मानं" (वे°भा°, 1.4.26). "यच्च यदात्मना यत्र न वर्त्तते, न तत् तत उत्पद्यते ; यथा सिकताभ्यस्तैलं" वे°भा°, (2.1.16) ।

[2] "नामादि प्राणान्तानि उत्तरोत्तर-विशिष्टानि तत्त्वानि, अतितराच्च तेषामुत्कृष्टतमं भूमाख्यं तत्त्वं" (छा°भा°, 7.1.1.) । "विकाराणां सदेव समाप्ति: अवसानं" (छा°भा°, 6.8.4).

There is thus a *conflict* between the statement of the *Sruti* and the position established by Sankara.[1] To this supposed objection, Sankara thus replies—

(*i*) To the ordinary ignorant people,—who under the influence of *avidyá,* resolve the underlying unity (Brahman) into the multiplicity of the changes and thus identifies the two,—the multiplicity of the changes is the *only* Reality. Thus no question of conflict between the unity and the multiplicity can rise here.[2]

(*ii*) But those who have realised the truth that the underlying unity (ब्रह्म) is untouched (unaffected) by the evolving multiplicity of changes—do not regard these changes as something separate and apart (व्यतिरिक्त) from Brahman, do not look upon them as so many independent and self-sufficient 'things' (अन्य) complete in themselves.[3] To these people, the multiplicity of changes would appear merely as

[1] "नामरूपोपाध्यस्तित्वे,—'एकमेवाद्वितीयं' इत्यादिश्रुतयो विरुध्येरन्—इति चेत्? न; सलिलफेन दृष्टान्तेन-परिहृतत्वात मृदादिदृष्टान्तैश्च" (बृ°भा°, 3.5.1).

[2] "यदा तु स्वाभाविक्या अविद्यया ब्रह्मस्वरूपं······केनचिदस्पृष्टस्वभावमपि सत्, नामरूपकार्य्यकरणोपाधिभ्यो विवेकेन नावधार्य्यते—नामरूपोपाधिदृष्टिरेव भवति स्वाभाविकी,—तदा सर्व्वोऽयं वस्त्वन्तरास्तित्वव्यवहारोऽस्ति" (बृ°भा°, 3.5.1).

[3] "यदा तु परमार्थदृष्ट्या परमात्मतत्त्वात् ...... 'अन्यत्वेन' निरूप्यमाने नामरूपे ...... 'वस्त्वन्तरे' तत्वतो न स्तः, तदा 'एकमेवाद्वितीय' मित्यादि परमार्थदर्शनगोचरत्वं प्रतिपद्यते, अतो न काचन विरोधाशङ्का" (बृ°भा°, 3.5.1)।

"स्वतन्त्रत्व-निषेधेन स्वतःसत्त्वानिषेधात्, न अद्वैतश्रुतिविरोधः ······ ननु ऐक्याभिप्रायेण" (आनन्दगिरि० व्याख्या)। "कारणात्तु 'व्यतिरेकेण' अभावः कार्य्यस्य" (वे०भा०, 2.1.14).

a *means* (उपाय, द्वारभूतानि), as a mere indicative *mark* (परिचायक लिङ्गानि), as an *expression* (संस्थानमात्रं)—of the underlying Brahman.[1] The gradually evolving changes[2] would appear to these people, merely as an *instrument* (परार्थ) for the realisation of the purpose (स्वार्थ)[3]—of the underlying Brahman. Thus there is no possibility of a *conflict* (विरोध) between the unity and the multiplicity here also.

After establishing his theory in his commentary on the Vedanta, Sankara has expressly recorded his remarks thus—

"The author of the *Brahma-Sutras* himself saw no reason for rejecting the manifested changing world (कार्यप्रपञ्च). The *Sutra-kára* adopts the विवर्तवाद (*i.e.*,

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[1] "नामरूपादि......सत्यस्य परमार्थस्य उपलब्धि-'द्वारं' भवति" (छा०भा०, 7.17.1) "विकार-'द्वारेणापि' ब्रह्मणो निर्देशः कर्त्तव्यः। ...तानि नामादीनि प्राणान्तानि निर्दिश्य, तद्'द्वारेणापि' भूमाख्यं तत्त्वं निर्दिष्टानि" (छा०भा० and वृ०भा०)।

"संख्या'स्वरूप परिज्ञानाय' रेखाध्यारोपणं कृत्वा, *etc.* (वृ°, 4,4,25).

"'पाणि-पादादयः......ज्ञेयसद्भावे 'लिङ्गानि'—गी०भा०, 13.13." "सत्-'संस्थान' मात्रमिदं सर्व्वं" (छा०, 6.2.2)। "सदेव संस्थानान्तरेण अवतिष्ठते," *ibid.*

"यत् अन्नदाकार परिणामित्वादि श्रूयते तत् ब्रह्मदर्श'नोपाय'त्वेनैव विनियुज्यते" वे°भाष्य, 2.1.14).

[2] "नामादि प्राणान्तानि उत्तरोत्तरविशिष्टानि तत्वानि, अतितराञ्च तेषामुत्कृष्टतमं भूमाख्यं तत्व" (छा°भा°) इत्यादि। "तारतम्येनाभिभवति" (गी°, 13.12)।

[3] "स्वार्थेन असंहतेन परेण केनचित् अप्रयुक्तं संहतानामवस्थानं न दृष्टं...... संहतानां 'परार्थ'त्वं दृष्टं" (कठ°भा°, 5.5).

the principle of unity) as of supreme value; but he has also *retained* परिणाम (*i.e.*, the fact of the multiplicity of changes) as of subordinate value and entirely dependent on the former." [1]

In his commentary on the Mándukya-kárikâ, Sankara himself expressly tells us that there is really no *conflict* between the *Dwaita* (the empirical world of changes and the *Adwaita* (Non-Dualism, *i.e.*, the fact of unity) [2]—for the reasons advanced above.

Ânanda-giri also in elaborating the idea of Sankara has by an illustration shown that no *conflict* really arises between the two standpoints—the empirical truth and the transcendental truth.[3]

Vidyāranya in his पञ्चदशी, in explaining the विवर्त्तवाद, has shown that in Sankara-

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[1] "सूत्रकारोऽपि परमार्थाभिप्रायेण 'तदनन्यत्वं' मित्याह। अप्रत्याख्यायैव च कार्य्यप्रपञ्चं, परिणाम-प्रक्रियाञ्च आश्रयति" (वे°भा°, 2.1.14.).

[2] "तेनायं हेतुना अस्मत्पक्षो न विरुध्यते तैः द्वैतैः।......अस्मदीयोऽयं 'सर्व्वानन्यत्वात्' आत्मैकत्वदर्शनपक्षो न विरुध्यते तैः, यथा स्वहस्तपादादिभिः" (मा°का°भाष्य, 3.17-18).

[3] "यथा पुरोवर्त्तिनि भुजगाभावमनुभवन् विवेकी—'नास्ति भुजङ्गो रज्जुरेषा कथं बिभेषीति'—भ्रान्तमभिदधाति। भ्रान्तस्तु स्वकीयापराधादेव भुजङ्गं परिकल्प्य भीतः पलायेत, न च तत्र विवेकिनो वचनं मूढदृष्ट्या विरुध्यते। तथा परमात्मकूटस्थात्मदर्शनं व्यवहारिक-जनादिवचनेन अविरुद्धं" (मा°कारि° भाष्ये, 4.57).

Vedanta the परिणामवाद is not incompatible with the विवर्त्तवाद[1].

Thus we find that no need arises to abolish परिणाम. Both the परिणाम and विवर्त्त can exist compatibly *together*.

It will be seen that we have tried in this chapter, as well as in others, to present Sankara before our readers, as he reveals himself in his own writings; and we hope that our readers will agree with us in thinking that it is not possible to come to any other conclusion than that which we have sought to reach here, from a deep and careful reading of his commentaries. It is our firm conviction that a great injustice has been done to this great philosopher of India in respect of this most vital point upon which rests his great मायावाद—the Theory of Mâyâ.

[1] "क्षीरस्य पूर्व्वरूप परित्याग पुरःसर मवस्थान्तरोत्पत्तिसद्भावेऽपि, मृत्सुवर्णयोस्तु पूर्व्वरूप-परित्यागाभावात् विवर्त्ततापीति" (पञ्चदशी, 1351—टीका)। (In the case of क्षीर even, compare Sankara's idea—"न क्षीरस्य सर्व्वोपमर्द्देन दधिभावापत्तिः—ब्र० भा०"). *Cf.* Sankara also—"पिण्डघटादीनामितरेतरव्यभिचारेऽपि, मृत्त्वाव्यभिचारात्"—छा० भा०, 6.2.2.

CHAPTER IV

PLACE OF ETHICS AND RELIGION IN VEDANTA



Opinion prevails that *Vedanta* is opposed to Ethical Theism and is ante-theistic in religion. Its goal is—not enrichment but emptying of human soul.

1. It is very widely believed that one of the fixed tenets in the Vedanta is that the work or कर्म्म is, after all, a bondage which ties a man to this metempsychosis or *Samsára* (संसार). One must try therefore to get rid of this bondage and secure his final release or मुक्ति from it. It necessarily follows from this that the Vedantic मुक्ति (Mukti) is equivalent to the emptying of the human soul, which directs all its energy to leave the human life devoid of all actions and thus to make it a barren desert. It is also generally held that human desires or कामनाs are condemned wholesale in this system of philosophy in no unequivocal language and unmistakable terms; and it is the desires which lie at the root of all works. To kill the desires outright is evidently the sole aim of the Vedanta and their total annihilation, it is thought, is enjoined in an authoritative tone, whose voice can be heard from every page of the Vedantic literature. In dealing with this subject, a writer has thus expressed his idea :—

> "The Indian Theism, because of its bondage to the Karma idea, has been unable to rise to a high conception of the

> Divine character. In making motive itself the fetter, instead of evil motive, it turned its back upon the ethical goal and suggested the endeavour to escape from the region of the ethical altogether.........The endeavour to get rid of desire is an endeavour to pass beyond the good, and ends in confounding the conscience with covetousness."

As the entire man is thought to be a mere sum-total of "desires and works mechanically related," and as his virtues and vices are all relegated to the empirical region and are described as false and unreal;—it has been generally supposed that the destruction of the individuality which consists merely in the desires, works, pleasure, pain, etc., is the aim of this philosophy which seeks absorption of one's being in the "difference-less pantheistic empty void" which it calls *Nirguna Brahman* (निर्गुण ब्रह्म) and such absorption is the मुक्ति which it teaches.[1] The healthy enrichment and expansion of the human soul by the acquirement and cultivation of moral virtues, it is seriously maintained, is out of place in this system of philosophy. And a philosophical system which, it is very justly concluded, can shed no wholesome influence upon the life and conduct of man and human society, has very little practical interest which it can evoke and it stands condemned in its own teaching.

Such, in fact, are the ideas and conclusions which are to be found extensively gaining ground both in Europe and

[1] *Cf.*, "The method of attaining to the *Âtmá* according to the teaching of the Upanishads, is that of *making the human spirit a desert.* *** The goal of effort is an absorption in which all difference is lost. Every movement of the mind and heart must be cast forth and stilled."

in India even among the best and the most sympathetic critics of the Adwaita philosophy.

We propose in this chapter to cautiously examine the validity of the assertions above referred to, and to see if such conclusions as have been drawn find any support from the writings of Sankara—the great interpreter and leader of this school of thought. We shall also try to discover what constitutes the real teaching of the Vedanta and to determine if Ethics and Religion do not form an integral and essential part of the Vedantic theory.

Man's impulsive nature or disposition (जैव-प्रकृति or स्वभाव).

2. Every man is born endowed with a psychological disposition which may be traced to the origin of the human race, and which constitutes the most essential heritage for him to which he has succeeded. In this disposition are to be found imbedded all his natural instincts and habits, his love and hatred, his pleasure and pain, his appetites and passions, and his entire stock of impulses and desires. It is the receptacle of all the race-experience and his past impressions or संस्कारs lying deep in it in a latent form, ready to rise up to the surface at the slightest notice or call. Sankara would call this disposition—जैवप्रकृति or स्वभाव or nature,[1] and man is *passive* (अस्वतन्त्र:, अवश:) in respect of this स्वभाव (nature) which determines him and his actions,

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[1] *Cf.* Sankara's observations in the *Taittiriya-bhasya*—"जन्मान्तरकृतसंस्कारेभ्यो...जन्मनैव विरक्ता दृश्यन्ते केचित्; केचित्तु कर्मसु प्रवृत्ता अविरक्ता-विद्याविद्वेषिण:" (तै° भा°, 1.11). *Cf.* also "दृश्यते च केषाञ्चित् कासुचित् क्रियासु चित्रकर्मादिलक्षणासु जन्मत एव कौशलं कासुचित् अत्यन्तसौकर्य्ययुक्तास्वपि अकौशलं। तथा विषयोपभोगेषु स्वभावत: एव केषाञ्चित् कौशलाकौशलं" (बृ°भा°, 4.4,2).

and which is revealed when he is born. It is owing to this disposition that man has likings and dis-likings for particular sense-objects ;—that some men are seen from their childhood evincing natural attachment to mundane objects of enjoyments, and others developing natural aversion to temporal pleasures.[1]

An idea of how this 'disposition' (जैव प्रकृति) has been described in the Vedanta-works can be formed from the following :—

(*a*) "Nature (प्रकृति) is the *Samskára* (the latent self-reproductive impression of the past acts of Dharma and a-Dharma) manifesting itself at the commencement of the present birth.........All living beings follow their own nature."

(*b*) "Nature (स्वभाव) is the tendency (Samskâra —Básaná) in living beings acquired by them in the past births, and manifesting itself in the present birth ready to yield its effects, and this 'nature' is the source of the *Guṇas*, it being impossible for the *Gunas* to manifest themselves without a cause."

(*c*) "As regards all sense-objects, there necessarily arise in each case love (रागः) for an

[1] Sometimes, Sankara calls this 'disposition' as—"अविद्या दि-कामकर्माशयः" (गी° भा°, 8.19). Since, this disposition is the natural determinant of all our activities, and it is the root of our desires, pleasure and pain stimulated from it. The term *avidya* is used in its connection, because it is not the 'true' self but Sankara describes it as composed of 5 sheaths or "मनोमयादिभिः पूर्व्वपूर्व्वव्यापिभिरन्तरोत्तरैः सूक्ष्मैरानन्द-मयान्तैः आकाशादिभूतारब्धै...'आत्मवन्तः' सर्व्वे" (तै°, 2.3).

agreeable object, and aversion (द्वेषः) for a disagreeable object. When desire (कामः) arises, it rouses the *Rajas* and urges the person to action.[1]

This 'nature' or empirical character of the man is a gradual development in consequence of his education, association, society and the circumstances in which he is born and brought up. This is the unformed, undisciplined animal nature in man. Thus, man is born with a fund of animal impulses and inclinations which are the source of his movements or the tendency to activities. He is born subject to desires—love and hatred—राग-द्वेष—which colour his whole nature. Man is, at the beginning no better than an animal being. He is just emerged from nature; he is not yet a self-conscious being. He is simply 'aware' or 'conscious' of certain passive feelings aroused in him in consequence of his contact with the outward environment, and of certain impulses within, spontaneously rising and demanding their satisfaction—moving him towards, and repelling him from, the agreeable and disagreeable objects, as the case may be. In fulfilling his काम-क्रोध (impulses of love and hatred), he fulfils his life's entire purpose. These impulsive movements are always accompanied by pleasure and pain which leave their impression upon the mind. Mere idea of pleasure, thus, becomes the guide of his life and the sole guide of his movements and actions.

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[1] (*a*) "प्रकृतिर्नाम धर्माधर्मादिसंस्कारः वर्तमानजन्मादावभिव्यक्तः...तस्याः सदृशमेव सर्वो जन्तुः चेष्टते" (गी° भा°, 3.33).

(*b*) "जन्मान्तरकृतः संस्कारः वर्तमानजन्मनि स्वकार्याभिमुखत्वेनाभिव्यक्तः 'स्वभावः' ..गुणप्रादुर्भावस्य निष्कारणत्वानुपपत्तेः" (गी°भा°, 18.41).

(*c*) "शब्दादिविषये इष्टे रागः, अनिष्टे द्वेषः—अवश्यम्भाविनौ ।......कामो ह्युद्भूतो रजः प्रवर्तयन्, पुरुषं प्रवर्तयति" (गी°भा°, 3.34 and 37).

> "Desire is the longing for a pleasure-giving agreeable object of experience when actually coming within the ken of our senses or heard of or remembered; and anger is the aversion for the disagreeable, for the cause of pain when being seen or heard of or remembered."
>
> (*Gītā-bhāsya*, 5. 23.)

Man is completely passive here and utterly at the mercy of these impulses. This is the empirical, actual-self.

Sankara, as we remarked before, is reluctant to call this self a self at all. He is fond of calling it अनात्मा. There is *agency* in this self no doubt; but this is no real agency at all. For, all the necessary elements constituting the agency of this self are reciprocally determined by their antecedents and consequents in time. The actions involving movements of the body, sense organs, *manas*, are necessarily mechanically determined by, and are the resultant of, their antecedent conditions in time—

> "चलनात्मकस्य कर्म्मण: अनात्मकर्त्तृकस्य
> 'अहं करोमीति' प्रवृत्तिदर्शनात्"
>
> (गी° भा°, 18.66.)

None of these actions can, therefore, be called 'free.'[1]

In such a life, there is no purpose, no end, no aim, no regulation.[2] As we are enslaved by these impulses and passions and blinded by their influence, we cannot discern

[1] *Vide* Chap. II of this book.

[2] "यो हि बहिर्मुख: प्रवर्त्तते पुरुष: 'इष्टं मे भूयादिति'—न स आत्यन्तिकं पुरुषार्थं (end) लभते" (वे° भा°)। "कामक्रोधवशात्—कार्य्याकार्य्यविषय-विवेकायोग्यता अन्त:करणस्य नाश उच्यते—नाशात् पुरुषार्थायोग्यो भवति" (गी° भा°, 2.65)। "करणानि हि मन-आदीनि नियमेन (regulation) प्रवर्त्तन्ते, तन्नासति चेतनावति अधिष्ठातरि उपपद्यते" (के° वा° भा°, 1.1.)।

our right path, we cannot choose our true End—our पुरुषार्थ—

> "To one whose mind is subject to the passions of desire and aversion, there cannot indeed arise a knowledge of things as they are, even of the external world. And it needs no saying that to such a man whose intellect is thus overpowered by passions of desire and aversion—इच्छा-द्वेष, there cannot arise a knowledge of the innermost self."[1]

Actual man and possible man.

3. But is this the 'whole' man? Is man's environment without and his impulses within,—the sole determinant? Is there no other nature *higher* in man than this his 'animal nature'? Is there no स्वरूप—inner unity—underlying these manifold impulses and instincts which is the true source of his action?

What a man speaks and acts is not the whole man. All that flows from him—all his words, actions and movements cannot be the exhaustive expression of the man. It is wrong to identify the man with all these. What the man actually thinks and acts can never be equivalent to what the man is in his essence. What he *actually* feels, thinks and does—falls infinitely short of what is *possible* for him to do. He is not a mere sum-total of his feelings, impulses, habits, gathered in the past.[2] As much as he

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[1] "इच्छा-द्वेषौ सुख-दुःखतद्धेतुप्राप्त्या लब्धात्मकौ भवतः यदा, तदा तौ सर्व्वभूतानां प्रज्ञायाः स्ववशापादानद्वारा परमात्मतत्त्वविषयज्ञानोत्पत्तिप्रतिबन्धकारणं मोहं जनयतः। (गी°, 7.27).

"नहि इच्छा-द्वेषवशीकृतचित्तस्य यथाभूतार्थ-विषयविज्ञानमुत्पद्यते बहिरपि। किमु वक्तव्यं ताभ्यामाविष्टबुद्धेः प्रत्यगात्मनि ज्ञानं नोत्पद्यते इति" (गी° भा°, 7.27).

[2] His *actual* life is swayed by each and every impulse as it is stimulated. How can there be unity and order in such life? The individual

did express himself in his past records, and as much as he expresses himself in his present deeds and thoughts—fall far short of what properly constitutes his 'nature' or स्वरूप. These will always remain imperfect expressions of that inner 'nature' which these seek to express. It is because man is something more than these.[1] It is because Brahman which is infinite and inexhaustible (अव्यय), is revealed in man and is present behind him.[2] It is for this reason that—no one of his expressions can fix the infinite and inexhaustible possibilities in man in a rigid and final form.[3]

Sankara has observed that infinite ज्ञानैश्वर्य्य (infinite knowledge and power, etc.) lies concealed in man under the cover of his *actual* thoughts and deeds.[4]

self is thus described—"That which first shows itself as the Innermost self (प्रत्यगात्मा) in the body, and turns out *in the end* to be identical with the supreme Reality—the Brahman."

प्रतिदेहं प्रत्यगात्मभाव: 'स्वभाव' :...देहमधिकृत्य प्रत्यगात्मतया प्रवृत्तं, 'परमार्थ-ब्रह्मावसानं'वस्तु—स्वभावोऽध्यात्ममुच्यते (गी°, 8. 3.)।

[1] "सर्व्वप्राणिनां करणै: 'महान्' भवति ; किन्तु ततोऽपि 'अधिकतरं' एतद् भवति" (तै° भा°)।

[2] "सर्व्वेषु भूतेषु...एकं भावं—आत्मवस्तु अव्ययं पश्यति, तच्च भावं अविभक्तं' (indivisible) प्रतिदेहं—देहभेदेषु" (गी° भा°, 18.20).

[3] It is wrong to restrict what is inexhaustible to its actual deeds and thoughts, as if these are its exhaustive expressions. In the Gita such idea has been condemned as *tâmasa* idea. 'यत कृतस्नवत् (*i.e.*, यत् अव्ययंतत्)......एकस्मिन्नेव कार्य्ये सक्तं......'एतावानेव आत्मा परमेश्वरो वा. नात:परमस्तीति'—ईदृशं ज्ञानं तामसानामेव भवति" (18.22). "यद्यपि कार्य्यात्मना उद्रिच्यते उद्गच्छति, तथापि यत् पूर्णत्वं तन्न जहाति—पूर्णमेव उद्रिच्यते" (बृ° भा°, 5.1.1).

[4] "सोऽपि तु जीवस्य ज्ञानैश्वर्य्यतिरोभाव: देहेन्द्रियमनोबुद्धिविषयवेदनादि-योगात् भवति" (वे° भा°, 3.2.6).

"विद्यमानमपि तत् तिरोहितं अविद्यादिव्यवधानात्"। "उपाधिकृतस्वरूप तिरोभावात्...स्वरूपस्य तु अनपायित्वात्" (वे° भा°, 3.2.5 and 35). "तत् पुन: तिरोभूतं यतमानस्य जन्तो:......ईश्वरप्रसादात् आविर्भवति" (3.2.5).

"Âtma," says Sankara, "has been expanded in man only. With other animals, eating and drinking alone constitute their sphere of knowledge. But man is entitled to approach and reach the supreme end of life (निःश्रेयस्). He it is who *desires to gain* the highest end by appropriate *means* and by knowledge (ब्रह्मविद्यया)."

"अहमेव उत्कर्षः अभ्युदय स्तत्प्राप्तिहेतुः ।
केषां ?—भविष्यतां—भाविकल्याणानां
उत्कर्षप्राप्तियोग्यानां "—

(गी° भा, 10.34).

That is to say—"it is the actual presence of the Supreme End behind them—which constitutes the possibility for their *future progress* from the present stage to the next higher and higher stages—of those who are fit for such progress."

"Man's distinction lies in the fact that instead of being passively disposed of by his impulses and desires, he can bring them under the law of the *rational self* which the impulses envelop."

It is this presence, within us, of something inexhaustible which makes us desire *more and more*, and it is for this *infinite possibility* in us that we never feel satisfied with our actual thoughts and deeds.

1 किं पुनः प्राधान्यं ? कर्म्मज्ञानाधिकारः ।...पुरुषे त्वेव आविस्तरामात्मा ; स हि प्रज्ञानेन सम्पन्नतमः विज्ञातं पश्यति वदति...मर्त्येन अमृतं ईप्सति । इतरेषां पशूनां अशना-पिपासे एव अभिविज्ञानं " (तै° भा°, 2.1) । " मनुष्य एव विशेषतोऽभ्युदय-निःश्रेयससाधने अधिकृतः...(बृ°, 1.4.19).

Man solely responsible for his deeds.

Because of this *possibility* of man he is held responsible for the works—good or bad—done by him. How is it that we do not make animals accountable for their evil works? What is it that distinguishes a man from the lower animals? It is not at all *possible* for an animal to do otherwise than what is dictated to it by its *actual* nature, by its impulses and passions. But with man the case stands differently. He could have, had he only paused and deliberated, seen the consequences of his impulsive actions which he had indulged in. There was, in him, a possibility for a better course of action than what he had done, and this possibility he had ignored. Why did he, in following his evil impulse, stoop to an animal satisfaction? It is for this that we hold the man responsible for his evil deed and punish him for it. We all know, his actual life is not all-in-all to him; infinite possibility lies hidden in him. An infinite possibility either for good or for evil is always present in him. It is for this possibility within man that nobody can tell how he will express himself at the present crisis. It was for this possibility within him that the notorious Jagai (जगाइ) whose life had seemed irrevocably fixed in evil ways, was suddenly shocked into his real life and quite unexpectedly turned over a new leaf, resolving thenceforward to live a higher life,—when the famous saint of Nadia—Srichaitanya—had extended his arms of love towards him in return for the bleeding injury he had received from the cruel hand of the miscreant. It is this possibility or power which is the shaping or directing force (प्रेरयिता) within us, bringing man, step by step, to the ultimate realisation of his final end—his परमपुरुषार्थ. Man's *actual present* life is this possibility *so far realised*;—is the partial and imperfect

manifestation or expression of this inexhaustible possibility.

4. Sankara has observed in more places than one that—

The nature of self: (*i*) It is an end—Purposive-Power—utilises all its activities for its own realisation.

"all the movements visible in the world, all its works and activities —must have a regulative purpose present behind them which shapes them for its own realisation."

"It not only holds good in the outward world, but it is also true in all the activites of the inner world." He continues—

> "it is also the case with all the impulsive movements which go on within the human organism—all the actions of the sense-organs, all the functions of the *man's* intellect and the like."

This is an observation the value of which, it is needless to add, cannot be overestimated. What are these movements and activities for? For what use do these aspirations, efforts and actions (सर्व्वाः प्रवृत्तयः) go on? Their value, Sankara points out, does not lie in that they exist alongside of Ātma, but in the *use* (कर्म्मत्वापत्तिनिमित्त) which the Ātma (the self) makes of them.

> " दृशिकर्म्मत्वापत्ति-निमित्ता हि जगतः
> सर्व्वा प्रवृत्तिः—' अहमिदं भोक्ष्ये '
> ...' एतदर्थमिदं करिष्ये ' ' इदं ज्ञास्यामि '
> —इत्याद्या "। [1]

[1] *Vide* Gita, 9.10—

> "मयाध्यक्षेण प्रकृतिः सूयते सचराचरं।
> हेतुनानेन कौन्तेय जगत् विपरिवर्त्तते॥

Sankara explains the stanza in this way—'The विपरिवर्त्तन of the world, *i.e.*, the continuously changing elements of the world are

All these activities of the organism have their only value in the fact that they may be used by the इन्द्र—the rational "I" for his own purpose; that they may be *utilised* for his end; that they may prove *useful* (कर्म्मेत्वापत्ति or उपकार) to him. Otherwise, all these actions and movements (प्रवृत्तय:) will entirely lose their value.[1] There is the Âtma or the self within, *other than* these movements and activities, *for whose sake* they act. This remark proves the self (आत्मा) to be a Purpose—and end—which is realised in these activities, and which utilises these for its own use.

Elsewhere, Sankara's remarks in this connection are equally valuable and bring the same important truth into prominence—

> "Suppose," he says there, "no Âtma (self) is present behind these activities (प्रवृत्तय:); there are only these activities working, but there is no purpose to regulate them. An absurd consequence will follow, *viz.*, nobody is present whose *purpose* they serve; nobody is there to use them, to utilise them—

moving to realise a Divine Purpose or end. The world with all it changing elements is moving for the realisation of the Final end. हेतुना निमित्तेन अनेन अध्यक्षत्वेन जगत् चराचरं विपरिवर्त्तते सर्व्वावस्थासु ...जगत: सर्व्वा प्रवृत्ति:...अवगतिनिष्ठा अवगत्यवसाना। *i.e.*, ब्रह्मावगति—The realisation of Brahman is its अवसान, *i.e.*, the Final end. In the Vedantabhasya he says—अवगतिपर्य्यन्तं ज्ञानं···नात: परं किञ्चित् 'आकाङ्क्ष्यं' अस्ति। *i.e.*, the realisation of Brahman is the पर्य्यन्त—the final goal where all desires find their fulfilment. Hence the sense of the stanza is that all activities are for the realisation of the final Purpose.

[1] "काष्ठ-लोष्ठसमस्य चेतनेन अप्रवर्त्तितस्य प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्त:" [वे° भा°, 3.2.38]. All प्रवृत्ति (activities) without the self to direct them are like काष्ठ लोष्ठ.

> "अप्रसिद्धे हि आत्मनि, स्वार्थाः सर्व्वाः
> प्रवृत्तयः व्यर्थाः प्रसज्येरन्" [1] ।—
>
> 'The activities would thus prove *useless* (व्यर्था); they would be to no purpose. For, there is no regulation of these activities; no purpose to guide them.' Thus there would be no order, no unitv, no central purpose in the human life.

It has been stated elsewhere, as a general principle that—

> "the works and activities (प्रवृत्ति), if *severed and cut off* from their source, the self,—are entirely valueless or useless, like the broom, the stick, the dust on the road-side."[2]

This important truth is also expressed in the Kena-bhasya where the self has been established as a purpose—a will-power—an organising principle—and it is this

[1] *Vide* Gita-Bhasya, 18-50. Here also the commentator remarks that the actions and the works point to something beyond them whose purpose they serve, for whose sake they act. Otherwise pleasure, pain, etc., would have to be supposed to be acting for the sake of pleasure and pain, etc.; the activities of the body are for the sake of the body. To avoid such absurd supposition, the existence of the self must be admitted whose purpose these activities realise. "न च सुखार्थं सुखं, दुःखार्थं वा दुःखं। आत्मावगत्यवसानार्थत्वाच्च सर्व्वव्यवहाराणां." All activities are moving for the realisation of the self (आत्मा) which is their final end (अवसान). It is the self which connects and determines all these functions and activities for its own *final* realisation. This is the significance of the commentary here.

[2] "अतः काष्ठ-लोष्टसमानि हि तानि (चक्षुरादीनां दर्शनादिसामर्थ्यानि) चैतन्यात्मज्योतिःशून्यानि" (वृ° भा°, 4.4.18). *Cf.* "काष्ठ-लोष्टसमस्य चेतनेना-प्रवर्त्तितस्य प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः" (वेदा° भा°, 3.2.38). *Cf.* also "तेन हि निरात्मकं किञ्चिद्व्यवहाराय अवकल्पते."

purpose for whose sake all the elements of the body work. And this purpose is, in its nature, *other than* (स्वतन्त्र) these activities which it directs and controls and moves for its own realisation—

"स्वतन्त्रस्य इच्छामात्रेणैव मन-आदि-प्रेषयितृत्वं " [1]

Do not all these passages clearly imply that Sankara's idea about the self was that it is an End-in-itself—a Purposive power—which purpose *utilises* all its impulsive movements for its own realisation? Can, in the face of such clear expressions embodied in these passages, Sankara's self be treated as a "mere intelligence divorced from action"? We have gathered together principal passages on the subject and presented them before our readers with the hope that they may come to their own conclusion on this important point for themselves.

(ii) It is a 'free causality.'

But we have not done with it as yet. To another passage which is found recorded in the Katha-Bhasya[2] we now beg to request our readers to turn their attention. This passage will show that the self is a 'free

[1] *Vide* Kena-bhásya, 1.1. Sankara has observed here that "किं यथाप्रसिद्धमेव कार्य्यकरणसंघातस्य प्रेषयितृत्वं, किंवा संघातव्यतिरिक्तस्य स्वतन्त्रस्य इच्छामात्रेणैव मनआदिप्रेषयितृत्वं"? This power is distinguished from the actions of the body, organs, manas, etc.; it does not disintegrate into those activities, none of which endures. The self, as causal Power, does not yield to the impulsive activities, but it lies entirely outside these empirical series and determines them. "मन: न स्वतन्त्रं प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिविषये अत्युग्रदु:खे कार्य्ये वार्य्यमाणमपि पतति मन:। तस्मात् युक्त एव केनेषित मिति प्रश्न:."

[2] *Vide* कठ-भाष्य, 2.2.5. "मन्दबुद्धीनां दुर्विवेकरूपे पुरुषं प्राप्तः श्रेयः प्रेयश्च। धीरः मनसा आलोच्य गुरुलाघवं पृथक् करोति, विविच्य च, श्रेय एव अभिवृणीते, प्रेयसोऽभ्यर्हितत्वात् श्रेयसः; यस्तु मन्दबुद्धिः सदसद्विवेकासामर्थ्यात् प्रेयः पुत्रपश्वादि-लक्षणम् वृणीते"—इत्यादि।

causality' which weighs its impulses and determines their activities for the realisation of its own End or purpose.

> "The supreme good (श्रेयः) and the mundane good (प्रेय) are confusedly presented to the man. The intelligent *compare* the two, and on mature *reflection* discern their *relative* value—their difference, the supreme good as worthier than the pleasurable. Then they adopt means to the attainment of the End chosen."

We thus compare, estimate our impulses, and they, thus, become *objects* of our contemplation. A sum-total of feelings, impulses, etc., cannot compare, deliberate and control any more than each feeling and impulse separately. Only a *free* self can do so which *has* them, which is *above* them. In a comparison between the impulses, in a preference among them of what is the highest good, we are *agents* and we are *free*. A man thus freely makes a choice from among his several objects of choice and desire which are qualitatively higher; and ultimately chooses what he *rationally* decides to be his *highest-good*. If it be true that—I often act *in opposition to* what is my strongest desire at the present moment, it follows that my self acts *independently* of pleasure, temperament, habit, etc.—

> "सर्व्वो हि उत्तरोत्तरं बभूषति लोकः,
> तस्मात्र पुत्रवित्तादिलोभैः प्रलोभ्योऽहं ।
> ततोऽधिकतरं पुरुषार्थं दुष्प्रापमपि अभिप्रेप्सुः"
>
> (कठ-भाष्य, 1.28).

Similar remarks are found embodied in the Gita also—

> "Man is man only so long as his *antahkarana* is competent to discriminate between right and wrong. When he is

unable to do so, he is debarred from attaining the highest of human aspirations. Hence at the very commencement he must *rise above* the sway of राग-द्वेष—affection for and aversion to the sense-objects or pleasures and pains." He must restrain these natural tendencies, he must exert himself with vigour to resist these natural impulses, and then the action of his will is in an opposite direction."

"महता प्रयासेन स्वभावप्रवृत्तिनिरोधं
कृत्वा, प्रतिस्रोतः प्रवर्त्तनमिव, प्रत्यगात्मानं पश्यति ।
(कठ-भाष्य, 4.1)"[1]

Unrestrained *desire* works mischief; and urged by uncontrolled desire, the man commits sin and evil. We are bent on selfish ends and are deluded by 'egoism'—when uncontrolled desire urges us to action. We must, therefore, bring our impulses and desires under the law of *rational* self, into the path of our positive purpose of life which we have deliberately selected and which has filled up our entire being.

[1] The conversion of undisciplined animal nature in man into a disciplined, moral and virtuous character involves great effort (महता प्रयासेन). The effort of the whole man must be turned and concentrated from the natural direction to opposite direction.

The same idea occurs in the Vedanta-bhasya also—" यो हि बहिर्मुखः प्रवर्त्तते पुरुषः,...न च तत्र आत्यन्तिकं पुरुषार्थं लभते ; तं आत्यन्तिक-पुरुषार्थाभिवाञ्छिनं, स्वाभाविकात् कार्य्य-करण-संघातप्रवृत्तिगोचरात् विमुखीकृत्य, प्रत्यगात्मस्रोतस्तया प्रवर्त्तयन्ति " (वे° भा°, 1.1.4) ।

Karma and Jnana :— Both cannot be the ultimate end or परम-पुरुषार्थ।

5. The foregoing discussion has brought into clear light an important truth before our mind. Both—the gratification of impulsive desires and the realisation of the highest purpose of life—cannot be pursued by the same man as an *object* of desire. There exists a conflict between the selfish impulsive activities and the realisation of the supreme purpose of life. Both cannot be chosen by a man, as an object for his realisation.[1] There cannot be *two ends* of his life. Sankara has repeatedly shown that there is eternal conflict (विरोध) between Karma (कर्म) and Jnan (ज्ञान). Unless a man feels disgusted (विरक्त) with the pleasure-giving mundane ends, he cannot choose the realisation of self as his supreme and only End of life.

Sankara has expressed his own idea on the subject, thus :—

(*a*) "I desire to attain an End which is eternal, imperishable and transcendental; what shall I do with Karma which is opposite to it in its nature?"

(*b*) "Light and shade cannot co-exist. Interests in outward activities and interests in the inner self are mutually exclusive. The dualism between the spheres of virtue and prudence is an irreducible dualism whose rival claims it is impossible to adjust."

(*c*) "Unless our mind is turned away from the mundane objects, we are unable to

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[1] This is the notorious कर्म-ज्ञान-समुच्चय, against which Sankara has written so much.

devote it to the realisation of the self. You cannot desire both—the outward objects and the inner self at the same moment. There is conflict between the two courses."

(*d*) "In the world people revel with mundane goods. It is not so with the wise whose *revels* are centred in the self alone. For the unwise, there are many pleasures due to the sense-objects. But to the wise, their sole rejoicing proceeds from the self."

(*e*) "A distinction has been made between Jnana-nishtha (ज्ञाननिष्ठा) and Karma-nishtha (कर्म्मनिष्ठा). Vedic works are intended for him only who has desires. The renunciation of these works is enjoined on him who seeks only the self."

(*f*) "He who wishes to reach the eastern sea, cannot have the same road that the man who wishes to go to the western sea chooses. The difference between the knowledge (ज्ञान) and works (कर्म्म) is as wide as between a mountain and a mustard-seed."

(*g*) "Emancipation being the *result* of knowledge, how can a man desire the *result* of works ?"[1]

[1] (*a*) "अहं नित्येन कूटस्थेन अचलेन ध्रुवेनार्थेन अर्थी । न तद्विपरीतेन। अतः किं कृतेन कर्म्मणा अनर्थसाधनेन ?" (मु° भा° 1.2.12) ।

(*b*) "न हि वाह्यक्रियावान्, आत्मरतिश्च भवितुं शक्तः । वाह्यक्रियात्मक्रीड़योः विरोधात् ; वाह्यक्रियानिवृत्तो हि आत्मक्रीड़ो भवति कश्चित् कश्चित् । न हि तमः-प्रकाशयो र्युगपदेकत्र स्थितिः सम्भवति" (मु° भा°, 3.1.4) ।

We need not quote further passages. The passages quoted above all declare what really worked in the mind of Sankara, and what led him to make a distinction between ज्ञान and कर्म्म—knowledge and works. His purpose was not that we are to renounce all works—even the higher moral virtues;—and, as we shall presently see, he was not advocating inertia. These and other similar passages clearly indicate the truth that there can be only *one* ultimate End of life. ज्ञान and कर्म्म *both* cannot constitute the supreme End. Karma (कर्म्म) done to secure mundane pleasure or goods and Jnana (ज्ञान), *i.e.*, the realisation of the self—cannot *both* be the ultimate ends of life.

Sankara thus contrasts the result of the two—Jnana (ज्ञान) and Karma (कर्म्म):

> If you desire the realisation of the self as your highest end, how can you choose works or कर्म्म? For, works or Karma

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(*c*) "न हि अस्मात् अनात्मनोऽव्यावृत्तचित्तस्य, आत्मानमेव लोकमित्युपासितुं बुद्धिः प्रवर्त्तते। बाह्यप्रत्यगात्मप्रवृत्त्यो र्विरोधात्" (बृ° भा°, 1.6.1)। "न हि बाह्यविषयालोचनपरत्वं, प्रत्यगात्मेक्षणत्वञ्च—एकस्य सम्भवति" (कठ-भा, 4.1)।

(*d*) "देहमात्रसाधना 'रतिः,' बाह्यसाधना 'क्रीड़ा'—लोके। न तथा विदुषः; किं तर्हि? आत्मविज्ञाननिमित्तमेव उभयं भवति।...शब्दादिनिमित्त 'आनन्दो'ऽविदुषां। न तथा विदुषः; किं तर्हि? आत्मनिमित्तमेव सर्व्वं" (छा° भा° 7.25.2)।

(*e*) "ज्ञान-कर्म्मनिष्ठयोर्विभागवचनात्।...अविद्या-कामवतएव सर्व्वाणि कर्म्माणि श्रौतादीनि दर्शितानि। तेभ्यो व्युत्थानं आत्मानमेव लोकमिच्छतोऽकामस्य विहितं" (गी° भा°, 2.11).

(*f*) "न हि पूर्व्वसमुद्रं जिगमिषोः, प्रातिलोम्येन प्रत्यक्समुद्रजिगमिषुणा समानमार्गत्वं सम्भवति। प्रत्यगात्मविषयप्रत्ययसन्तानकरणाभिनिवेशश्च—ज्ञाननिष्ठा। सा, प्रत्यक्समुद्रगमनवत्, कर्म्मणा सहभावित्वेन विरुद्ध्यते। पर्व्वत-सर्षपयोरिव अन्तरवान् विरोधः" (गी° भा°, 18.55)।

(*g*) "न ज्ञाननिष्ठा कर्म्मसहिता उपपद्यते। कैवल्यफले ज्ञाने, क्रियाफलार्थित्वानुपपत्तेः" गी°, 18.66)।

can be chosen only for the following purposes :—

(*i*) You can choose Karma, if you are desirous of producing something which is as yet non-existent (उत्पाद्य). But as the self is what is already in you eternally existent, —how can Karma produce it ?

(*ii*) If you desire to reach a place or an object, you must perform certain activities or Karma for it (आप्य). But the self is what is always within your reach, no Karma is needed at all for it.

(*iii*) For the purpose of effecting a change or transformation to a thing, work or Karma may prove necessary (विकार्य). But as the self is beyond change, as it is subject to no transformation—is immutable—Karma is out of place here.

(*iv*) If you desire to effect purification to your mind or something else, work or Karma proves useful for the purpose (संस्कार्य). But what would action do to the self which is always pure ?[1]

Now, from the foregoing discussion it follows that there can be but one object of our desire, one supreme end of our life, and that is—the realisation of the self. And works or Kàrmas are only needed for the purification of our mind or antahkaraṇa.

[1] *Vide* Vedanta-Bhásya, 1-1-4, and Brihadáranyaka-bhásya, 3-3-1, and other places for this discussion.

6. We have seen above that we are naturally selfish beings. We seek always the gratification of our pleasure, to appropriate which to ourselves, we do not hesitate to work mischief to others. Our mind is, by nature, filled with desire for agreeable objects and aversion to disagreeable—राग-द्वेष,—and driven by these impulses, we work blindly for our selfish ends and often quarrel with others to secure pleasure to ourselves. It is absolutely necessary, therefore, for us to *purify* our mind from these selfish desires and inclinations, and to free it from their influences. Unless this purification can be effected, the realisation of the self is out of the question.

The place of higher altruistic Karmas: and their needs.

The purification of the mind or antahkaraṇa can be effected by restraining these egoistic impulses and tendencies to action (negatively), and by performing higher kinds of works (positively). By exerting ourselves always for the good of the community and by the performance of unselfish and disinterested works, our mind may become gradually free from selfish passions and desires; and when these impurities are thus removed, it is prepared for the supreme realisation. But a caution is needed here. These unselfish works ought not to be done, nay they cannot be done—as *ends*-in-themselves. As there can only be *one* supreme *End, viz.,* the realisation of the self which is the only object of our desire; higher disinterested works can be done only *as a means* of helping that realisation. This, in brief, is the view of Sankara.

Works done with impulsive and selfish motives have been condemned in the Vedanta, as *Sakáma-karmas.* And as such works have always been looked upon as the source of bondage, with a view to supplant and supersede these self-seeking activities, higher disinterested kinds of works have been prescribed and the

aspirants after emancipation (मुमुक्षु) are called upon to diligently perform such works. These higher works are considered indispensable for the purification of the mind (चित्तशुद्धि or सत्त्वशुद्धि), infested as it is with selfish impulses and desires.[1] And as these are done for emancipating the mind from the influence of the lower natural tendencies, which would ultimately lead to the realisation of the true self, these works cannot prove a bondage. If, however, the supreme end is forgotten, and these are done as ends-in-themselves, only then they will prove a bondage.

(1) They are indispensable for purification of mind (सत्त्वशुद्धि).

An idea prevails among many that in Sankara's System of Vedanta no room has been left for works and that his aim was to get rid of all works altogether. To our mind, this is an idea which cannot be accepted and which must be condemned as erroneous, with all the emphasis which we can command. We have said above that as our mind is naturally swayed by selfish passions and desires, it needs purification in order to prepare it finally for the realisation of the ultimate End which constitutes the only object of our desire. How this purification is to be executed will appear from the following

(*a*) "When a man performs higher kinds of *works* (Nitya-karmas or obligatory works), his mind or antahkaraṇa, unsoiled by

[1] "इन्द्रिय-विषयसंसर्गजनित-रागादिमलकालुष्यापनयनात्, आदर्श-सलिलादिवत्, प्रसादितं स्वच्छं अवतिष्ठते यदा, तदा ज्ञानस्य प्रसादः स्यात्" (मु० भा०, 3.1.8)।

"दृष्टा हि असंस्कृतकल्मषस्य उक्तेऽपि ब्रह्मणि अप्रतिपत्तिः, विपरीतप्रतिपत्तिश्च।" (केन० भा०, 4.8)।

desire for results,—without attachment and longing for results—becomes *regenerated and pure*. When thus purified, the mind becomes fit for contemplation of the self. Thus the man whose mind has been purified by the performance of obligatory works (नित्यकर्म) and who is thus *prepared* to acquire the self-realisation, may gradually attain to Jnāna-niṣthā (the final End)."

(*b*) "The three higher kinds of action should be performed; for, they cause *purity* in those who have no desire for fruits... These actions should be performed by a *seeker of liberation*, though they form the cause of bondage in the case of one who has an attachment for the actions and a desire for their fruits."

(*c*) "The seekers of liberation must perform ritual works and other obligatory duties without any longing for the fruits of such works. When performed, the works prove useful as a *means* to the birth of spiritual regeneration of the mind (विद्योत्पत्ति)."

(*d*) "He who is free from a desire for the fruits of action and performs action as a bounden duty (Nitya-karmas)—not as a Kámya-karma; he who performs actions thus, is superior to those who perform action in a different spirit...... One who is devoted to action abandoning attachment for the results of action—performs for the purification of the mind

(सत्त्वशुद्धि) is said to be a Sanyâsin and a Jogin."

(*e*) "Works are meant for the *purification* of the mind. Selfish desires and passions are *impediments* to self-realisation. Unselfish prescribed duties when not done with self-seeking motives remove these impediments, effect purification of the mind, and thus help the final realisation."[1]

We need not multiply instances. Such observations are to be found everywhere in the Vedanta works. The readers will judge for themselves if such observations at all favour the idea of *inertia* prevalent among the critics of the Sankara's theory. We find Sankara everywhere teaching that higher works which are described as Nitya-karmas must be done for the purification of the mind.

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[1] (*a*) "य: नित्यं कर्म्म करोति, तस्य फलरागादिना अकलुषीक्रियमाणमन्त:-करणं, नित्यैश्च कर्म्मभि: संस्क्रियमाणं विशुध्यति। विशुद्धं प्रसन्नमात्मालोचनक्षमं भवति। तस्यैव नित्यकर्म्मानुष्ठानेन विशुद्धान्त:करणस्य, आत्मज्ञानाभिमुखस्य क्रमेण तन्निष्ठा स्यात्" (गी॰ भा॰, 18.10)।

(*b*) "यज्ञो दानं तपश्चैव पावनानि विशुद्धिकराणि फलानभिसन्धीनां।...... सासङ्गस्य फलार्थिनो बन्धहेतव एतान्यपि कर्म्माणि मुमुक्षो: कर्त्तव्यानि इत्यपि-शब्दस्यार्थ:" (गी॰ भा॰, 18.5 and 6)।

(*c*) "अनभिसन्धाय फलमनुष्ठितानि यज्ञादीनि मुमुक्षोर्ज्ञानसाधनानि भवन्तीति प्रपञ्चितं...धर्म्मविशेषैरनुग्रहो विद्याया: सम्भवति" (वे॰ भा॰, 3-4-27 and 3 etc.)

(*d*) "यो हि कर्म्मफलतृष्णावान्, स कर्म्मफलमाश्रितो भवति। अयन्तु तद्विपरीत: अनाश्रित: कर्म्मफलं......स कर्म्मान्तरेभ्यो विशिष्यते।"..."किं तर्हि? कर्म्मी अपि। कर्म्मफलासङ्गं सन्न्यस्य, कर्म्मयोगमनुतिष्ठन् सत्त्वशुद्धये—'स सन्न्यासी च योगी च' भवतीति स्तूयते" (गी॰ भा॰, 6-1; and intro.)।

(*e*) "कर्म्मणां विशुद्धिहेतुत्वात्। कर्म्मभि: संस्कृता हि विशुद्धात्मान: शक्नुवन्ति-आत्मानं अप्रतिबन्धेन वेदितुं।... एवं काम्यवर्ज्जितं नित्यं कर्म्मजातं सर्व्वं आत्म-ज्ञानोत्पत्तिद्वारेण मोक्षसाधनत्वं प्रतिपद्यते। एवं कर्म्मकाण्डेन सह एक-वाक्यतावगति:" (बृ॰ भा॰, 4.4.22)।

But a word of caution is again necessary. These are never to be performed *as an End, i.e.,* as an object of desire. For, as we have seen, there can only be *one* object of desire,—one End, *viz.,* the realization of the true self.

(II) Why Karma-Section of the Veda not useless.

As a corollary to the above proposition, we may mention here another fact. The reader will find an objection raised by Sankara himself in several places of his works that—if the self-realisation be the only End which we must pursue, all works necessarily become useless. And the work-section (कर्म्मकाण्ड) of the Veda—in which rules and prescriptions have been elaborately laid down for the performance of works—does also prove utterly valueless. To meet this objection, Sankara replies :—

> "Only the selfish works (Sakámakarmas) are to be considered useless. The higher disinterested works (Nityakarmas) have always a value in the Vedanta; they are never to be considered useless. For they are meant for the *purification* of the mind. Disinterested works always help the realisation of the self."[1]

> The reply suggested by Sankara in his commentary on the Gitá is still more valuable and deserves our particular consideration—"Our theory does not lead to the conclusion that the *sruti* teaching

[1] "न च निष्प्रयोजना प्रवृत्तिः ।...यदि हि आत्मविज्ञानेन आत्मविद्याविषयत्वात् परितित्याजयिषितं कर्म्म, ततः 'प्रक्षालनाद्धि पङ्कस्य दूरादस्पर्शनं वरं' इति अनारम्भ एव कर्म्मणः श्रेयान् ।...एतत्तु सकामस्य, न निष्कामस्य । तस्य तु संस्कारार्थानि एव कर्म्माणि भवन्ति । ... निष्कामस्य तु आत्मज्ञान-प्रतिबन्ध-प्रमार्ष्टॄ भवति । उत्पन्नात्म-विज्ञानस्य तु, अनारम्भो—निरर्थकत्वात्" (केन° वा° भाष्य, 1.1) ।

works proves useless. For, by restraining the first *natural activities* one after the other, and thereby gradually inducing fresh and *higher activities*, it serves to create an aspiration *to reach the innermost self*."[1]

From these passages the readers will find a very clear enunciation of Sankara's position about the works. It is not true that works have no place in his philosophy and that he considered all works as fetters. On the contrary, higher and higher works, as we have just seen, must always be performed—so long as we have not reached the final End where all works, all our duties, find their completion and highest fulfilment—

> " न च असति सम्यग्दर्शने, सर्व्वात्मना काम्य-प्रतिषिद्धवर्ज्जनं केनचित् प्रतिज्ञातुं शक्यं "— (वे० भा०, 4.3.14) ;
>
> " यत् कर्त्तव्यं तत् सर्व्वं, भगवत्तत्त्वे विदिते कृतं भवेत् ; न च अन्यथा कर्त्तव्यं परिसमाप्यते कस्यचित् । "—
>
> (गी० भाष्य, 15.20) ।

But here we must remind the readers of the note of warning which Sankara had sounded. No works, however high their nature, should be done as an end-in-itself ; no work ought to be made an object of your desire (न इष्टव्यत्वेन). For, as an *object* of desire, work will constitute itself *as an end*. Wherefore it is that, everywhere it has been laid

[1] न चैवं कर्म्मविधिश्रुतेरप्रामाण्यं । पूर्व्वपूर्व्वप्रवृत्तिनिरोधेन, उत्तरोत्तरापूर्व्वप्रवृत्तिजननस्य प्रत्यगात्माभिमुख्येन प्रवृत्त्युत्पादनार्थत्वात् " (गी० भा०, 18.66) । Again *cf.* " भगवत्कर्म्मकारिणो युक्ततमा अपि कर्म्मिणो ये, ते उत्तरोत्तरहीनफलत्यागावसानसाधनाः " (गी० भा०, 18.66) ।

down that works are not to be performed with a desire for their fruits (फलाकाङ्क्षा). Since, there can only be *one object* of desire, one ultimate End of life. Works ought not to be abandoned—

" न त्याज्यं, कार्य्यमेव तत् "—18.5

They must be done for the purification of our mind—

" पावनानि मनीषिणाम् "

which is full of impure thoughts and tendencies to activity. Only they must not be done as ends-in-themselves—as if they possess a primary and independent value in themselves. But their performance is always indispensably needed as a *means* (उपायत्वेनैव)[1]; they must be utilised by us, so that they may prove *useful* for the ultimate purpose we have in view, *viz.*, the realisation of the final goal. The works, nay—everything of the world—have value, *not* as they exist alongside of the Âtmá, but only so far as they are *used* by us—how we use them—

" सन्निपत्य 'उपकारकत्वं' (वृ० भा०, 4.5.15)."

" अहिंसा-ब्रह्मचर्य्यादीनाञ्च विद्यां प्रति

'उपकारकत्वात्' " (तै० भा०, 1.11).

" अनभिसन्धाय फलमनुष्ठितानि यज्ञादीनि

मुमुक्षोः ज्ञान'साधनानि' भवन्ति " (वे० भा०, 3.4.27).[2]

[1] " परस्मिन् ब्रह्मणि चित्तावतारोपायत्वेनैव एते परिकल्प्यन्ते, न द्रष्टव्यत्वेन " (वे० भा०, 3. 3. 12) [Here 'उपायत्व' stands in *contrast* with 'द्रष्टव्यत्व'. उपायत्व useful as means, न द्रष्टव्यत्वेन—*i.e.*, not as an End.]

[2] All the good and disinterested works and virtues are *means* useful for the realisation of the final End. They are to be looked upon as instruments (साधनानि) which we must use (उपकारक) as *helps* to the realisation of the self. They have value, only because they are *utilised* by the self for its own purpose.

" उपायभूतानि हि कर्म्माणि संस्कारद्वारेण ज्ञानस्य । "—केन० वाक्य भाष्य, Int.

(III) Higher Nitya-Karmas regenerate man from animality to rationality:

In this way, by the performance of disinterested higher works, the man is regenerated from the undisciplined 'animality' (पशुत्व—असुरत्व) to the disciplined 'rationality' (देवत्व). In the Brihadáranyaka, the yielding of the mind to the natural inclinations and instincts has been called as Ashura-bháva (असुरभाव—पशुत्व), and the doing of higher disinterested works for the good of the community, under the prescriptions of the shástras, with higher and unselfish purposes and inclinations has been designated as Deva-bháva (देवभाव).[1] If men follow passively the natural bents of their mind and permit them to become the sole guide of their life, they are no higher than animals. But if they obey the injunctions of the sástras and work for social good and public utility—such disinterested motives and works will exalt them to the higher attributes of benevolent gods (देवत्व). This high lesson the Vedanta teaches. How to make men possessors of godly qualities while on earth is the aim of Vedanta. But here again the Vedanta has *not stopped*. Its ultimate aim is to carry the man *beyond* the world to final realisation and to fulfil his *transcendental* destiny.

Higher, disinterested works cannot be hypostatised as an *End*. Two *reasons* stated. They are to be used as a *means*.

7. We have said that the higher forms of works—Nityakarmas—works done with disinterested motives cannot be treated as ends-in-themselves, but always as *means*—as a sádhana (साधन) useful, through the purification of mind, for the attainment of the true self which is our ultimate End.

[1] "स्वभावसिद्धौ राग-द्वेषौ अभिभूय, यदा शुभवासना-प्राबल्येन धर्म्मपरायणो भवति, तदा स 'देवः'। यदास्व भावसिद्ध-रागद्वेष प्राबल्येन अधर्म्मपरायणो भवति, तदा 'असुरः'।"—गीताभाष्यव्याख्यायां मधुसूदनः।

If, however, these works are treated as *ends*, as is generally done, some serious consequences will follow. Let us consider these consequences now.

We are all members of a social whole. We belong to Varnásrama-community, of which we are the members. Certain rules and laws we find recorded in the *sástras* for our guidance. These laws are authoritative for us; because they form the collective experiences and opinions of the best selves of the community. It is generally held that certain rules and acts which have been evolved within the community for its own preservation, are imposed upon its individual members, so that each of them may observe and act up to these rules. Thus the preservation or the good of the community becomes the *End* for which the individual members live and act. These actions are known as Varnásrama-Dharma (वर्णाश्रम-धर्म) and we must all perform these Dharmas or duties for the good of the Varnáśrama-community, of which we, as members, form parts. Its prescriptions (विधि) and its prohibitions (निषेध) are all binding upon us which each of us must obey. This is the generally accepted and usual view with regard to Varṇāsrama-Dharma. The individuals can have no other purpose in their life, but to perform these duties or Dharmas. Regarded in this way the individuals have only an instrumental value;—they are reduced to a machine somehow constructed to produce certain works beyond themselves, for the good of the community. They exist for these duties which they owe to the community of which they form quite an insignificant part; they have value only for these works. The community thus annexes the individuals to itself. The moral value of the individuals entirely depends upon their works—their service—their utility—to the community as a whole. Their moral criterion is judged only by some *outward result* which

they can produce. The individual is thus entirely resolved into his works. *If the outward works are regarded as* ends in themselves, such inevitable consequence is bound to follow.

But this cannot be the right view of the works. Sankara urges his objections against this view of the works thus—

He points out—

(I) Man cannot be made an object of command (नियोग-विषय) from outside. Man is not a *thing* to be passively moulded and shaped from outside.[1] He may be persuaded from the inner side, not controlled passively from the outside. Sankara has told us that—

ज्ञापकं हि शास्त्रं, न कारकं।

"Man chooses his *end* according to his own light. The Sástras only present before him the lower and higher lines of conduct, but do not compel him to select a particular course of action. The Sástras do not mould the man to their own ideas of good; they can only appeal to his inner self.[2]

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[1] *Vide* Ved. bhasya, 3.2.21 and 2.3.48. "ज्ञानन्तु प्रमाणजन्यं, यथाभूतविषयञ्च। न तन्नियोगशतेनापि कारयितुं शक्यते ; न च प्रतिषेधशतेनापि वारयितुं शक्यते। वस्तुतन्त्रं हि तत्। अतोऽपि नियोगाभावः" (3.2.21).

[2] "न तु शास्त्रं भृत्यानिव बलात् निवर्त्तयति नियोजयति वा।...पुरुषाः स्वयमेव यथारुचि साधनविशेषेषु प्रवर्त्तन्ते। यस्य यथावभासः, स तथारूपं पुरुषार्थं पश्यति तदनुरूपाणि साधनानि उपादित्सते" (बृ॰ भा॰, 2.1.20). Hence, how can you say that the rules prescribed by the community (through its Sástras) are the *ends* to which the man is entirely *subordinated?* As if the man is a *mere means* for the performance of these prescribed duties as his *end*.

(II) Again, Sankara points out that the ideas of good works (virtues) and bad works (vices) evolved within the community cannot be regarded as *ends in themselves.* For, he says, we find the ideas of virtue and vice in a particular epoch of society *differ* from the ideas of virtue and vice in the next or another epoch.[1] Again, "in the same epoch of the community different people select different works as ends." "What are looked upon as good works in a particular time and place are regarded otherwise in a different time and place."[2]

(III) It is also laid down in the Vedanta-bhasya that "in the progressively higher and higher worlds, the virtues and vices are being evolved in higher and higher forms up to *Brahma-loka* where they are perfected."[3]

[1] "उपासनेषु पूर्व्वस्मात् फलविशेषं उत्तरस्मिन् उपासने दर्शयति।...ब्रह्मतत्त्वे तु कथं फलविशेष: स्यात् ब्रह्मणोऽविशिष्टत्वात्" (वे०भा०, 4.3.16)। "विद्या-'साधन" स्ववीर्य्यविशेषात् स्वफले एव विद्यायां, *i.e*, virtues कञ्चित् अतिशयं आसञ्जयेत्।...... न विद्या-'फल' मुक्तौ।...न मुक्तावपि उत्कर्ष-निकर्षात्मकोऽतिशय: उपपद्यते।...... तस्यां चिराचिरोत्पत्तिरूपोऽतिशयो भवन् भवेत्" (वे०भा०, 3.4.52)।

[2] "तथाच यागाद्यनुष्ठायिनामेव विद्यासमाधिविशेषात् उत्तरेण पथा गमनं; केवलैरिष्टापूर्त्तदत्तसाधनै: दक्षिणेन पथा।...तत्रापि साधन-तारतम्यं श्रूयते" (वे० भा०, 1.1.4)।

"यस्मिन् देशे काले निमित्त च यो धर्म्मोऽनुष्ठीयते, स एव देशकालनिमित्तान्तरेषु अधर्म्मो भवति" (वे०, 3.1.25)।

[3] "मनुष्यत्वादारभ्य ब्रह्मान्तेषु देहवत्सु सुखतारतम्यं अनुश्रूयते, ततश्च तद्धेतो- र्धर्म्मस्यापि तारतम्यं गम्यते" (वे०, 1.1.4).

All these clearly show that virtues (and vices) are constantly evolving in higher and higher forms, and they are constantly growing with the progressively growing communities and the worlds. They cannot therefore be regarded as the *ultimate end of* life.

We can do no better than to repeat in this place the utterances of Sankara himself which embody his general views on the Varnâsrama-duties (वर्णाश्रम-धर्म्म). These remarks are important and we invite particular attention of our readers to them. These remarks bring the relation between the higher karmas (कर्म्म) and Jnâna (ज्ञान) very forcibly home to the mind; and the valuable bearing which the works have upon the self-realisation stands palpably revealed. Sankara writes—

> "These duties, respectively enjoined on the several castes, lead, when rightly performed, to swarga as their *natural result*......... But from the *operation of a new cause*, a higher result accrues; *viz.*, worshipping the Lord (ईश्वर) by performing his duty, man *attains perfection*, through his being qualified for the Jnâna-nisthâ." [1]

(Gitâ-bhâṣya, 18.44.45.)

> "Can this *perfection* be attained *directly* by the mere performance of one's duty? No;—how then? ....The perfection

[1] "एतेषां जातिविहितानां, कर्म्मणांसम्यगनुष्ठितानां स्वर्गप्राप्तिःफलं स्वभावतः। ···कारणान्तरात्तु इदं वक्ष्यमाणं फलं।···स्वकर्म्मानुष्ठानात् भगवद्विषये सति, कार्य्येन्द्रियाणां ज्ञाननिष्ठायोग्यतालक्षणां संसिद्धिं लभते।"

> accruing in worshipping the Lord through *one's own duties* qualifies the aspirant for the Jnana-nishthá which *culminates* in Moksha" (18-56).[1]

In this manner—

> "the works which are held as a *bondage* are converted into a *means* for *self-realisation.*"[2]

From these observations, we can now conclude that the works (Karma) when regarded *as ends*, as objects of desire—do prove a *bondage*, and they come into *conflict* with the Jnána (*i.e.*, the self-realisation). But taken *as a means*, and used as such, this conflict (विरोध) between them vanishes, and instead of offering opposition to Jnâna, the works prove a very useful ally—

> "तेषां निरभिसन्धीनां नित्यानां कर्म्मणां
> आरादुपकारकत्वात्, मोक्ष-साधनान्यपि
> कर्म्माणि भवन्तीति—न विरुध्यते (ब्र° भा°, 3.3.1)।"

The right, therefore, of Karma as separate and rival interests, as rival ends-in-themselves—must die; because Karma is *superseded and included in* one supreme interest or end of life. All works thus become *an element in* this one interest, and *organic* to this one central purpose.[3]

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[1] "किं स्वकर्म्मानुष्ठानत एव साक्षात् संसिद्धिः? न; कथं तर्हि?···स्वकर्म्मणा तमीश्वरं अभ्यर्च्य केवलं, ज्ञाननिष्ठायोग्यतालक्षणां सिद्धिं विन्दति मानवः।···ज्ञाननिष्ठा मोक्षफलावसाना" (गी°, 18.45).

[2] "ननु बन्धहेतूनां कर्म्मणां कथं मोक्षहेतुत्वं? उपासनाविशेषादित्याह 'तच्छृणु' इत्यादिना" (मधुसूदन's gloss).

[3] *Cf.* "ज्ञानस्यैव हि प्रापकं सत् कर्म्म प्रणाड्या मोक्षकारणं भवति। तस्मात् कर्म्मणोऽपि ज्ञानसंयुक्तस्य 'मोक्षकार्य्यों' पपत्तेः" (वे॰ भा॰, 4.1.16). And also *cf.* मुमुक्षुणा मोक्षप्रयोजनोद्देशेन कृतं—प्रतिबन्धकारणोपात्तदुरितक्षयहेतुत्वद्वारेण—ब्रह्मविद्यया सह 'एककार्य्यं' भवति" (वे॰ भा॰, 4.1.18).

All works now become the medium, the vehicle, the opportunity, for the realisation, in and through them, of the spiritual purpose—

"सर्व्वं कर्म्माखिलं पार्थ ज्ञाने परिसमाप्यते।" 4.33.

What then is the outstanding relation between Karma and Jnana? Higher Karmas point to the Transcendental goal.

8. The foregoing discussion has brought us to the conclusion that the life of higher works—of unselfish virtuous deeds, is not the ultimate goal of human life. Virtuous deeds possess value in that they purge our mind from selfish, self-seeking propensities which know no other higher end than gratification of the sense-pleasures, and thus to prepare it for the realisation which alone constitutes the ultimate goal of our life. One deed of virtue leads to another, which again leads to a still higher deed of virtue and so on perpetually. Sankara has pointed out that one work done is succeeded by another work which awaits you for its accomplishment [1] Moral or virtuous life is therefore a life of incessant endeavours for, and aspirations after, higher and higher virtues (पुण्योत्कर्ष), which cannot be *completed here* under mundane conditions. It is, thus, a life of constant progress; it is marked by incessant advancement from lower to higher deeds; such a life therefore cannot itself be an end but always points to the End, to a goal *beyond it*, where all its aspirations after higher and higher *goods* will reach their fulfilment and complete satisfaction. [2] Thus, the human

[1] बहूनि हि कर्म्माणि...तेषां कानिचित् लब्धावसराणि,...कानिचित्तु देशकाल-निमित्तप्रतीक्षाणि आसते, इत्यतस्तेषां अवशिष्टानां साम्प्रतेन उपभोगेन अपक्षासम्भवात्। ...कर्म्मशेषसद्भावसिद्धिश्च" (वे० भा०, 4.3.14).

[2] "यावत् यावत् पुण्योत्कर्षः, तावत् तावत् फलोत्कर्षप्राप्तिः। तस्मादुत्तमेन पुण्योत्कर्षेण मोक्षो भविष्यतीति आशङ्का स्यात्। सा निवर्त्तयितव्या। ज्ञान-

life of virtue will reach its perfection in a Transcendental goal which is the End towards which it is perpetually moving.

We have seen before that the performance of higher works and virtuous deeds is not an end in itself—is not the ultimate goal of human life. These virtuous deeds are needed for the *purification* of our mind from selfish propensities and tendencies and for constant preparation for the ultimate End. The higher works, in this way, prove to be an *indirect* cause for the attainment of Mukti or the final goal.[1] They cannot *directly* produce Mukti ; for, in that case, these works would themselves become the ultimate End. The readers will realise that Sankara's position in this respect remains logically unassailable. As the ultimate goal is transcendent, no mundane works or attributes can have power to directly produce it.[2] For, in that

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सहितस्य प्रकृष्टस्य कर्म्मण: एतावती गति: । व्याकृतनामरूपास्पदत्वात् कर्म्मणस्तत्-फलस्य च । न तु अकार्य्ये नित्ये...क्रियाकारक फलस्वभाववर्ज्जिते (transcendental goal) कर्म्मणो व्यापारोऽस्ति " (वृ० भा०, 3. 3. 1). *i.e.*, When the works are not ends in themselves, the End must be beyond them to which they lead ; moral ideal is not an absolute and self-sufficient ideal, but it is a progress to the supreme or perfect End.

[1] " विषयोपलब्धिलक्षणस्य विज्ञानस्य शुद्धि:—आहारशुद्धि: रागद्वेषमोहैरसंस्पृष्टं विषयविज्ञानमित्यर्थ: । तस्यां सत्यां अन्त:करणस्य सत्त्वस्य शुद्धि: भवति सत्त्वशुद्धौ विशेषेण प्रमोक्षणं यत एतत् ' उत्तरोत्तरं ' (progressively higher and higher) आहारशुद्धिमूलं, तस्मात् सा कर्त्तव्या " (छा० भा०, 7. 26. 2) । " पूर्व्वं पुण्यकृत्भूत्वा, पुनस्यक्तैषणा: परमात्म-तेजसि अभिनिवृत्त: " 4.4.9 (वृ०).

[2] There must therefore always be a *negative relation* between the mundane life (and its works) and its transcendental goal (towards which it moves and where it will be perfected). Yet it is the same life. This mundane life would become transformed into supra-mundane life.

" अस्य आत्मलोकस्य कर्म्मभि: असम्बन्धात्, कृत्स्नस्य च कर्म्मफलस्य विद्याफलेऽन्तर्भावात् " (वृ०, 4.4.2).

case, what is transcendent would become merely mundane; —the distinction between the two worlds or lives would disappear: the mundane works would themselves become the final end or goal: mere performance of higher works would give us perfection, and moral life, as it is known to us *here*, will cease. In the system of Sankara, ethical or moral progress points to a transcendental goal beyond, where the infinite aspirations after higher and higher deeds will reach final satisfaction and all our higher and higher desires and aspirations reach final fulfilment.[1] Thus, morality or ethics ends in religion, in the Vedanta system; it cannot be pursued for its own sake. Ethics, without religion for its fulfilment, is incomplete. Hence we find that the life's End cannot be realised ultimately, merely by the performance of civic duties or वर्णाश्रमधर्म [2] which we have already considered. All the life's *duties* reach their final fulfilment in a higher life than this, *i.e.*, in a transcendetal goal.—

[1] "अन्त्यमिदं प्रमाणं...नातःपरं किञ्चित् आकाङ्क्ष्यमस्ति। न तु आत्मैकत्वव्यतिरेकेण अवशिष्यमाणोऽन्योऽर्थोऽस्ति, यः आकाङ्क्ष्येत" (वेदा° भा० 2.1.14)।... "पुरुषार्थसमाप्तिबुद्ध्युत्पत्तिः···तथैव च विदुषां तुष्ट्यनुभवादिदर्शनात्" (4.3.14).

[2] In Vedanta-bhasya, 4. 3. 14, it is shown that mere performance of social duties (नित्यकर्म्म) is not sufficient. Life cannot be made perfect here by doing civic works. For, there is no completion of our works in this world. One work accomplished finds other works waiting for their accomplishment and so on. Such is the characteristic of the mundane life. All our duties can reach their final accomplishment only when the Transcendental goal, *i.e.*, Brahman is reached.

रागद्वेषमोहाना मन्यत्र आत्मज्ञानात् उच्छेदानुपपत्तेः, धर्म्माधर्म्मोच्छेदानुपपत्तिः।" Similar arguments occur in the Gita-bhasya also.

" न च अन्यथा कर्त्तव्यं परिसमाप्यते कस्यचित्।
भगवत्तत्त्वे विदिते यत् सर्वं ' कर्त्तव्यं,' तत्सर्वं
कृतं भवेत् । ".

(गी० भा०, 15.20).

" नहि सम्यक्‌दर्शने निष्पन्ने, 'यत्नान्तरं'
किञ्चित् शासितुं शक्यं । ... " आत्मविद:
कर्त्तव्याभावं दर्शयति...न किञ्चिदन्यत् 'कृत्य'
मवशिष्यते ।   (वेदा० भा०, 4.1.2).

A rapid survey of the position thus far reached.

Moral endeavour passes into a higher fulfilment and is completed in the Transcendental goal.

9. We are now in a position to enumerate some of the higher virtues, ethical and moral qualities, the cultivation of which has been deemed *useful* for the realisation of the self, through the purification of the mind. But before we proceed to do so, it may be found instructive to make a rapid survey of the entire position which we have tried to sketch in the preceding pages.

Man is, we have found, naturally a selfish and egoistic being, seeking the gratification of his own pleasure and depriving others of it; and all his activities are impelled by impulsive, self-seeking motives. As man is thus subject to sensibility, he commits sin and evil, under its influence. But man is *also a higher* being in whom God has been revealed, and a life of infinite Divine possibility is implanted in him, and this is the true man within him. Man is thus endowed with a discriminative knowledge of right and wrong.—

> " The ignorant, *natural* man regards desire (राग-द्वेष) as a friend at the time when he thirsts for objects. The mind, when allowed to be engrossed in the thoughts of various pleasurable objects, loses its discriminative knowledge of the self and the

> not-self and turns towards the sense-objects." But as man is a *rational* animal, he must bring his impulses under the law of the rational self which those desires envelop. In fact, he exerts himself *actively* with vigour to resist and control such impulses and consequently his action is in an *opposite* direction—
>
> " आत्मवश्यै र्विधेयात्मा विषयानिन्द्रियैश्चरन् " ।

Sankara further observes—

> " Man is man only so long as his *Antah-karana* is competent to discriminate between right and wrong. When he is unable to do so he is debarred from attaining the highest of human aspirations (परम-पुरुषार्थ). Hence at the very commencement, he must *rise above* the sway of राग-द्वेष—affection for and aversion to sense objects of pleasure and pain. He must restrain these natural tendencies *by means of their enemy, i.e.,* by actively cultivating the *virtues,* which are the enemies (प्रतिपक्ष) of love and aversion."

When the man, thus, cultivates these *ethical and moral virtues,* he is no longer subject to *his own nature* (प्रकृति). These virtues are the *means* (ज्ञान-साधन) for attaining the

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[1] " कार्य्याकार्य्यविषयविवेकायोग्यता अन्तःकरणस्य नाश उच्यते। तावदेव पुरुषो यावदन्तःकरणं तदीयं कार्य्याकार्य्यविषयविवेकयोग्यं, तदयोग्यत्वे नष्ट एव पुरुषो भवति...पुरुषार्थायोग्यो भवति " (गी० भा०, 2-63). " तत्रायं पुरुषकारस्य (human free-will) विषय उच्यते...या हि पुरुषस्य प्रकृतिः सा रागद्वेषपुरःसरैव स्वकार्य्ये पुरुषं प्रवर्तयति (man is passivo here)...यदा पुनः राग-द्वेषौ तत्प्रतिपक्षेण नियमयति, तदा शास्त्रदृष्टिरेव पुरुषो भवति न प्रकृतिवशः (actively free) तस्मात् तयोर्वशं नागच्छेत् " (गी० भा०, 3.34).

self-knowledge which is his highest end.[1] Natural राग-द्वेष creates the idea of *separateness* or exclusiveness; but as these are supplanted by the moral virtues, his *true unity* with his fellow-beings will gradually remove this idea of exclusiveness.[2] The term दैवी-सम्पत् (Daivi-Sampat) used in the Gita covers under it the virtues which man must cultivate in the place of the natural selfish impulses for which the term आसुरी-सम्पत् (Âsurî-Sampat) has been used.[3] These virtues have been described as—

> "the virtues leading to *liberation* from Samsára."

Is it not, we ask, wrong, in the face of all these remarks of Sankara, to suppose—as has been supposed by many—that the Vedanta "insists upon the *emptying* of the human mind, making it a barren desert?" Is it not wrong to hold that "no moral virtues are taught in the Vedanta" and that "all actions are treated as a bondage and therefore liberation from this bondage is the goal or aim of the Vedanta?"

From what has been stated above, the readers must have seen that such remarks as these[4] do the greatest injustice to Sankara's own views and his writings.

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[1] These are called as धर्म्मपूग (गी॰ भा॰, 12.13) and they are *means* of the highest realisation.

"ज्ञान-साधनगणं, यस्मिन् सति ज्ञेयविज्ञाने योग्यो भवति। ज्ञान-साधनत्वात् ज्ञानशब्दवाच्य' (गी॰ भा॰, 13.7).

"ज्ञान-निमित्तत्वात् ज्ञानमुच्यते" (गी॰ भा॰, 13-12).

[2] "यथा मम सुखमिष्ट' तथा सर्व्वप्राणिनां। यथ दुःखं मम प्रतिकूलमनिष्ट' तथा सर्व्वप्राणिनां।...सुखदुःखे...तुल्यतया सर्व्वभूतेषु समं पश्यति, न कस्यचित् प्रतिकूल माचरति" (गी॰ भा॰, 6.32).

[3] "दैवी सम्पत् विमोक्षाय, निवन्धायासुरी मता" (गी॰ 16-5).

"दैव्याः आदानाय, इतरयोः, परिवर्ज्जनाय" गी॰ भा॰, 16-1).

[4] For other similar remarks, *vide* p. 178 of this book where they are quoted.

Nothing short of a Transcendental good satisfies man.

Man cannot find final satisfaction of his self in any earthly and temporal order of things. He seeks in Brahman the fulfilment of the good he is trying to realise in his own life. The supreme good (प्रियतम)—which is working and revealing itself in the worldly objects,—of which they are but imperfect manifestations—is the *highest* end of human pursuits. The higher and lower objects are therefore only the proximate ends and these can be made to be embraced and included in the supreme End. But as Brahman *transcends* the temporal order of things, man must not rest satisfied with these lesser ends, but must move through them for a *final* realisation of the supreme good [1]—

> " अयमात्मा सर्व्वलौकिक-प्रियेभ्यः
> प्रियतमो भवति। तस्मात् तल्लाभे
> महान् यत्न आस्थेयः।" 1.4.8.

The self-realisation, therefore, is the life's highest End. This End, says Sankara, which has been deliberately chosen, must be *steadily kept in view* and resolutely maintained against all other partial interests and ends.[2] For, it is only when one perceives the End of knowledge that one will endeavour to *cultivate the attributes* which are the *means* of attaining that knowledge.[3] The inner purity of the mind consists of the removal from it of

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[1] आत्मानात्मप्रिययोः, अन्यतरप्रहानेन इतरप्रियोपादानप्राप्तौ, आत्मप्रियोपादानेन, इतरहानं क्रियते" (बृ० भा०, 1.4.8).

[2] आत्मतत्त्वमेव ज्ञेयं अनादृत्य अन्यत्। अन्यत् लौकिकं प्रियमपि अप्रियमेवेति निश्चित्य, आत्मैव प्रियो नान्योऽस्तीति प्रतिपद्यते।...योहि लोके निरतिशयप्रियो भवति, सर्व्वप्रयत्नेन लब्धव्यो भवति.........कर्त्तव्यताप्राप्तमपि अन्यप्रियलाभे यत्नमुज्झित्वा" (बृ० भा०, 1.4.8).

[3] "आत्मविषयं ज्ञानं...तस्मिन् नित्यभावः। अमानित्वादीनां ज्ञान-साधनानां भावनापरिपाकनिमित्तं तत्त्वज्ञानं; तस्य अर्थो मोक्षः संसारोपरमः। तत्त्वज्ञानफलालोचने हि तत्साधनानुष्ठाने प्रवृत्तिः स्यात्" (गी० भा०, 13. 11).

the stain of attachment and other passions (राग-द्वेषादि), by cultivating the ideas that are inimical to them.[1] "These attributes or moral virtues are conducive to knowledge. What are *opposed* to these, *viz.*, pride, hypocrisy, ignorance, cruelty, insincerity, impatience—should be shunned as tending to *bondage and samsâra*."[2]

A glance at these 'moral virtues' as elaborated and explained by Sankara in his commentaries on the Gitá and the Upanishads will convince one of their *social or civic character*, and their inestimable value will be found in our daily and hourly dealings with our fellow-beings. If one fails or neglects to cultivate these virtues, the purification of the mind or inner organ which is naturally vitiated by impure thoughts and impulsive tendencies would be hindered and the possibility of self-expansion and self-realisation would be debarred.

Ethical virtues and altruistic deeds—ennumerated in four main groups:

10. We now proceed to give below a list of these virtues (धर्म-पूग) and must rest content with referring our readers to the elaborate explanation of each of the factors constituting this list, as given in the commentaries of Sankara.

The ethical or moral virtues to be cultivated are—

[1] "अन्तश्च मनसः 'प्रतिपक्षभावनया' (अमानित्व-मैत्रीकरुणादीनां भावनया—(मधु० टीका) रागादिमलापनयनं" " (गी० भा०, 13.7)। "एतैः हि संस्कृतस्य सत्त्वशुद्धिद्वारा तत्त्वज्ञानोत्पत्तिः दृष्टा" (केन० भा०, 4.8)।

[2] "एतत् अमानित्वादि···ज्ञानमिति प्रोक्तं ज्ञानार्थत्वात्, ज्ञाननिमित्तत्वात्। अज्ञानं—यथोक्तादन्यथा विपर्ययेण। मानित्वं, दम्भित्वं, हिंसा, अक्षान्ति, अनार्जवं इत्यादि 'अज्ञानं' विज्ञेयं, परिहरणाय संसारप्रवृत्तिकारणत्वात्" (गी०भा०, 13.11)।

(*a*) The *first group* of moral virtues described by *Patanjali* in his *Yoga-philosophy* is this—

मैत्री-करुणा-मुदितोपेक्षाणां
सुख-दुःख-पुण्यापुण्यविषयाणां
भावनातश्चित्त-प्रसादनं" ।

Before we proceed to explain this group, we should like to invite our readers' attention to the remarks made by Madhusūdana when elaborating the commentaries of Sankara on the moral virtues enumerated in the Gitá. Madhusūdana observes to the effect that this group of moral virtues together with the *two other* groups given in the Gitá—form three groups and all these must be cultivated. These virtues properly cultivated and developed would remove and supplant [1] the natural evil desires (राग-द्वेषादि) and gradually create the healthy idea of our unity with our fellow-beings.

Now, to explain the *first group* stated above—

"मैत्री or sympathy is the identity of feeling with the object of the emotion which one experiences on seeing happiness or misery. If we see one happy, our feeling must be identical. Compassion (करुणा) is the same feeling for misery of whatever kind. It implies, besides the emotion, *action*, on

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[1] *Cf.* here मधुसूदन's observations—"सा च वासना द्विविधा—मलिना, शुद्धा च । शुद्धा—दैवी सम्पत् । मलिना—आसुरी सम्पत् । तासां वासनानां परित्यागो नाम—तद्विरुद्ध-मैत्र्यादि-वासनोत्पादनं." Sankara himself also expresses the same idea "यदा पुनः रागद्वेषौ तत्प्रतिपक्षेण नियमयति, तदा...न प्रकृतिवशः पुरुषः—इति पुरुषकारस्य विषय उच्यते" (गी° भा°, 3.34).

[2] "मैत्री-करुणा-मुदितो पेक्षाणामिति—मैत्र्यादिचतुष्टयस्य उपलक्षणं । 'अभयं सत्त्वसंशुद्धि' रित्यादीनां, 'अमानित्वादीनाञ्च' अन्येषां सर्व्वेषामेवैषां शुभवासना-रूपत्वेन, मलिनवासनानिवर्त्तकत्वात्" ।

the part of him who feels the emotion, as lies in his power. Complacency (मुदिता) is joy at the sight of virtue and the sacrifices incidental to its practice. As to vice which enters so largely in the composition of the human society, the least that one should do is entire indifference (उपेक्षा). If he can help to cure the one and remove the other, it is sacrifice of a superior kind; but generally indifference is the best attitude to maintain."[1]

(*b*) The *second group* of moral virtues is given and explained in Gitá-bhásya 13.7-11—

Absence of self-esteem and self-assertion; doing no injury to any living being, and not being affected when others have done any injury; inner purity[2] consisting in the removal from the mind of the stain of attachment and other passions; direction, to the right path, of the body and its organs which are naturally attracted in all directions; thinking of what evil there is in birth, age, disease and death; non-attachment to things which may form object of attachment; constant

[1] This explanation is mainly taken from the "Yoga-Sutra" of Patanjali edited by Manilal Nabhubhai Dvivedi.

[2] Truthfulness (सत्यं) in conduct, speech and mind—is a most important virtue stated in बृह०, छा०, केन० and other Upanishads. "सत्यमिति अमायिता अकौटिल्यं वाङ्मनः-कायानां।" "तेषु हि आश्रयति विद्या ये अमायाविनः, नासुरप्रकृतिषु मायाविषु...सत्यस्य साधनातिशयज्ञापनार्थं" (केन० भाष्य, 4.8)। "कुहक-माया-शाठ्याऽहङ्कार-दम्भानृत-वर्जिताः"—मु० भा०, 3.1.6.

equanimity consisting in not being jubilant over attaining the desirable and in not chafing on attaining the undesirable; the society of disciplined men, because such society is an aid to self-realisation and distaste for society of ordinary undisciplined men." [1]

(c) The *Third group* is embodied in Gitâ-bhâsya, 16.1.3—

"Abandonment of deception, dissimulation, falsehood and the like, in all our practical transactions; reflection and recognition of the true nature of things (वस्तुस्वरूप)[2]; concentration through the subjugation of the senses; constant steadiness of our attitude; abstaining from injury to sentient beings; speaking of things as they are without giving utterance to what is unpleasant or false; suppression of anger arising when reviled or beaten; compassion to those in suffering; absence of fickleness." [3]

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[1] "अमानित्वमदम्भित्वमहिंसा क्षान्तिरार्ज्जवं ।
आचार्य्योपासनं शौचं स्थैर्य्यमात्मविनिग्रहः ॥
इन्द्रियार्थेषु वैराग्यमनहङ्कार एव च ।
जन्ममृत्युजराव्याधि दुःख-दोषानुदर्शनं ॥
असक्तिरनभिष्वङ्गः पुत्रदारगृहादिषु ।
नित्यञ्च समचित्तत्वमिष्टानिष्टोपपत्तिषु ॥
विविक्तदेशसेवित्वमरतिर्जनसंसदि ॥—इत्यादि ।

N. B.—"संस्कारवतां विनीतानां संसत्, तस्या ज्ञानोपकारकत्वात्"।

[2] This is विचार. *Vide* p. 182, note.

[3] अभयं सत्त्वसंशुद्धिर्ज्ञानयोग व्यवस्थितिः ।
दानं दमश्च यज्ञश्च स्वाध्यायस्तप आर्ज्जवं ॥
अहिंसा सत्यमक्रोध स्त्यागःशान्तिरपैशुनं ।
दया भूतेष्वलोलत्वं मार्दवं ह्रीरचापलं ॥—इत्यादि ।

(*d*) It has been laid down as a general principle that those characteristics in the disposition and conduct, which have grown habitual and natural with a Mukta, *i.e.*, a man who has already realised the ultimate good are to be considered as the *Sádhanas* for a *Mumukshu, i.e.*, an aspirant after self-realisation. With diligence and good care these are to be constantly cultivated *as virtues* by him.[1]

(*e*) The surrender of the self to the supreme self (*i.e.*, Brahman) and meditation on His Swarūpa. A man cannot hope to be Mukta, unless Brahman's grace falls upon

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Cf. "सर्व्वभूतेषु शत्रुभावरहित: आत्मनोऽत्यन्तापकार-प्रवृत्तेष्वपि"—गी° भा°, 11.55.

N.B.—All these virtues have been mentioned in all the *Upanishad-bhasyas* also.

Cf.—"एवमाद्यन्यदपि ज्ञानोत्पत्तेरुपकारकं—"अमानित्वमदम्भित्व'मित्यादि... ...तेषु हि सत्सु ब्रह्मविद्या प्रवर्त्तते" (केन° भा°, 4.8).

[1] "सन्न्यासिनां परमार्थज्ञाननिष्ठानां धर्म्मजातं।......इदं धर्म्यामृतं 'मुमुक्षुणा' यत्नतोऽनुष्ठेयं विष्णो: परमं पदं विजिगमिषुणा" (गी° भा°, 12.20)। "ज्ञानसाधनगण ममानित्वादिलक्षणं—यस्मिन् सति ज्ञेयविज्ञाने योग्योभवति; यत्पर: सन्न्यासी ज्ञाननिष्ठ: उच्यते" (13.6)। गुणातीत:...एतदन्तं यावत् यत्नसाध्यं तावत् सन्न्यासिन: अनुष्ठेयं गुणातीतत्वसाधनं मुमुक्षो:. Nílakantha explains this idea thus— "मुक्तलक्षणानि एव मुमुक्षो: साधनत्वेन विधत्ते." (*Vide* Nílakantha's notes on 12-20.) Some of the habitual characteristics of a *Mukta* are given in Gita, ch. 12.13-19—

"अद्वेष्टा सर्व्वभूतानां, मैत्र:, करुण एव च। निर्म्ममो निरहङ्कार: समदु:खसुख: क्षमी॥ यस्मान्नोद्विजते लोको लोकात् नोद्विजते च य:। सम: शत्रौ च मित्रे च तथा मानापमानयो:"—इत्यादि।

him, unless He helps him graciously in the task" [1]—

"तदनुग्रहहेतुकेनैव विज्ञानेन मोक्षसिद्धिर्भवति" (वे° भा°, 2.3.41).

In connection with the cultivation of these ethical virtues, Sankara has remarked at one place that these virtues cannot be developed in a day or two, but it requires time to gradually make them more and more matured (परिपाक), developed and perfected. So long as these are not perfected, the self-realisation would remain incomplete. It is necessary therefore to make life-long endeavours towards the maturity and perfection of these virtues, so that man may gain a thorough and perfect mastery over the impulsive self (प्रतिपक्षहीनस्य), such that his true self may be realised in it.[2]

(*f*) For the completion of the list on the moral virtues, we must mention here the fact that the list includes in it the performance of certain ritual works (यज्ञ)—*Yajnas*—which, when done with a *higher motive* for the final realisation, certainly help the *purification* (सत्त्व-शुद्धि) of the mind which forms the object of all other higher works or virtues.

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[1] "विद्यमानमपि जीवस्य ज्ञानैश्वर्यं तिरोहितमविद्याव्यवधानात्। तत्पुनस्तिरोहितं सत्, परमेश्वरमभिध्यायतो यतमानस्य......ईश्वरप्रसादात् संसिद्धस्य कस्यचिदेव आविर्भवति" (वे° भा°, 3.2.5)। "तमेव ईश्वरं आश्रयं गच्छ सर्वात्मना। तत्-प्रसादात् ईश्वरानुग्रहात्......विद्यो परमं पदमवाप्स्यसि" (गी° भा°, 18.62)। "तेषां कथं श्रेयः स्यादिति दयाहेतोरहं...अन्तःकरणाशये स्थितः सन्, ज्ञानदीपेन...भक्तिप्रसादस्नेहाभिषिक्तेन...तमो नाशयामि" (गी° भा°, 10.11)। "संराधनञ्च—भक्ति-ध्यान-प्रणिधानाद्यनुष्ठानं" (वे° भा°, 3.2.24)।

[2] "ज्ञानस्य स्वात्मोत्पत्तिपरिपाकहेतुयुक्तस्य, प्रतिपक्षविहीनस्य, यदात्मानुभवनिश्चयावसानत्वं तस्य—ज्ञानोत्पत्तिपरिपाकहेतुं शङ्करादिकारणं बुद्धिविशुद्ध्यादि अमानित्वादि च अपेक्ष्य जनितस्य...आत्मानुभवनिश्चय-रूपेण यदवस्थानं सा परा 'ज्ञाननिष्ठा' (*i.e.*, ज्ञानावस्थितलक्षणा) इत्युच्यते" (गी° भा°, 18.55)।

The views of Sankara on the *Yajnas* (यज्ञ) will appear in the following paragraphs where we have gathered together his opinions, for the benefit of our readers:—

> Certain portions of those Upanishads which are regarded as most reliable and ancient are found to contain discussions about the manner in which *Yajnas* are to be performed. This shows that कर्म्मकाण्ड is not really antagonistic to the ज्ञानकाण्ड as some scholars hold. The former has an intimate relation to the latter, and far from being hostile it forms a necessary part of the latter. There is no real conflict between the two sections of the Veda. The purpose of the rituals is to *purify* the mind—exclusively and deeply engrossed in the attachment for the pleasure-giving sensible objects,[1] so as to prepare it for the dawn of perfect knowledge. The actions which are done from a lower motive for the enjoyment of pleasure, and which have only selfish and self-seeking ends—have been condemned as *Sakáma*. Those who are naturally selfish and are deeply absorbed in the sensual pleasures and worldly objects, cannot at once be raised to the contemplation of an ideal which is exalted beyond all sensual conditions. Their minds are to be gradually worked upon by the gradual

[1] अज्ञानां जिजीविषूणां ज्ञाननिष्ठाऽसम्भवे—'कुर्व्वन्नेवेह कर्म्माणीत्यादि कर्म्म-निष्ठा उक्ता द्वितीयो वेदार्थः'' (ईशा भा°, 8)।

change of the ideal to which they are attached.[1]

Three different ideals for three different classes of people according to three distinct types of culture received by them have been laid down side by side in the Rig-Veda[2]; and these three types of people are to be found, we believe, in every stage of society.—

(*a*) Those who travelled on the lowest plane and whose mind could not and did not receive any spiritual culture, and who had desires and longings for self-seeking pleasures, worshipped the gods; and to these, the gods appeared endowed with sensible attributes and each seemed to have a distinct existence of its own and each capable of fulfilling the desires of the devotees.

(*b*) But to the people of higher types, these gods appeared not as self-existing and independent entities, but only manifestations of *one Power* working within them

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[1] "मन्दबुद्धीनां दिग्देशादिभेदवद् वस्त्विति एवं भाविता बुद्धिः न शक्यते सहसा परमार्थविषया कर्त्तुं इति। अनधिगम्य च ब्रह्म न पुरुषार्थसिद्धिरिति। अनेकजन्म-विषयसेवाभ्यासजनिता विषय-विषया तृष्णा न सहसा निवर्त्तयितुं शक्यते। सोपानारोहणवत् स्थूलादारभ्य सूक्ष्मं सूक्ष्मतरञ्च बुद्धिविषयञ्च ज्ञापयित्वा, तदतिरिक्ते स्वाराज्ये ऽभिषेक्ष्यामीति नामादीनि निर्दिदिक्षति"—इत्यादि (छा° भा°, 8.1.1; 7.1.1).

Cf. "न हि अग्निहोत्रादीन्येव कर्म्माणि। ब्रह्मचर्य्यं, तपः, सत्यवदनं, शमो, दमो ऽहिंसा—इत्येवमादीन्यपि 'कर्म्माणि' विद्योत्पत्तौ साधकतमानि भवन्ति। ध्यानधारणा-दिलक्षणानि च वक्ष्यति"—तै° भा°, शिक्षावल्ली, 1.11.

[2] *Vide* our Introduction appended to the third Volume of our work, "Upanishader Upadeśa" in which various arguments from the Rig-Veda have been collected and discussed in support of this position.

and realising its purpose in and through these manifestations. For these, the Veda has enjoined "conjunction of work with knowledge" (ज्ञानकर्म-समुच्चय).

(*c*) But there are still higher types of people to whom, owing to the superior spiritual culture they received through good works done in the previous states of existence, the Veda holds out the ideal of Brahman —both immanent and transcendent—and for these, no ritual duties were thought useful and necessary, but only the exercise and repetition of contemplation, altruistic thoughts and works, cultivation of moral virtues ('अमानित्वादि') were deemed as the only *means* for the attainment of this ideal. कर्मकाण्ड has, thus, its own efficacy and purpose and is not in any way conflicting and antagonistic to the ज्ञानकाण्ड. We for these reasons find it difficult to subscribe to the view that at the Vedic period the Vedic people could not rise above the idea of a duality and from the planes of selfish ends.[1]

Such, in brief, is the view of Sankara on the Karmakánda of the Veda and in this manner he has attempted a reconciliation of the Karma section with Jnána section of the Veda—

[1] We cannot also agree with the view that the Vedic people—one and all without exception—could not rise to the grasp of the highest unity ब्रह्म—and that all of them worshipped as gods the striking phenomena of nature which by their grand and impressive features captured their imagination. This view goes against the conclusion arrived at by Sankaracharyya and others.

"एवं कर्म्मकाण्डेनास्य एकवाक्यतावगतिः"

(बृ० भा०, 4.4.22)।[1]

11. Before we take leave of the subject under discussion, we must try to estimate the real purport of certain passages found scattered in the Bhâsyas of Sankara which may, possibly, create some confusion in the mind of the readers.

Certain anomalous passages explained, and cleared up.

(i) Let us first consider such passages in which "abandonment of *all* kinds of works" has been taught.[2] Such passages, to all outward appearances, demand, no doubt, from all, the renouncement of all sorts of works including even the disinterested higher nitya-karmas. But when these passages are considered, not isolating them from, but taking and reading them in connection with, the contexts in which they occur, and in the light of Sankara's general position on the Karmas which we have tried to exhibit in this chapter,—the right import and true solution of these passages cannot but stand revealed before the readers in their own light.

When an aspirant has already attained the self-knowledge, has reached the final goal, no further need arises for him to

[1] *Cf.* "काम्यवर्ज्जितं नित्यं कर्म्मजातं सर्व्वमात्मज्ञानोत्पत्तिद्वारेण मोक्षसाधनत्वं प्रतिपद्यते"।

[2] Compare such passages as—"सर्व्वकर्म्मसन्न्यासः कर्त्तव्यः," etc., etc.

perform any kind of works—lower or higher. Sankara suggests this truth in the line—

"उत्पन्नात्मविद्यस्य तु अनारम्भः निरर्थकत्वात्"—

(केन-वा-भा०, 1.1)।

For, when the man has attained the Transcendental goal (ब्रह्मात्मभाव:). all his duties have reached their fulfilment. All contrast between lower and higher works, all succession of time-order, all his higher and higher endeavours and aspirations have ceased for him to have any further meaning.[1] "For him who has realised the Âtmá, no further work remains to be done."—

"न चैवमात्मान मनुभवतः किञ्चिदन्यत् कृत्यं अवशिष्यते"।

(वे० भा०, 4.1.2)।

We find therefore that the "abandonment of works" mentioned in those passages is meant only for the 'Âtma-vid,' *i.e.*, for those who have already realised the final End, which is the *completion* of all desire.

(*ii*) We now come to consider the nature of some other passages. There are some passages in the Bhásyas, which speak of the higher Nitya-karma in terms no better than the Sakáma impulsive activities. Like our selfish works the nitya-karmas are sometimes described as

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[1] "न च तस्यामपि उत्कर्ष-निकर्षात्मकोऽतिशय उपपद्यते—उत्कृष्टैव हि विद्या भवति" (वे० भा०, 3.4.52)।

the "product of *avidyá*, and of love and hatred (राग-द्वेष)." Take such passages as—

"यद्यपि शास्त्रावगतं नित्यं कर्म्म, तथापि
अविद्यावत एव भवति"—

(गी० भा०, 18.66)

i.e., the Nitya-karmas are done by him who is influenced by passions and other lower tendencies.[1]

For the solution of this apparent difficulty, we must call our reader's attention to the fact that our outward actions are always the outcome of our inner motives, and intentions;—our outward works entirely depend upon our inner motives, of which they are the expressions. It follows therefore that our selfish activities may, by changing our inner motives, be converted into disinterested actions; and our un-selfish works might change their disinterested character, if they are done with selfish ends in view. Sankara's idea is—'even the virtuous deeds (धर्म्मकर्म्मs) may be done with a lower motive—with a desire to gain some mundane end, such as social position, prosperity, higher regions

[1] *Cf.* विषयप्राप्तिनिमित्तं कामाः पुरुषान् नियोजयन्ति तेषु तेषु विषयेषु...तैः धर्म्माधर्म्मप्रवृत्तिहेतुभिः विषयेच्छारूपैः—इत्यादि (मु° भा°, 3.2.2). Also *cf.* such passage—"काम-क्रोधादिपूर्व्वक-पुण्यापुण्यकारिता......संसारस्य कारणं" (बृ°भा°, 4.4.5). "लोक-त्रयसाधनं...मानुषं वित्तं कर्म्मरूपं पितृलोकप्राप्तिसाधनं विद्याख्यं दैवं वित्तं देवलोकप्राप्तिसाधनं......अविद्याकामवत एव सर्व्वाणि कर्म्माणि" (गी°, 2.11)।

or Devatâs, and the like; and when so performed, the virtuous deeds become *ends* in themselves, not *means*. His idea therefore is that the value must be placed not upon the outward deeds—not even upon virtuous deeds—but upon the inner intention.[1]

Man has always an infinite *possibility* either for good, or for evil; man's nature cannot be *exhaustively* expressed in his past and present achievements. Man is always *more* than what he actually is. If he allows himself to be *passively* guided by the impulses (अविद्याध्यस्त), his actions are selfish. If he keeps himself alive to his *rational* nature, he is unselfish.

Thus the apparent difficulty is solved.

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[1] "दृष्टा च काम्याग्निहोत्रादौ कामोपमर्द्देन काम्याग्निहोत्रहानिः। तथा मतिपूर्व्वकामतिपूर्व्वकादीनां कर्म्मणां कार्य्यविशेषस्य आरम्भकत्वं दृष्टं। तथेहापि...... कर्म्माणि विदुषोऽकर्म्म सम्पद्यन्ते" (गी° भा°, 4.24)। "अभ्युदयार्थोऽपि प्रवृत्तिलक्षणो धर्म्मः देवादिस्थानप्राप्तिहेतुरपि सन्, ईश्वरार्पणबुद्ध्यानुष्ठीयमानः, सत्त्वशुद्धये भवति फलाभिसन्धिवर्ज्जितः" (गीता°, उपोद्घात)। "कामप्रयुक्तो हि पुरुषः पुण्यापुण्यकर्म्मणी उपचिनोति; उपचितेऽपि पुण्यापुण्ये कर्म्मणी कामशून्ये फलारम्भके न भवतः" (बृ° भा°, 4.4.5)।

"साभिसन्धीनां नित्यानां कर्म्मणां ब्रह्मत्वादीनि (लोकप्राप्ति) फलानि। येषां पुनः नित्यानि निरभिसन्धीनि, तेषां उपकारकत्वात् मोक्षसाधनान्यपि कर्म्माणि भवन्तीति न विरुध्यते" (बृ° भा°, 3.3.1)।

i.e., Even these higher works when done for gaining a higher world or for gaining identity with the *Devatás*, still involve *avidya* since they are done for *pleasure*. But when these are done to gain final realisation (through purification of self), they are done with higher motives.

"देवयाज्यात्मयाजिनोः, आत्मयाजिनो विशेषश्रवणात्—'देवयाजिनः श्रेयान् आत्मयाजी'—

आत्मयाजी आत्मसंस्कारार्थं नित्यानि कर्म्माणि करोति (3.3.1)।

Final Emancipation (मुक्ति).

12. We ought to look upon the world of emergent nâma-rūpas *from the standpoint of unity*, always in connection with the underlying Brahman. In that case, no difference, no भेद, will appear to us. All the so-called differences would appear as higher and higher *revelations* of that underlying unity.

But such is the perversity of the human intellect that we ignore the underlying unity and identify it with the emergent nâma-rūpas. And the emergent differences alone become the only standpoint to us from which we look upon the world. Everything appears to be composed of parts (अवयव) and one part lying outside another part and one part being distinct and different from another part—

स्वाभाविक्या अविद्यया...नाम-रूपोपाधि-
दृष्टिरेव भवति स्वाभाविकी "—

This false view of the world is entirely due to our *avidyá*, our intellectual error.[1] It is our intellect which entirely *identifies* the underlying unity with the emergent differences and thus imagines *parts* in the unity.[2] Really there can be no such identity. The underlying Brahman

[1] In तै° भा° Sankara has shown that अविद्या is not धर्म्म or property of the self. It is the property of our intellect, understanding (तै°, 2.8) (In° ; °, S. calls it चित्तकल्पना and इन्द्रिय-प्रज्ञा).

[2] As there is always an unchanging ground in which the changing विकारs are grounded (1.3.1., वे° भा°), we are liable to take these as parts of the ground of which it is composed. It is विकल्पना, बुद्धिदोष. We must keep the ground *apart* from the विकारs.

There are people who from the use of the term चित्तकल्पना conclude that the विकारs are all our mental phantasm and these are unreal. But that is not the true sense.

retains its unity, maintains its own nature, in these emerging diversities of nâma-rupa. Sankara has pointed out—

> " न हि बुद्धिपरिकल्पितेन अवयवेन
> परमार्थतः सावयवं वस्तु भवति "—[1]

i.e., our intellect has no power to effect any actual change in the object. The unity does not change to multiplicity, simply because our intellect imagines parts (अवयव) in it, identifies the two.

" *Can the mirage actually wet the surface of the desert?* "

We must make earnest effort to change our intellectual outlook. We must try to look upon the world from the standpoint of the unity, from the standpoint of Brahman. Sankara says—

> " There can be no object—subtle or gross—past or present—distant or near—which can remain *separated* from the underlying Brahman—either in space or in time."

> " न हि आत्मनोऽन्यत्...तत्-प्रविभक्तदेशकालं
> सूक्ष्मं व्यवहितं भूतं भविष्यद्वा वस्तु विद्यते "—
> (तै° भा°, २।६) ।

No *difference* will appear again to our changed outlook now, as it used to appear before. Everything—all differences of nâma-rūpa will now appear as revelations of Brahman's nature, as higher and higher manifestations of the underlying unity which is realising itself in them. The diversities of nâma-rūpa being only the manifestations of

[1] अविद्यापरिकल्पितेन दोषेण तद्विषयं पारमार्थिकं वस्तु न दूष्यति। मरीच्यम्भसा उषरदेशः न पङ्कीक्रियते। ज्ञेयेन ज्ञातुः संसर्गानुपपत्तेः। न च मिथ्याज्ञानं परमार्थवस्तु दूषयितुं समर्थं (गी° भा°, १३।२)। बुद्धिपरिकल्पितेभ्यः सदवयवेभ्यः विकारसंस्थानोपपत्तेः...एकमेवाद्वितीयं परमार्थतः 'इदं'-बुद्धिकालेऽपि " (छा° भा°, ६।२।२)।

Brahman's nature, how can these have a nature of their own which can be called *different* from the nature of Brahman? It is the self-same nature of Brahman which is present before us now in the form of diverse nâma-rūpas. Hence, this world of nâma-rūpas cannot be looked upon as something *different* from the nature of Brahman. They are merely the *expressions* of the nature of Brahman, which we used to call erroneously as *this* or *that* thing,[1] which we so long used to regard as *different* from Brahman. And this idea of separateness (भेदबुद्धि—अन्यत्व-बोध) is due to the deep-rooted and inveterate error of our intellect (अविद्या). This erroneous idea, says Sankara, stands between our self and Mukti or the final realisation. All our endeavours are to be directed to the extirpation of this illusion born of the habits of our thought.[2] All phenomenal objects, all activities are to be looked upon as *means, instruments* (ब्रह्मदर्शनोपायत्वेनैव) for the realisation of the Divine Purpose

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[1] यथा सतो 'ऽन्यद्वस्त्वन्तर' परिकल्प्य पुनस्तस्यैव प्रागुत्पत्तेः प्रध्वंसाच्च ऊर्ध्व असत्त्वं ब्रुवते तार्किकाः ; न तथा अस्माभिः सतोऽन्यद्वस्तु परिकल्प्यते। सदेव तु सर्व्वमभिधानं, अभिधीयते च यदन्यबुद्धा। यथा रज्जुरेव सर्पबुद्धा सर्प इत्यभिधीयते ; यथा वा पिण्ड-घटादि मृदोऽन्यबुद्धा पिण्ड-घटादिशब्देन अभिधीयते" (छा° भा°, ६।२।२)।

[2] (*a*) "अन्यत्व-दर्शनापवादाश्च विद्याविषये सहस्रशः श्रूयन्ते"। (*b*) "विद्याऽविद्याकार्य्यं—सर्व्वात्मभावः, परिच्छिन्नात्मभावश्च—आत्मनः 'अन्यद्वस्त्वन्तरं' प्रत्युपस्थापयति अविद्या" (बृ°. 4.3.20)। (*c*) यदन्यग्रहणं......तदविद्याकृतं" (तै°. 2.8)। (*d*) "न हि विदुषो 'अन्य' इत्यन्तरमस्ति भिन्नं (तै°, 2.9)। अविद्याकृतं भूतमात्रोपाधिसंसर्गरूपं अन्यत्वावभासं तिरस्कृत्य।...परमात्मस्वरूपात् अन्यदिव प्रत्यवभासमानं" (बृ°, 5.1.1)। (*e*) "अन्यत्वापोहेन अतद्धर्म्माध्यारोपेण, संसारोपरमः कर्त्तव्यः" बृ°, 4.4.20। (*f*) "इमानि भूतानि मत्तोऽन्यानि, कामाः सर्व्वे मत्तोऽन्ये ...तत्तु न इन्द्रस्य हितं न तु राज्ञो राज्यमिवत् अन्यत्वेन" (छा°, 8.12.1)। (*g*) नित्योहि आत्मभावः...अतद्विषय (अन्य इव) इव प्रत्यवभासते...'अन्यात्म' भावनिवृत्तौ... आत्मभावः स्वाभाविकः भवति—बृ°, 4.4.20। (*h*) 'न आत्मनोऽन्यत् कामयितव्यं वस्त्वन्तरम्—बृ°, 4.4.6। (*i*) अविद्यया 'अन्यत्वेन' प्रत्युपस्थापितमासीत् ; तत् एतस्मिन् काले एकीभूतं" (बृ°, 4.3.23)। (*j*) 'अन्यस्य—अविद्याकृतत्वे, विद्यया अवस्तुत्वदर्शनोपपत्तिः—(तै° भा°, 2.8)।

working in them. Sankara calls this—Sarvâtma-bháva (सर्व्वात्मभाव). This idea of सर्व्वात्मभाव, *i.e.*, the idea of taking all emergent nâma-rūpas, all emergent activities, as higher and higher *expressions* of the Divine purpose is to substitute the former false idea, *i.e.*, the idea of *separateness* (अन्यत्वबोध). When this सर्व्वात्मभाव is firmly established in the place of अन्यत्वबोध—Mukti or the final realisation is reached. This is Mukti in the Sankara's system.[1]

The individual Ego is not a *component part*, a mere phase, of Brahman. But as we have already seen, all Egos have a 'nature,' have infinite *possibility* in them; and this possibility has become so far *expressed* in our *actual* states and activities. Through our constant endeavour, through the constant cultivation of the moral virtues and performance of higher moral works, and also by विचार [2] we must *purify* our *sense*-organs, *manas*, intellect and our mental capacities more and more. We shall, then, be able to comprehend and realise more and more, through these, the infinite wealth of the inexhaustible nature of Brahman

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[1] "(*a*) सर्व्वात्मभाव: स्वाभाविक:। यत्तु सर्व्वात्मभावात्......बालाग्रमपि 'अन्यत्वेन' दृश्यते...तदवस्था अविद्या...सर्व्वात्मभावो मोक्ष:" (4.3.20).

(*b*) "ज्ञानञ्च तस्मिन् परात्मभावनिवृत्तिरेव। नित्यो हि आत्मभाव: सर्व्वस्य 'अतद्विषय' इव (*i.e.*, अन्य इव) प्रत्यवभासते। तस्मात् अतद्विषयाभासनिवृत्ति-व्यतिरेकेण न तस्मिन् आत्मभावो विधीयते। अन्यात्मभावनिवृत्तौ आत्मभावो भवतीति आत्मा ज्ञायते" (बृ° भा°, 4.4.20).

(*c*) "परमार्थतोऽद्वैते......भिन्नमिव 'वस्त्वन्तरमिव' आत्मन उपलक्ष्यते।...यत्र तु ब्रह्मविद्यया अविद्यानाशमुपगमिता, तत्र आत्म-व्यतिरेकेण 'अन्यस्य' अभाव:" (2.4.14).

(*d*) "सर्व्वात्मन: सर्व्वफलसम्बन्धोपपत्तेरविरोधात्—मृदइव सर्व्वघट-कुण्डाद्यात्मि:" (छा°, 8.12.11).

[2] विचार is—"वस्तुयाथात्म्यदर्शन" (गी° भा°), *i.e.*, to look behind the changing particulars to their underlying universals. This is—contemplation of the Beautiful.

which is present in our finite self as the infinite possibility or purpose.[1] In our higher and higher progress to the higher and higher worlds, we shall build up higher organisms. And through these higher organs and organisms, we would be able realise Brahman in a higher and superior form.[2] In this progress, there is no breach of memory.

This realisation, by the Ego, of the inexhaustible Brahman in him has been beautifully described by Sankara by an illustration. "The union of man with Brahman," he says, "is like the union between man and his beloved wife in marriage." "When a man embraces in love and affection his beloved wife, he forgets the presence of the objects near him and loses his consciousness of himself and everything else in the perfect happiness born of this

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[1] "यस्मात् विद्या-कर्म्मणी पूर्व्वप्रज्ञा च देहान्तरप्रतिपत्त्युपभोगसाधनं, तस्मात् विद्याकर्म्मादि शुभमेव समाचरेत् यथा इष्टदेहसंयोगोपभोगौ स्यातां" (बृ° भा°, 4.4.2).

"पूर्व्वकर्म्मोद्भवैः विविक्तैः कार्य्य-करणैः संयुक्ते जन्मनि सति, प्रज्ञामेधास्मृति-वैशारद्यं दृष्टं" (बृ° भा°, 1.4.2).

"कार्य्येन्द्रियाणां ज्ञाननिष्ठायोग्यतालक्षणां सिद्धिं लभते" (गी° भा°, 18.45).

विषयोपलब्धिलक्षणस्य विज्ञानस्य शुद्धिः......रागद्वेषमोहैरसंस्पृष्टं विषयविज्ञानं ...तस्यां सत्यां अन्तःकरणस्य शुद्धिः...अविच्छिन्ना स्मृतिर्भवति। यतः एतत् 'उत्तरोत्तरं' आहारशुद्धिमूलं, तस्मात् सा कार्य्या" (छा°, 7.26.2).

[2] "स्वातन्त्र्येणैव हि गृहादिव गृहान्तरं अन्यमन्यं देहं संचरन्तः...अपरिमुषित-स्मृतयः एव। देहेन्द्रियप्रकृतिवशित्वात् निर्म्माय देहान् अधितिष्ठति" (वे° भा°, 3.3.32). In छान्दोग्यभाष्य, it is stated that a Mukta possesses his organs, intellect, purified and perfect—"स वै मुक्तः सर्व्वात्मभावमापन्नः सन्...... मनउपाधिः सन् एतेनैव मनसा कामान् पश्यन् रमते" (छा°, 8.12.5).

mutual union."[1] The readers will realise from this illustration that this सर्व्वात्मभाव, the result of the union—is not the actual *abolition* of the objects of the world as unreal,[2] leaving Brahman as the only reality. *This is also not the absorption of the Ego in Brahman*—which is his true essence.

And this सर्व्वात्म-भाव is the Vedantic *Mukti* ;—it is simply the cessation of the idea of *separateness* or अन्यत्व-बोध—

अन्यत्वाभावनिवृत्तौ आत्मभावो भवति (बृ° 4.4.11).

"सर्व्वात्मभावो मोक्ष उक्तः" (बृ° भा°, 4.4.6). [3]

[1] "यथा प्रियया स्त्रिया सम्परिष्वक्तो...न वाह्यं किञ्चन वेद—मत्तः 'अन्यद्वस्तु' इति ; अपरिष्वक्तस्तु तया, 'प्रविभक्तः' जानाति सर्व्वं । एवं पुरुषः क्षेत्रज्ञः भूतमात्रासंसर्गतः 'प्रविभक्तः' (*i.e.*, अन्य इव),...स्वाभाविकेन आत्मना सम्परिष्वक्तः... 'सर्व्वात्मा' न वाह्यं 'वस्त्वन्तरं' वेद" (बृ° भा°, 4.3.21) । "भेदजातस्य सर्व्वस्य आत्मभूतत्वात्" (तै° भा°, 3.10.5) । "कथं सर्व्वात्मत्वोपपत्तिरित्याह—इमान् लोकान् आत्मत्वेन अनुभवन्...ब्रह्म 'सर्व्वानन्यरूपं' गायन्" (तै° भा°, 3.10.5).

[2] It is simply looking upon everything as *not* '*anya*' (अन्य) from the self. "द्रष्टु 'रन्यत्वेन' सर्व्वेषां अभावात् न पश्यति...मुक्तस्यापि सर्व्वैकत्वात् समानोद्वितीयाभावः—'केन कं पश्येत् ?' इति च उक्तमेव" (छा° भा°, 8.12.3). [For the sense of 'केन कं पश्येत् ?'—*vide* Chap. III of this book where such expressions have been explained.]

[3] As an example of सर्व्वात्मभाव, Sankara (वे°भा°, 1.1.4) has quoted the Vedic sentence अहं मनुरभवं सूर्य्यश्च, etc., etc., and this he takes as "ब्रह्मदर्शन" which shows that when सर्व्वात्मभाव is realised, the existence of मनु, सूर्य्य and other objects of the world is not *abolished.* These objects will then be looked upon as simply the expressions of ब्रह्म's nature (ब्रह्मदर्शनोपायत्वेनैव) and hence they are not something अन्य absolutely, but there is unity in difference. Readers are requested to note this. Similarly in तै°, in describing the experience of a मुक्त पुरुष it is stated as "अहमन्नं अहमन्नादं...सर्व्वानन्यत्वेन गायन्," etc. Here also, everything appears to a मुक्त as 'अनन्य' really. There is no question of abolition at all.

Cf. also what Sankara has spoken of a मुक्तपुरुष—"एष विशेषो विदुषां, पश्यतोऽपि प्रपञ्च-संसारं । पृथगात्मनो न पश्येत्"—आत्मनिरूपण (१००) ।

Index of Sanskrit References.

These are arranged in order of the sources from which they have been quoted in the book.

———:0:———

Sankara's Commentary
On Brahma-sutra—

Sankara's Commentary
On Brihadaranyaka—

Sankara's Commentary *On* Chándogya—

Sankara's Commentary
On Isa—

Sankara's Commentary
On Kena—

Sankara's Commentary
On Katha—

Sankara's Commentary
On Prásna—

Sankara's Commentary
On Mundaka—

Sankara's Commentary
On Mándukya—

Sankara's Commentary On Gita—

Sankara's Commentary
On Taittiriya—

Sankara's Commentary
On Aitareya—

Commentary on Aitereya-A'ranyaka.

Works by the same Author.

1. **The Outlines of the Vedanta Philosophy.**— (Published by the Calcutta University). (Second Edition). Re. 1.
2. **Adwaita-Va'da** (Bengali).—(Published by the Calcutta University). (Second Edition) Rs. 3.
3. **Upanishader Upadesh** (Bengali).—
   ———Vol. I. Chandogya and Brihadaranyaka. (Third Edition). Rs. 2/8.
   ———Vol. II. Katha and Mundaka. (Third Edition). Rs. 2/8.
   ———Vol. III. Isha, Kena, Prasna, Aitareya, Taittiriya and Mandakya. (Third Edition). Rs. 2/8.

[In each volume, complete translation with elaborate exposition of the commentaries of Sankara has been given. Three Introductions have been appended to the three volumes. Highly spoken of by eminent scholars and the Press. Each volume has been translated into Hindi by Pandit Nandakishore Sukla in Oudh.]

EXTRACTS FROM OPINIONS.

1. **Professor A. Berriedale Keith,** D.Litt., D.C.I., University of Edinburgh—

"...... Your book is a remarkably able and highly interesting contribution to the interpretation of Sankara. Its collection of passages alone would be of very high value, for the extent of Sankara's writings is so great as to render easy reference impossible without such aid, and I fully appreciate the labour which has been involved in the selection of the texts cited. Even greater value applies to your powerful exposition of the realistic element in Sankara. Your restatement of his position in terms of modern philosophical conception shows very great skill and will demand the most careful consideration from those who seek to apprehend the true force of the teachings of the Acharyya. It is a striking tribute to his great philosophical power that the question of the interpretation of his doctrines still presents the most interesting problem of Indian Philosophy......I shall not fail to mention your work in my next publication now in the press......"

2. **Professor S. V. Lesny,** Ph.D., University of Prague, Austria—

"I have read your valuable book with great interest. It will be reviewed by me in one of our periodicals, but it can be said at once, that the teaching of your great countryman—Sankara—has been treated by you in a very happy way and to much profit of your readers. The problem of Sankara's Adwaita Philosophy is complicated and I am of opinion that our understanding of his teaching may be far more furthered by Indian scholars and books like yours which treat the problem in a scholarly way, than by European scholars who very often treat the matter too much in the light of our European Philosophy...... There is one point more which I like in your book, that are the accurate quotations, at least as far as I can see. The merit of the book is not diminished by some misprints, as for instance Asat-karjya-váda instead of—(káryya)......on the whole, your work displays complete acquaintance with the problems derived certainly from the extensive reading of Sankara's writings."

3. **Professor E. Washburn Hopkins,** Ph.D., LL.D., Yale University, America—

"I beg leave to acknowledge with many thanks the receipt of your very valuable book, Adwaita Philosophy, which has been at hand for some months. I should have thanked you for it before, but I wanted to study it first.....,Now to speak of the book itself, I will confess that

at first it rather bewildered me, since in several particulars it contravenes general opinion very drastically. But on a second reading, which I found necessary owing to the weighty matter in it (for though the book is small it is of profound significance), I discovered that my primary revolt against your conclusions diminished in proportion as I read more carefully your citations tending to uphold your contentions stey by step. My final judgment is that you have made a most important contribution to our knowledge of Sankara's Philosophy. Your powerful analysis of the Iswara idea and of the Ego leaves the *onus probandi* on the shoulders of those who would *still* believe in an unreal God and empty individual self. Having just published a little book on Hindu Ethics, I was particularly interested in your final words on the Ethical reality of the Vedanta and am glad to see so forcible a presentation of this matter. As I have phrased it in my book—" there can be no religion without morality, no morality without religion " (In B. G. and Vedanta). I have not yet done with your " Adwaita," in fact I wish to go through your citations again and perhaps make public note of your position. In my view, you have done a great service in composing this work."

4. Prof. Julius Jolly, Ph.D., University of Wurzburg, Bavaria—

" Your valuable book has been duly received. This work contains an excellent exposition, I think, of the main principles of the Adwaita system and an equally excellent vindication of this against the reproaches raised by scholars wrongly interpreting its technical terms. The numerous original Sanskrit texts quoted in your work make it easy to control the doctrines contained in it. It is to be certainly hoped that the study of your work will give a just impetus to Adwaita Philosophy both in India and in Western countries, and will remove the misunderstandings concerning it."

5. Prof. Louis De la Yallee-Poussin, University of Brussels, Belgium—

" I am happy to say that I have read your book with great pleasure. I am willing also to think that the views of many controversists on this great system are wrong, because they do not realise that Sankara, although he is a great rationalist, is also a mystic. It is not the intention of Sankara to deny the existence of a personal, all-knowing and all-powerful God, nor the existence of the human souls, or of the world. I believe that your great endeavour—" महान् यत्नः :" to purify the Mimansa from all misinterpretations—" कल्दर्थे "—is on the whole successful. Do you not admit that there are in his system a number of theses which *obscure this* general tendency and the main lines? **Máyá**—was an unfortunate word to express the idea that the " **Transcendental** one " is able to create beings who are not its substratum, although their existence depends upon it;—beings who are both **Swártha** and **Parártha**. I beg you to accept my best thanks and to believe that I very strongly sympathise with your work."

6. **Prof. J. H. Muirhead,** M.A., LL.D., University of Birmingham—

" ...... I have read the Central Chapter on the ' Pure Ego as Active Power ' and find it so entirely on the line of my own thought in connexion with what I am at present writing that even although the book had not been your gift I should have desired to write to thank you for the valuable help I have got from it. I think that now we have from Professor Radhakrishnan and others competent *histories* of Indian philosophy *as a whole*, the next step is *more detailed* work such as yours, and I think nothing could be more valuable than your book......I hope you will pursue your admirable researches and publish them as opportunities come."

7. **Professor Rudolph Otto,** Ph.D., of Marburg, Germany—

" Many thanks for your very interesting book. You emphasise correctly those elements in Sankara which people had so long very much neglected. On the whole, it appears to me that the standpoint which you have taken is that of Bhedá-bheda which also Chaitanya adopted. I have just studied Sankara's commentaries on the Gitá and Mándukya and am filled with wonder at the extent of his thought which comes out more clear and prominent than in the Vedanta Sutra alone."

8. **Dr. P. K. Roy,** D.Sc. (London and Edinburgh), late Professor and Principal, Presidency College, Calcutta—

" ...... The Preface is well conceived as well as well written, and the book bears evidence of your labour and thought to give correct interpretations and to remove misinterpretations in all disputed and difficult points. You have done a very great service to the cause of the true Religion of the Hindus by publishing this English version. I hope it will have an extensive circulation not only in India but also in England, Germany and America ...... In my old age there cannot be a greater joy than in witnessing the success of my old pupil and his devotion to the subject of my devotion."

9. **Professor S. Radhakrishnan,** King George V Professor of Philosophy, University of Calcutta—

" I thank you for your valuable gift of Adwaita Philosophy, which I read with the greatest interest. As you may imagine, I appreciate very much your strenuous attempt to repudiate the popular view of the world-negating character of Sankara's Philosophy. Though your re-presentation of the Adwaita Vedanta brings it very near Rámánuja's view, you have made out a very strong case for it. What struck me most in your book, apart from its wealth of learning, was your independence of mind which is rather rare among Indian thinkers of the present day."

10. Sir George A. Grierson, K.C.I.E., Ph.D., D.Litt., LL.D.—late Vice-President, Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland—

" ...... I have read a good deal of it and found it very interesting and instructive...... your book shows evidence of much original research, and I hope that you will continue your studies of this and other important Systems of Indian Philosophy."

11. Professor M. Winternitz, Ph.D.,—University of Prague, Czecho-Slovakia—

" ...... It seems to me to be an excellent Introduction to the system of Sankara in its different aspects. As I am specially interested in the Ethics of the Indian systems, I have read the IVth Chapter on the ' Place of Ethics and Religion in Vedanta ' more attentively. You have very well shown that for the Adwaita, altruistic *Karma* is required as a means for purification of mind, and that Sankara endeavours to harmonize कर्म्मकाण्ड and ज्ञानकाण्ड. I am not sure that this subordination of moral action to ज्ञान is the best way to strengthen social and ethical feelings in the masses and in mankind generally. But there is something in the idea of Adwaita which seems to me of high ethical value—the idea of *unity of all that is*, which may lead to the idea that there is no difference between my own self and that of my neighbour, whence there is no reason why I should care more for myself than for another. This has well come out in Maháyána Buddhism—in my opinion under the influence of Vedanta ......Your book, as you see from my remarks, is *very suggestive.*"

12. Dr. L. D. Barnett—Oriental Studies, London Institution (University of London).

" ...... Your book is a work of considerable merit."

13. Professor J. Wackernagel, Basil, Switzerland—

" ...... ' Introduction to Adwaita Philosophy ' is a valuable book ......I shall not fail to make it known and accessible to fellow-workers interested in Indian Philosophy, and hope it will be appreciated universally according to its merits."

14. Professor Hermann Jacobi, Ph.D.—University of Bonn, Germany—

" ...... A look into the book convinced me that it is a work of much thought and deep reasoning. I determined, instead of simply acknowledging it with some complimentary remarks to regularly study it. I am reading your book now and hope to write you at more length......... I have read this novel exposition of Sankara's system with interest and profit, whether one entirely agrees with the author's theory or not, one will admire his ingenuity and be grateful for many valuable suggestions...... It is an admirable book...... I have the highest esteem for you personally." (The learned Professor writes here a long criticism mainly on the Unreality of God and the

World. This has been printed *separately* and incorporated in the second edition.)

15. **Rev. W. S. Urquhart,** M.A., Ph.D.—Principal, Scottish Churches College, and Fellow of the Calcutta University—

"......It is an exceedingly useful treatment of the subject from your point of view and will, no doubt, have the effect of removing certain misunderstandings and reconciling contradictions which are a puzzle to many students of Sankara's Philosophy. But it seems to me that in some cases you have transferred your allegiance from Sankara to Rámánuja. For, is it that there is no fundamental difference between them?"

16. **Professor W. Caland,** M.A., Ph.D., University of Utrecht, Holland—

" ...... I can assure you that I have read your very clear exposition of the Adwaita Philosophy with profit."

17. **Professor Richard Schmidt,** Ph.D.—University of Munster, Germany—

" ...... I do not hesitate to furnish you with the expression of my warmest appreciation of your work on Adwaita Philosophy. I am not able, it is true, to say whether or not the great commentator and philosopher Sankara will satisfy to modern Indian or European aims, but surely your book is an admirably suitable introduction to that most magnificent achievement of Indian thought, the knowledge of which will be very useful to all those students and general readers who are interested not only in the system of Adwaita, but in the evolution of human mind generally spoken. From this point of view, your book is not only a highly interesting contribution to the interpretation of Sankara's writings, but also in every way a new argument of the justness of the "Ex Orienti lux." I therefore wish you best success.—

"अभिवर्षति योऽनुपालयन्, विधिबीजानि बिवेकवारिणा ।
स सदा फलशालिनीं क्रियां, शरदंलोकइवाधितिष्ठति ॥"

18. **Professor Otto Jesperson,** M.A., Ph.D., University of Copenhagen, Denmark—

" Allow me to thank you most cordially for your extreme kindness in sending me your valuable " Introduction to Adwaita Philosophy." I am not an expert in Indian Philosophy, but I have seen enough of your book to say that it is a most painstaking and thorough work which I very greatly appreciate......"

19. **Professor Alfred Hillebrandt,** M.A., Ph.D., University of Breslau, Germany—

" I beg to express my best thanks for your very interesting—'Introduction to Adwaita Philosophy.' A temporary disease of eyes

prevented me from answering sooner and congratulating you on this elucidation of the views of the great champion and interpreter of the Vedanta—Sankara......It is obvious that your work marks a great progress by the brilliant exposition which Sankara's views have found therein, by your painstaking labour and judicious treatment. Every one, who will make himself acquainted with his philosophy and has no time to go through all his various works, finds now the way opened and will be indebted to you for this masterly introduction.

.... I fully appreciate the value of your scholarly work which I think a *perfect success.* Allow me to repeat my opinion that your work represents a high standard of Indian scholarship."

20. Professor Dr. L. Stcherbatsky, University of Leningrad, Russia—

"I have received your valuable book about Adwaita. Please accept my greatest thanks. I am full of admiration for your wonderful knowledge of Sankara, and have profited a great deal from its perusal ......The attacks on Sankara from the stand-point of Christian missionaries are never regarded very much, it is biassed and official standpoint......In reading your book I got the impression that you wish to protect Sankara against aggressors who are much below him........."

21. Professor James H. Woods, Ph.D., University of Harvard, America—

"Your book on the Vedanta has given me the greatest pleasure. It is coherently written and the arguments move forward with logical precision and at the same time keep close to the text of the Vedanta. I found the book extremely valuable and I hope it will be the first one of a series. Your work has impressed me so much that I am sending you an invitation........."

22. Professor Richard Garbe, Ph.D., University of Tubingen, Germany—

"I thank you much for your valuable work—'An Introduction to Adwaita Philosophy.' It is more than the title indicates : not only an able introduction, but a very important contribution to the history of Indian Philosophy. Especially Chapter III—'On the falsity of the world' with its sharp distinctions seems to me to be of particular importance, as, according to it, the current notions about Sankara's conception of the world *have to be corrected.* Inaccuracies in the transliteration of Sanskrit words may easily be removed in a second edition of your book which I hope will be necessary in a short time...... I have always been a stern and modest worker in the field of Indian philosophy and philology, but I am glad to find that my endeavours are acknowledged in the land of my studies. I wish you all success which your learning and diligence deserve."

23. **M. E. Senart, Esq.,** Ph.D., of Paris—

"...... I have indeed read enough of your book to value your thorough knowledge of Sankara's writings and your ingenuous industry in bringing together scattered utterings of his doctrines and presenting them in clear translations. Of course we cannot forget that the illustrious thinker has expressed his ideas in the garb of commentaries to many works which, although different in age and origin and diversely influenced, in our opinion, by independent speculations, are nevertheless all considered by him as equally authoritative. So appear several of his discussions less a spontaneous expression of his doctrine than a secondary adaptation to it through subtle commentations, of tenets originally derived from other currents of thought. Anyhow, your deep justice to the old master—Sankara—and your remarkable command of the difficult literary materials cannot but meet the grateful acknowledgment of all interested in this line of research."

24. **Professor Maurice Bloomfield,** John Hopkins University, America—

"...... you must not think of me at all disregarding your kind letters, you must do so least of all as regards your valuable book on Sankara's Adwaita. I have had time to read it, but not enough time to comment upon it in print. I am glad to say to you that your book is, I am convinced, a most valuable contribution to our knowledge of India's high thought; your exposition of Sankara is that of a loving disciple, but, at the same time, critical as well as sympathetic. Your Chapter on Máyá is especially illuminating, but I remember *every page* of the book as full of clarifying information. No Indologist can possibly read it without being grateful to you for your first-hand, trustworthy help in this difficult field—a field which shows Hindu thought on its very pinnacle. I hope that you will continue to send me your valuable writings. Even if I should not find occasion to review them formally, I shall without doubt sooner or later refer to them in print."

25. **Dr. Sylvain Levi,** Ph.D., Professor, College de France, Paris—

"......I am sorry, very sorry that I have been so slow in thanking you for your excellent work—" An Introduction to Adwaita Philosophy." Could you realise what kind of life I am living here, you would be ready to excuse me.............. Your book is of a lasting value. You have mastered Sankara's works as a real Pandit, and you know to expose his doctrines perfectly as a modern scholar. Never did I realise before so fully the perfect unity of Sankara's teachings. Your book is a Concordancy, a Cyclopædia of Sankara's philosophy. The quotations are well selected, thoroughly clear, conclusive; a glance over the notes at the foot of the pages shows they are a substantial reading, affording the सार of Sankara's thoughts. It was indeed

safe and wise to exclude from your expositions any *other* source than Sankara himself;—here we have him genuine, telling his own tale in his own words, not having to carry on his powerful shoulders the burden of another's responsibility. I hope you will publish some more essays of the same value."

26. **Professor Carlo Formichi,** M.A., Ph.D., University of Rome, Italy—

"......I thank you most sincerely for the very valuable gift of your book on Adwaita Philosophy. I myself shall review it in one of the next numbers of our journal. In the meantime, I congratulate you on your excellent work, the offspring both of knowledge and of love."

27. **Dr. G. Tucci,** University of Rome—

"......I know you are the author of a very interesting book on the Adwaita Philosophy, which competent scholars have judged the *best exposition* we have of Sankara school. As particularly interested in Indian philosophical thought, and Director of "Studi E. Materiali de Storia Delle Religion" and Colabourator for Indian section of the "Recista Dept.—Study Oriental" edited by the professors of the University of Rome, I shall be very grateful to you, if you would be so kind as to send me a copy of your book. I shall be very glad to publish a review of it in our journals so that it will be presented to our public."

28. **The Honourable Dr. Justice W. Ewart Greaves,** Kt.—Vice-Chancellor, Calcutta University—

"As Europe is proud of Kant, so is India proud of Sankara—the have received such high praise from Dr. Keith of Edinburgh University, and this University is proud of the honour which comes to it from your association with it.........I am sure Sir Asutosh, had he been alive, would have been proud of your work."

29. **The Prager Presse** (A German Periodical), No. 169—July, 1925.

"As Europe is proud of Kant, so is India proud of Sankara—the great teacher and philosopher of the end of the 8th and the beginning of the 9th Century. There appears every year a good number of books which represents and expounds the philosophy of Sankara. One of the most important of such publications is "An Introduction to Adwaita Philosophy" by Kokileswar Sastri that appeared in Calcutta last year. This Introduction distinguishes itself from the average publications of its kind in a considerable measure. The author is conversant with all the minutest details of the subject, interprets it correctly and intelligently in a scientific method; and his book is therefore a valuable contribution towards the right understanding of India's national philosophy. One of the great merits of the book is the clearness of the representations and the synoptical arrangement of

Sankara's philosophy. The doctrine most well-known in Europe is that the world is an illusion (Máyá); the only true reality belongs to the Divine Brahman that is one without a second (Adwaitam). The world is really nothing but one of the many-sided manifestations of Brahman, of his creative, unending and inexhaustible power. Upon this preliminary presumption, it goes on to explain all phenomena, the individuality and activity of man and the ethical character of this religious-philosophical doctrine. As regards the last point, Sastri's book is particularly a beautiful addition to Sankara-literature. According to Vedanta, our Karman ties us to this world. As the only safe resort of the individual components or phases of Brahman consists in recognising the fact that man is not distinguished from Brahman, but is a means of the realisation of Brahman;—the last goal of the individual is to tear asunder the chains that bind us to this painful world. This would mean a reduction of the works of man and would make his life a fruitless waste. Kokileswar Sastri shows that that is not the case, and that Sankara's philosophy even provides for man a full field for his moral activity. It is desirable that this book would be frequently read in Europe, because *it corrects many familiar notions* and gives rise to discussions." (*Translated from original German.*)

30. **The Indian Review** (of Madras), May, 1925—

" The Adwaita Philosophy as propounded by the great Sankara, was a most magnificent achievement of Indian thought, and any work aiming to simplify and popularise that difficult system of Philosophy, should meet with public favour. The present work under review is an able treatise in that direction, and the learned author has endeavoured to furnish the student and the general reader with the right views about the teachings of Sankara on each of the topics treated therein. No pains have been spared to make the work a suitable introduction to the study of Vedanta, and the subject-matter has been arranged in such a way as to make the book an indispensable companion for any full understanding of Sankara's position. It presents also to beginners an opportunity of making themselves acquainted with antagonistic views on various points and supplies them with materials to combat those views. The book is wholly expository and contains the teachings of Sankara in a simple language."

31. **The Calcutta Review**, July, 1925—

" Some of the publications of the Calcutta University have by their real worth and originality shed a lustre on the scholars who have undertaken research work as one of the important activities of an up-to-date University.

This brilliant expositions by Pandit Kokileswar Sastra, M.A., of one of the most abstruse systems of Indian philosophy and abstract speculation presenting even to trained minds extraordinary difficulty in rightly interpreting the precise position taken by Sankara, India's

greatest thinker, bids fair to hold a prominent place among those scholarly productions of the premier University of India.

Pandit Kokileswar Sastri is already known among the *savants* of the East and the West and we are glad to see that he has well maintained the high tradition of scholarship for which his family is famous in Bengal.

It is not possible to overestimate the value of a book like this to the students of Philosophy who will surely find much help in properly appreciating Sankara's true philosophical position in Pandit Sastri's exposition and interpretation so thorough, lucid and elaborate, and in his method, as scientific.

The quotations of text and citations from commentaries are so generously extensive that the book will serve to many busy scholars as a storehouse of ready reference. Another merit of the book is due to the author's extraordinary power of co-ordinating the individual scattered passages found in Sankara's voluminous works (especially his extensive Commentaries) with the masterly ease of a real scholar. One, perhaps, may just wish that more reference had been made to treatises like Aparokshánubhuti, Vivekachudámani, Adwaita-kaustubham, Vedanta-muktabali and Vivekádarsha.

Another distinct advantage is that the author is deeply versed in both Eastern and Western philosophical lore. This knowledge has stood him in good stead in the elucidation in Western terminology or in terms of modern philosophical ideas of many an abstruse point of the Sankara-school of Vedantism and some of the baffling technical expressions used in his various Commentaries.

The ably written preface throws light on a number of controversial points besides precisely indicating the scope of the volume. Rightly does it claim that " an endeavour has been made to discover the real teaching of Sankara," though the author's innate modesty leads him to describe his work as only a " suitable introduction to the proper study of the originals." Happily, he does not permit this modesty to interfere with the strong conviction with which he has put forward his new interpretation and defence of Sankara without any halting hesitancy in the face of the formidable body of very adverse criticism made by Western writers some of whom make up the deficiency of their qualification as competent judges by their reckless audacity.

We do not pretend to attempt within our space limit anything like a detailed criticism of the volume before us and have to rest content for the present with a rapid survey of the work divided (as it is) into only *four* well-defined and comprehensive chapters.

The *first* chapter " On Brahma as Creator " tackles very ably the much-vexed problem of the true relation between Brahma and Iswara and attempts to present in a clear and undisputed light the character

of Sankara's theory of causality (I, Sec. 6) and corrects the view that in Sankara's system finite individuals have been divested of their "personality" and therefore of "responsibility" for their acts. It shows that according to Sankara, Brahma is not an abstract Intelligence but a self-conscious Knower and a Directive or Purposive Power whose purpose in the creation of the universe is the complete realisation of the Atma as the *final end* or realisation of the Infinite in the finite (*viz.*, in human beings and the world—*i.e.*, in man and nature), Brahma itself being the highest purpose or end. It also establishes that Sankara's theory of causality involves his *attitude of opposition* to Pantheism by means of his emphatic recognition of Individuality or responsible Personality and by reason of the special stress laid on the idea of the "*nature*" of Brahma (his स्वरूप or स्वभाव and on the distinction between सामान्य and विशेष (pp. 34-35).

The *second* chapter deals with the important question of the distinction in Sankara's system between the real and the empirical self and establishes the truth that Pure Ego is an active power, the agent and source of all activities and not merely a being or knowledge. Practically a good part of this chapter is devoted to the refutation beyond all legitimate controversy of the erroneous charge of Pantheism levelled against him.

Here the author begins by distinguishing after Sankara empirical from the real self (pp. 46, 48-49). The real self is the indwelling Brahma—the Ideal or Final End—and it underlies all manifested states and all activities of man. This End ensures infinite possibilities of progressive growth in future and is the *real* agent in man— "सर्व्व-प्रवृत्तीनामात्मावगत्यवसानार्थत्वात् ." This End (which is man's higher self and his real nature) is the true determining agent and stands above the *time-series* and is called पर्य्यन्त or पुरुषार्थ and ब्रह्मैकत्व in Vedanta-bhashya I. I. This real self is चेतन and स्वार्थ (self-existent intelligence) and नित्यसिद्ध (self-sufficient).

The empirical self in which human nature and its elements are manifested has its temporal importance and instrumental value *only as a means* or medium for the realisation of the true end of the real self. Such is also the value (*as means*) of the external world and its manifold changes and varied manifestations.

Avidya (which, by the way, is explained after Sankara on pp. 108-109) is responsible for the identification of the empirical with the true self. The activities of the empirical self are determined mechanically in an unbroken time-series; free activity—eternal, changeless, independent of the influence of the external world—being the quality only of the true self. The activities of the चेतन ब्रह्म and the human self are both called the End; yet the idea of the final realisation of the supreme End transcends the sphere of Nature and its elements. This is the goal to which the whole creation moves.

In this important chapter the author repeatedly emphasises the absolute need of carefully bearing in mind that the individual (like Brahma) has a distinct " *nature* " of his own—his स्वरूप or स्वभाव or धर्म or सामान्य (कूटस्थकारण) which is permanent (नित्य) and which ever maintains its " *unity* " amidst all diversities and equally preserves its *identity* in the midst of the phenomenal changes which this स्वरूप underlies and which are transient and impermanent (pp. 55-56 and 66-68).

The conclusion arrived at (p. 64) is that to Sankara the real character of the Pure Ego is not merely a being or a knowledge but an active power and a source of activities (सामर्थ्य) which, again, can never be reduced to or resolved into its manifested activities (*i.e.*, into pantheism).

In the *third* chapter the principle of causality (सत्कार्यवाद) is thoroughly investigated (pp. 98-101) with a view to particularly refute the erroneous charge of pantheism brought so often against Sankara's *Adwaita* philosophy and as a result it shows the true significance of the idea of the falsity of the world. The conclusion here reached (pp. 103-104 and p. 113) is that the world of phenomenal changes is the manifestation of the " NATURE " (स्वरूप) of the self which changes serve to gradually reveal this स्वरूप, but when these changes (called the many) are erroneously *separated* (as something independent) from Brahma (the One), then and only then, they become unreal or false (*vide*, pp. 103-104, 113 and 121). In Sankara's language– सतोऽन्यत्वे अनृतत्वं. If Brahma is erroneously resolved into the world and the two are made identical, the world becomes unreal or false. The correct interpretation of Sankara is that Brahma *realises* itself in the *form* of the world which is never identical with Brahma but must be " taken as the means through which the ' *nature* ' (स्वरूप) of Brahma is ever being realised in a higher and higher form." " The world cannot be looked upon as unreal or false " as such (p. 107). There is a further elaboration of this conclusion in the re-statement of Sankara's exact position regarding the falsity or otherwise of the world on pp. 122-125.

* * *

The exposition given by the author and the interpretation adopted by him are represented as logically resulting from a correct appreciation of the Vedantic theory of causality as also of Sankara's vigorous refutation of Pantheism (*vide* pp. 98-101 and footnote to p. 102). The puzzling technical term अनन्य explained by the Tiká-Kára in his way (p. 101), and rendered by Western scholars as " *identical* " has been sought to be properly explained by our author at some length on pages 25, 26, 52, 72, 83, 100 and 109.

* * *

The end systematically kept in view in these three chapters which practically constitute the book itself is to remove the misconceptions

formed regarding Sankara's position and his *Adwaitabad* by the West since Hegel's time who started this wrong interpretation by assuming without sufficient first-hand knowledge that Brahma in the Vedanta system is no better than an empty abstraction without purpose and without activity—a sort of negative infinitude. Later Western critics have repeated this criticism with individual variations. The function of "*Maya*" has also been much misunderstood and the result is that the empirical self in its relation to the real Self has been presented in a wrong light. Pantheism has, therefore, also been wrongly fastened upon the Adwaita philosophy on the basis of a wrong interpretation of the true significance of the well-known Vedantic formula of Twattam-asi (तत्त्वमसि)—"Thou are *That*."

The *fourth* chapter has been added evidently to emphasise the value of the *practical* aspect or side of the Vedanta which is often considered by these Western critics as a mere speculation. The last chapter (Chap. IV) starts with a statement of all the serious allegations made against the Indian theism based on the Vedanta and its ideal of salvation (मुक्ति) on the assumption that the Vedantic system is "opposed to ethical theism and religion." The author's aim, as he avers, is to "cautiously examine the validity of the assertions" so made (*vide* pp. 126-128). Incidentally there is a summary of Sankara's views on the Hindu socio-religious organisation वर्णाश्रमधर्म and finally follows an explanation of a large number of perplexing "anomalous passages" scattered here and there in the various commentaries of Sankara that are likely to "cause confusion" especially to those who are not to the manner born. The elaborate enumeration of the ethical virtues and their classification (pp. 166 *et seq.*) in sec. 10 of the chapter will also serve a very useful purpose.

The investigation here begins with an analysis of the psychological disposition (जैवप्रकृति) with which man is born and which determines his nature or empirical character (स्वभाव) and actions and to which is due his love for agreeable and aversion to disagreeable objects रागद्वेषः. Sankara calls this empirical self no real self at all (अनात्मा), the true self being a self-determining End-in-itself guided by the rational regulator as a free agent of all purposive activities (called बुद्धि).

The aim of man's life is not merely to attain pleasure and avoid pain—his supreme end (परमपुरुषार्थ) is bliss (निःश्रेयस) through realisation of Brahma (ब्रह्मविद्या) (*cf.* Kathabhâshya, II. 2. 5).

There is an eternal conflict between enlightenment and impulsive activities and the soul's emancipation is achieved by true knowledge of Brahma

Sankara does not demand renunciation of *all activities* but he insists on their *proper regulation in order to secure the realisation of* the highest self through purification of the *mind (and body) (i.e.,* सत्त्वशुद्धि), by means of well-regulated *Karma*, from selfish desires

and impulsive proclivities, passions and inclination to self-gratification. Even if good work is done as an end in itself it proves to be a bondage —good work must be done as a *means* of spiritual regeneration (विद्योत्पत्तौ). Thus "ethical or moral progress" in Sankara's system "points to a transcendental goal" (p. 161).

"अयमात्मा सर्व्वलौकिक-प्रियेभ्यः प्रियतमोभवति" * * "आत्मतत्त्वमेव ज्ञेयम् अनादृत्य अन्यत् * * आत्मविषयं ज्ञानं * * तस्मिन् नित्यभावः ॥

Sankara definitely and positively avers that man is a free agent (p. 155) and the Sástric injunctions (whether as prescriptions of duties or prohibitions) are not, therefore, a mandate from the outside imposed on man—the Sástras only indicating the course of action to be adopted (*vide* footnote to p. 155). According to the present author's interpretation, Sankara does not consider *Jnana and Karma* as antagonistic (pp. 172-173), for he has attempted a reconciliation of *Karmakánda* with *Jnanakánda* and *Karma* is needless only in the case of those who have realised Brahma—आत्मविदः.

Finally, Sankara's position with regard to *Adwaita* or *Aveda* (*i.e.*, extirpation of the notion of difference and separateness between Brahma and the empirical world of नामरूप is that the idea of such difference (भेदबुद्धि) is the work of *Avidya* which is destroyed by the idea of taking all emergent activities as *higher and higher expressions* of the Divine Purpose (सर्व्वात्मभाव) which supplants the sense of separateness (अन्यत्वबोध). This सर्व्वात्मभाव leads to emancipation (मुक्ति) which, again, is not absorption of the Ego in Brahma (pp. 182-184).

By way of general criticism we may say that the author has rightly started his whole investigation with an enquiry about the real significance of *Prana-spandan* which forms the subject-matter of the fourth section of the second chapter of Vedantadarsanam and is also referred to in I. 1. 23, 28-31 and which is considered in Sankara's system to be the primal and earliest manifestation of Brahma's nature—Brahma being प्राणस्य प्राणः —*viz.*, that which differentiates itself as the phenomena of the world (*cf.* Chandyogya and Isha Bhashya). Section 4 of Chapter I contains an original interpretative contribution to the discussion of the true nature of Brahma often misunderstood and represented as "pure undifferenced being." In that view, Brahma is not regarded in both the transcendental and immanental aspects which, again, are inseparable. Here the author has very rightly and properly laid great stress on Brahma's underlying nature (स्वरूप). Sections 1 and 2 of Chapter III are equally important in this respect with regard to the much-vexed question which has long baffled and often misled Western critics as to Sankara's true attitude towards the empirical world.

Even when we fail to see eye to eye with our author's interpretation, supported though it is by closely-reasoned arguments and exten-

sive quotations, we have to admit that he has for the first time cleared the atmosphere to enable an open mind to distinctly discern how Sankara has been misunderstood and misinterpreted by his Western critics. The author's own view regarding the right interpretation of Sankara has nothing hazy or equivocal and there is no halting state ment, no vacillation, no lurking doubt anywhere in his mind as to the correctness of this interpretation made in the light of Sankara's own utterances combined together from a very large number of Sankara's commentaries.

In section 3 of this Chapter (*vide* page 101 *et seq.* and also pp. 21-23) we have a convincing restatement of the salient points in Sankara's powerful criticism of the purely Pantheistic position wrongly ascribed by Western writers to Sankara but really held by one of his opponents—the Vrittikára (*vide* pp. 75-76, 78-80, 82-83). Yet candour leads the author to admit there is some reason for the misinterpretation to which Sankara has made himself liable. The grounds of this misapprehension are next sought to be removed.

Now, the real trouble is that Hindu metaphysical concepts can hardly be appropriately and accurately rendered into the alien form of Western terminology, because the very back-ground of thought-movement is so fundamentally different in the two philosophical cultures even when both of them happen to be monistic or transcendental. Pandit Kokileswar Sastri possesses, as we have stated, a special qualification through his mastery of Eastern and Western philosophy.

In the discussion of ' Ethics and Religion in Vedanta ' (Ch. IV) the author has, however, relied more on Sankara's Geetá-bháshyam than his Vedanta-bhashyam especially in the attempt to prove his thesis regarding the precise place assigned in the Sankara system to what are known as ethical virtues. The problem of ethics does not, in fact, form an *integral* part of the Vedanta at any rate in the same definite and categorical form as in the Bhagabatgeetá, even though some of the Upanishads on which the Brahma-sutra is particularly based are made at all events by Sankara's Commentaries on them and his *method* of interpretation to lend a strong support to the exposition of this problem which the present author too successfully endeavours to expound in this " Adwaita Philosophy."

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One naturally expects that a University publication should be free from printing mistakes. We have unfortunately noticed too large a lot of them to be mentioned. There are a few other mistakes too but we have preferred to point them out to the author for necessary correction in a second edition of the book which, considering its importance and worth, may reasonably be looked for within a short time.

The busy reader may object that the book is full of repetitions which may appear to be tiresome, but it should be remembered that

the book is an attempt to refute the interpretation authoritatively given to Sankara's system by a number of distinguished Western scholars of great repute who so justly carry so much weight and hence the present writer may have felt, we presume, the need of making his own stand-point and exposition as elaborate and convincing as possible. There is an apology for his method implied in the author's remarks in section 5, page 118, paragraph 1."

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